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THE HISTORICAL STUDY OF RELIGION

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Professional historians have not always included religion within the purview of their science. Toward Christianity in particular their attitude has often been one of deliberate reserve or outright indifference. The task of exploring this phase of humanity's past has usually been left to the theologian, who might or might not employ the methods of study approved by historical science.

Fear of trespassing upon the preserves of the theologian is probably not the sole reason for the historians' neglect of religion, nor is this the only topic that he has been wont to slight. Frequently he has been content to chronicle the deeds of militant princes or scheming statesmen, as though a record of political events constituted the sum total of history. Scarcely a generation ago an eminent professor of modern history at Oxford could still affirm that history is "past politics." This penchant for politics has resulted in fixing the gaze upon monarchs and battles and legislative chambers, to the neglect of those more ordinary activities of mankind which though less spectacular are none the less significant for an understanding of the past.

Today the horizon of the historian is rapidly enlarging. His vision ranges beyond the doings of kings and armies and senates to the life of common humanity. Here he discovers

a complex stream of interest, thought, and action which has been calmly but imperiously moving on its course down through the ages. It is not peculiar to one region or to one people, but is the common denominator of all history from the very beginning of man's existence down to the present moment. Nations rise and fall, warriors and politicians come upon the scene only to disappear from view, while the rank and file of men in every age continue to make history in their own modest fashion. Their quest for food and clothing and other necessities of existence never ceases; they continue their struggle for the acquisition of wealth and power; they constantly strive to safeguard health and happiness through the establishment of various social institutions; they seek æsthetic satisfaction in the production of works of art and music and literature; they search for wisdom in the fields of invention, discovery, and intellectual discipline; and they ever yearn for protection and help in the presence of those mysterious forces of the universe which have so often become objects of fear, love, and worshipful adoration.

With this widening of vision the historian is no longer content to center attention simply upon political happenings. The scope of his observation enlarges to include those common daily interests which have characterized the life of men in general at all times. But no one of these interests has been more conspicuous or persistent than religion. Of humanity's past it can still be said with a large measure of truth that "a man's religion is the chief fact with regard to him—a man's or a nation of men's" Therefore the study of religion falls properly and of necessity within the domain of the historian.

During recent times the horizon of the theologian has also been enlarging. Formerly he was concerned for the most part with maintaining the validity of beliefs and practices current in the religion of his own day. He was interested in the past only as it was thought to furnish guaranties for the present, and he unconsciously overlooked, or deliberately ignored as

unessential to his religion, those features of the past that he found no longer tenable. He saw only the world of his own immediate interests, and so did his work quite unaware of the distortions that inevitably resulted from his lack of historical perspective.

The developments of recent years have tended seriously to disturb the accustomed complacency of the theologian. The static world of yesterday has become the dynamic and evolving universe of the twentieth century. Past and present no longer coincide, but are clearly differentiated stages in the historic process. This process of becoming is disclosed to view throughout the whole range of mankind's experience, not excepting even his religion. Hence the theologian is gradually coming to recognize that religion—even Christianity—is a genuinely historical phenomenon and that if he is to remain master in his own household he must learn the ways of the scientific historian.

The application of scientific historical principles to the study of religion might be a somewhat simpler task if historians were entirely agreed among themselves regarding their own methodology. But just as there is a "new" theology, whose propriety and validity have often been called in question, so there is a "new" history which has been gradually winning its way to recognition in recent times. In the first place, we shall attempt to state in summary fashion the distinctive characteristics of this modern science of history.

I

Probably not even the most ardent champion of new methods in the study of history would care to deny the fundamental importance of documents, or to abandon the slogan "no documents, no history." If historical investigation is to be in any sense scientific it must deal with concrete data. Where specific documents or other similarly tangible evidences from the past are lacking, no sound historical knowledge is

obtainable. The new history shares with the old the latter's insistence upon the acquisition of accurate statistics.

On the other hand mere study of documents may become a serious handicap to the would-be historian. The ultimate unit in history is not the document, but the contemporary social order, of which the document may have been merely an incidental product. Yet sometimes the study of literary records and archaeological remains becomes so inherently absorbing that no appreciable effort is made to visualize the social background necessary for the correct interpretation of all historical data. One may be an expert in documentary statistics and yet utterly ignore the task of the historian in the larger sense of the term. The new history asks its representatives to make *society* rather than documents their point of departure in reconstructing the story of the past.

Now society in any age is an exceedingly complex affair. Even our professional sociologists, with the rich materials of the present at their disposal, do not find it easy to unravel the intricacies of the modern social nexus. Much less can it be expected that the historian, dependent as he is upon relatively meager sources of information, will be able to lay bare all the secrets of society's life during the centuries that have passed. Nevertheless acceptance of the social point of view does signify some very definite things for the historian's method.

At the very outset this social emphasis calls for the abandonment of the static conception of history attaching so readily to the notion of documents, which by their fixity of form have become specific entities for all time. Similarly the historical institutions of any period or people have often been treated as though they were fixed quantities that might be studied in isolation from the social milieu by which they were produced and maintained. When, on the other hand, one centers attention upon the great on-going process of society's evolution, out of which documents and institutions have from time to time emerged, history can no longer be regarded as primarily

a study of static entities. Its more comprehensive and fundamental aim must be to exhibit, as far as possible, the on-flowing currents of real life throughout the ages. Thus a *developmental* conception of the past dominates in the method of the modern historian.

Adoption of the developmental point of view in historical thinking leads on to another important item in the definition of method. Frequently historians assume that their task is simply to describe, with such accuracy of detail as the records may justify, the happenings of the past. They deliberately refrain from attempting to discover the causes that have determined the course of events. So long as it was customary to seek these causes entirely in the realms of supernaturalism and metaphysical speculation the historian wisely left this quest to theologians and philosophers. He, as a mere historian, had no objective data from the realms in question. But when historical processes are viewed as facts of social evolution they become amenable to laws of empirical investigation and so constitute a suitable subject for scientific inquiry. In fact it is an established canon of the new history that he alone is historically minded in the true sense of the term who sees the happenings of the past in their proper *genetic* connections. To have real historical knowledge one must be familiar, not only with specific events, but also with the casual nexus underlying phenomena.

Search for the genetic forces that enter into the determination of the historical process leads, further, to consideration of the environment by which men of the past have found themselves surrounded. Since society in the last analysis is an aggregation of human beings more or less closely organized and acting under the impetus of varied stimuli, the question of environmental contacts justly occupies a place of considerable importance in the historian's attention. Peculiarities distinguishing different groups of the human family from one another used to be dismissed offhand on the hypothesis of

inherent racial traits, but nowadays the influence of habitat and climate is taken into account as among the significant factors determining racial characteristics. Even within more homogeneous groups the *physical environment* cannot be ignored in one's quest for the genetic forces that have determined the course of history

When observation is centered upon the smaller units of society the importance of environment usually increases in proportion to the minuteness of one's analysis. Within a complex organism a multiplicity of *social stimuli* are in constant operation shaping the direction of history. The power of inherited customs and ideas is easily recognized by even a casual observer in the field of social motivations. At times crucial political experiences have furnished noteworthy incentives for action. Less spectacular and also less sporadic in its occurrence is the pressure of the never ceasing economic quest in which the vast majority of men are always involved. These are but a few of the more easily recognizable forces to be taken account of by one who would even approximate a full analysis of the genetic forces that operate within the average social order.

While man is a social creature, it is also true that he is possessed of both conscious and unconscious mental life. No study of his past is scientific which does not recognize the significance of the *psychological* factor in history. There is on the one hand the mental life of the individual and, perhaps more significant for history as a whole, the psychology of the group. The mental interests and activities of the group, as it reacts to heritages and environmental stimuli, determine the social customs of any particular age or people. It is also in this psychological world of the mass, so to speak, that new tendencies and convictions, emerging from time to time in the course of historical evolution, attain general recognition.

The new history does not deny the great man a place in its esteem, nor would it necessarily reject outright the familiar

assertion that "the history of what man has accomplished in this world is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here." But the life of the great man is always socially conditioned both in its genesis and in its operations. Were it possible for his interests and ideas to become so entirely novel as to separate him completely from the common life of his contemporaries, history undoubtedly would adjudge him a freak rather than a hero. The significance of the individual mind is not necessarily obscured, but on the contrary may become more apparent, by a fuller recognition of the so-called *social mind* than was formerly customary among historians.

Furthermore, the will of the mass, whether operating unconsciously under the force of circumstances or voluntarily pursuing its own intelligent purposes, finds its characteristic expression in the *institutional* life of the group. For this reason the modern historian is quite as much interested in institutions as in persons. An established institution reveals more or less clearly the common habits and beliefs of a particular age, while an individual, however conspicuous, may not be truly representative of the historical process in the large, and indeed the more striking is his personality the less likely is he to be representative at all.

To restore a picture of ancient society in whole or in part along the foregoing lines is no easy task. One might fear that the "new" history had attempted the impossible. At best literary remains and archaeological finds are but secondary witnesses to the actual performances in real life of peoples long since deceased. True, their institutions may in some instances survive, but immediate contact with the vital social processes of antiquity is no longer possible. In this respect the students of modern society have a marked advantage over their co-laborers in the historical field. It is only by the most rigorous effort to orient himself psychologically in the ancient world that the historian may hope to acquire the proper perspective and the trustworthy historical imagination necessary for his task.

Fortunately for modern historians, at the present time valuable assistance may be derived from workers in other fields closely related to the study of history. From the sociologist and the psychologist one may learn much about the nature of society both in its material and in its mental aspects. While it would be absurd to assume that modern civilization is merely a replica of ancient society, nevertheless it is unquestionably true that the more elemental interests and the characteristic impulses of the human species, particularly in its group life, have perpetuated themselves from generation to generation substantially unaltered. It is in the realm of presuppositions underlying thought and conduct that change has been most pronounced, but at this point the assistance of the anthropologist may be sought. Until within relatively recent times the scientific bases of modern thinking were quite unknown, hence the unscientific presuppositions entertained by primitive societies and individuals, as disclosed especially by the modern study of anthropology, may often be of far greater service than twentieth-century scientific concepts in helping the historian to orient himself within the life of the ancient world.

Such in barest outline are the more noteworthy principles of scientific method employed today in the field of historical study. We may now ask, in the second place, how a recognition of these principles affects the study of religion.

II

The historian who undertakes the study of religion is confronted at the outset by a serious challenge. Has he the equipment and capacity for dealing with the subject in hand? As a professed scientist his method of procedure must be strictly inductive; all of his conclusions are to be derived from concrete and empirically verifiable data. He lacks chart and compass for navigating those treacherous seas of poetic fancy, mystical emotion, and metaphysical speculation which in vary-

ing degrees have always played a conspicuous rôle in all religions. To be sure, he possesses tolerably accurate instruments for measuring the extent to which such phenomena have been current in the past; he can trace with some degree of certainty their historical evolution; frequently he is able to define the circumstances by which they have been produced and maintained; and he can note the function served by them in the various religions. But beyond these experimentally ascertainable facts he, in the capacity of historian, may not go.

This is not to say that the historian would deny religion its right to be fancy free in exploring those regions of emotion and speculation that lie beyond the present boundaries of empirical knowledge. But he would distinguish sharply between his own task, as an observer and interpreter of historical data, and that of the speculative theologian whose principal concern has always been with problems lying outside the realm of experimentally attestable knowledge. The very nature of his science compels the historian to choose the former field for his operations. He works under the conviction that religion can be best understood by giving first attention, not to its theoretical aspects, but to its actual historical manifestations; and when speculative interpretations and historical research meet on common ground he will insist that all hypotheses be judged at the bar of his science.

In his search for the historic facts of religion the student who adopts modern methodology will aim ultimately to interpret religious movements, and only incidentally to expound sacred literatures. This observation, while true in connection with the study of all religions, is peculiarly in point for the student of Christianity. Particularly during the last half-century its sacred book, especially the New Testament, has been engaging the attention of numerous scholars. Scientific methods have been employed in recovering the most original form of its text, note has been taken of the circumstances under which its various parts were composed, and the documents

have been expounded as expressions of the minds of their several authors. These results are of immense significance for a historical understanding of the New Testament, but they are scarcely more than introductory to the work of the modern historian of early Christianity. His ultimate concern is with the real people who constituted the personnel of the Christian communities, and who acquired and exhibited their religion in actual life as members of a definite social order. When viewing religion thus as a vital factor in the social evolution of humanity, the historian clearly differentiates his task from both that of the speculative theologian and that of the distinctively biblical interpreter.¹

When linked up thus inseparably with the evolution of society, religion must be viewed as essentially a developmental rather than a static phenomenon. Religions, like other factors in the social order, emerge and increase by a gradual process of growth from simpler to more elaborate forms. It is the business of the historian to follow the course of this evolutionary process from first to last. Within the last half-century this developmental conception has completely transformed our study of the ethnic faiths. Instead of assuming, as was formerly the custom, that heathen religions are the result of a degeneration from a purer and nobler type of faith, we now recognize that they are products of actual growth resulting from a gradual process of expansion increasing in complexity under the continued stimulus of social environment.

Perhaps it is less easy to appreciate the significance of the developmental conception of religion as applied to Christianity. Its history has usually been read not in the language of evolution but in terms of definite quantities of doctrine, custom, and organization. But modern historical study treats these entities as products of the Christian movement which itself is visualized and interpreted primarily as a process of historical

¹ As an indication of this growing interest in vital religion socially conceived, one may note that the present *Journal of Religion* supersedes a journal of "theology" and a "biblical world."

evolution in religious living on the part of persons and groups of persons affected very immediately by the contemporary social order.

In treating of factors that influence the evolution of religions, the historian is restricted by the very canons of his science to such items as can be discovered in the actual personal experiences of the devotees of a religion. For the student of Christianity in particular, this phase of modern method may prove at the outset somewhat disturbing. The time-honored custom of resorting to an alleged revelation, which is assumed to operate independently of ordinary human experiences, and the habit of regarding Christianity as inherently possessed of an unhistorically conditioned quantity of generative spiritual energy, not only has prejudiced one against considering seriously the possibility of normal social influences but has left nothing to be gained from this source of inquiry. This attitude of mind is incompatible with the method of the scientific historian. In discussing the question of genesis he insists that the fountains of empirical knowledge are to be exhausted before the problem is passed on to the metaphysician.

Consequently the modern student vigorously interrogates the environment in order to extract its secrets regarding the genetic forces that have gone into the shaping of religions. It should be noted that his concern is with concrete religions and not with religion in the abstract, for no mere historian can hope to snare this creature of speculative fancy. But where definite people and specific religions alone are involved, the question of environmental influences is capable of thoroughly scientific treatment. From the point of view of historical study, life in relation to surroundings is the primal stuff out of which religions evolve. They result from man's effort to secure and perpetuate the welfare of the group or of the individual in contact with environment, particularly in its less thoroughly mastered aspects.

It follows that the vital interests which are dominant at any particular period or in any specific community, and the means available for the satisfaction of these interests, are, historically speaking, the determining factors in the making of a religion. Except in the most primitive of societies, these factors are exceedingly complex and the task of the historian is correspondingly difficult. But no study can hope to approximate accuracy and completeness if it omits analysis of the surroundings amid which the adherents of any specific religion live. Even the common place facts of habitat and climate are not without their influence. The Iranian plateau, the mountain-girt districts of Greece, the detached territory of Palestine, all left their mark in one way or another upon the religion of their respective inhabitants. Frequently political events have affected very materially the course of religious history. Not less significant, though much less frequently observed, are those incentives which operate in the sphere of common daily experience. These more ordinary social motivations may emerge in the form of economic interests, group rivalries, or a host of other elemental impulses, all of which must come under the observation of the historian in his study of religion. And in case of a religion which emerges and develops within a social order already highly organized, as was the case with Christianity, the fact of acquisitions derived from predecessors and contemporaries becomes peculiarly important.

That the student of religion should be fully cognizant of the psychological factor in history goes without saying. In no other realm of human experience does mental life, whether of the individual or of the community, figure more prominently. Conversion experiences, ecstatic visions, marvelous revelations, and other mental phenomena both ordinary and extraordinary are always in evidence. The student who ventures upon the interpretation of these items without some knowledge of modern psychological science will find himself greatly hampered in his work; and he will be a blind guide indeed if he fails to

appreciate the immense influence which psychological interests have exerted within the sphere of religion at all times.

The student of religion needs especially to be reminded of the significance of institutions as a factor in history. There is a very strong temptation to be content with portraying the careers of distinguished individuals, or recounting the popular myths, or expounding theological systems. But one who should desire, for example, to comprehend the real significance of religion as a fact of life among the Greek people, would hardly find his quest satisfied in the Homeric description of the Olympian deities or in the theogony of Hesiod. The Greek religion of real life is to be discovered most truly from a study of specific cults operating as institutionally organized movements. But this latter aspect of religion often lacks those picturesque features that appeal to the imagination and accordingly its importance for the historian is not always appreciated. Similarly among interpreters of Christianity, particularly in Protestant circles, interest in persons and dogmas has commonly towered far above interest in institutions. Modern historical method calls for a correction of this one-sidedness and emphasizes the fundamental place of institutional activities in the evolution of religions.

In the pursuit of these various lines of inquiry the historian of religion no less than his colleague in the so-called secular field—and perhaps even to a greater degree—needs the assistance of co-workers in allied departments of research. From the sociologist he seeks information regarding those social motivations and activities that may be found to characterize the life of mankind. To the psychologist he goes for knowledge of the ways in which mental interests may determine the behavior of individuals and communities. And the anthropologist may render him indispensable service by making more clear the contrast between the presuppositions of a primitive age and those postulates by which he as a man of the twentieth century is accustomed to regulate his conduct and thinking.

III

Finally, we may ask what practical value results from the application of scientific historical methods to the study of religion? It is a very old notion that history is "the handmaid of providence, the priestess of truth, and the mother of wisdom." For centuries men have been accustomed to look upon the past as the unique source of ideals and norms for the guidance of life in the present and the future: Within the sphere of religion this reverence for antiquity has often been enhanced—as is the case for example in Judaism and Christianity—by resorting to the hypothesis of a special revelation to guarantee the authority of ancient customs and beliefs. From this point of view it is the business of the student to derive from history, especially from the history of religion, authoritative examples and normative precepts without which subsequent generations would be quite incapable of realizing a worthy type of life. And such reformers as may appear from time to time must make their egress out of the past into the present with their faces turned steadfastly toward antiquity.

Belief in the normative function of history rests ultimately upon that pessimistic philosophy of life which interprets the present as a deterioration of humanity, a condition to be remedied only by the restoration of an idealized past. This was a widespread mode of thinking among the ancients, who were wont to believe that remote antiquity veiled a golden age, in comparison with which present times were sorely degenerate. But when history is viewed scientifically, as an evolutionary process in human living, the past inevitably loses its authoritative character. The order of progression throughout the ages is seen to be from the simpler to the more complex, and there is no discoverable warrant for affirming that the attainments of any past age should be regarded as normative for all subsequent times. There is no apparent reason for preferring the past above the present, or for rejecting the poet's hope that "the best is yet to be."

Cultural features of a past age are to be evaluated strictly from the standpoint of their social and functional significance. The extent to which they meet the needs—both material and spiritual—of mankind in a particular age and environment, is the true measure of their worth for the people of that day. Likewise, their value for subsequent generations will be conditioned by pragmatic tests. Where environments repeat themselves substantially unchanged for a succession of years and the great mass of human interests moves along in accustomed channels, the cultural attainments of an earlier day easily retain their grip on society and assume the dignity of an absolute authority. But a radical change in surroundings or a powerful awakening of new interests leads sooner or later to revolutions and reformations. This fact is seen to be true of all history whether in its secular or in its religious aspects.

Thus one very significant result of modern historical study is the deliverance which it gives from bondage to the past as an ideal for modern living. But to abandon the notion of normativeness does not mean a denial of history's value for the man of today and tomorrow. On the contrary, it takes on a new and larger meaning in the light of modern methods. One is able now to understand as never before how present society in all its various phases has actually come into being. Viewed as an evolutionary process, the course of history discloses how existing institutions and beliefs have arisen through the operation of definite genetic agencies within the life of humanity. Thus one is led to realize that the character of future societies will also be determined, not by forces acting from without, but by a process of vital growth from within. This fact emphasizes in a new and helpful way that the opportunity for bettering mankind's condition and the responsibility for accomplishing this task lie with men themselves.

History also has a significant word to say with regard to the nature of the reformer's ideal. The normativeness of criteria adopted from antiquity is found to be illusory.

Whether a new social order is to be "good" or "bad" will depend entirely upon the degree to which it satisfies the vital needs of real people then living. At first glance the student of religion in particular may hesitate to accept this dictum of the historian, for religion has been accustomed to insist perhaps more strenuously than any other phase of our culture upon the authority of the past. Yet historical inquiry readily shows that even the rites and dogmas of religion have not been able to withstand permanently the imperious demands of pragmatic necessity. Once upon a time it could have been held—and in fact was so held—that to accept the Copernican astronomy would mean a rejection of authoritative Christian teaching. Nevertheless the views of Copernicus have triumphed, for they have come to be regarded by men in general as necessary to intelligent thinking about the heavenly bodies.

The mighty pressure of human needs, as they increase in extent and intensity, cannot be resisted for long even by the powerful conservatism of religions, and one who has read history wisely will not be found spending his energies in a futile effort to lay the dead hand of the past upon the spontaneous life of the future. History teaches the prophet that he must justify his message, not by the norm of theory, but by the mandate of efficiency, and that ultimately he must derive his sanctions not from the past but from the future. The attainment of this conviction cannot fail to mean in the end a tremendous gain in effectiveness among all classes of workers for the advancement of human welfare.

It may not be inappropriate to note in passing that history raises many a signal of warning for the well-meaning enthusiast who would transform an old order into a new with a single turn of the wheel. The process of social change is necessarily slow, and transformations, to be genuinely effective, must inhere in the very structure of the evolutionary process. This is a fact needing to be noted particularly by students of religion. Programs hastily superimposed, before a general demand has

been awakened for the values they aim to conserve, are foredoomed to failure. How often zealous prophets of a new day, lacking the steadying power that might have been derived from a better knowledge of history, have gone down to defeat chiefly in consequence of their determination to save the world by their favorite program in their own generation! But the mills of the gods grind slowly in the making of history as in the administration of justice.

Although history may not yield authoritative norms for future conduct, has it no prophetic function? Does it not reveal laws that enable one to forecast the destiny of man from the handwriting on the walls of time? Having at the outset relinquished the privilege of appealing to metaphysics, the historian is unprepared to affirm that there is an abstract theological principle governing the progress of social evolution. He hesitates also to posit for history a mechanistic order of development fashioned after the analogy of biological laws. He recognizes that social progress moves forward by the method of trial and error, so to speak, and that the course of development is on the whole determined by forces inhering within the social order itself, but to predict the exact way in which these complex factors will combine to produce the society of the future is too venturesome an undertaking for the historian.

Even though he aspires to no prophetic function, the modern student of history is not without his faith in the future. To be sure, adherence to his scientific principle of empirical research makes him unwilling to seek guaranties beforehand either in a metaphysical theory or in a biological analogy, but he is gravely impressed with the stately progress of society's evolution throughout past ages. Man is seen keeping step with the rest of the universe—nay, leading the van—in the procession of the ages. And that confidence which is born of faith in the future of the cosmos carries with it faith in the future of society. Thus derived, the laws of history are laws of the universe, and the laws of the universe are laws of God.

THE RELIGIOUS BREAKDOWN OF THE MINISTRY

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Does not the Christian ministry of our country show signs of breaking down religiously? The emphasis of this question is upon "religiously" quite as much as upon "breaking down." We often concern ourselves with external obstacles to ministerial success, and occasionally with the defects of ministers, but we seldom raise the fundamental question whether in the first and distinctive matters of their calling they are on the right track. Suppose they should succeed in ministering to us precisely as they desire to do: in what sense and to what extent would this be a Christian ministry?

This theme does not invite to fault-finding, but to something far more thoughtful. Finding fault with ministers is an old amusement, but it requires so little in the way of either intelligence or skill—for there are no rules of the game—that it can hardly be regarded even as good sport. On the other hand, criticism, in the more technical sense, is distinguished by care both in choosing standards and in weighing performance or product. Moreover, serious criticism itself has several possible levels, and many methods. We might, for example, pass judgment upon the status of a profession by first assuming an arbitrary standard of perfect performance and then showing at what point between this and zero the average or median individual stands. The details might be handled after the manner of bookkeeping, the strong and weak points being recorded, added, and subtracted. A critic who employs this method takes the standpoint of an outsider; at his best he would be like a judge of a court, who must have no financial or family connection with any litigant. The churches

and the ministry have been subjected to much criticism of this general type, but how much they have profited by it one cannot say with confidence.

A far different approach is possible, one in which the critic endeavors to think with the minister, not merely about him. By thinking with him is not meant hunting for extenuating circumstances, but rather seeking a clear definition of purposes and of relative values, and then a corresponding evaluation of the policies that are pursued. One who had printed a critical and largely unfavorable review of a certain book received from the author of it a letter saying, "Such a review as yours helps a thinker to understand himself." It is not offering incense to strange gods, then, if one asks whether we Christians, even in what we call Christian, have grown conventional and therefore dull in our appreciation of what is central in our religion. We do not bring into question the sincerity, devotedness, or ability of our leaders, if we inquire whether they really know where the sharp edge of Christianity is, and whether their present policies can bring us to the goal of our Christian hopes. Such inquiries are a form of co-operation.

In our part of the world the Christian religion has been free to utter itself for several generations. It has placed ministers in almost every community; preaching—plenty of it—has been accessible to nearly the entire population, and has had a rather general hearing; evangelism, moreover, has constantly gone outside the stated church services in order to reach the masses; enormous use has been made of the press; millions of children are constantly under the tuition of the churches; almost everybody has a "church affiliation"—in short, the religion of our ministers has had abundant opportunity to make itself known to a population that is counted as, on the whole, intelligent. Would there be anything unfair in the assumption that this population must by this time have caught the main point: that what our religion is fundamentally for and fundamentally against must be clear? As clear, for

example, as the popular apprehension of the antagonism between the steel trust and organized labor? I have in mind nothing that requires historical insight, or systematic thinking, or even ability to state an article of a creed, but only rudimentary apprehension of any central issue that the ministers have actually pressed upon the conscience of the people. Surely spiritual clarity in the pulpit and in the guidance of religious instruction could hardly result in spiritual ignorance and confusion. Let us remember that our ministers have had a fair opportunity to make themselves understood, and that they have had a remarkably large direct hearing besides being able to guide the teaching activities of multitudes of laymen. Yet who does not know that the populace is ignorant of any specific, sharp issues for which the clergy as a whole stands? The English and American reports on conditions in the armies¹ have awakened little or no surprise on the part of those of us who have approached our religion from the educational point of view. We have known that spiritual illiteracy abounds in the churches themselves, and we have repeatedly pointed out some of the reasons for it. Among the seasoned leaders in the reform of religious education there is a widespread conviction that the greatest single obstacle to this reform is the inertia of ministers. This inertia is present in what is certainly central and crucial in our religion. Everybody knows that ministers stand for goodness in general, and against wickedness in general, and this is no slight ground for praise. But what is the Christian view of wickedness and of goodness? What is the main point? Wherein should we expect a Christian to differ from anybody else? On vital points like this the ministry as a whole has not spoken so that the populace can understand.

If we hesitate to place so much stress upon the state of the popular mind, let us limit our inquiry to members of the churches. Suppose we were able to ask of them, What do you

¹ *The Army and Religion*. Association Press, New York, 1920. *Religion among American Men*. Association Press, New York, 1920.

judge that the ministry stands for with life-and-death seriousness? We should learn much, no doubt, of the amiability of the clergy, of their high character, of their sympathetic helpfulness, of their general support of conventional ethical standards. But the names of many of them would call up no focalized message, and, for the rest, the issues that would come to mind are, with occasional exceptions, such as these: some view, orthodox or otherwise, of the Scriptures or of dogmas; some ideal of churchmanship, or the promotion of church enterprises; some reform, as temperance, or some sin, as worldly amusements; some mode of piety, mystical or other; the conversion of sinners. The importance of these interests is not here called into question, least of all the last named. The conversion of sinners might be so conceived as to offer us the great characteristic issue for which we are looking. But until there is far sharper definition than now prevails of what we are to be converted from and what we are to be converted to, even a life-and-death purpose to win converts will remain, like the evangelism that we know, as only one item in a miscellany of ends that have no obvious co-ordinating or central principle. The members of the churches themselves cannot tell what dominant issue the ministry as a whole stands for.

Another approach to the same phase of our problem may be put thus: What have the members of the churches been led by their pastors to understand as the meaning of church membership? Let not this question be confused with popular flings at the inconsistencies of Christians. The point concerns their conscious standards of the Christian profession and life, not their successes and failures as measured by these or any other standards. Here, surely, is a perfectly fair test of ministers. For, before a candidate is received into full membership in a church the minister instructs him or sees to it that he is instructed in the meaning of the step, and then examines and approves him. Moreover, though the minister

may be relatively unknown to many in the community, he has opportunity to enlighten his own congregation upon the way of life not less often than once a week. Yet the ideas of church members concerning the significance of their membership, like the ideas of the general populace concerning the Christian religion, are partly vague and partly miscellaneous and unco-ordinated. That I am a church member means that I have been converted; that I believe the Christian doctrines; that I go to church; that I partake of the bread and grape juice of the communion; that I abstain from killing, stealing, lying, liquor, and fornication; that I am benevolent; that I pray, and use the other means of grace; that I support church enterprises with my money and my labor—is not this a fair inventory of current ideas as far as they are at all definite?

That these standards are not insignificant goes without saying. It is no slight thing to have in every community an organization and a voice that constantly speak for so much that is good. But we are not at all concerned at this moment with the question whether the church is worth while. Of course it is. Our sole concern is to know what ministers think about the function of the church, and to evaluate what we find. In the churches we behold a vast number of men; men who have responded to what they regard as the call of God; men to whom this means pursuing good and not evil. Here is potential spiritual energy so vast that if it were directed toward a definite objective it would be irresistible. Here are enormous investments of money, and even these represent but a fraction of what church members could give to any cause that was dearer to them than life. If church membership meant that there is such a cause, imagination can hardly picture the possible results. It is clear, however, that the ministry has not succeeded in impressing upon the laity that church membership has any such meaning as this. The natural inference is that the ministry itself does

not think in such terms. We must assume, of course, that our leaders might make the attempt to impress an ideal upon their followers, and yet fail. Certainly some ministers, in the aggregate a considerable number, have seen a vision, and have endeavored to communicate it. They have found in the gospel such big, inclusive conceptions, a revelation of such overwhelming needs, an experience of power so adequate for these needs, such a foretaste of a regenerated world, that they have said to their brethren, "Come, let us mass all our forces upon these great world-objectives." But the response from their brethren in the ministry has been so slight that there is not the least ground for supposing that the situation in the laity is due to unresponsiveness toward clerical leadership. No; the clerical profession as a whole has not espoused any such large and aggressive cause as vital to the meaning of church membership.¹

But perhaps we ought not to seek an index of the ministry in the everyday, commonplace life of the churches. One might plausibly argue that, just as we did not perceive the heroic qualities of the holder of a Carnegie medal until he had an opportunity to risk his life to save that of a drowning person, so the religious vitality of the ministerial profession will fully demonstrate itself only in times of unusual moral stress and danger. Well, we have had opportunity to see what clergymen do in spiritual emergencies as well as in the common day. Was there ever a greater spiritual emergency, in fact, than that which the Great War precipitated? Here,

¹ The criticisms thus far made do not apply equally to the Protestant and the Catholic clergy. Every intelligent Catholic has definite and correct ideas as to what his priest stands for, and of the meaning of membership in the Catholic church. This gives the advantage of a unified and determined front, indeed, but the ulterior problem here concerns the ends prescribed by the hierarchy to the faithful. To save one's own soul by obeying an autocratic spiritual authority, and to contribute to the final and complete triumph of this autocracy—this conception of spiritual life, duty, and destiny makes the problem of the priest too simple. He can fulfil his essential functions by performing certain prescribed operations in his strictly official capacity (*ex opere operato*), and teaching certain doctrines and duties already strictly formulated. The problem of the Protestant minister goes many fathoms deeper than this.

surely, were issues sufficient to stimulate to the utmost whatever there was of conscience in men. Here were moral confusions to be cleared up; here were temptations as vast as empires to be met; here, if ever, the difference between the Kingdom of God and every other aim in life needed to be brought to the fore in men's thinking concerning the future of society. If ever in the history of man a "Thus saith the Lord" was needed, it was needed then. Yet the ministry in general had nothing distinctive to offer. Here and there a little group—Quakers for instance—bore testimony by word and deed to something specific that they thought they had received from God. A few individuals paused to ask whither the spirit of Jesus would lead us in the world welter, and a few endeavored to weigh in Christian scales the principles upon which our contemporary society is so bunglingly organized. A few gestures of friendship were directed by ecclesiastical groups toward members of Christian communions in enemy countries. But the masses of the clergy took their cues concerning the great issues of the time from the same prompters to whom the worldlings who control our newspapers turned for guidance.

It is only fair to say that the clergy employed their faith in God and a future life so as to bring comfort to the suffering and the bereaved, and that many ministers, working among our soldiers and sailors, brought to multitudes of individuals strength to endure temptation and hardship. We do not undervalue such services if we point out that, on the other hand, the attitudes taken by the generality of ministers toward the major moral problems—problems that concern the meaning and ends of our organized life—were little if at all affected by religion. In all good works of mercy and help they labored as equals with those not of the faith. In speech and in print they supported, on the whole, just what non-Christians supported. It is not evident that their position on the great issues differed from that of plain secularists—apparently their religion had no contribution at this point.

Of course the ministers prayed, but into their prayers they poured the very desires that secularists and they had in common. Of course they searched the Scriptures, and there, to be sure, they found texts that fitted the spirit of the times! Can anyone show a plausible reason for believing that if the clergy as a whole, adopting an "interim ethics," had taken a vacation from their pulpits for the duration of the war, the mind of the church, as far as the main issues of the hour are concerned, would have been appreciably affected? Would not the newspapers have taken care of the consciences of church members as well as their spiritual shepherds did? I am amazed at myself for asking this question; all my training prompts me to reject the implications of it. But the evidence must decide, and the evidence does not show that our tragic moral emergency evoked from the clergy, except in a few instances, any guidance or inspiration that had a specifically Christian source or character. The clergy did count, and that splendidly, but it was not their religion that counted.

A similar lack of religious distinction meets us when we ask what attitudes the clergy take toward several ethical problems of our domestic policies and conduct. For example, what have our spiritual guides found in the Christian religion that bears upon the proper treatment of conscientious objectors? Only a bare handful of ministers seem to see that freedom of conscience and humane treatment of prisoners are religious issues at all! No one will claim that the course that events have taken has been influenced by our religion, which has remained, in the persons of its official representatives, acquiescent and aloof. I forget! One minister did propose that conscientious objectors should be deprived of the right to vote, and another wrote with a sneer of their sufferings. Perhaps, after all, the ministry had more influence than I have just now attributed to it. I am far from intending to approve or condemn, at present, the conduct of our government in

this matter; the whole point is that the clergy as a whole showed no positive sign that the matter interested them as Christians. Unless we assume that they are ignorant that the relation of human government to the conscience of the citizen is counted a great point in religious history and in the conception of modern civilization, we must conclude that the explanation of their attitude is to be sought in the realm of spiritual sensitiveness.

No Protestant who is informed on the history of his faith will deny that freedom of speech and of assemblage is a matter in which religion is deeply concerned. What, then, is the attitude of the clergy toward the suppression of freedom of speech and of assemblage in our country at the present moment? Since this suppression is effected not in spite of government, but by using the police power itself, we have before us all the elements of an issue which in other days provoked appeals to the will of God. But times have changed. The old problem is here, but those who speak for God are, with a few notable exceptions, silent. The events that are occurring under our eyes strike no religious chord, and church members are receiving their guidance in this tremendous issue almost exclusively from extra-ecclesiastical sources.¹

The relation of the clergy to the ethical issues involved in our economic and industrial life is distinctly better. With some approach to unanimity they opposed the liquor traffic, and with complete unanimity they favor a rest day for workers, generally on humanitarian and not merely ecclesiastical grounds. Further, they have taken high ground, in the social creed of the churches and elsewhere, upon child labor, the labor of women, and other industrial problems. The interchurch investigation of labor conditions in the steel

¹ In respect to issues such as these the failure of the Catholic clergy is more profound than that of the Protestant. For, (1) no one but the pope may assume prophetic functions in the church, and (2) the pope is so hedged about by traditions that must not be contradicted that even he becomes little more than a warder of the *status quo*. The inability of the head of the church to cope with the problem of the historical criticism of the Scriptures is typical.

industry speaks in unmistakable terms of the spiritual aggressiveness of the group that carried it through. But there is an underlying and all-pervading ethical issue, not at all foreign to historical Christianity, upon which no clear guidance is to be had from the generality of ministers. In order to make sure that I shall not be misunderstood when I state what this issue is, a paragraph must be devoted to certain distinctions.

Condemnation of ministers based upon the assumption that they ought to be competent as technical economists, sociologists, or statesmen, is to be resisted and refused all standing. It is criticism of the first type mentioned at the beginning of this article, and it is erroneous because of a false standard arbitrarily assumed. Likewise, to demand of ministers such fabulous wisdom as to be able to tell just what to do in every troublesome situation is unjust for the same reason. But, though the Christian minister be not a social researcher or a social engineer, he is, by the nature of his office, a guide and inspirer of social ends and motives. Though he decline to judge whether the timbers of a certain bridge will bear a certain load, he must be ready to say whether the road that goes over this bridge runs east or north. And not only must he seek to be expert in discriminating motives and ultimate ends; he must also take account of the conditions that further or hinder these motives and ends. That is, he must be a critic of social organization and process, and particularly of the human product thereof. Though he is not required to be a church architect, he must be able to judge whether a given edifice is adapted to the needs that called it into being. To what extent does our social order aim to produce, and succeed in producing, the best sort of men and women, specifically men and women related to one another as members of a family of God? The major part—by far the major part—of men's thoughts and purposes and labors arise within our economic order and refer to economic ends. This is life; this is where meaning must be found; this is precisely where ideals belong.

The minister must understand it, judge it, and in view of its products suggest needed changes in aim and motive. It is his function to utter the divine will with respect to the fundamental ethics of our organized life, and not less to call, whenever necessary, for social repentance and regeneration.

Is a system in which one works for wages and another for profits fundamentally Christian, anti-Christian, or neutral? Are its motives Christian? What is the effect upon character of the repeated exercise of its motives? What is the actual outcome as respects the relation of man to man? Here we are concerned with the meaning and value of life. Our question leads straight back to Jesus and straight forward to any vision that we dare indulge concerning the coming of the Kingdom of God. It is not answered by any position we may take upon such special problems as hours of labor or prevention of industrial accidents; much less can any talk of a fair wage so much as touch it. It is the great parting of the ways for the Christian ethics of society. The ministry must take upon this question an open stand that is definitely Christian or lose its soul.

We have needed guidance on this point—O how sorely!—for years. Industrialism has developed its logic far faster than our ethical insight into the new conditions has grown. For many years, too, voices have been challenging us to face this issue, so that we can hardly plead that we have not had time to find an answer. “And while men slept, an enemy came and sowed tares.” Opposing forces are gathering—enormous forces on both sides—to attempt the solution of this fundamental ethical problem by a clash of non-ethical weapons. And the Christian ministry is looking on!

It is needless to pursue the theme farther. If the nature and the functions of the Christian religion are what I have assumed them to be, and if the facts are as I have alleged, then the answer to the question with which we started is before us. The conclusion, let it be noted, does not depend upon dissent

from anything that ministers teach, or upon disapproval of anything that they do. Our question concerns their grasp of religious problems as religious, and their conception of their calling as they reveal it in their practice. What has been indicated is, in part, lack of point, and tendency to blur; in part, lack of religious perspective even where devotion is focalized; in part, failure to recognize vital religious issues when they arise.

PRESENT TENDENCIES IN THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS IN AMERICA

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The Society of Friends, more generally known as Quakers,¹ is one of the few Protestant English-speaking religious organizations whose history goes back to the middle of the seventeenth century. Only the Episcopalians, Baptists, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians antedate them. Though George Fox, the founder, had been preaching for some years, the year 1652 is commonly taken as the beginning of the organization, and the year 1656 marks their entrance into America. Neither Fox nor his immediate associates at first had any thought of setting up a new denomination. They believed their message was for all men. That it was incompatible with existing church polity and practice was forced upon them, and, almost in spite of themselves, a new religious body sprang up. Within the lifetime of Fox, and largely his own work, a democratic organization was instituted which, with but slight alteration in details, has lasted till the present day.

During the more than two and one-half centuries of its existence the society has passed through several trying periods, the most serious of which was a separation in 1827-28, which for a time threatened to wreck it. The causes of this division were many, but the most obvious were matters of organization and of doctrine. Though the basis of the church polity is a pure democracy, a supplementary organization known as the Meeting of Ministers and Elders, in later times the Meeting on Ministry and Oversight, claimed and exercised far greater powers than had been customary

¹ As the Orthodox comprise about four-fifths of all calling themselves Friends, reference will be to them, unless otherwise stated.

in earlier days. This body was subordinate to the Yearly Meeting, and at no time have its members been considered a separate class. The minister or elder in the conduct of church affairs in no respect differs from the other members. Notwithstanding this well-known fact, the elders in particular often made decisions which to many in the rank and file seemed arbitrary and intolerant. In addition, and in connection with this, doctrines claimed to be unscriptural and at variance with the accepted doctrines of the Society were set forth by certain ministers. The doctrines resembled those of the Unitarians, and in some instances were distinctly rationalistic. The result was a divided body, and weakness in the promulgation of those teachings held in common. Later a further but much smaller separation took place relating rather to matters of practice than of doctrine. Thus, at the middle of the nineteenth century, there were three bodies—Orthodox, Hicksite, and Conservative¹—each claiming the name of Friends or Quakers. The Orthodox in essentials agreed with the evangelical bodies; the Conservatives differed from the Orthodox chiefly in practice; and the Hicksites or Liberals, as they like to be called, laid no stress whatever on doctrine. The Orthodox in 1828 were somewhat larger in numbers than the Hicksites, and the Conservatives much smaller than either. For some years all bodies showed a steady decline in membership, the greatest being among the Hicksites, a decline which has continued to the present time. The Orthodox body, on the other hand, not only ceased to decline, but began to grow, in some years making large accessions to its numbers.² With slight exception these three bodies had no official intercourse, and for many years there was much antagonistic feeling. But with the passing away of the leaders who had been active in the period of disruption,

¹ Hicksite, so called from Elias Hicks, the most prominent leader among them; Conservative, long called Wilburite, after John Wilbur, a prominent leader.

² In 1918 the official statistics were: Orthodox, 97,275; Hicksites, 18,218; Conservatives (partly estimated), 3,648.

the bitterness gradually disappeared, and a feeling of friendliness has largely taken its place, especially in recent years.

While the Orthodox in essentials agree with the evangelical bodies, there are certain great differences. The Friends from the very first, and this is true of all Friends, have held that there is a living, independent, personal relation to God—a direct revelation of Himself to the individual—a light from Himself “shining in the heart and conscience.” This doctrine of the “inner light” or “inward light” was no new teaching, but it had been, to a very great extent, obscured or lost sight of. It meant that in every man there is that which answers to God’s message or call, and which, if followed, will lead to Christ. This, the cardinal teaching of the Friends, calls for a system of worship which will afford opportunity for individual communion with God as well as for the exercise of individual gifts. Hence the necessity for meeting in silence. There also flowed from it the belief that if the soul has direct communion with God, an outward communion is not only unnecessary but will be likely to draw attention to the symbol rather than to a personal spiritual experience. Again, as no outward baptism can cleanse the soul, such is needless and may be hurtful.¹ The teaching further implied that anyone, man or woman, might be called of God to exercise the gift of the ministry independently of scholastic training. Ministers were to be *recognized*, not ordained. So there is no ordination among the Friends to this day. There is no division of clergy and laity—all members are upon the same plane.

It might naturally be supposed that this doctrine of the “inward light” would lead to extravagances and error, and the Friends have always recognized this danger.² But if this is the light of Christ, as claimed, it will not lead to that

¹ General William Booth, more than two centuries later, on practically the same grounds, disused the ordinances in the Salvation Army.

² This danger was realized very soon in the case of Nayler and of Perrot. The former acknowledged his error and repented and was reinstated; the latter severed his connection with the body.

which is at variance or inconsistent with his teachings. Here is the test to which the Friends have never hesitated to submit.

Another historic position, and the one most prominent in the near past, is the attitude toward war. War to George Fox and the early Quakers was absolutely incompatible with the type of Christianity which they professed. Fox said to one who wished him to enter the army, "I told him I lived in the virtue of that life and power that took away the occasion for all war." And an official document of 1660 says:

We utterly deny all outward wars and strife and fightings with outward weapons, for any end, or under any pretence whatever. . . . The spirit of Christ . . . will never lead us to fight and war against any man with outward weapons, neither for the kingdom of Christ, nor for the kingdoms of this world.

This statement is based on the belief that the Spirit of Christ is a spirit of love, not one of hate and destruction. All official declarations of the Society from that time to the present have never varied from this position; it is the historic position of the body.

It was held from the first that the outward life must conform to the inward spiritual life; so there must be truth and justice in all dealings with others. This requires that all statements must be truthful, hence no oath is needful, and is contrary to the words of Christ. Moreover, the use of an oath sets up two standards. Justice in trade led to the establishment of fixed prices for perhaps the first time in economic history.

Though the theory has always been that women were exactly on an equality with men, and it has been carried out in regard to the ministry, in church administration it was not completely so till the nineteenth century.

For the first half-century the Friends were an active missionary body, and their missionaries visited all parts of Europe, America, the West Indies, and even Turkey. Large sums for that age were raised to support this work, which was carried on with enthusiasm and almost regardless of difficulties, hardships, and sufferings. That results were not

permanent is chiefly, because these efforts were not systematically followed up, and partly because of the kind of governments existing on the Continent, which, based on force and carried on under a system of militarism, were fatal to the existence of a body whose principles were based on love and whose adherents lived according to the principles of a Prince of Peace.

During the latter half of the eighteenth century the Society sank into a condition of quietism, occupying itself in preserving its "testimonies" rather than reaching out and continuing the missionary efforts of earlier years.

But if the Friends were lacking in religious missionary zeal, it was not so in practical matters, such as penal reform, wise treatment of the insane, and just treatment of the American Indian, all of which claimed their close attention. Even more than these was their attitude toward slavery. In 1688 some German Friends of Germantown, Pennsylvania, made a protest against holding men in bondage, so far as known the first official protest of any religious body on this subject. About the middle of the eighteenth century John Woolman became the apostle of freedom, and through his efforts and those of others the conscience of Friends was so aroused, that by the close of the century slavery was driven out of the Society, and thereafter no Friend could own a slave. This action had far-reaching effects, for it led to the wholesale emigration of the Quakers from the slave states of Virginia and the Carolinas to the free soil of Ohio, Indiana, and the Northwest, not only furnishing sturdy, independent, and industrious citizens to these states, but exerting no small influence on the Quaker body itself.

It was not till about thirty years or more after the troubles of 1828 that the decline in membership was arrested in the Orthodox body. In the country west of the Alleghanies the Friends began to grow not only by the emigration just mentioned and by that from other eastern states, but by accessions through request. The Society had again become an aggressive

body. It was not long before the traditional dress of the eighteenth century and the language began to be laid aside, and the discipline considerably relaxed. The quietism of the previous century had become an evangelistic spirit. This led to some important changes in polity and practice. Methods similar to those used in the revivals of other religious bodies were employed, and in various ways new ideas and practices came into being. Territories where Friends were unknown were entered, and converts were made who had no knowledge of Quaker doctrine or history. After conversion these needed religious instruction. To meet this need, men and women were appointed whose work closely resembled that of the Methodist pastor, and in many places congregations worshiped which could scarcely be distinguished from those of other denominations. In fact, the chief difference was the omission of the Lord's Supper and baptism.¹ Thus sprang up what is known among the Friends as the "pastoral system."

It was quite evident to thoughtful Friends that a centrifugal force was at work, which, if not checked, would be disastrous to the body. After some preliminary effort, a general conference representing all the Yearly Meetings² in America but one, and those in Great Britain and Ireland, met at Richmond, Indiana, in 1887. It was a conference for discussion only and was without power, but it was of great value in bringing Friends together. Its main visible work was the preparation and issuing of a long and rather verbose "Declaration of Faith." Another conference was held in 1892, at which the representation was in proportion to membership. The evident value of these conferences led to a continuance in 1897, at which time the advantages of a closer union were discussed, and means adopted to bring a tentative

¹ It is not surprising that at one period a few Friends advocated the use of these.

² A Yearly Meeting somewhat resembles a Methodist Conference. It is composed of a number of subordinate meetings. A representative gathering which is the legislative body for the group and also a final court of appeal meets annually. The bounds of a Yearly Meeting are mainly on geographical lines, though not wholly so.

plan of union before a conference in 1902. To this conference a plan of union with a constitution and practically uniform discipline was presented with the indorsement of a large majority of the Yearly Meetings of America. Through this action the Five Years' Meeting of the Friends in America came into being, and it has held quinquennial sessions since 1902. There can be little doubt that this is the most important event in the history of American Quakerism, for through it what had been practically a congregational union became an organized church.¹

The plan of the Five Years' Meeting is that of a federal union, which in principle closely resembles the Articles of Confederation of the United States which preceded the Constitution. Under it each Yearly Meeting is practically independent as to local interests but unites, by means of a quinquennial proportional representative body and various standing boards, with the other members of the union in matters of common interest, such as evangelistic work, foreign and home missions, Bible schools, peace, education, young people's activities, legislation, publication, and the like. This union has worked fully as well as was expected by most of its advocates, and, while during the eighteen years of its existence there has been some friction, and two Yearly Meetings remain outside, there can be no doubt that it has brought Friends closer together,² and that by united action church activities have been better organized and better work has been done.³ This is particularly true of the foreign-mission work, which

¹ It was not the first time such an effort had been made, for the records show that Philadelphia Yearly Meeting in 1683, probably at the suggestion of William Penn, proposed to hold a general meeting of Friends from New England to Carolina. It was probably owing to geographical conditions and difficulties of transportation that the scheme was not carried out.

² Ohio Yearly Meeting remains apart chiefly on the ground of doctrine, claiming that the doctrines upheld are too liberal; and Philadelphia Yearly Meeting chiefly on the ground of preserving full, independent action.

³ The Yearly Meetings composing the Five Years' Meeting are New England, New York, Baltimore, North Carolina, Wilmington (Ohio), Indiana, Western (Indiana), Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, California, Oregon, and Canada.

has been brought under the direction and oversight of the American Friends' Board of Foreign Missions, thus obviating duplication of officers, and greatly aiding in the assignment of missionaries and in the economic and wise administration of the work.¹

Another striking feature in the polity of the Friends since 1912 has been the Young Friends' Movement. This is an organized association of the younger members for the purpose of deepening their own spiritual life and supporting and extending the activities of the body at large. This is done by local associations, study-groups, country-wide conferences, and personal efforts in such fields as seem to call for work.

Besides the Boards, the Five Years' Meeting has a general secretary with an office at Richmond, Indiana, whose duties are the collection and dissemination of intelligence of value to the body, collection and tabulation of statistics, aiding in the meetings and work of the Boards and Committees, serving as a medium of communication between needy fields and available workers or committees, and in every way furthering the interests of the denomination.

One important matter remains to be dwelt upon. With some notable exceptions, the meetings of the Friends have adopted, though not officially, some form of a pastoral system.² It should be clearly understood, however, that this does not mean that every individual meeting has a pastor; very far from it, but the tendency has been toward such a condition, particularly in the West where there has been no Quaker background.

¹ The fields of labor of the Five Years' Meeting are Cuba, Mexico, Jamaica, Palestine, and British East Africa. The amounts collected were, in 1905, \$6,953; in 1917-19 (six months) \$150,155 (a special effort). Besides these missions Philadelphia Friends maintain flourishing missions in Japan; Ohio Yearly Meeting missions in India and China; and California Yearly Meeting missions in Alaska and Central America.

² This includes all the Yearly Meetings of the Five Years' Meeting (except Baltimore Yearly Meeting), and Ohio Yearly Meeting; Philadelphia Yearly Meeting has had neither pastors nor pastoral system.

Such in outline was the condition of the Friends in 1914 and recent years. Without this survey the present position and outlook of the Quaker body could hardly be understood. To the thoughtful Friend and one to whom the continuance of the body on practically its old foundation was dear, it was evident that an essential point in the situation was the meeting for worship. If this was held according to a strict program, it would be impossible for individual spiritual communion to exist or for individual gifts in the ministry or exhortation or vocal prayer to be exercised, and there could not be that "liberty of prophesying" to gain which the early Friends had suffered so much. That some sort of a pastoral system was needed in many places few could gainsay. How could it be so modified as not to conflict with historic Quaker teachings. Though perhaps not put so bluntly as this, the problem was in the minds of many, though not always acknowledged. It was also evident that there was much dissatisfaction with existing conditions, but no way of improving them was seen. No definite plan of modification has yet been proposed, but there is no doubt that at present there is an increasing desire and effort to adjust the pastoral system to the fundamentals of historic Quakerism, and this is true particularly of the younger pastors.¹ The Friends had become alive to contemporary problems and to the fact that a church, in order to continue, and to be effective, and to grow, must be aggressive. The association in the Five Years' Meeting not only had enabled better work to be done but also, and even more important, had brought the members East and West into that closer touch and better knowledge of each other without which it is altogether unlikely the subsequent united work would have been possible.

¹ In some places the pastor is not necessarily a minister, but resembles the Young Men's Christian Association Secretary, the effort being, especially in rural communities, to make the meeting a center, not only of conversion, instruction, and religious uplift, but also of social interests for the betterment of the neighborhood.

When the United States entered the Great War in 1917 an unlooked-for condition presented itself to the Friends. Since the close of the Civil War in 1865, the armies of the United States had been composed wholly of volunteers. To the Friends the matter of compulsory military service had seemed a purely academic question, but now it loomed up as a certainty. Like the British Parliament, the American Congress recognized the existence of certain religious bodies among whose historic doctrines was a conscientious objection to war and military service, and, for the members of such, provision was made for noncombatant service. But, less liberal than the British Act, individuals not belonging to the designated bodies, were ignored.¹

The drastic conscription laws which were enacted fell heavily upon the Friends and the few small denominations which shared their views regarding war. Whether the historic position of the Society would be upheld was a question of anxious interest. The individual answer was to be given by young men, most of whom had never anticipated such a trial of faith. Three classes were shown to exist: those who, having no convictions against war, accepted military service; those who refused military service but accepted some kind of alternative service; and those who refused any compulsory service whatever. This last class numbered very few; the majority belonged to the middle class, though there was much difference of opinion as to what kind of alternative service could be accepted. The number of those entering the army or navy was not large². So far as the official attitude and statements were concerned, no meeting failed to maintain the

¹ The definition of "noncombatant" was left to the President, and decisions to exemption boards, whose decisions often conflicted and were far from uniform. The records of the treatment of the conscientious objectors by exemption boards, military courts, and above all in the military prisons make a sad page in American history.

² The accredited number was greater from the fact that up to 1902 birthright membership was universal among the Friends, and, consequently, in 1917 there were many nominal members who, nevertheless, were reckoned as Friends.

Friends' historic attitude against war, and in favor of peaceful methods in the settlement of differences international, national, and social.

As soon as war was declared in 1914, the British Friends, as in the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-71, at once formed organizations for relief work. An ambulance unit for the rescue and care of the wounded; a reconstruction unit for the aid of devastated districts; a committee for helping innocent aliens, especially women and children; a war victims' relief committee, and others. While France was the chief field, Italy, Serbia, Russia, and other countries were also fields of work. This earnest, self-sacrificing, unpaid labor was often carried on under difficult and extremely dangerous conditions.

American Friends contributed funds to help their British brethren, but when the United States entered the war in April, 1917, it was felt that personal aid and service were called for. Accordingly late in April, 1917, the American Friends' Service Committee was organized. All calling themselves Friends were invited to take part. The response was general, and members of all groups had place on the executive committee. For the first time since 1828 all those calling themselves Friends united harmoniously in a common service. When the Five Years' Meeting convened in the autumn of 1917 the committee was officially recognized by the appointment of representatives on it. It was concluded to work with English Friends, and later, in addition, to be attached to the civilian branch of the American Red Cross. An appeal brought large funds and called forth earnest workers. As the work developed it naturally was divided into groups which it may be worth while to mention: emergency work, such as assisting persons out of the danger zones and providing for their needs; agricultural, providing labor, machinery, seeds, personal service; building—such as constructing temporary houses in devastated districts; miscellaneous—providing maternity and other hos-

pitals, and factories for making portable houses and furniture, establishing co-operative stores, etc. Except necessary office work and that connected with transportation, none of the workers received any pay except a simple maintenance and their necessary traveling expenses. It will give some idea of the extent of the work to state that in three years, to May 31, 1920, the total number of American workers was 645, mostly men, and the total contributions \$2,329,868.19.¹

This relief and reconstruction work received the approval of the United States War Department, the French government, and the American Red Cross, and is a complete answer to the charge frequently made during the war that pacifists must be unpatriotic and slackers.

So far as known this is the only work of the kind by a religious organization begun during the war and carried on without interruption ever since. The work in France, with the exception of the erection of a maternity hospital, has just been discontinued (July, 1920), but has gone on in Central Europe, Poland, Serbia, and elsewhere. In January, 1920, Herbert C. Hoover turned over to the American Friends' Service Committee the work of distribution of relief for the needy women and children of Germany.²

The Friends have participated in the Interchurch Movement, and moreover, antedating this, have carried on a Forward Movement of their own to sustain and extend the interests, spiritual and material, of their own denomination.

Education has always been highly valued, and schools, when they have been needed, have been maintained since an early date. But for a long period higher education was viewed

¹ Seventy-five workers were Mennonite conscientious objectors, turned over by the United States War Department for noncombatant service. Of the contributions \$276,115.86 were contributed by the Mennonite Board of Missions; almost all the rest by Friends.

² At last accounts (July, 1920) 632,300 children are given one meal per day in eighty-eight cities in Germany. It is expected this feeding must be continued another year, though perhaps not on so extensive a scale.

with distrust. The feeling, however, has long passed away, and at present the Society maintains seven colleges, one in the East, four in the Middle West, and two on the Pacific Coast. Haverford, Pennsylvania, though not officially connected with the Society, is owned and controlled by members. All the institutions, elementary, secondary, and higher, rank well in the classes to which they belong. Their interests are fostered by the General Board of Education of the Five Years' Meeting.

As is well known, Friends have always been in the van in the cause of temperance, and have been active in the anti-saloon and prohibition movements.

The harmonious co-operation of the different groups in the European relief work has frequently suggested the question whether it will not bring about a closer union. It may be said in reply that, so far as can be seen, it is very unlikely, for too great differences in doctrine still exist to make a church union desirable. But it has taught many that kindly feeling and much co-operation are quite possible even when there is great difference of opinion on important matters.

Passing for a moment to the Hicksite and Conservative groups, it may be said of the former that the members have been active in philanthropic and social work. Great attention has been paid to education. Their excellent schools and Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, a co-educational institution, have received hearty support. By means of biennial conferences, representing the whole group, the membership has been kept in touch with all movements of interest to the body and enabled to share more fully in whatever efforts may be made. There has been a constant tendency to greater freedom in doctrine and practice. Within the past few years recording of ministers and appointment of elders have practically ceased, and the tendency is toward the greatest possible democracy in the church organization. Notwithstanding these and other efforts and the institution of an active Young Friends'

Movement the decrease in membership has not yet been arrested.¹

The Conservatives have kept the even tenor of their way repeating very nearly the quietism of the eighteenth century, and showing little missionary interest. Their membership, as nearly as can be ascertained, also shows a decline. Both groups have joined heartily in the relief and reconstruction work, and have representation on the executive committee of the American Friends' Service Committee.

A conference representing all, the world over, who call themselves Friends, was held in London, England, in August, 1920. The object of this gathering was to discuss matters of common interest, especially means for furthering the cause of peace, international, national, social, and economic, and to consider what part the Friends should take in the effort. Notwithstanding the diverse elements, and different nationalities represented, the conference was harmonious. Several addresses were issued and the general effect has been to bring all Friends into closer fellowship.

Such is a brief review of the history of Quakerism. What can be said of its present condition and tendencies? Let us return to the consideration of the Orthodox body with which we are especially concerned. Problems of peculiar difficulty face a small denomination spread over a wide expanse of country. Differences of environment, education, outlook, far more than in a large denomination, have an influence antagonistic to a close union. It is emphatically so with the Friends. That they have held together as closely as they have, is more remarkable than that there should be, here and there, disintegrating influences at work. Some members in the Middle West and more on the Pacific Coast view with concern the greater liberality in matters of doctrine, and the

¹ This may be partly due to the concentration of the membership, as more than half belongs to Philadelphia Yearly Meeting (Hicksite), and about three-fourths to Philadelphia and Baltimore Yearly Meetings (Hicksite).

willingness to join in relief and other work with those they do not consider evangelical. They also lay great stress on written statements of religious doctrine, and fail to see that Friends in placing emphasis on life rather than on creed are simply maintaining their historic attitude, and taking their place alongside of those increasing numbers in other denominations who, while holding fast the essentials of Christian faith, believe that a life of Christian service is more important than subscription to a formal creed or a written statement of faith. Such dissident members are few in comparison with the membership at large and are scarcely likely to increase greatly in number. It is, however, recognized that there is a serious danger that, in devoting thought and effort to external service, the spiritual may not receive that close attention which is essential to all work professed to be carried out on a Christian basis. It is a fundamental of the Quaker faith that nothing can take the place of a personal spiritual experience.

In common with other denominations, the problem of the ministry is a serious one. That there is need for an intelligent, educated service is unquestionable; zeal, earnest exhortation, or both combined are not sufficient. How can the need be met without conflicting with the historic position of the body as to the necessity of a divine call, sometimes immediate, and "the priesthood of *all* believers"? Is it practicable, amid the legitimate demands of modern life, for members to devote the necessary time to ministerial and pastoral work? Can any considerable number of men and women of ability be expected to devote their lives or a great part of them to a work in which but a meager income for years and small prospect for the future is all that can be looked for? Various efforts have been made to meet certain phases of the question. Some Friends, a number of years ago, instituted a Bible Training School for ministers and Christian workers; but it cannot be said that the results have been satisfactory to the body at large, for the tendency has been toward the creation of a ministerial

class, inelastic methods, and a narrow outlook. A School for Social and Religious Education, much less formal, intended rather for Christian workers, has also been in operation for a few years. Another method has been to introduce into the college curriculum, for those who feel called to the ministry or Christian work, courses on the Bible, church history, sociology, psychology, and practical ways of church service. Still more recently, a well-endowed graduate school has been opened, offering instruction in "biblical literature, philosophy, sociology, history, and kindred subjects." Whether these later efforts will bring about adequate results remains to be seen, but it cannot be questioned that the last three methods are more in accord with fundamental Quakerism than the first.

Notwithstanding the local differences mentioned above, the Friends have never been more closely united than at present; their foreign-mission work has never been more extensive or better organized; nor has greater practical interest been taken in education, more interest in social and neighborhood betterment, more extended or deeper spiritual interest among the younger members; and, while the old revivalist methods have fallen largely into disuse, there is a genuine evangelistic spirit of outreaching and upbuilding very general throughout the body. To these must be added the extensive relief and reconstruction work or "service of love," as it has been called, in which all the Friends have been engaged since 1917. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this service. Taken up originally with the simple desire to aid those suffering from the war, and to show that pacifists were not necessarily shirkers of service, this self-sacrificing, voluntary labor has developed and extended into an almost international work. Great trust and responsibility have been placed, unasked, upon the Friends, and their name has become known far and wide in this connection. There is also a prospect of the continuance of this or similar work both at home and abroad.

That the reaction of recent movements within the Society has already been great is evident; what it will be in the future it is too soon to predict. One effect of the war and the relief service has been to lead many not only to examine more fully into the grounds of their religious belief, an examination to which the Young Friends' Movement has contributed in no small degree, but also to see what part the Friends should take in the effort to strengthen Christian faith and rebuild society on a Christian basis. Moreover, national and world conditions seem to call, as never before, from the Friends for a greater service, not only in definitely religious work, but also in the fields of labor adjustment and social betterment and uplift, a service for which their democratic Christian organization, their emphasis on positive good-will, and their simple religious faith would seem peculiarly to fit them.

The Friends, like the other churches, are thus facing serious problems both internal and external, the solution of which is still unknown and in the future; but to adopt the words of another,¹ "They look forward with courage and confidence, believing that the good hand of God which has been over them in blessing in the past is still guiding them and will continue to lead them into larger service for him who is the Master of us all."

¹ Professor Williston Walker regarding the Congregationalists in the *American Journal of Theology*, XXIV, 18.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF JESUS' HOPE

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I

Jesus' hope for the world seems to separate him from the tasks of civilization. All his teachings have reference to the Kingdom of God, which, as he conceived it, is not to be obtained by historic progress, but is to descend suddenly from heaven in divine power. The short interval, which he expected between his announcement that the Kingdom is at hand and its catastrophic inauguration, was not to be for its evolution, but for preparation of heart for the Kingdom's appearing. His absorption in that celestially originated order excluded from his mind the problems of the developments of industry, government, culture, as these demands confront us. The influence of Jesus upon the progress of social institutions seems to many to be based upon one of the most fortunate misconceptions that ever blessed mankind. But now that his authentic thought and ideal have been recovered, we can no longer profit by the age-long mistake.

The limits of an article on this subject permit only a few unexpanded reflections and suggestions. Their lacks will be evident to everyone who appreciates that all the contents of Jesus' soul were fused into his expectation and molded by it; that the main current of spiritual history flowed through it; that the contrasts between his gospel and the conditions that men have to face and the work that men have to do, may separate life into discordant realms, with increasing confusions of faith and action. The arguments for modern scholarship's view of Jesus' eschatology I must, except for a few intimations, leave to each reader to find or to work out for himself. Those who may think that my emphasis upon the social motives of

Jesus' hope is at the expense of its religious and personal elements, will recognize that I am obliged to make a selection. Yet I acknowledge that my social emphasis is because of my conviction that the faith and hope of Jesus are social in ground and origin, social in essence, social in fulfilments.

A detailed knowledge of Jesus' expectation would require much clearer and fuller reports of his teaching than we possess. In such paucity of data we should be cautious of exaggerating contradictions and incongruities, and should concentrate upon elements of his prophecy that are pervasive. There are important differences from Jewish, Pauline, and other forms of the hope then prominent in Israel, of an impending revolution of the world by divine interference. From these are derived many statements incorrectly attributed to Jesus by the evangelists. But there remain in the synoptic records utterances derived from their most authentic sources and which are consistent with our best substantiated knowledge and clearest impression of him. In these reports we recognize his own message. Jesus shared the general hope. He purified it. He poured into it his own spiritual consciousness and social passion.

Jesus' expectation differs from the materialism, secularism, and exclusive nationalism of the Jewish and—with modifications—the Jewish-Christian eschatology. It also differs from the celestially inclined hope of Paul, from which the colors of Jesus' earth of the glorious future have faded, and from the still more transcendentalized expectation of the gospel and epistle called by the name of John. Jesus looked into the near future of the world for the realization of the Kingdom of God, and anticipated there a social order worthy of God to give and of men to receive.¹

¹ Careful readers of the New Testament, though not technically trained, can construct the expository argument on its main lines for themselves. They should keep to the first three gospels, read "age" for "world" in most places where it makes sense, and understand "treasure—or reward—in heaven" not of where the treasure is to be enjoyed, but where it is being kept. Also, "the Kingdom of God" is evidently Jesus' usual phrase; and Luke 17:21 refers to the Kingdom's sudden irruption: the translation "among you" is near enough. These hints may help to correct other misapprehensions.

The change which Jesus expected is only subordinately a change in the material world. It is a regenerated, revolutionized order of human life upon the earth. Some synoptic passages indeed, judged to be essentially his because they are characteristic of him and closely represent their oldest sources, appear inconsistent with this anticipation. Such incongruities are unavoidable in a conception which no vision or thought can make a complete unity. There are glorious confusions from hopes so exultant that they can never, to our thought at least, be realized on this earth; as the absence of death, the tangible presence of those risen from the dead, including himself, and the ordering of the forms of human life upon celestial models—"like unto the angels." That these confusions did not confuse him is due to his prophetic consciousness, essentially different from the claim of a magical clairvoyance of future events. It is not a rationalizing, systematically constructive consciousness. He was not concerned to work out a utopian system. The new order is the Father's gift. It includes every good which the Father can bestow upon his children. How its blessings are to be interrelated is the Father's concern, not his. Of inexhaustible significance is his relation of the Kingdom to the divine Fatherhood.

He thought that nothing men can do hastens or retards this impending divine event. Its coming and the moment of its coming depend upon God only. Far from his faith was the Jewish assumption, that if Israel should keep the law for one day the Kingdom of God would come. Yet men are to await it, not with folded hands, but with girded loins and lamps trimmed and burning. "Repent" was his proclamation, "for the Kingdom of God is at hand." The word inadequately translated "repent" means an inward revolution. It is not merely a repudiation of the conduct condemned by the morality and religion of his time or of any imperfect time. It is not satisfied with standards of righteousness below those which his own life expressed. The very spirit of the Kingdom, the inward

holiness, self-renouncing devotion, and all-enduring, all-forgiving ministering love, to which the blessings of the new order correspond, must be implanted and must grow in the receptive heart. Not that this establishes the Kingdom in the heart thus directed to it. Nor has it become established in the present fellowship of men thus changed in mind. It is to be a regnant social order, not yet realized. Yet this new life in the soul makes its possessors sons of the Kingdom, no longer children of the present age. This part of Jesus' gospel opens to us his own inexhaustible treasures of character, spiritual life, and devoted ministry.

These are the two essential, inclusive elements of Jesus' message: the all-important divine event in the near future and preparation of heart for it. "Be changed inwardly: for the Kingdom of God is at hand." But between these two extends a vast field of human tasks. Only by the fulfilment of our responsibility to the tasks of civilization may mankind advance toward the perfected world-order of Jesus' hope. Admitting, as we are forced to admit, that Jesus was mistaken both in the nearness and the manner of the coming of God's Kingdom on earth, and that he made no conscious provision for our inalienable responsibility, must we undertake it with only incidental help from him, acknowledging that his gospel is not for the world as it is, to make it the world as it ought to be?

II

The significance of Jesus' expectation, it is said with increasing currency, is his perception that the betterment of the world depends, not upon a process of natural evolution, but upon spiritual forces. In this sense, it is said, the Kingdom descends from heaven and is God's gift, whether it comes soon or late, suddenly or progressively. Without entering upon a critical analysis of this thought, we may accept its estimate of spiritual powers. That appreciation will, I believe, make evident that the essentials of Jesus' hope are indispensable for the task of civilization which we have to do, and inevitably

translatable into it. Also, our fulfilment of our task will be found to be historically conditioned upon his hope as he held it, to the practical sufficiency of which its mistakes and limitations are requisites.

One with the best spirit of our age, one with a militant and devoted humanism, is Jesus' prophecy of a perfected earth. "The distant triumph song" sounded for him, not from the heaven above us, but from the earth as it is to be, from happy, pure, and loving men, even as we hear it, whose hearts humanity has touched, while we toil for the world's perfecting. His deepest and tenderest consolation to his disciples about to be bereft of him, was not that they should "meet the Lord in the air," nor that he, coming again, would "receive them unto himself," in that heaven to which he was returning, but that he who had so often pledged with them the cup of joy and love would "drink it new with them in the Kingdom of God." It is not heaven that we are working for or can work for, but earth as he foresaw it. The toiler's Kingdom of God is to be here. Often our hope of the world's progress is turned to doubt, sometimes to despair. Then we limit ourselves to patching one rent or another of an old decaying garment. We fret to make some conditions a little less intolerable, some human interrelations a little less discordant, if we can, between man and man, nation and nation, race and race, those who are in possession and those who are frantic to possess. Then we sink to futile compromises. We wander along desert trails that lead nowhere. Both aim and inspiration depart from resultless tasks. We need the reassurance that abides in the spirit of humanity, and which rises in our hearts from the insight and confidence of him who was most human. In his vision we see that the aims most spiritual, the faith most heroic, move unfalteringly on to the hope that is set, not unrelatedly above us, but attainably before us. It is this hope which intensifies the great task of humanity upon earth, the realization of humanity in the conditions and relations of earth.

Jesus' gospel of the Kingdom offers not only inspiration to an attainable goal, but guidance no less. His Kingdom is for the poor; this is our directive principle. His dominant beatitudes are to the hungry, who shall be filled; for them that mourn, who shall be comforted. The earth is the inheritance of the meek, even the lowly and oppressed. These announcements are not figurative. Does one offer rescue in a figurative sense to drowning men, or figuratively promise bread to starving children? Nor is he pointing to heaven, as we have indolently and supinely misunderstood him. He is speaking of the establishment of his Father's Kingdom upon the earth. Those who groan under the intolerable yoke of tyranny, inequality, inhumanity, and are hungering and thirsting for God's righteousness on the earth, shall have their longing satisfied. The last are first in his exultant hope, as in his beneficent compassion: the last must be first in every human task. The initial object of every service is the least of these his brethren.

In this incontrovertible interpretation of his words, ministry, social passion, our discipleship to Jesus gains a meaning more revolutionary than any socialistic programs, which must be tested, without prejudice either way, by their practical working out of his aim. His gospel of the Kingdom imposes a task pervasive of all our life, of every man's calling, of all our organizations and institutions. Only as practically directed to the redemption of the poor, the neglected, the miserable, is any comfort, pleasure, character, spirituality, permissible, any advantage of birth, opportunity, ability. All things which are not directed and proved effective to this end are to his disciples unclean, hateful. They are blasphemies of his name, repudiations of his leadership, rejections of his salvation. They are Peter's denials of him, and Judas' betrayal. Ministry to the last and least is the primary and inclusive purpose of all government, all commerce, all industry, all social relations. By service directed to them impartial

benefit is secured for all. For this purpose the gifts of genius descend from the wisdom and compassion of the all-loving fatherhood, wealth is accumulated and distributed, inventions conquer the material to human uses and ends, and the church preaches the gospel to the poor.

The spiritual nobility of Jesus' hope exempts it from particularistic and materialistic aims. Moral and spiritual regenerations are inseparable from the blessings of his Kingdom. Into it may enter only the righteous, kind, loving, forgiving. Therefore our ministry to the last and least, which regulates all personal and social action, is, above all else, though not prior to all else, cultivation of their mind and heart and soul, of their character, spirituality, service: Of them is required devotion to his self-renouncing ideals, including the forgiveness which brings men back to one another from every hatred, hostility, and prejudice, however caused, and makes those who were enemies of one another fellow-workers for the Kingdom of God. When we merge with Jesus' compassion for the poor his demands upon them—for the least in that Kingdom is to be greater than the greatest of this age—when we recognize them as first in human and divine regard, that they may be blended with all citizens of the Kingdom in equal and supreme privilege and service, it can be said with clearer meaning, that there is no other practicable all-inclusive aim for humanity and every member of it. Then every other principle of advance yields to Jesus' compassionate concentration of all human forces upon the neglected, the oppressed, the last and least. The opposite principle, most monstrous inhumanism of the passing era dominated by physical science, that the inheritance of the earth is the contention of the strong and the spoil of the strongest, has gone down in the world-war to everlasting contempt. Between the two principles there is no standing-ground, and Jesus' principle can make no compromise. Whatever aim is not directed to that or comes short of that, thereby reverts to the opposite. It is time to shame

its antagonist out of thought as out of history. Let the ape and tiger die out of our philosophies. For men are of a higher order, which has attained another principle, save as the brutes have devotions to the helpless, in anticipations of the human. The futility of the anti-Christian principle is attested by the dark places of the earth, the habitations of cruelty, and by suffering bodies and barren souls about us, by the groaning ages, the horrible reverses of humanity, by irreparable wastes of ability stifled under poverty and oppression, by potencies of ministry suppressed, by thought and beauty and leadership wrenching in vain at their prison bars, or dead at hungry mothers' empty breasts.

III

But what did he do about it? He did the only thing he could do, and it was the strongest thing that could ever be done. He founded the new humanity, which is the fellowship of his social passion. This was not the church. No utterance of his which meets the tests of authenticity as demonstrated in the general trend of modern scholarship, mentions the church. It receives no sanction or inheritance from him, except in so far as it belongs, with other practical stimulations and agencies, in the fellowship of his social passion. Many tests of membership which all branches and divisions of the church agree in imposing are nonessential to the fellowship which he formed and is ever forming. Even the confession of his name is not a requisite. Multitudes of those whom he has united in his spirit do not know the source of their regenerated social and personal life. This result is to his unspeakably greater honor, to the deeper recognition of his power. Multitudes in distant climes, who never heard of him, multitudes who lived before his coming, are members of the brotherhood which he established by completing it; for their spirit is so akin to his, and his regenerative power is so much greater than theirs, that their true devotions to humanity must find his deeper intensities, must be merged into his larger and clearer aims.

The sympathetic student of spiritual history must judge that the greatest names are destined to array themselves under the name that is above every name. This judgment becomes conviction in men of conscious discipleship to him. In the way most direct, simple, inevitable, he established the new humanity, into which everything truly human pours itself. He attached to himself a little company, in most of whom he kindled a spark from his own fire. That little company became an enlarging nucleus—not conterminous with the church, even in its early history—of the new humanity, or rather of humanity restored to its own inmost nature. This renewed mankind, which is not an abstraction or a mass, but a concrete unity of souls interrelated in him, endured, expanding, contracting, corrupted, repurified, baffled, resurgent, but ever on its way to subdue all human life unto itself.

Against the discredited interpretations of history which, in various formulations, reduce its power of advance to material forces, capable of only material results, stands history's own witness that its power grows through companies of men in whom a vision has dawned and a passion has been enkindled, and that material things and developments are their instruments. So, when we are tempted to despair of any predominant good resulting from the colossal sins, sacrifices, heroisms, of the world-war, and we sorrow over reactions of greed and insensibility, confusions breeding confusions, recrudescences of brute and devil, our courage grows strong again when we find, in high places and lowly places, men to whom life can never again be as far as it was from Jesus' hope and aim. We become aware of heart responding to fraternal heart, and determined will joining determined will, into the fellowship of those whom the woes and intrinsic spiritualities of humanity have absorbed. We know that the world's future is given into their hands. This fellowship springs from the heroic devotion of those who gave their lives that humanity might live. So the all-inclusive fellowship created by Jesus, in which this fellowship

from the world-war was formed and is completed, is vitalized forever from his heroic sacrifice. His glorious death of love, agony, and shame rises increasingly, in immortal life, into the brotherhood of the world as it is to be. This is what he did about it. He did the only thing he could do, and it was the strongest thing that could ever be done.

Jesus' expectation of the almost immediate gift of God's Kingdom can connote a lack of wisdom only to those who suppose that thought has any value when it is less than a transforming power. The dissevered intellectualism which then remains is on a level with the performances of arithmetical prodigies. The wise man is not one who separates himself from those limitations of his time which enshrine its noblest hopes and aims. The prophets of Israel were greater, not less, for conditioning the world's hope upon the fortunes of Israel. If it were true that certain medieval thinkers anticipated the German idealists, and died leaving no trace upon the mind of their age, those barren cliffs of desolate seas cannot compare in the world's gratitude with men who spoke to their own time some comprehensible word that stirred it on. It is wisdom to take into one's own soul the highest, strongest impulse which at the time broods on the hearts of men. This Jesus did when he fused the contemporary expectation of the Kingdom of God into all his thoughts and deeds. It is wisdom to ennoble and humanize the supreme impulse of one's own time, to enforce the moral and spiritual conditions of realizing its hope, and to create its devoted brotherhood. This Jesus did. If he had attempted or even imagined more, he would have accomplished little, for only through appropriation of the best in one's own generation can one work upon the ages following. And when the form bursts asunder, the spirit, which pours itself into the molds of each generation, remains to inspire and guide through all successive forms.

What personal expectation mingled with his universal hope? Did he anticipate a seat on the right hand of power, coming

on the clouds of heaven and all his holy angels with him? Such claims wake little response in hearts attuned to his self-renouncing ministry. We welcome every success of criticism in sifting out from the Gospels the additions to his authentic sayings concerning the Kingdom of God, because so little is left of the pretensions attributed to him. His theme was the Kingdom, not the Christ. All the more evidently is he central in his eternal religion because the supreme significance is forced upon him by the experience of his disciples. So the Fourth Gospel would be a tawdry thing if understood to be an authentic report of his own words and deeds. It is a glorious thing, notwithstanding its ecclesiasticisms and long antiquated attempts at philosophy, when it is recognized as the imaging of the significance which Jesus has attained in the mind and heart of humanity. Criticism has not been able indeed to deny his messianic consciousness, but has made evident that this consciousness was predominantly of the inspired and empowered herald of the Kingdom. So predominantly that every forward look into his own destiny was the confidence of the victory of his mission, expressed in whatever incidental and traditional forms. The popular understanding of the title "Son of Man," though it has no suspicion of the original meaning, does not misinterpret essentially his mission and his consciousness. He who announced the Kingdom, building better than he knew, as does every man in proportion as the spirit of humanity and the God of it sweeps through him, founded the Kingdom from the spiritual attainments of humanity and his own soul, by forming the brotherhood of service to the last and least. He desires no pompous throne from which to lord it over us and to exercise authority upon us. He came into the world's history never to be ministered unto, forever to minister, to the utmost power of redemptive sacrifice. The attainments of his life, the triumph of his cause, are his only lordship. They are his supreme lordship because he gave himself to them utterly.

The heralding of the Kingdom, his essential messiahship, determined all his ministry. For the sufficient herald has more to do than to announce his message in words. The very spirit of the Kingdom must possess him, must be expressed in him, and this is one with the holy spirit of God. He could not have announced the Kingdom if his life and deeds had not enabled him to say, "The spirit of the Lord is upon me." That spirit of the Kingdom makes its representative holy in its holiness, loving in its love, unto the last demand of heroic devotion, and stern as the conditions of entering the Kingdom are inviolable. It urges him to those ministries which shall constitute the Kingdom's consummations, it impels him to open the blind eyes, to set at liberty them that are bruised, to preach the gospel to the poor, to receive sinners and to eat with them, to pour himself out to the last and least. His unparalleled, but not miraculously incredible influence upon sick bodies and distracted minds, through the faith which his announcement awakened, was derived from the same consciousness that as ambassador he was the representative of the Kingdom's beneficent power. Through all the wild exaggerations of the gospel reports there is manifest in him a calm restraint in his exercise of this influence. He subordinated it to his office of herald of the Kingdom, and made it contributory to his high calling. Therefore it never led him into failure, through attempts to exceed that power's legitimate exercise. He correctly viewed his mighty works as attestations of his message, credentials of his office. And as the Kingdom is God's gift, so these works of his are by God's power. In every way Jesus' announcement of the Kingdom rises into the power of his life to organize it.

Complaints against Jesus that he failed to attack the evil or senescent institutions of his day need not long detain the historic sense. These criticisms take too little account of his terrific indignations, his blastings of those abuses which encountered his high mission. In the reports of his denun-

ciations, the bitterness, unfairness, and scurrility attributed to him by the evangelists, manifest so plainly the temper aroused in his successors by their conflicts with Judaism, and are so unlike his habitual poise in the face of his antagonists, that no unbiased historic criticism can charge them against him. He entered the conflicts necessary to his heart-searching and persuasive announcement of the Kingdom of God. Whatever opposed that proclamation he fought down, though the battle swept on to Calvary. His two chief antagonists were hypocrisy and inhumanity. Hypocrisy was to him the substitution of another spirit for the spirit of the Kingdom. Inhumanity culminated in the laying of a stumbling-block in the way of God's little ones. This was the battle which his heralding encountered. Upon it has depended our age-long strife. Faithful to his orders, he refused to divide his forces for any other.

IV

The work left for us, in connecting the two great elements of Jesus' gospel, involves modifications of some of his teachings in the interest of his purpose, to which alone they are subordinate, and by which alone they are amendable. Literal faithfulness to them is spiritual unfaithfulness to his aim. Non-resistance to the evil man, or that waiving of an individual right which compromises the progress of universal human rights, means something different from Jesus' view, to those who must work out the order which he expected to descend soon from God. The accumulation, distribution, and use of wealth may be different from the unsocial covetousness and self-indulgence against which he prophesied, when we take wealth as an instrument for serving his ends. The developing institutions and goods of civilization are different when they become the progressive incarnations of the good most dear to him. In these tasks we develop instruments outside his absorptions, and unnecessary for the work he had to do.

The work which is left to us makes the demands of our discipleship severe and difficult. A man who loses in the things of it Jesus' spirit and purpose is none of his. Then our toils and strifes, however we may attempt to justify them, become subversive of his desire. When the pursuit or retention of these things contradicts his purpose, we must unbind ourselves from them and fling them away. None the less, ineffectiveness in any man's part of the world's work is more severely judged by the standards of the Kingdom than by the world's inconsiderate demands. God's workmen have no time off. Sleep and food, recuperations and replenishments of exhausted powers, play, respites when "I loaf and invite my soul," books and art, joy and love, prayer; meditation, and the cultivation of the spiritual life, all are for the world's work that we have to do, and implicit in it; and the sternest demand of the work, which is the life, is that it shall somehow and every way direct itself and concentrate itself upon Jesus' great purpose of ministry to the last and least. When this is done, the care and fret and exhausting self-regarding ambition, with slavish dependence upon the world's estimates of success, fall away, leaving it all a delight in the spirit and purpose which now occupy even its least details.

Whatever powers we employ for his Kingdom's service, the supreme energies are from his heart. The age to come is the conquest of his sacrifice and ours, as at every morning's renewal of our tasks we take up our cross and follow him. Force beats back evil that a space may be won where his plants of life may grow, from his light, his tears, his bloody sweat. We use resisting, annihilating force to the end that it may become unnecessary. The carnal weapons of our warfare achieve victories by the superior strength of heroic devotion, not because we take the lives of his enemies, but because we give our own. From the compulsions which we enlist for his cause, we keep out, so imperfectly, the opposites of his spirit, which cancel his designs. And we find, in sublime contrasts

to its inefficiencies, how great were his ways of getting things done. So wealth, though it may be his instrument, may suddenly change, even in the hands of best intention, from a rod of power to a serpent that darts at the face of him who holds it. Still the covetousness of its accumulation and the self-indulgence of its use are as evident as when Jesus branded the mammon of unrighteousness. Dives, faring sumptuously every day, is eulogized because some crumbs from his table are fed to Lazarus laid at his gate full of sores. Even wealth's purest philanthropies are infected by the injustices of its accumulation and tenure of proprietorship in an un-Christianized, unhumanized industrial order. Many who have the talent, which they must use, for getting it, and are oppressed by the load of it, struggle in vain against the present barbarous conditions, to find a practicable way to the righteous acquiring and distributing of it. Those who are most blatant to show the way out are blind leaders whom only the blind can conscientiously follow. The intensifying class struggle for wealth makes little progress because it neglects to consider the purpose of wealth. The church, though not competent to work out a science of wealth, is under obligation to proclaim a gospel of its motives and ends, by which its methods may be tested; but she shirks her responsibility. To this inefficiency is due a large part of her futilities. And meanwhile the wealthiest benefactions descend from riches of the soul. So institutions which house the finer accumulations of civilization are transient tabernacles of the humanity regenerated from Jesus' heart. Many which seemed essential have become superfluous. Artificial complexities will work out into natural simplicities at last. Our tasks are like those which we give to a child, when we care little for what is outwardly accomplished, if only the child is developed by them. Yet all the more earnestly do we apply these insufficient devices because we perceive their insufficiency, for our task is not only to use them, but continually to improve the means which we must use, unto

perfectings beyond our sight, changing the earth as it is into the earth that is to be. All the realm bequeathed to us between Jesus' goal and his creation of the new humanity, we fill from his life which continually renews and unites us, and from his purpose which guides us. We are servants bidden to wait and watch for our lord; but his way to us is impassable; therefore we go to meet him, and across the flood that bars his progress, we, with labor and long pain, build the road by which the King of Glory shall come in.

V

Now that Jesus' hope is found to be fixed upon a perfected earth, the charges against him of otherworldliness and historic pessimism fall to the ground. They were always evidently contrary to his view of nature and his estimate of man. But from the opposite direction objections arise, only to be merged into his hope.

Perfection, it is urged, is unattainable and undesirable. It would turn to evil if attained. A perfected earth, with all its problems solved, all its ambitions accomplished, with nothing to do except the same old things, nothing left to strive for, to amend, would be a lubber-land, a garden of Eden, a blank, an extinction. But it is a deeper thought that perfection is not static, but dynamic, an energy of holy love that fulfils itself and accomplishes evolving tasks always and from more to more. No lower, idler perfection than this is in Jesus' soul, nor is anything unworthy of this in his hope. Hope does not contradict the energies that form it.

But, it is again objected—and these two objections seem to involve whatever may be challenged from this side—this earth, which Jesus made his goal in what he supposed the fulfilment of God's purpose, is as a spark in the flaming universe, gleaming for a moment and then ashes. What are the traversible miles of its circumference, in spaces which light-years cannot measure! What are the computable millenniums of its possible

habitableness, in eons to which the birth, duration, and death of the star-mist beyond Andromeda are an incident! The expectation of Jesus may seem to disappear with the shriveling up of his cosmology. Is the human spirit, in this instance at its most generous ideal, again overwhelmed by superspatial and supertemporal immensity? Yet in some estimates all bigness sinks into insignificance in comparison with the universe of Jesus' soul. Nor would our astronomy have changed his hope and purpose any more than, upon reflection, it need change ours, who know the science of which he was ignorant, and are learning the rudiments of the wisdom which he knew. For the work which anyone must do is the work next his hand. If it is an eternal task, it begins and forever continues with the task at hand. The universe beyond this world is not now our field of labor: it becomes so by our work upon this earth. Every faithful man works in the lot assigned to him, or rather, attainable by him, to make that place better, in Jesus' spirit, towards Jesus' goal. Each faithful man works with every other in the works which unite and advance to redeem the earth in Jesus' spirit and to Jesus' goal. And when we feel ourselves transcendent of these limitations, for God hath set not the world only, but eternity in our heart, we may see our earth task flashing its signals beyond the orbit of Mars. They are responsive signals. God's work of redemption is everywhere in his encircling skies, accomplished by those who in every lot attainable by them work together for his Kingdom in the works appointed them. The perfecting of earth is essential and directive in Jesus' work and ours. It is not final. The service of the last and least everywhere is final. The work and the workers beyond us are one with us in his prayer, "Thy Kingdom come."

VI

When we ask what detailed contributions Jesus has made to the consciousness and the tasks of our awakening spiritual humanism, the wealth of the answer amazes us. He discovered,

to mention only a part of his discoveries; the child, the woman, the common man, the union of spiritual aims with daily toils, the fundamental answer to the perplexities of human relations. From the God of the social passion down to the place of the sparrow and the grass of the field in the universal order, which is the Father's love, everything that enters man's life or touches it is implicit in Jesus' gospel. Every problem of politics, of industry, of the courses of individual lives, of the unity of lives in the great human brotherhood, depends for the essential of its solution, and therefore for the use and direction of every element in the process of its solution, upon his progressive creation of a new humanity concentrated in the primal devotion to the last and least. The demonstration of this thesis is far beyond the scope of these few reflections. It can be completely established only when the Kingdom of God is come. Yet it is safe to derive our guiding principle, whose proof can be only in its outworking, from the fusion of Jesus' hopes with the works we have to do; especially as that principle has never yet failed to result in deep satisfactions to the man who tests his life's efficiencies by their workings out of character and spirituality, of joy and love, and of the conditions favorable to these things. This effectiveness is the supreme instance of the universal content, the inexhaustibly unfolding applications of simplest principles. Nor is this appreciation lessened by the recognition of the wide realms which Jesus could not enter. The greatness of any thinker is measured by the applicability of his thought to activities which are, by historic necessity, outside his view. The wisdom which meets that test has attained the heart of things. It is a continually evolving and originating power of thought and action in its disciples, and becomes more originaive with each successive generation of them.

In our day, as in other epochs of change, mankind has seemed to have come to the parting of the ways, the parting of Jesus' way from ours. Once more many earnest men, with

tender reverence, with stern devotion to the work at hand, bid him farewell. They and the generations after them, they know, can never forget the gentlest, holiest, manliest presence that ever blessed the earth. Sanctifying memories of him will, they gratefully acknowledge, impart inspiration to tasks which, they judge, are not his tasks, and which must be pursued along ways that are not his way. With aching hearts of loneliness we follow the path which now opens to our advance. And before us again we see the guiding presence of our Master. In his leadership we are united into the new humanity continuously created by him, as he leads us, one in heart and purpose, to the neglected, the oppressed, the last and least of his brethren. To the starving, ruined peoples he leads us, and to the waste places of the earth, many of them at our doors; wherever there is ignorance, wherever there is crime, and the publicans and the harlots rise up and follow him; wherever there is poverty that withholds the largest human privilege; wherever a little child of a backward race has denied to it equal and supreme opportunity of all the accumulated excellencies of mankind. It is into a regenerated civilization that we follow him. It were better for a civilization that a millstone were hanged about its neck and that it were drowned in the depth of the sea, than that it should lay a stumbling-block before one of these little ones. Through this earth and beyond it, we his brotherhood, sweeping into our front ranks those who were the neglected and oppressed, follow him, to the spirits in prison, to the innumerable dead of unilluminated ages, wherever in his unending path there are blind eyes to be opened, dead souls to rise again, hate to be won to love, lower forms of existence to be led up into his universal human, forms of spiritual life unimaginable to us, to be united in the fellowship of his inexhaustible helpfulness; there is his leading, there is our following, into fulfilments everywhere of the love for which he died.

THE INDIANIZATION OF CHRISTIANITY

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In Christianizing the Hellenic world of the first few Christian centuries, Christianity became pretty largely Hellenized, especially in its apologetic and dogmatic formulas. Fortunately for the Christians of Graeco-Roman culture, those who introduced them to Christianity did not introduce the new faith in the form of creeds and dogmas. The missionaries to that world were men of contagious faith and heroic adventure, whose lives were joined by vital links to Jesus Christ. Their contribution to the Hellenic world was a living religion of redemption, and not a system of theology.

But the Christianity that emerged from the Mediterranean world of the Graeco-Roman age was quite a different religion. Dr. Hatch in his *Hibbert Lectures* on the influence of Greek ideas on Christianity has lucidly unfolded the tremendous change between the Christianity of the Sermon on the Mount and the Christianity of the Nicene Creed. This difference is explicable in terms of the Hellenic social environment into which the new faith came, early in its history. It was only to be expected that the Greeks would interpret Jesus and the religion of Jesus through the media of their current religious and philosophical imagery. And it is to the everlasting credit of the Greek Fathers that their critical work was so constructive that it met the needs of the day. The question remains: Do we do them justice or do we deal justice to the constructive Christian thinking of the subsequent centuries if we attempt to make their formulations normative for all time?

There is always constructive Christian thought in process. It is psychologically necessary that such thinking be in terms of the imagery of the environment, chronological and social.

It is the glory of the Christian faith that it is always so vitalizing that strong men feel the urge to interpret its great facts, especially its greatest fact, Jesus Christ, in terms of the current philosophy of life. This is one of the reasons that its redemptive influence continues throughout the ages to suffice for peoples of varying molds of thought.

The prophets of power are those who have spoken as with the voice of God the Christian message as it related itself to a living situation. So the author of the Fourth Gospel, and Clement and Origen of Alexandria became prophets to the Hellenic civilization. So Augustine bore a prophetic message to Imperial Rome. So Anselm arose like a seer to the culture of medieval Europe. So Thomas Aquinas uttered the message for the day when Aristotelianism was revived in the latter Middle Ages. So Martin Luther became the prophet of the Reformation. So John Calvin vocalized the prophetic message for nationalistic Europe. So Horace Bushnell spoke with the prophet's voice to the dawning democratic spirit. And in the same way others are becoming prophets of the Christian life to the newly awakened social consciousness.

May we not take it as significant of the vitalizing, redemptive power of our religion that the keener minds among the converts to Christianity in countries to which the missionary has gone are jealous of a similar opportunity? The missionary is at best a stranger in a strange cultural environment. Sometimes his task takes him among people whose culture is decidedly primitive. At other times he finds himself planted on the soil of an environment with a culture with greater claims to antiquity than his own. In any case he comes among the new peoples, the heir to a wealth of social imagery that has supplied the tools for all of his past religious thinking, but which is foreign in many respects to the thought processes of his new neighbors and friends. He cannot escape the disadvantage of clothing his message in intellectual molds other than those common to his hearers. In spite of an

overwhelming desire to do full justice to the gospel which he bears, in his hands it invariably presents some aspects of a foreign religion. It is for this reason, that the missionary enterprise is increasingly being realized as the task of building up strong churches with intelligent leaders, native to the soil and the culture, so that the religion of Jesus may assume a more indigenous character everywhere.

I

Each country or social group presents problems peculiar to itself. In India one of the problems is created by the widely divided social strata of the people. It is not the mere division into the classes and the masses. Nor is it the division between capital and labor. The caste system is more than social; it is more than economic. Its roots are deeply imbedded in an ancient history, and its fibers are inextricably interwoven with religious strands. Moreover it has been traditional to confine the chief cultural advantages to those belonging to the "higher" castes, and to deny such advantages to those of the "lower" castes or to the non-caste peoples. One result is that one may find within the precincts of a single village men of culture and mental acumen and others scarcely beyond the stage of primitivity.

It is of no small significance that the majority of the converts to the Christian faith have been from the depressed and backward classes. It is not my place to discuss at this point the particular phase of Christianity that has proved most attractive to these peoples. The point to be noted is that, until they were given greater cultural advantages than they had enjoyed hitherto, they were not in a position to make much contribution to the task of rendering an Indian interpretation of their new faith. Now that we are getting to the third and fourth generation of Christians in some localities, the situation is rapidly changing. Christians, whose forefathers a few generations ago were the victims of a system

that gave them few of the advantages of education, are today graduating and graduated from the various colleges of general and technical learning throughout the land.

There is the added fact that, though less common, there is a good number of Christians from caste communities who bring with them to their adopted faith the heritage of their ancient civilization. In many cases the thought processes have been more active and the emotional element less prominent than in the case of the conversions from the backward classes. Hinduism has very little to offer the non-caste man. So when the claims of Christianity are presented, he has to choose between the traditional religion which proposes to perpetuate his disadvantages and the new faith which promises amelioration for his wrongs and a democracy of spiritual privileges. It is somewhat different with the caste man. He and his ancestors, for millenniums perhaps, have been in the enjoyment of the rights and privileges of Hinduism. When he becomes a Christian he does so because he has deliberated and reached the conclusion that the new religion has more to satisfy his felt needs than the old. The psychological process in the conversion experience of the average caste man has included more of the cognitive element than in the experience of the average non-caste man.

My personal observation is that Indian leadership is decidedly more prominent in the Indian church than it was when I first came to India fourteen years ago. And I may add that Indian Christians have grown immensely in the capacity for leadership during these years. This is as it should be. It indicates the dawning of the day when the Indian people will lead not simply in the formal matters of church government, liturgy, and ceremonial, but also in the more spiritual affairs of interpretation and evaluation. Already some of the leaders are impatient for the withdrawal of foreign influence in the person of the missionary. And the wisdom of the mission societies is being evidenced where

they are studying the most practical and serviceable ways of giving the Indian church a larger share in the control and direction of Christian propagandism. It is not enough that the foreign influence should formulate plans and provide the money, inviting the Indian to help carry the schemes to fruition. He must be given an increasing share in the formulation of the plans which he is invited to realize.

II

The Christianizing of India will involve an Indianizing of Christianity, as surely as the Christianizing of the Graeco-Roman world involved the Hellenizing of Christianity. It is undeniable that India has as much right to interpret the world and to interpret Jesus as Hellenism had. The truth is that India is going to make her own interpretations whether the West likes or dislikes it. Surely Western Christendom should welcome the process as the harbinger of a day of larger significance for Jesus to the life and culture of the Orient.

We must all admit that the experience of God in human life, the consciousness of moral delinquency, the realization of salvation, and the redemptive influence of Jesus are facts too large to be confined within the logical categories of any human group. It is not a token of decadence but a sign of vitality that men are continually making new statements, new interpretations, and new evaluations in terms of the prevailing social consciousness. It is because Christianity is a religion of redemption and not simply a philosophy of religion or a system of dogma that men are never content to accept someone else's theory as doing justice to their own experiences. The reality of the matter is that all of these facts are transcendent facts, refusing to be confined to any definitions or theories, be they never so logically devised. The best that we can bring of mental as well as spiritual vigor to the task of realizing the meaning and worth of Jesus is all too little honor for that peerless life which we would proclaim as the world's Redeemer.

The psychology of the Indian religious consciousness is not easy for the West to appreciate. The imagery with which the thought processes of the Indian people proceed is so different from that of Westerners that we do not realize its significance without years of observation and study, and even then not fully. For this reason it is imperative for the future of the Christian religion that its presentation be by Indians for Indians.

1. In the first place the Indian mind responds more readily to parables than to syllogisms. Even the philosophic arguments abound in similes and metaphors. To many of the people an apt illustration is much more convincing and constitutes a more valid proof than any logical or mathematical deductions. For that reason the man with a ready wit in drawing parallels, which appeal as symbolic of the case that he is attempting to establish, is likely to be more successful in gaining assent to his arguments than one who proceeds in cold logic from premise to conclusion.

It is only necessary to be reminded of one or two of the most common similes to appreciate this phase of the Indian consciousness. One of the more frequent figures is stated somewhat thus: As all rivers flow eventually into the ocean, so all religions have their common goal in God. This is the usual method of evading the question of deciding between the relative merits of two religions. With others it is a sincere conviction that it matters not what one's religion may be, all of them being varying modes of worshipping the one God.

Another simile which is to be found frequently in the philosophic literature is one that is used in connection with the doctrine of *māyā* or illusion. This doctrine is a tenet of the monistic Vedantism of Sankaracharya the leading school of philosophy among Indian thinkers today. It teaches the identity of the individual soul (*ātman*) with the world-soul (*brāhman*), and claims that the sense of the plurality of phenomena is only illusory. The simile is stated somewhat as

follows: The perception of the not-self as distinct from the self is an illusion by virtue of ignorance, just as a man walking in the dark sees a rope and thinks it to be a snake. Sankara puts it: "Just as, by illusion, one ignores the rope and perceives the serpent, so does he of deluded intellect perceive the universe without realizing the truth."

Illustrations of this kind might be multiplied by references to the literature of India. They are of a piece with a poetic temperament which is quite characteristic of the people. The mines of poetic lore are only beginning to be explored by the world at large. There is not only the Sanskrit literature, but the Pali, and the literatures of the many vernaculars which abound in thoughts, mostly religious and largely poetic. Nor is the tendency confined to the past. It is in evidence very conspicuously among the thoughtful people of the present day.

2. In the second place, the Indian mind responds more readily to the idealistic than to the empirical method of thought. That is to say, there is a stronger tendency to posit a philosophy of life on the basis of a carefully reasoned system, than to find one's way to it through the maze of experience. That is not to say that there have not been and are not empiricists among Indian philosophers. The suggestion is rather that idealism is preponderant.

There are six systems of philosophy that may lay claim to orthodoxy. On the other hand there were two systems evolved which were regarded as heretical, and these developed in time into distinct religions, viz., Buddhism and Jainism. Of all these, the one system which is most empirical—Buddhism—is a heresy. As has been already indicated, the system which has won the largest number of followers is Vedantism, and that especially in the form of monistic idealism as outlined by Sankara.

The language adopted by many of the educated community, when using English as a medium of expression, is the language of idealism. God is spoken of as the Absolute, the Eternal

Being, the Infinite Being, the Imperishable, the Soul of the Universe, etc. Then all gods are spoken of as many manifestations of the universal Soul. And all religions are modes of worship and service directed to the Infinite.

The picture of man is also more idealistic than scientific. The results of anthropology and kindred sciences which give us the story of the human race from lowly cultural beginnings, and the progress made toward civilization are neglected or ignored. The Vedantic idealist portrays the history of mankind as one of regress instead of progress, the ideal man and the ideal caste being the Brahman of Indian lore, conceived in terms of unworldliness and divine wisdom. The salvation of the Hindu race or indeed of the world thus consists in the realization of the divinity within the soul of the individual.

These illustrations of the idealistic trend of thought indicate one phase of the Indian philosophic and religious temperament. The problem is yet open for solution: Is it possible to accomplish a synthesis of Christianity and Indian philosophic thought, even as Thomas Aquinas did in the case of Aristotelianism and the Christian faith?

3. A third observation in regard to the Indian religious consciousness is that it is inclined to be mystical and contemplative. The ideal of mysticism is a life of ineffable communion with or union with God. In pantheistic systems such as we find in Brahmanism and Buddhism, this communion with God usually is interpreted by the idea of absorption. In Brahmanic philosophy there is no thought more prevalent than the idea of the absorption (*samādhi*) of the individual soul (*ātman*) in the cosmic soul (*brāhman*). This is the goal of all striving, the *sine qua non* for the attainment of bliss (*moksha*). The philosophies of religion are interested in how the obstacles to that end are to be overcome, and the possible means of fulfilling that aim.

Now the Hindu position in regard to redemption is embodied in the desire for release from *karma* and *samsāra*

(metempsychosis). The various schemes for attaining salvation all have for their ultimate aim the release from transmigration through the overcoming of *karma*. The mystical element comes to the fore in the *yoga mār̥ga* or way of asceticism. The word "*yoga*" means yoking, and refers to steadfast contemplation (*dhyāna*) by the mind on things mystical or divine, as e.g., on the mystic syllable, *Om*. It encourages bodily asceticism (*tapas*), suggesting either abstention from works or else the performance of works without any thought of a possible reward.

This doctrine is largely responsible for the large number of religious mendicants that are to be found throughout India. The ascetic ideal is one which gains very ready honor among the Indian peoples. Even this summary statement of the *yoga* doctrine should serve as an explanation of the fact. Many of the most saintly characters have been ascetics so that Indian religious history abounds in names that all have been taught to hold in reverence, if not to worship.

III

Can the gospel of Jesus Christ be interpreted so as to appeal to the Indian consciousness? Is it possible to form a compact between Christianity and the social mind of India? That is the problem that besets the representatives of the Christian faith in India. We must lament that as yet no great progress has been made in that direction. But the fact that the need for such service is being felt, especially by the Indian Christian leadership of today, is promising for some constructive attempts in the near future.

One expression of Indianized Christianity is to be seen in the South Indian United Church, in which the Christians of several Protestant bodies have formed an organic union. The fact that even the Episcopal and Syrian Christian bodies are willing to discuss plans whereby they would unite with other churches is evidence of the fact that the Indian church

would have little mind to perpetuate the denominational distinctions of Western Christianity, if the latter influence were withdrawn.

Another expression of Christianity in an Indian garb is seen in the Christian Sadhu movement. Here we witness the attempt to link the Christian life to the *yoga* ideal. Its most outstanding example is seen in the person of Sadhu Sunder Singh, the Christian Sadhu who is so well known and loved in India, because he expresses the religion of Jesus after the Indian ideal of a holy life. His recent visits to England and America have given those lands an opportunity to appreciate Indian idealism.

The needs of today in this direction are profound. There is need for poets who will give the Indian church a hymnology that will be both Indian and Christian. There is need for artists who will interpret Christianity in music and painting in accordance with Indian ideals. There is need for architects who will give the Indian church a temple for social worship, both Indian and Christian. There is need for men of thought and piety to develop a liturgy both Indian and Christian. And finally there is need for men of learning and Christian experience to give to India an interpretation of Christianity in the social imagery of the land. In the words of the editor of the *Christian Patriot*, an Indian Christian journal:

If we desire to commend Christianity to India, we must have at the back of it a new Christian experience, as new as St. Paul's was to the Apostolic Church, and possibly as militant. This red-hot experience must be cast into the moulds fashioned by the genius of India during the ages, kept ready for use in the religious and metaphysical speculations of our spiritual ancestors whose blood runs in our veins. Then only will the Great Lord be satisfied with the true Gitanjili of His bhaktas in this land.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

Editorial Note—The progress of scholarship depends upon the interchange of ideas among those who are engaged in the work of research. Scholars are constantly conscious of important problems to which insufficient attention is being given. A clear statement of a matter which demands investigation may be the means of stimulating profitable discussion. The editor has asked a few scholars to state concisely certain problems which they would like to see solved in their several fields. It is hoped that this department of the *Journal of Religion* may be used for the brief, informal discussion of questions on which, perhaps, no one is yet ready to write at length.

WHY DO RELIGIONS DIE?

A subject upon which I have long wished for further light, and one which seems to me to possess great theoretical and even some practical interest, is the question, *Why religions die*. Leaving out of account the various primitive cults with their beliefs and mythologies, we are acquainted with some fourteen "historical religions"—sixteen if we include the religions of the Teutons and the Celts. Of these fourteen or sixteen faiths, each of which once commanded the unquestioning adherence of millions, only ten today survive. Among these ten, moreover, two (Buddhism and Zoroastrianism) have perished from the land of their origin, and a third (Jainism) is with difficulty sustaining a precarious life, and notes with every census the steady decline of its numbers. Why have some of these religions died? Why are some of them dying? May religions perish of disease or only by violence? If by disease, what are its symptoms and its causes? How many diseases are there which in the past have proved fatal to religions? Are the symptoms of any of these diseases to be found in any of the present religions of the world? Are they to be found in our own?

Plainly the solution of this problem requires the combined resources of the history and the psychology of religion. In one sense it is a historical problem. But it is a problem which no historian of religion can solve unless he is possessed of considerable psychological insight and has studied his facts from the psychological point of view. While he

must base his conclusions on an exact and detailed historical knowledge drawn from many fields, the conclusions which he reaches must be largely psychological in their nature, and they will be sound conclusions only if drawn both from exact historical investigation and also from a thorough understanding of the psychology of religion.

As is indicated in what I have said, there are nine or ten historical fields from which the major portion of our data must come: namely from the death of the Egyptian religion, the Babylonian, the Greek, the Roman, the Teutonic, the Celt, from the disappearance of Buddhism from India and of Zoroastrianism from Persia, and possibly the present decline of Jainism and the secularization of Shinto.

A consideration of this list enables us at once to begin a hazy and tentative outline for our investigation. It is plain that some religions die from violence while others fall prey to internal and more subtle evils. Some of them disappear before militant rivals through a process of peaceful conversion—as for example the Celtic and Teutonic religions and presumably several of the others. But this fact, true as it is, only puts our problem in a new form instead of solving it. For when one religion supplants another through peaceful propaganda, what are the characteristics of the two religions which make this process possible? Christianity was a much *better* religion than that of the Teutons or the Celts; but can one safely conclude that it supplanted them *because* it was better? If so, better in what respect? Is it always the *purser*, or the *more rational* religion that wins out in the struggle for existence? If not, what are the sources of strength and the sources of weakness?

But it is not always through hostile attack, whether of the sword, the tongue, or the pen, that religions weaken and die. Paganism died out of Europe and Buddhism died out of India not merely because they were attacked by hostile religions; for long before there was any violent propaganda against them they seem to have been in something approximating a moribund condition.

It is in these two fields, in fact, that we are likely to find our investigations the most fruitful. This is partly because it is in the decline of paganism and of Indian Buddhism that we get the question of religious pathology most sharply separated from the factors of violence and hostile missionary activity, and also because nowhere else can we find so much data bearing on our question. Our question in fact has already been answered in part by writers on these fields. There are a few good books dealing with the history of Buddhism which throw out suggestions as to the causes of its decline; and as to the death of paganism in Europe we are even better off. Many excellent books have been

written dealing with the triumph of Christianity and the rise and fall of the various Oriental cults in the Roman Empire which give us a good start toward the answer to our question. Yet no book with which I am acquainted attempts to give a complete analysis of the various causes, internal as well as external, which brought about the decay and death of Indian Buddhism or of the Greek or the Roman religion. What we need, moreover, is a work which should not only investigate the downfall of one of these but should compare the Indian and the European cases, glean what could be found in the decline of the other religions which have died, and seek to get at the social and psychological factors involved.

The intrinsic interest of such an investigation must be evident to all. It is conceivable, moreover, that it might bring useful practical information to those who care for the health and welfare of religion today. It is perfectly possible that such an investigation as I have suggested might treat us to some mild surprises. It may be that the forces most feared by religious people are not truly dangerous but that the most insidious disease germs are not greatly feared, and perhaps not recognized. At all events, a scientific autopsy carried out in the case of each of the dead religions could hardly fail to be of service to all those who, for either academic or practical reasons, are interested in knowing wherein lies the strength and wherein the weakness of the various religions of our own day, Christianity among the number.

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JAMES BISSETT PRATT

CRUCIAL PROBLEMS IN BIBLICAL THEOLOGY

It may be permissible for me to take the question asked in a broad enough sense to include the work I would like to see done, and the books written, in the different parts of my own field of biblical theology.

In the history of Old Testament religion I do not think the last word has been said about the beginnings of the ethical element which is so distinguishing a mark of this religion. The first inclination of the modern school of Old Testament science to attribute the ethical interpretation of religion to Amos and his successors was natural, but is certainly an inadequate account of the matter. Amos would not recognize himself as the discoverer of the truth that God is one who requires righteousness of men rather than sacrifice. How far can literary criticism and the comparative study of religions carry us toward the real secret—to put it as Wellhausen did—of the difference between the place of Chemosh, the god of Moab, and that of Yahweh, the god of Israel, in the spiritual history of mankind? The blending of ethics and religion which is the

greatness of prophetic teaching was apparently hardly more natural to the Hebrews than to their neighbors. Certainly it made its way slowly and with difficulty through the new championship of exceptional leaders from one age to another; and the outcome in Judaism was only half a victory for the prophetic faith. But its champions did arise one after another, and found always some response in the deeper consciousness of the people. Present studies in Old Testament religion seem to me to be too much interested in emphasizing its likenesses to contemporary religions, and its debts to religions before and about it, and too little concerned to find the secret of its difference. The likenesses and relationships are extremely important. It was necessary to undermine a structure which rested on the assumption of the entire uniqueness and fully exceptional supernaturalness of this history. But there is a peculiarity which we do not find explained and a greatness which we do not find appreciated in many modern treatments of the subject. One reads them with general consent to what they offer, but with a sense that the real quality of the Old Testament literature and history is not in them. The tendency toward the ethical, the inward, the spiritual—where did it start? how did it work? how was it related to outside influences and how to varying tendencies within Israel itself? These are questions for the historian to answer; but his answer will be more likely to be true and satisfying if he is not afraid of wonder in the presence of greatness, and if he is capable of sympathy with man's endeavors after the unseen.

In the field of the Judaism of New Testament times a lack that I feel especially is that of commentaries on some of the more important and representative books of Philo. With Cohn and Wendland's edition of the original we should hope for detailed studies with translations and notes of some such books. J. G. Müller's Commentary on *De Opificio Mundi*, 1841, has, I believe, no successor. Conybeare's *Philo About the Contemplative Life*, 1895, is a model of scholarly work which still stands pretty much alone. Such books on separate treatises can of course be written only by men who know Philo from beginning to end, and who know him both as a Greek philosopher and as a Jew. It is perhaps the difficulty of mastering both the Jewish and the Greek antecedents of Philo, as well as Philo's own voluminous writings, that keeps this open and inviting field from being entered. On the basis of such commentaries more valuable work than is now possible could be expected on various important aspects of the teaching of Philo.

In the New Testament field the need I feel most is that of a commentary on the Fourth Gospel. I confess that I am not hopeful about its coming. It will require a writer who combines rare intellectual and

spiritual qualities in a rare balance and proportion; one who unites entire freedom with reverence, the equipment of the historian with the insight and sympathy of the man of letters. In fact the Fourth Evangelist requires a related soul as his expositor; and modern biblical science does not remove or lessen this requirement, nor does it stand in the way of its fulfilment. There must be a way in which this spiritual Gospel can be set forth in its true character and in its real relations both to historical fact and to the inner life. I even think that this is a sort of test of modern New Testament scholarship, not of the truth of the historical method, but of the capacity of historical criticism to serve man's higher life. We have no doubt occasional glimpses of the sort of treatment of this book which we would like. We may get such glimpses in E. A. Abbot's volumes, or in a different way in James Drummond's *Johannine Thoughts*. Though it is a very delicate matter indeed one cannot doubt that scientific truth and spiritual value can be found and shown to belong together here as elsewhere, and each to help the other. The words of this writer, like those of his Master, are spirit and life, as the experience of Christendom has proved, and in them it is not the letter that profits. The trouble with those who have expounded the Gospel of John for its spiritual meaning is that they have too often connected these values with untrue judgments on literary and historical questions; while the historical critics have often corrected errors and provided facts, but remained far from the center of the writer's personality, and from appreciation of the things he really cared for and meant to convey by what he wrote. Historical methods have established themselves securely enough so that we need not be on the defensive about them or in fear of compromising them if we turn from things outward to things of the spirit. The historical critic, though his conscience is clear, may be discouraged at the slowness of the truth to make its way among Christian people and the persistence of the sincere conviction that historical research endangers the spiritual value of the New Testament. It is not only true that a thoroughgoing exposition of the Fourth Gospel in its true character and with a sympathetic and constructive purpose would help to remove this misunderstanding and to hasten the recognition of the value of science here as everywhere else; but it is also true that the Christianity of the Fourth Gospel positively prepares the way for a free and progressive type of Christian thought which is true to the past only by leaving the past behind. We need his help as we do that of Paul in our present necessity of liberating Christian faith from dependence upon anything that science shakes. There is a sense no doubt in which our present need is a return to the religion of Jesus; but there is also

an important sense in which we need to make our own that religion of the spirit of which Paul and the Fourth Evangelist were the bold and creative advocates. The commentary on John that I want must be Johannine as well as modern; and my conviction is that the two are not inconsistent, but on the contrary belong together.

I have named three large and difficult undertakings. They are not subjects for investigation of such a sort that a student who has a certain linguistic or other technical equipment can be set at them as a task to be done, on the condition only of time, patience, and accuracy. There are many such themes which we teachers are always trying to find and formulate for aspirants to a doctor's degree. But the tasks I have described are for mature scholars, men of learning who are also men of large and fine nature; and such men among us are apt to be so engrossed with the duties of responsible positions, or so divided among many demands for their speech and action, that they do not find time and concentration of attention enough to carry through such studies. I have the courage to believe that this will not always be so, and the boldness to urge large undertakings upon those who alone are able to accomplish them.

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CURRENT EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

THE RELIGIOUS OUTLOOK IN GREAT BRITAIN

As the history of Hebrew prophecy shows, it is in seeking a meaning in *facts* that those who speak for God are led to *truths*. If in contemporary events the divine purpose can be discovered, faith is assured; but if only human folly and wickedness are exposed, faith is challenged. The war brought bewilderment to many minds. Ignorant of, because indifferent to, historical causation, many Christian believers made bold guesses as to the reasons for God's sending, or at least allowing, the war. The problem of the divine providence was raised afresh, and often found an altogether inadequate solution. Even grotesque intentions were sometimes assigned to God, e.g., to punish Home Rule, Welsh Disestablishment, Sabbath desecration, or excessive drinking. Others who had a clearer and wider view of the problem took refuge in a solution which has again and again reappeared, viz., that God's power is somehow limited so that he cannot do as he wills in his love, that he is himself engaged in a struggle against some opposing force, and needs the help of man to win the victory. It is along this path that Mr. Wells's mind has moved toward religion. But as the history of philosophy and theology alike shows, thought cannot remain in such a dualism.

One religious gain has been from the rethinking of the problem. The deistic view of God as indifferent to, and inactive in, human history has been discredited; and there is a growing tendency to find not only speculative satisfaction but even practical consolation in the view of God as fellow-sufferer with man, and man as fellow-worker with God. This tendency may even assume the more distinctively Christian form; many are thinking of the passion of God for man's sin in the Cross of Christ as the clue to the labyrinth of the divine providence. "Without shedding of blood there is no remission" is an affirmation which is gaining fresh meaning; salvation comes only by sacrifice. Multitudes comforted themselves in their own sufferings and bereavements by assuring themselves

that this was a sacrifice which would bring to the world salvation from those evil conditions which were the cause of the war. Not only was the purpose of the war idealized, but even the method of war. No less exalted motive than the resolve to resist wrong and assert right, to defend weakness against strength, was taken into account, although the impartial observer must have been aware that this was not the only motive. The young manhood of the nation was called to the war as a crusade, and any hesitancy to respond to the summons was treated as a disobedience to the heavenly vision. Hence the indignation against, and the persecution of, the conscientious objector.

Not only was the cause without any qualification and reservation thus declared good, but it was often assumed that it could be only for the advantage, moral and religious, of the young men to enter the army. The trenches were assumed to be "a school of saints." That many lads from Christian homes came out of the fiery ordeal refined as pure gold, more mature in religious experience, more developed in moral character than they would have been under normal conditions, may be conceded. Some "found Christ" on the battlefield. There was some response to the efforts made to influence the soldiers for morals and religion. Many most admirable qualities were displayed—cheerfulness, unselfishness, comradeship, courage, heroism, self-sacrifice, where they might have been least expected. But patriotic partiality led not a few Christian preachers to ignore, if not to deny, many painful facts; profanity and obscenity in speech, drunkenness and uncleanness, were only too common; and many a boy has come home a moral wreck, diseased in body as in mind. The expectation even was cherished that with the return of "the boys" there would be a widespread quickening of the religious life of the churches; more alive themselves, they would impart life to others.

Even those who will not confess it, and may even themselves not be conscious of it, are disillusioned. The idealism of the call to fight has not found expression in the terms of peace. Hate, fear, and greed have been allowed to influence the settlement which has been proposed, but which the course of events already is proving must be modified. The idealism of a Wilson has suffered much damage from the chauvinism of a Clemenceau or Millerand,

the opportunism of a Lloyd George. Financial interests have been more potent than humanitarian considerations. That the covenant of the League of Nations has been embodied in the peace treaties may seem a token for good; but not only is the covenant defective in its terms; so far the three allies, Britain, France, and Italy, through their politicians and diplomatists have been pursuing a policy, the result, if not the intention, of which is to perpetuate the old evil conditions in the relations of nations, and to discredit this new organization. The treatment of the League of Nations in the matter of Armenia looks almost like a deliberate attempt to undermine its influence.

The delay in the ratification of the treaties, and especially the action by the Senate of the United States, has done a great deal of mischief. Christian men in Great Britain do not and cannot believe that in this policy the Senate has been interpreting the mind and giving effect to the will of the nation as a whole, least of all, of the Christian churches. They are convinced that the idealism to which President Wilson for a time at least gave voice still survives. It seems a moral impossibility that such a nation should now, after sharing the common sacrifice of the war, withdraw into an isolation which would delay if not prevent that salvation for the nations for the sake of which the sacrifice was made. This assurance can be given. If the politicians should fail, the churches in Great Britain are resolved that the League of Nations shall not be allowed to perish through contempt or neglect. Denominational assemblies and individual congregations are pledging themselves to do their utmost and best to save the League and to make it effective as manifestly one of the ways God has appointed to make ready the way for the coming of the Kingdom. It is for the American churches in like manner to pledge themselves; and can there be any doubt that, if the moral and religious forces of the two nations unite in a persistent and strenuous endeavor, they cannot fail? I should despair of our churches if they allowed the nations to be robbed of this gleam of hope for a better day amid the darkness of the present time. Having given the state such support as they did in the prosecution of the war, they must not suffer the state to rob the world of that good, to secure which alone the war could be justified.

But the question arises: Have the churches in themselves the spiritual vitality and the moral vigor for such a task? Here too there has been disappointment. It is a comforting fact that, as far as it is possible to gain evidence on such a question, not many of the young men and young women who were withdrawn from the fellowship and the work of the churches by varied forms of national service have been lost altogether; most have come back with even greater zeal; and in some churches there have been a revival of interest and increase of service. But the religious revival and consequent moral reformation for which many hoped and prayed have not yet become manifest. If it come not quickly, there is even the danger that the old routine will again return. Against this peril the best men and women are on their guard, and are doing what they can. Although generalization in such a matter must be a conjecture, yet there is some reason for the belief that during the war many ministers gained an efficiency and secured an influence in the discharge of their pastoral duties such as in less trying conditions they would not have reached; and that as the experience has been matured and the character been developed among the younger men generally, the preaching is more living and powerful than it was in many a pulpit. The ministry seems to me on the whole a better instrument for any work that the churches may attempt.

The younger men especially are eager for a forward movement and some are impatient of what seems to them the lack of leadership on the part of the older men. In the universities and colleges, more even among the women than the men, there is a great deal of unrest. The new world, which politicians and even some preachers promised as a result of the war, is very slow in arriving; the signs of its coming even are not certain. Patience with this impatience is what the more responsible guides of the churches must practice, solicitude for those courses which are appealing to youth, sympathy with all aspirations, even when they appear very crude. Some papers by discussion have tended to encourage misunderstanding and estrangement between age and youth. The old are represented as solely responsible for the continuance of the war so long, and the unsatisfactory peace at last, while callous to the sufferings and sacrifices of the young. If it be true, as is sometimes maintained, that there is a physiological as well as a psychological ground

for the opposition of the young to the old, the more reason is there by all moral and religious means possible to "turn the heart of the fathers to the children, and the heart of the children to their fathers." The young need the experience of the old; the old need the freedom from tradition and convention of the young. Only by their conciliation and co-operation can a permanent progress be secured.

As regards those who are outside of the churches, there are reasons for grave concern. While many a husband and wife in their enforced absence from one another learned their worth, the one for the other, and the bonds of many a home have been drawn closer, yet, as the proceedings in the divorce court show, there has been an enormous increase in sexual license, and also its consequent venereal disease. The standard of modesty and chastity among girls has been lowered, and the recovery of the normal relations of the sexes is likely to be slow. Crimes of violence have been more frequent; many men in the army have learned the use of firearms, and have also come to count life cheap. High prices, the shortage of houses, the unemployment of ex-service men, the displacement of women from work which they had taken up when the men doing it were called to the colors, have produced a great deal of discontent. Against the profiteer, the man who has grown rich in his country's hour of need and peril, there is a very bitter feeling. Extreme theories are being preached, and are listened to by the discontented, although there is no ground for the assumption that the working classes have been captured by bolshevism. The attempt to identify the movement for improved industrial conditions by the trades unions with this bolshevism is nothing less than criminal folly and will only encourage the tendency it denounces. If a class war should take place, it will not be the working classes who will begin it but politicians who for their own ends wish to exploit the fears of the other classes.

These moral, economic, and social conditions must be taken into account in dealing with the religious outlook. The old evangelistic methods have lost their effectiveness, the old evangelical theology fails to appeal as it once did. Nothing is gained, much is lost, by mere denunciation of indifference. What the churches must find out is: How can their witness and work be made

adequate to the opportunity? Individualism in religion and morals, no less than in economics, is out of date. It is a social gospel which is needed today. Men want to know, not what will save individuals, but what will renew society. The two objects are not mutually exclusive. As society is composed of individuals, and individuals are dependent on society, the improvement of the one is the advancement of the other. It is a question of emphasis and approach. The Kingdom of God as the transformation of human society in all its interests and pursuits must be made the dominant conception, and to that social ideal the individual fact of the new birth must be related. Whether the eschatological view of the teaching of Jesus be right or wrong, it is certain that the moral principles in the Gospels cannot be treated as an *interim* ethic. There is an insistent demand that these very principles be applied in the solution of social as well as individual problems today. The Jesus of the Gospels, however criticism may seek to recompose his historical reality, makes an appeal to multitudes who are outside of the churches, and to whom the traditional theology has no meaning; it is to what they understand to be his teaching about God and man that they look for the light to guide the steps of society today along the forward path. Such movements as the "Faith and Labor" groups show that there is an approach of men and women of good will in the churches and in the labor organizations toward one another. The danger to be guarded against here is twofold. On the one hand the Christian church must not be identified with any single economic tendency or program. On the other hand the interest shown in economic questions must be a genuine appreciation of their moral importance, and not merely a means used to try to capture the working classes for the churches. It must be made quite clear that the churches are not seeking to advance their own interests, or the advantage of any one class in the community, but only the coming of the Kingdom of God in the individual as in any other sphere. No church can be required to accept and to advocate any ready-made program of reconstruction, even if all labor were agreed upon its terms; but the churches must strive unitedly to formulate a social program to which they can give the authority of the teaching of Jesus and the guidance of his spirit.

It is only by maintaining this attitude of independence and impartiality that a danger can be exposed, the imminence of which cannot be concealed. In many of the churches the majority of the members belong to the class whose financial interests will be affected by such changes as now appear inevitable. It is easy for a man of business, whose religious convictions and moral principles have been formed by the individualism which prevailed last century, to persuade himself that changes which lessen his control over, or his profits from, his mill, factory, or workshop are themselves morally wrong, and that to defend his own present position is his Christian duty. It is easy for him also to regard his pastor, whose views on economics are more adequate to the actual situation and its urgent necessities, as a mischievous, impractical doctrinaire. The dependence of so many of the schemes of the churches on wealthy givers puts them in a difficult position in formulating the Christian ideal. It will require great magnanimity on the part of many of the supporters of the churches to give their assent to the declaration from the pulpit of principles of reconstruction, the appreciation of which consistently will involve inevitably such modifications of the present economic system as will adversely affect their interests. It will require great courage on the part of ministers to preach what they believe is right, even when they know that by so doing they are risking the loss of a generous supporter. It will require much wisdom, also, if the minister is to avoid giving needless offense by his manner of presenting the truth; if it is the truth itself that offends, he cannot be blamed, for the truth must be freely and fully spoken.

Great as are the dangers, a position of neutrality on all these issues seems now impossible. During the war the churches espoused the course of the nation as righteous and good; and national service and sacrifice were commended as the call of Christ himself. Having assumed this perilous responsibility, the churches cannot now retire and affirm that the reconstruction necessary after the war involves no moral issues on which their testimony must be borne and their influence be used. If to denounce German outrages is a Christian duty, to expose social wrongs cannot be treated as an offense against the body of Christ. When all has been said that

can be said for caution and consideration, for the avoidance of offense whenever possible, it must still be admitted that a challenge to the churches has been made in the existing conditions, opinions, and sentiments, the refusal of which would involve that the churches would lose their moral authority and consequent religious influence and would become private societies for the mutual benefit of the comparatively small numbers of pious persons who would still adhere to them. In the making of the nation they would cease to have any potent influence.

It will be an advantage to express the issue as distinctly as words allow. If the reconstruction of human society after the war is to take place without a class war, a ruinous economic conflict if not a destructive political revolution, Christian principles must be applied to the economic and the social problems, and the Christian spirit must prevail in all efforts at their solution. For this end the Christian churches must bear their testimony and exercise their influence explicitly and directly, and not merely by attending to individual religious experience and moral character. In doing this duty the churches will, however, be compelled to condemn wrongs from which some of their members profit, and to defend changes which will adversely affect the interests of those members. Genuinely good Christian men have a conscience formed more under the influence of the capitalism which has been for their self-advancement than under the authority of Christ, who demands self-sacrifice from them. It may be that many of the churches as existing organizations may be compelled to sacrifice themselves in order that they may save the nation by securing the dominion of the Christian ideal in the economic and social conditions. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same sacrifice may some day be required of them to insist that Christian universalism may prevail in international relations. It may be necessary for them to appear unpatriotic that they may be Christian.

It is probable that very few even of the leaders of the Christian churches see the issue so clearly defined, and this is itself a danger. Nation and churches alike may "muddle through" into some sort of condition in which there will be a slight improvement in the economic and social order and the churches will appear at least to hold their own; but neither will society be refashioned according

to the Christian ideal, nor will the churches have the share in the making of what the nation will become, that they should desire. A great opportunity may pass, and a more bitter disillusionment within and without the churches may follow. What would avert such a calamity would be (and is it too great a thing to inquire of the Lord?) such times of refreshing from His Presence by His Spirit that the churches, ministers and members alike, would rise to the height of their calling and would do and dare, whatever the interests of the Kingdom might require. As Pentecost followed the certainty of the Risen Reigning Lord in the primitive community, so the enthusiasm and the energy of such a revival and reformation can only come as faith gains an ever firmer grasp of the eternal reality of God in Christ Jesus the Lord; and there is a promise, if not marked, that the churches are recovering faith, and that many pulpits sound forth faith's certainty.

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The Religious Activities of Undergraduates.—The Christian Union of the University of Chicago, an organization concerned with the whole religious life of the University, has made a survey of the activities of the undergraduates in religious and social service. The work was carried through by a group of undergraduate students with the direction of the Chaplain of the University. The period surveyed was the academic year 1919-20.

The principal means employed, although this was supplemented by other investigation, was a questionnaire passed to every student at chapel. The undergraduates attend chapel once a week in four groups on four different days. Each group consists of about six hundred. The chapel exercise occupies twenty minutes. During the week when the questionnaire was presented, the Chaplain explained each day the character of the survey and asked for the co-operation of the students.

The investigation was made at the end of the spring quarter when 2,800 undergraduates were in attendance. Of these, 295 were excused from chapel for various satisfactory reasons. A small number would be absent each day for specific reasons. Two thousand and sixty-five questionnaires were properly filled out. There were thus 440 who either did not attend chapel that week or failed to answer the questions. It is probable therefore that while 74 per cent of the students actually

furnished the information, the results are good for nearly the whole number.

Eighty-eight per cent of the students reporting stated that they were members of some religious body, distributed as follows: 67 per cent, Protestant; 12 per cent, Jewish; 8 per cent, Catholic; 1 per cent, miscellaneous. Of the 2,065 students, 1,268 were men and 797 women. The Protestants and Jews were about the same proportion for men and women, but of the men, 10 per cent were Catholic, of the women, less than 5 per cent. A surprising fact developed that there were more women than men without religious affiliations—15 per cent as against 9 per cent.

Every student attends chapel once a week and they were asked to state how often they attended some other religious service. It appeared that 92 per cent were accustomed to go to church at least once a month and 45 per cent were regular attendants every Sunday. It is questionable whether any other group of 2,000 persons in the United States would present a more satisfactory condition.

It was desired to find out how far the students are taking part in less formal religious exercises. One hundred and eighty-five or 14 per cent of the men attended a class for religious education or a Young People's Society at least once a month, 119 of them being regular weekly attendants. Of the women, 163 or 20 per cent attended once a month and 110 regularly each week. Thirteen per cent of the students were engaged in some form of religious work such as Sunday-school teaching, president of young people's societies, actual pastoral work, Gideons, choir directors and soloists, assistants at missions and with the Salvation Army, and directors of shop meetings. The women were strongly represented in missionary societies, as pianists and organists and as leaders in church-welfare agencies.

The survey was concerned to discover the extent of the social service work of students other than that which was performed in the churches. Seven per cent of the students stated that they were members of a community-service organization. Thirteen per cent were engaged in definite social service work. The disproportionate number of women was very marked, 24 per cent of the women as against 6 per cent of the men. The particularly efficient work of the Y.W.C.A. in placing about 200 women in social work helps to account for this. Some of the activities mentioned were United Charities case work, boys' clubs, sick visitation, care of children in social settlements, teaching English to foreigners, (and one Chinaman who reversed the order and put it "teaching Chinese to English"), Red Cross work, girls' clubs, work in police stations, legal aid, directors of Americanization courses.

A type of social service which is less spectacular than the above and which is often neglected in an estimate of students' activities is that of non-renumerative household work. It was discovered that 216 men, or 17 per cent, were engaged in household work and 296 women, or 37 per cent. Forty-nine of the men and 95 of the women were doing more than ten hours a week. Inasmuch as student members of the family are often thought of as somewhat selfish persons, these figures are particularly interesting.

As bearing on the opportunity for social service, it was desirable to find how large a number of the students were engaged in renunerative work. Five hundred and thirty-nine men or 42 per cent and 224 women or 30 per cent were so engaged. Four hundred and nine men and 114 women were doing more than ten hours per week; 228 men and 58 women were doing more than 20 hours per week. There were frequent cases among the men of from 30 to 40 hours per week. The renunerative work of the women was naturally much less.

How many of the undergraduates were actually preparing for some form of religious or social vocation? Seventy-six men and 68 women indicated that they had definitely decided their life-work in this direction, while several others indicated that they were considering the matter. Among the different vocations mentioned by the men were: social service, 40; ministry, 12; general mission work, 4; medical mission work, 12; Y.M.C.A. secretaries, 3. Among the activities mentioned by the women were: general social service, 53; missions, 10; religious education, 4. Out of the entire undergraduate student body, therefore, 7 per cent have decided to devote their lives to some form of religious or social service.

A Significant Example of Co-operation between Churches.—The ideal of the Interchurch World Movement for interdenominational co-operation was not an idle dream. It actually has been working in Montana for more than a year. The story is told by G. Clifford Cress in a pamphlet entitled, *The Montana Plan of Every-community Service*. A survey conducted by the Home Missions Council presented some startling facts. Many communities were without Christian ministrations, while in others the provisions were wholly inadequate. In some the various denominations were overlapping in their efforts. The Council's proposals for united action led to a conference of nine denominations. This Conference, after a careful study of the conditions in a number of different types of communities, outlined a plan of co-operative Christian service for the state.

Some of the more important principles of action adopted by the Conference are:

1. No attempt to be made to merge or obliterate denominations.
2. Refer all cases of overlapping to denominations concerned without recommendations.
3. Promote joint enterprises under denominational boards only as rare exceptions.
4. Provision for affiliated or associate membership for devoted adherents of denominations unrepresented in the community to be encouraged.
5. Where but one circuit is feasible and unless other factors are determinative, such circuits should be allocated to the denomination whose local church is best able to provide ministry.
6. Where communities are destitute of wholesome recreational facilities and other needed community service, the church should endeavor to provide such facilities.
7. Fields unsought by any denomination shall be assigned to the denomination best able to serve them.

Upon these principles one hundred and seven areas were allocated to the various denominations, and almost without exception the results have been favorable beyond expectations. A better understanding of the real needs of the different communities, a spirit of brotherhood and unity of purpose among the co-operating denominations, and the ability to carry on the work of the Kingdom much more effectively have been immediate results. Moreover, the Congregational Polytechnic Institute has made an unequivocal offer of its plant to an interdenominational organization for the promotion of a united Christian College for the state. Other advances are in prospect for the near future. This admirable plan should commend itself to missionary organizations in other states and sections of the country.

The Task of the Church in the Industrial Crisis.—Professor Albion W. Small, in an article entitled, "Christianity and Industry" (*American Journal of Sociology*, XXV, [May, 1920] 673-94) presents an exceptionally sane survey of the problem. The task of Christianity he contends, is to save the world by manning its essential operations with people actuated by the Christian spirit. It should be remembered that Christianity is one of the many factors that have molded western civilization. It is also true that many of the achievements of this civilization have been realized in spite of the opposition of the church. There have been two contradictory conceptions of character in the history of Christianity;

(1) that character is a condition complete in itself within the person, (2) that character is an achievement of right relations with others. Unsocial and subjective monasticism resulted from the former; and an attempt to realize the Christian spirit in Red Cross drives, cleaner politics, settlement houses, and the abolition of capitalism, apart from religious exercises, has often been the method of the latter. Instinctively the church has sought a place somewhere between these two extremes.

The method of the church must be educational—a type of education that makes its appeal to the conscience and the heart. We saw the part that this played during the war. The attitude that Christians ought to take toward war was visualized. With the recent shift in the economic situation it has become clear that the central human question now and perhaps for many generations to come is the matter of righteousness in economic relations. The parties in conflict range from those who believe that property is robbery to those who can see nothing wrong with the present property system. Between these extremes are the masses seeking their way out. The church cannot be neutral. It must give aid to these who seek to make a critical examination of the present property system, or stand with those who are opposed to that examination. The church can go far toward preventing a wasting war between the contending parties by aiding the movement for a critical examination of existing property rights. Such an attitude will do much to keep the conflict within the limits of law and order. It is a question of adapting a traditional pietism to a fictitious moral order, or recognizing the challenge to make this world Christian.

The Destination of the Epistle to the Hebrews.—In an article entitled, "The Epistle to the Hebrews and Roman Christianity" (*Harvard Theological Review*, XIII [July, 1920], 205-19) Professor E. F. Scott presents the theory that the letter was written to a select group of Christians in Rome, who having advanced beyond the sins of paganism, are exhorted to "press on to perfection." The most significant of his reasons are the following:

1. The doctrines of the Epistle, though roughly parallel to Paulinism, are characteristically non-Pauline; and the Roman church had grown up under the influence of other Christian leaders. Mysticism and sacramentalism are conspicuously absent from Hebrews, which is in harmony with the doctrines of the Roman church as reflected in both Clement and the Shepherd of Hermas.

2. The idea of Christianity as a given body of beliefs and practices, based on the principle of authority, is distinctly seen in this Epistle.

Such an attitude is quite in keeping with the Roman type of mind which emphasized loyalty to the confession and reverence for the past.

3. The absence of any outstanding polemic against heresies, also suggests the Roman church which, according to Ignatius, was "filtered clear from every foreign stain."

4. The lack of any distinction between Jew and gentile, with the accompanying idea of Jewish institutions and ordinances as normative for the church, reminds us of Rome where the trend was early toward order and uniformity of organization. Likewise, the idea of the Christian's approach to God through Christ as High Priest would find welcome acceptance in Rome.

When Christianity and Islam Were Closely Akin.—How far does the efficiency of a religion depend upon its ability to adjust itself to new conditions of progress? This interesting question is suggested by an article entitled, "Islam" by Albert Kinross (*Atlantic Monthly*, CXXVI [Nov., 1920], 669-80). Islam appears to the observer as a static faith, one sufficient for the needs of the age of the Crusades, but essentially closed to all progress. In its beginnings it was superior to the Christianity which it replaced in the East, a Christianity of "feud, faction, greed, persecution and sectarianism." Likewise, the famous Saladin was a finer gentleman than any of his Christian enemies; but the Moslem faith has stood still or degenerated since that time, while Christianity has made great strides in its development.

This reactionary, unprogressive history of Islam is explained on the ground of several inherent characteristics: (1) It is predominantly masculine in its emphasis. Its utter disregard for the worth and individuality of woman has been a strong determining factor in its downfall in such strongholds as the Turkish Empire. (2) It is too intensely individualistic in its emphasis, whereas the modern world requires co-operation. (3) Notwithstanding this individualism it has not developed great original thinkers and leaders, for it is essentially a faith of inhibitions. It has tried to live by negation and denial, in the face of a vital, growing Western world which demands affirmation. (4) It is still but semi-civilized. Its leading idea of political action is "to murder and mutilate the men of the opposing party and to violate their women." (5) Its exclusive tribal morality and social outlook renders it wholly incapable of solving modern problems of international and inter-racial relationships.

Will Islam yet adjust herself to the modern world or will she be left behind in the new order of world-life? On this answer will largely depend the future of many peoples.

BOOK REVIEWS

CIVILIZATION IN ISRAEL¹

A good book upon the history of civilization in Israel has long been needed. The need is in great part met by Dr. Bertholet's work. The history begins with the civilization of the stone age in Palestine as revealed by the excavations. It is then traced through the Amorite and Canaanite periods to the entry of Israel. The pre-Canaanitish culture of Israel is briefly sketched and, still more briefly, the culture of the period of transition. Here the historical treatment ceases. The rest of the book is devoted to the civilization of Israel in Palestine. No attempt is made to analyze this into periods; it is treated as a whole. The contents of this section are organized in five chapters, (1) Family and Household Life, (2) Occupations, (3) Social Life, (4) Political Life, (5) Psychic Life. Under this last chapter fall Justice, Learning, Arts and Literature, and Religion.

Upon scrutinizing this treatment, it is at once noted that the greater part of it is the familiar material found in the handbooks on Old Testament archaeology. But this material is brought down to date and often handled in a fresh way. It is to be regretted that the high cost of these days presumably ruled out all illustrations. The discussion of many subjects is pitifully inadequate owing to the limitation of space. Fortunately the Pan-Babylonian temptation has been successfully resisted.

The section devoted to religion covers only 29 pages. This, of course, excludes any possibility of a comprehensive survey of the subject, and no such thing is attempted. Religious archaeology is the real subject of this section. It concerns itself with such things as the sanctuaries, images and idols, prophets, nazirites, priests, feasts, sacrifices, the law, and the sage.

The significance of the Assuan papyri for an understanding of Hebrew civilization has been strangely overlooked. In the treatment of the religion, though confined to the external and objective side, the Assuan temple, sacrifices, and priesthood should have received considerable notice. Not only so, but the presence of an Aramaic copy of the inscription of Behistun among these Jewish documents found away off

¹ *Kulturgeschichte Israels*. Alfred Bertholet. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1920. 294 pages. M. 14.30.

in Egypt is worthy of emphasis as showing the way in which the literatures and institutions of the Oriental world were carried throughout its whole extent and therefore must be reckoned with in estimating the civilization of any particular area or people.

Would not a full appreciation of the significance of the presence of a fully equipped Yahu-temple in Egypt, as shown by these same papyri, have made it safer to interpret Mal. 1:11 (p. 278) as referring to sacrifices in Jewish temples throughout the pagan world rather than as expressive of an absolute, clearly thought through monotheism?

It is ungracious, however, to ask for more when we are given so much. An immense amount of labor has gone into the making of this book, and every student of Hebrew life and thought will find occasion to be grateful for the aid here furnished.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

NEW BOOKS ON EARLY CHRISTIANITY

Three books of note dealing with the history of early Christianity have recently appeared. One of these is the concluding volume of Johannes Weiss, *Das Urchristentum*,¹ another is a group of five popular lectures by Kirsopp Lake,² and the third is the initial volume in a projected series of elaborate studies edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake.³

Professor Weiss of Heidelberg died on August 24, 1914, less than a year after the publication of the first part of his book. But at that time the undertaking had progressed so far that it was found practicable to have an editor complete the work as originally planned. In the matter of actual composition pages 555-672 come from the hand of the editor, but his task has been done so well that probably no reader will feel any break in continuity or any lessening of interest in passing the point where the pen was dropped by the author and taken up by the editor.

As originally designed, this history of early Christianity aimed to be a semi-popular presentation embodying the results of years of scientific

¹ *Das Urchristentum*. Von Johannes Weiss. 2. Teil: Schluss. Nach dem Tode des Verfassers herausgegeben und am Schlusse ergänzt von Rudolf Knopf. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1917. x+417-681 pages. M. 11.10.

² *Landmarks in the History of Early Christianity*. By Kirsopp Lake. London: Macmillan, 1920. x+147 pages. 8s. 6d.

³ *The Beginnings of Christianity*. Part I: The Acts of the Apostles. Vol. I. Prolegomena I: The Jewish, Gentile and Christian Backgrounds. Edited by F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake. London: Macmillan, 1920. xi+480 pages. 18s.

investigation. Like every book treating of Christianity in the first century, the life and religion of Paul furnish the chief theme and claim the bulk of the space. It is in this portion of the subject that the author is at his best. He knows how to study Paul, not merely as a theologian, but as a living and acting individual whose religion was a product of contacts with a real world of immediate experience. Account is taken of his debt to both his Jewish and his gentile environment. Various and complex factors are recognized as entering into the making of the Christian apostle, but all these heritages are thought to have been fused into a unity through Paul's own personal religious experience and ethical sincerity.

Professor Lake's *Landmarks* consists of the Haskell Lectures delivered at Oberlin in 1919, and is in substance only a popularization of the section on "Primitive Christianity" in the larger work on *Beginnings*. Therefore his contribution to the subject in hand may be ascertained sufficiently from an examination of the latter volume.

The plan of the series as announced by the publishers assigns three volumes to the interpretation of Acts, as follows: I. The Jewish, Gentile, and Christian Backgrounds; II. Literary Criticism of Acts; III. Text and Commentary. The first main division of Volume I is given up to a description of the Jewish world of early Christian times. Professors Jackson and Lake, writing jointly, give an account of Jewish political history, Mr. C. G. Montefiore writes a characteristically scholarly and well balanced chapter on the "Spirit of Judaism," to which the editors add a survey of varieties of thought and practice in Judaism and a sketch of Jewish life in the Diaspora. The salient features of Jewish history, particularly in its religious aspects, are set forth compactly but clearly and in terms of the latest results of scientific research. Now and then a novel interpretation is put forth, as when it is suggested that according to Josephus, John the Baptist at first addressed himself only to ascetics (p. 102), or that it is incorrect to apply the term Zealots to the followers of Judas of Galilee who were called by Josephus adherents of the "Fourth Philosophy." Yet it is conceded that Judas propagated the "doctrines afterwards adopted by the Zealots in 66 A.D." (p. 12).

The gentile background for a study of Acts is presented in two sections, one by Professor H. T. F. Duckworth of Trinity College, Toronto, on the Roman system of provincial administration, and the other by Professor Clifford H. Moore of Harvard University, on life and thought within the Roman Empire. Each essay is the work of an expert and is concerned with a topic of prime importance for the interpretation of Acts. Professor Duckworth gives an array of pertinent information

regarding the essential features of the provincial system of government under which Christians lived in gentile territory. Fortunately, the operations of the *concilia*—a subject too often neglected by students of early Christianity—have been described with some detail. This information is especially valuable for an understanding of the history of emperor-worship and the relations of Christianity to the Roman government.

Professor Moore has not been so happy in the selection of topics directly contributory to the interpretation of Acts. His comparatively lengthy account of the philosophies of the period is in itself excellent but rather remote from the interests of those Christians whose life is reflected in the Book of Acts, except perhaps chapter 17. A few valuable pages are devoted to an exposition of the mystery religions, but the chapter is not an adequate introduction to the dominant religious interests and activities that made up the everyday experiences of the common man in those particular gentile circles from which the Christian movement drew its converts during the early decades of its history.

In the third main division of the book, under the title "Primitive Christianity," the editors jointly write four chapters dealing, respectively, with (1) the career of Jesus, (2) the work of the disciples in Jerusalem and the beginnings of preaching among Gentiles, (3) the growth of speculation on the subjects of the spirit, the church and baptism, and (4) Christology. One distinctive phase of these chapters is a disposition to distrust that interpretation of Jewish messianism and eschatology of which Schürer and Charles are the best-known modern representatives, and to incline instead toward that type of opinion expounded by J. Klausner in his dissertation, *Die messianischen Vorstellungen des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter der Tannaiten*. Perhaps limits of space prevented a sufficiently elaborate display of evidence to effect a convincing solution of so moot a problem, but to have the question opened anew may prove well worth while. It is interesting to note the drift away from the view, current among the modern "eschatologists," that Jesus identified himself with the Son of Man of Jewish apocalyptic writings, or in fact that he claimed messiahship for himself in any sense of the word (p. 283).

As a whole, this book is always stimulating, and if sometimes more interesting than convincing, it is probably only what good "Prolegomena" should be—an accurate statement of matters no longer open to question and an arresting presentation of debatable issues. The appearance of future volumes in the series will be eagerly awaited.

Perhaps it is not out of place in these days of the high cost of printing to congratulate the publishers upon the pleasing form of the book. The

attention of the proofreaders should be called to a particular typographical error four times repeated in the citation of authorities (pp. 277, 298, 325; *Landmarks*, p. 20), the promise of a bibliography (p. 81) to appear at the end of the volume is not fulfilled, and apparently the sub-heading on page 171 should be carried into the margin. But all in all the volume is a delight to the eye.

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

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JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY, AND MOHAMMEDANISM

With the appearance of the second volume¹ George Foot Moore's *History of Religions* is now complete. The promise of the first volume is more than fulfilled. To speak in superlatives about a book which one enjoys greatly is a strong temptation, but to yield to the temptation in this instance would appear to the reviewer to be a distinct weakness. It is one of those rare productions of the restless modern press, a masterly book; its pages are replete with evidences of many years of keen and diligent labors; it exhibits especially in its first two sections which are of greatest interest to us in that they are powerful factors in our own little corner of the world, a fullness and security of grasp rarely attained.

He who seeks fundamental information about the rise and growth of the great forces called Judaism and Christianity, from dim antiquity down to the confusing complex of the most modern world, cannot do better than to begin with this book. Packed with information, as every page is, the reading is nevertheless smooth and of unflagging interest throughout. The space at the author's disposal restricted him necessarily to clear and concise statement of essentials only, and he has never once yielded to the dangerous, if scholarly, temptation to stray into alluring bypaths. In other words, to the reviewer's mind most of what is essential is here found and little or nothing that is not essential.

Not much that is new is said on the earlier phases of Hebrew religion and Judaism, but what could safely be placed in such a compendium has for the most part found its place. Luckenbill's "On Israel's Origins," (*American Journal of Theology*, XXII [1918], 24-53) and J. M. P. Smith's "Southern Influences upon Hebrew Prophecy," (*American Journal of Semitic Languages*, XXXV [1918], 1-19) probably appeared too late for use; otherwise the coming to maturity of a new

¹ *History of Religions*. II. Judaism, Christianity, Mohammedanism. By George Foot Moore. New York: Scribner, 1919. (International Theological Library). xvi+552 pages. \$3.00.

trend in investigation succeeding the Wellhausen schema would probably have been signalized in this portion of the book. On the other hand the ease and mastery with which the author threads his way through the intricate mazes of medieval and modern Jewish thought and feeling in a scant 26 pages (81-106) is admirable (why is Husik's *History of Medieval Jewish Philosophy* not mentioned?).

The high point of art and mastery to the reviewer's mind is reached in the chapter on the apostolic age of Christianity (chap. v, pp. 107-59). The reviewer knows no other similar statement, which sets forth so clearly and succinctly the manner in which Christianity emerged from the Judaism and Hellenism of its time. And thence through no less thorny paths than in the case of Judaism, with unerring mastery George Foot Moore leads us to our own time. Just one note of rather sardonic criticism of one of the most modern trends of Christianity jars a bit (p. 379, last paragraph); what is said there has in it more than a modicum of truth, but the saying of it with the same cool, even-handed sobriety which elsewhere rules throughout the volume might have been more helpful.

The section on Mohammedanism is good, very good, indeed. But here, after all, the fact, that the author is not so completely on his own ground as in the previous sections tells, however slightly. Space forbids a full statement of the reviewer's differences with the book at this point. Just a few examples can be adduced. Jewish slaves *do* seem to have been rare in Mecca (p. 389). Was Ali really an early believer (p. 391)? Can Islam be said to have made real progress at Medina before Mohammed's advent (p. 392)? A fair number of similar questions might be asked in regard to the earliest history of Mohammedanism. Not all of these could safely be answered in a sense contrary to that of the author. The fact is that many of them have not yet been sufficiently examined to make any statement quite safe. George Foot Moore's statements do, however, appear to the reviewer frequently to lean not only to the safe, but rather distinctly to the over-conservative side at this point. In the case of Ghazali, it seems to the reviewer, that his place in the history of philosophy is not brought out quite clearly enough. But with it all, for this section as well as for the others the reviewer stands by his judgment. This is a masterly book, which deserves and will deserve for a long time to come, careful attention at the hands of every interested amateur and professional student of religion and religions.

M. SPRENGLING

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SOME LEADERS OF RECENT RELIGIOUS THINKING¹

It is always easier to find information concerning theological movements in the distant past than in the period in which we are living. Professor Buckham has rendered a very real service to all students of theology by his survey of recent progressive religious thinking in this country. He has assembled information hard to obtain without much research. One would naturally expect that such a survey would bring into the foreground theologians of the conventional type. We are accustomed to thinking of men like Charles Hodge, N. W. Taylor, and Edwards A. Park, as those who shaped the thinking of the generation immediately preceding ours. It is therefore a little surprising to discover that the majority of those named in this volume were pastors rather than professional teachers of theology. The reader is compelled to agree with the author that perhaps the most vital and fruitful influences in modern religious thinking came from this source rather than from scholastic learning.

The men to whom primary attention is given are Bushnell, T. T. Munger, George A. Gordon, Wm. J. Tucker, Washington Gladden, and the two brothers, Egbert and Newman Smyth. No one will question the leadership of these men. It is to be noted, however, that they all come from the Congregational denomination. This raises the question whether perhaps the author has not been influenced somewhat by his own personal relationships in his selection of names. Others might consider that men like William Newton Clarke, Milton S. Terry, and A. V. G. Allen have been quite as influential in modern thinking as have some of those in the above list.

It is interesting to observe that the conscious aim of all these men was to humanize the traditional theology. They used the terminology of that theology and never seriously questioned its fundamental tenets. To be sure, the content was in many instances radically changed under the stress of modern social interests, as with Dr. Gladden, or at the behest of modern idealistic philosophy, as in the case of Dr. Gordon. But with all the modifications which took place, one discovers no fundamental dissatisfaction with the general framework of the traditional theological system. Today we are coming to be keenly conscious that the principles of inductive science and the vogue of psychological analysis create an attitude of mind which does not start complacently with what seemed axiomatic to the men of a generation ago. Pro-

¹ *Progressive Religious Thought in America*. By John Wright Buckham. New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1920. xi+352 pages. \$2.00.

fessor Buckham himself appears to feel that the future progress of theology will be in the main continuous with the work of these men. While the next generation of theologians will undoubtedly gain great inspiration from their courage and their human sympathies, they are likely also to be impressed with the fact of certain assumptions which should be more critically investigated.

The book is written partly in the form of biographies and partly in the form of theological interpretation. The great advantage of this presentation is that it permits the creative personalities of these leaders of thought to stand forth, and we thus see the making of theology in the actual life of men instead of having it discussed in terms of the development of ideas. Moreover, while all of these men had to face distrust and sometimes vigorous opposition, yet they continued honored and trusted leaders in the denomination. This is evidently due to the fact that their primary interest was in the promotion of genuine religion rather than in the indifferent discussion of theological questions. The practical conclusion to be drawn is that a liberalism which maintains social sympathy with the religious aims of the church will be permitted actively to make its contribution. It is only a liberalism which becomes indifferent to religious motives which is excluded from a place in the life of the church.

In a sense this book is a contribution to the celebration of the Pilgrim Tercentenary. These leaders of Congregational thought are the spiritual descendants of the Pilgrims. Professor Buckham has rendered a valuable service in furnishing so appreciative an interpretation of the expression of that Pilgrim spirit in the religious life and thinking in the generation immediately behind us.

GERALD BIRNEY SMITH

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THE PROBLEM OF GOD

The life of modern man constantly expands with new interests, new hopes, new powers, and his vital religion, which embodies all of these things, tends ever to flow away from the dogmas of a more restricted past. One by one the ideas of the old Christian creeds have been revitalized or discarded. For this generation God has become a problem, and the task of the apologists is made more difficult through the thrusting of the fact of evil into the agonized consciousness of man during these last few pathetic years. Professor Sorley's book¹ must be counted as

¹ *Moral Values and the Idea of God*. By W. R. Sorley. New York: Putnam, 1919. xix+534 pages. \$5.00.

an *apologia* but of the better kind. His is an argument in clear, forthright English with no metaphysical fog to cover failure in thought. He manifestly desires to come to terms with reality as it is given in experience not to interpret experience in accordance with preconceived ideas of reality. As against philosophic naturalism he demands that all the facts be considered, especially moral facts. As against absolute idealism and all monisms he insists upon the reality of purpose and freedom in the activities and struggles of man. The argument begins from an empirical basis. The problem is not, Does God exist? but, How is the universe to be understood and interpreted? Given a world in which moral values have a place, what estimate may we make of the nature of reality?

By the following pathway, then, we come to God. Persons are part of the order of existence. Ethical ideas are facts of personal consciousness and are realized through the will and in the character of persons. They have therefore a place in existent reality. Hence a theory of the universe cannot be complete which ignores their existence as facts and forces. Moreover, these ethical ideas claim objective validity. But this validity differs from the validity of the laws of nature in that ideal values are not actualized at any specific time in existing persons. The ideal moral values are imperative for man whether or not he realizes them or accepts them or even is conscious of them. They may never find complete realization in time yet they are the limit toward which the nature of persons points. They are valid *of* reality and belong to the sum total of reality as an existing system. Ultimate reality must include the ideal moral order. This gives the setting for the moral argument for God's existence. "Persons are conscious of values and of an ideal of goodness which they recognize as having undoubted authority for the direction of their activity; the validity of these values or laws, or of this ideal, however, does not depend upon their recognition: it is objective and eternal: and how could this eternal validity stand alone, not embodied in matter and neither seen nor realized by finite minds unless there were an Eternal Mind whose thought and will are therein expressed? God must therefore exist and his nature must be goodness." (pp. 352-53).

But the world presents a difficulty. How are we to see any harmony between the natural order and the moral order? In the actual world there is evil, imperfection, suffering. The world as a causal system seems indifferent to a standard of good and evil. Moreover, persons in whom moral values must be realized, make painfully slow progress and realize goodness very imperfectly. This ancient problem of evil

the author faces with heroic postulates. He answers, first, that moral values can only be realized by free beings and freedom entails the possibility of failure and evil; secondly, that an imperfect world is necessary for the growth and training of moral beings. The world must be thought of as a purposive system. We must postulate purpose in the world as well as freedom in man. "The order of nature, therefore, intends a result which is not found at any particular stage in the process of existence. It requires an idea of the process as a whole and of the moral order to which it is being made subservient. It means therefore intelligence and the will to good as well as the ultimate source of power. In this way the recognition of the moral order and of its relation to nature and man involves the acknowledgment of the Supreme Mind or God as the ground of reality" (pp. 513-14).

The chasm in this argument yawns for the empiricist at the point where an eternal moral goodness of objective validity is assumed. For him moral values and ideals exist nowhere but in persons, find their place in reality in persons, change with persons, and beyond the purposive strivings of living beings they have no status. To speak of an eternal moral order of which man slowly becomes conscious is to assume the very thing he finds it impossible to demonstrate. The case is made more hopeless by the assumption of purpose in the natural order and the justification of evil in order that this eternal goodness may be realized by free spirits. Is there any purpose until living beings bring it into existence? To think of the world-process as the program of a God for the production of free moral agents is to put a heavy discount on his goodness and intelligence for in that program millions of living beings are subjected to the position of mere means, are given over to merciless pain and the long drama becomes a nightmare from the human standpoint. Since it is all to end, at last, in the production of perfect spirits who, like God, will only the good, the question is inevitable. If the character and not the struggle is the goal would a perfect God be so disdainful of his own automatic will to goodness as to refuse to create the perfect spirits at the beginning? Moreover, for the wreckage as well as for the perfect spirits another assumption is necessary in the argument—immortality of personal existence. And even this seems to provide no place in the cosmic program for the idiot. He surely is a divine blunder.

But suppose one were not so impressed with the sacrosanct character of the God-idea of Graeco-Christian philosophy, were even willing to see that idea as a faulty attempt to envisage reality, then from Professor Sorley's starting-point there might be a path to another goal. One who

has "folded the silken wings" of metaphysics and given up his delight in absolutes might find still a ground for hope in the existence of moral values in a world of free, living beings. He might seek the value of God in the future rather than the existence of God at the beginning. In persons this cosmic process has become moral and is becoming increasingly intelligent and purposive. This is their achievement in the interest of their larger life. Evil then is reduced to that part of the natural world and of human social relationships not yet brought into subjection to the intelligence and purposes of man. With larger vision man might even find a religious enthusiasm in the challenge of the evil of the world as a task for the growing powers of intelligent purposive life, might accept the call to devotion and self-sacrifice in the co-operative effort of man to put purpose into the world, to organize cosmic life, and to construct a world social mind embodied in institutions which will guarantee the opportunity of the complete life to all men. So at last the value man has sought in the idea of God through the ages might be achieved. But this means a surrender of the quest for ultimate origins, a break with the old supernaturalism and a radically new idea of the cosmic support of men.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.]

ALEXANDER, S. *Space, Time, and Deity* (Gifford Lectures, 1916-18). Vol. II. London: Macmillan, 1920. xiii+437 pages. 36s.

A closely reasoned and fundamental discussion of the metaphysics of the concept of God.

ATHEARN, WALTER S. *The Malden Survey*. New York: Doran, 1920. 213 pages. \$2.50.

A survey of seventeen church and religious education buildings so as to exhibit concretely the relation between religious needs and physical equipment. The volume should be studied by every pastor contemplating a building enterprise.

BABSON, ROGER W. *Religion and Business*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. 221 pages. \$2.75.

Suggestive reflections of an eminent business man on the kind of religion which he would like to see in operation.

BAKEWELL, CHARLES M. *The Story of the American Red Cross in Italy*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. xi+253 pages. \$2.00.

An effective presentation of the human service rendered by this great organization.

BETH, KARL. *Einführung in die vergleichende Religionsgeschichte*. Leipzig: Teubner, 1920. 125 pages.

A convenient elementary survey of the main factors in religion.

BERGSTRÄSSER, G. *Hebräische Lesestücke aus dem Alten Testament*. Leipzig: Vogel, 1920. viii+43 pages. M.10.

A Hebrew reader consisting of brief narrative selections from the Old Testament.

BURTON, ERNEST DEWITT. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*. (International Critical Commentary.) New York: Scribner, 1920. lxxxix+541 pages. \$4.50.

An exhaustive study of the epistle, including all sources of information contributing to its interpretation.

CADOUX, C. JOHN. *The Early Christian Attitude to War*. (Christian Revolution Series.) London: Headley Bros., 1919. xxxii+272 pages. 10s. 6d.

A careful survey of Christian sentiment on the question of war from the teaching of Jesus to the time of Constantine.

CHARLES, R. H. *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of St. John*. (International Critical Commentary.) 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1920. cxcii+373 and viii+497 pages. \$9.00.

An exhaustive book by a scholar exceptionally equipped to utilize the entire field of apocalyptic literature in his interpretation.

CLEMEN, CARL. *Die griechischen und lateinischen Nachrichten über die Persische Religion*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1920. 232 pages. M.40.

A critical examination of Greek and Latin sources of information concerning Persian religion in the light of present-day knowledge.

DEANESLY, MARGARET. *The Lollard Bible and Other Medieval Biblical Versions*. (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought.) Cambridge: University Press, 1920. xx+483 pages. 31s. 6d.

A study of translations from the Vulgate, illuminated by a survey of the general conditions of learning and education in the Middle Ages.

DOUMERGUE, E. *Moïse et La Genese*. Paris: Editions de Foi et Vie, 1920. xv+121 pages.

An exposition of the views of Edouard Naville concerning the Pentateuch, which is accounted for as having been written by Moses who based his work on (a) Babylonian tablets brought west by Abraham, (b) a record made by Abraham himself, (c) an autobiography of Joseph, all of which, as well as Moses' own contribution, were written in Babylonian cuneiform signs.

EBERHARDT, PAUL. *Religionskunde*. Gotha: Perthes, 1920. xii+242 pages.

A well-organized textbook, giving in brief outline a survey of the great religions of the world.

EDWARDS, LYFORD PATERSON. *The Transformation of Early Christianity from an Eschatological to a Socialized Movement*. Menasha, Wis: Banta, 1919. 94 pages.

A doctor's thesis, tracing the development by which Christianity came to be conscious of itself as a society with a definite mission in the world.

ENELOW, H. G. *A Jewish View of Jesus*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. 181 pages.

A sympathetic interpretation from an unusual point of view.

FAULKNER, JOHN ALFRED. *On the Value of Church History*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1920. 50 pages. \$0.30.

A lecture by one who has given years to the teaching of church history.

FIFE, GEORGE BUCHANAN. *The Passing Legions*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. 369 pages. \$2.00.

A well-told story of the service rendered by the American Red Cross to the soldiers in transit and in training in Great Britain.

FITCH, ALBERT PARKER. *Can the Church Survive the Changing Order?* New York: Macmillan, 1920. 79 pages. \$1.00.

A stirring challenge to religious thinking. The church in the past interpreted and promoted great dominant social ideals. The social ideals of today are too largely neglected or suspected by the church. What will be the outcome?

FITCH, ALBERT PARKER. *Preaching and Paganism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. 229 pages.

The Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching, delivered at Yale University last year.

FLEWELLING, RALPH TYLER. *Bergson and Personal Realism*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1920. 304 pages. \$2.00.

A criticism of Bergson's conception of the creative source of reality, and an exposition of the author's own philosophy of "personal realism."

FLORENZ, KARL. *Die historischen Quellen der Shinto-Religion*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1919. xii+470 pages.

A valuable source book, consisting of German translations of excerpts from Chinese and Japanese original sources.

GRAHAM, JOHN W. *The Faith of a Quaker*. Cambridge: University Press, 1920. xvi+444 pages. 21s.

A comprehensive history of the religious ideals and achievements of the Society of Friends, written by an ardent believer in his own type of mysticism.

HASTINGS, JAMES (editor). *The Children's Great Texts of the Bible*. Vols. I-III. New York: Scribner, 1920. xi+327, vii+332, vii+324 pages. \$3.25 per volume, \$15.00 set of 6 volumes.

Three volumes of children's sermons based on appropriate texts.

HILL, OWEN A. *Ethics, General and Special*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. xiv+414 pages.

A textbook on ethical theory and on specific ethical problems, bearing the *imprimatur* of the Roman Catholic Archbishop Hayes.

HUNGERFORD, EDWARD. *With the Doughboy in France*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. 291 pages. \$2.00.

An informing account of the work of the American Red Cross in France during the war.

JACKSON, A. V. WILLIAMS. *Early Persian Poetry*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. xxii+125 pages. \$2.25.

A valuable presentation of literary fragments from ancient and medieval Persia, rendered into exquisite English by an eminent authority in the field of Indo-Iranian culture.

JASTROW, MORRIS. *The Book of Job*. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1920. 369 pages. \$4.00.

An interpretation and a new translation by a well-known Semitic scholar.

JONES, RUFUS M. *A Service of Love in War Time*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. xv+284 pages. \$2.50.

An account of the remarkable undertaking of the Society of Friends for the reconstruction of the devastated area in France.

KENNEDY, H. A. A. *The Theology of the Epistles*. New York: Scribner, 1920. xii+267 pages. \$1.35.

Another volume in the excellent series, "Studies in Theology." It interprets the theological messages of the epistles in the New Testament.

KING, HENRY CHURCHILL. *A New Mind for the New Age*. New York: Revell, 1920. 192 pages. \$1.50.

The Cole Lectures for 1920 delivered before Vanderbilt University. It interprets the spiritual upheaval caused by the war with a view to discerning fundamental values to which men must now devote themselves.

LATTEY, CUTHBERT, KEATING, JOSEPH, and KEOGH, ALEXANDER. *The New Testament*. Vol. III., *The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, The Epistle to the Galatians, The Epistle to the Romans*. (The Westminster Version of the Sacred Scriptures.) New York: Longmans, Green, 1920. xviii+85 pages. \$1.20.

Translations, with brief notes, and brief introductions bearing the *imprimatur* of Roman Catholic authority.

MCLACHLAN, H. *St. Luke, the Man and His Work*. London: Longmans, Green, 1920. xii+324 pages. 7s. 6d.

A series of studies designed to discuss all important problems connected with the Third Gospel so as to interpret the character and message of Luke.

MAXSON, CHARLES HARTSHORN. *The Great Awakening in the Middle Colonies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1920. vii+158 pages. \$1.25.

A doctor's thesis which has gathered from contemporary sources information concerning the course of the great revival in Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

MERCER, SAMUEL A. B. *Ethiopic Grammar*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. 116 pages. 7s. 6d.

An elementary introduction to the study of Ethiopic, supplying a needed textbook in English.

OLDENBERG, HERMANN. *Vorwissenschaftliche Wissenschaft. Die Weltanschauung der Brahmana-Texte*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1919. vi+249 pages.

An attempt, by a study of the Brahmana texts to reconstruct pre-scientific philosophical concepts.

PARRY, R. ST. JOHN. *The Pastoral Epistles*. Cambridge: University Press, 1920. clxv+104 pages. 20s.

An extensive critical introduction followed by a commentary on the Greek text. The Pauline authorship of the epistles is elaborately defended.

PERKINS, JEANETTE ELOISE, and DANIELSON, FRANCES WELD. *The Mayflower Program Book*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1920. vii+229 pages. \$2.00.

A suggestive book of educational programs to be used in Sunday schools for developing neighborly interest in people the world over. Designed for children of six to eight years.

PRATT, JAMES BISSETT. *The Religious Consciousness*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. ix+486 pages.

A comprehensive and searching examination of the characteristics of religious experience.

RALL, HARRIS FRANKLIN. *Modern Premillennialism and the Christian Hope*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1920. 256 pages. \$1.50.

A well-written critical discussion of a current theological emphasis, based on a careful objective historical study, and embodying constructive suggestions as to a sane interpretation of the Christian Hope.

Religion among American Men, as Revealed by a Study of Conditions in the Army.

New York: Association Press, 1920. xvi+155 pages.

An informing survey of what was learned during the war concerning the religious ideas and ideals of the soldiers, and concerning methods of promoting religious and moral welfare.

ROBERTSON, A. T. *Luke the Historian in the Light of Research.* New York:

Scribner, 1920. ix+257 pages. \$2.50.

A readable survey of the main critical problems connected with the authorship of the Third Gospel, being an enlargement of lectures given at the Northfield Christian Workers' Conference.

SCHMIDT, HANS, and KAHLE, PAUL. *Volkserzählungen aus Palästina.*

Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1918. 96+303 pages.

A very interesting and valuable collection of folk-lore current in modern Palestine. As a source book for the study of the folk-psychology of this region it will serve a useful purpose.

SCHOFF, WILFRED H. *The Ship "Tyre."* New York: Longmans, Green,

1920. 157 pages. \$2.00.

An attempt to show that the "Tyre" of Ezekiel really refers to Babylon.

SLATTERY, MARGARET. *The Highway to Leadership.* Boston: Pilgrim Press,

1920. 143 pages. \$1.50.

Some essentials of personal influence popularly expounded.

SMITH, C. HENRY. *The Mennonites.* Berne, Ind: Mennonite Book Concern,

1920. 340 pages. \$2.25.

A history prepared under denominational approval, and intended for a textbook in Mennonite schools.

SMITH, CHARLES RYDER. *The Bible Doctrine of Society in Its Historical Evolution.* Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1920. xviii+400 pages.

A survey of the history of biblical religion from the point of view of social development.

SNOWDEN, JAMES H. *The Personality of God.* New York: Macmillan, 1920.

xii+148 pages. \$1.75.

An argument based on the principles of philosophical idealism supplemented by an appeal to the value of personality as an ultimate interpretative concept.

SNOWDEN, JAMES H. *The Truth about Christian Science.* Philadelphia:

Westminster Press, 1920. xiii+313 pages. \$2.40.

An account of the rise and the teachings of Christian Science with conscientious regard for the sources, but embodying an adverse judgment. The real values of Christian Science, the author contends, can be more wholesomely expressed in the commonly accepted Christian doctrines.

SWISHER, WALTER SAMUEL. *Religion and the New Psychology.* Boston:

Marshall Jones, 1920. xv+261 pages. \$2.00.

An examination of various phases of consciousness in which religious or occult experiences occur. The author applies the Freudian methods of psychoanalysis to his problems.

TORREY, CHARLES C. *The Annual of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem*. Vol. I. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. xiii + 92 pages.

Four studies by men who have been directors of the School in Jerusalem, giving valuable reports of investigations and explorations in Palestine.

WEBB, CLEMENT C. J. *Divine Personality and Human Life*. (Gifford Lectures.) New York: Macmillan, 1920. 291 pages.

The second series of the Gifford Lectures, in which Dr. Webb suggestively shows the implications of a belief in a personal God for various realms of individual and social life.

WEBER, VALENTIN. *Des Paulus Reiserouten bei der Zweimaligen Durchquerung Kleinasiens*. Würzburg: Becker, 1920. 41 pages.

A brief popular discussion of the missionary journeys of the apostle Paul with the purpose of clearing up some of the problems raised by Acts 16:6.

WOODBURNE, ANGUS STEWART. *The Relation between Religion and Science: A Biological Approach*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1920. vii + 103 pages. \$0.75.

A careful analysis of human instincts, to discover the precise impulses satisfied by science and by religion. The conclusion is that an entirely cordial co-operation between religion and science is possible when both are understood as means of satisfying native instincts. Both science and religion are seen to be more complex in their genesis than is often assumed.

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WHAT IS THE PRESENT ATTITUDE OF COLLEGE STUDENTS TOWARD ORGANIZED RELIGION?

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I

It is not easy to give any answer to this question which will be sufficiently accurate to be illuminating. It is never a simple matter to discern what youth is thinking or feeling, either on those matters which it believes to be important to itself or those which it is aware we propose or desire it should regard as such. There is always a gulf fixed between middle age and youth though for the most part age only dimly comprehends it. We who have grown up remember our childhood with sufficient and rather sentimental clearness and we have a vivid realization alike of the trials, the responsibilities, and the privileges of age. But the years of our adolescence tend to fade from our memory. Those days of swift transition, of continuous experimentation, of unrelated, irresponsible, and ephemeral expansions left no enduring marks upon the tablets of the mind. For the most part we have so far forgotten their significance that we do not even realize they have passed out of our recorded consciousness.

This largely accounts, I think, for the characteristic impatience of our self-protective prudence with the gay and careless destructiveness of newly awakened life. This is why age

has more of jealousy than sympathy for youth and why it is more prone to expect adolescence to understand and pay tribute to what appear to it the self-evident standards of maturity, than to remember the need and difficulty of thinking itself back into the morning of life. Few older men can deal with youth imaginatively. Hence professor and student live side by side in outer decorum and superficial companionship, but the real springs of action and the scales of value by which youth builds its life are often carefully concealed.

This is particularly true when the discussion deals with matters of faith and conduct. The sense of the maladjustment between an older and a younger generation is strongest here. Youth does not understand its own attitude toward religion any too well. It is both self-conscious and self-exacting and these traits increase the inhibitions induced by the sense of the obtuseness and remoteness of older lives. Moreover, youth is not unaware that the reasons age brings forward in the support of established institutions are often more ostensible than real, that it is not so much the intrinsic worth of organized religion as it is its by-product of stability, comfort, and professional security which endears it to its defenders. *The Profits of Religion* is a grotesquely unfair and one-sided book but there is truth in it and just the kind of truth that youth can perceive. Youth thinks that age demands more of it in the way of intellectual and moral docility than it, itself, is prepared to give.

In short, a community of young people strives on the whole toward higher standards of thought and conduct than does the armored and respectable middle age around it. However fantastic and perverse some of its contemporary expressions may seem, nevertheless it is generally distinguished by ethical insight and moral sensitiveness. Youth sometimes fails dreadfully but it is more honest with itself regarding its failures, realizes their nature more keenly, and takes them more seriously than does the older life about it. Hence the

spiritual atmosphere of a college or a parish, which offers the only medium for the exchange of real thought and emotion, is clouded by false values. The young idealists in it are tongue-tied and uncertain except when talking among themselves; the older formalists are too exacting, especially of other people, and too expressive, at least in public. Hence the initial suspicion with which youth regards both professional advocates and conventional forms of religion; hence the voluntary expression of religion among the better undergraduates is meager, reticent, not easily analyzed. Quite aside from any other reasons there is something inherent in the nature of the relationship and the different status of the lives composing it in a college community which makes a just and accurate common understanding difficult.

The first thing, then, to remember about such a discussion as this is the peril of quick answers. We are hearing a good deal at present about the godlessness of modern youth and the immorality of the present generation. But easy summations of undergraduate attitudes, either by way of censorious condemnation or sentimental praise, are all likely to go wide of the mark. We should understand youth better if we were more confident of it, more critical of ourselves; if we approached it with a mixture of disinterested and expectant observation and some personal humility. There is something truly ironical in the apparent simplicity of academic relationships, something almost fatuous in the bland acceptance on the part of older men and women of the mere appearances in youth of virtue or vice, piety or irreligion. There is something, too, profoundly unjust in the easy generalizations, the all but absolute judgments by which an established order betrays its resentment at the critical scrutiny or frank hostility of young life.

II

Let us attempt then a dispassionate analysis, from the point of view of the churches, of the undergraduate community.

We shall discern at once three conventional attitudes toward organized religion on the part of college students. They are all of them classic; they illustrate, in the realm of the religious interests, corresponding reactions having the same characteristic emphases and approaches which may be found in the economic and social and political life of the time. First: there is the natural conformist. He is the boy who is temperamentally "good," who identifies religious faith with external moral practices. He issues from average, middle-class American life, the son of a thrifty, practical, unimaginative household. He has had a sober and careful bringing up. He has been taught to read the Scriptures, to say his prayers, to attend church. There is often a frank and naïve strain of commercialism in his piety; he has been schooled to remember that social disgrace or academic failure, or material ruin, are the punishments of irreligion and immorality. He largely conceives of religion in the terms of group respectability; assumes that the content of the moral law is practically unchanging from generation to generation. Wrong and right are simple and self-evident; they are mutually exclusive territories, separated by clear boundary lines. Faith and character are achieved by remaining in the right territory.

Boys of this group often have substantial sanity, a rather shrewd and sensible scale of values. But their imaginative deficiencies, their narrow range of desires and interests, with the accompanying intolerance and complacency make them unlovable and relatively negligible figures among their peers. This group has sent many recruits into the ministry in the past. Some of them have become saints and have deepened and enriched the life of the profession. But on the whole they have not strengthened it. They have not had enough creative ability to be great preachers. They have approached the ministry with a too simple notion of its duties; it has been strangely mechanicalized in their minds. It has appeared to consist of preaching pleasantly an accepted mes-

sage furnished ready to their hands, of making routine calls, of gently perpetuating existing organizations—even if with a slowly diminishing momentum! Instinctively they have expected the institution to carry them; the office to make the man, not the man the office. It was such innocuous, if complacent conformity which the late William E. Godkin had in mind, when, referring to a distinguished foreign university, he observed that it was an ideal place for those youth who were chiefly interested “in lawn tennis, gardening, and true religion.”

The numbers of these men, however, are diminishing in the college just as middle-class religion, with its passion for respectability and its identification of faith with conventional conduct is, in proportion to the growth of the population, everywhere diminishing as well.

Second: there is the group of the young institutionalists. They are a more characteristic product of our present society and therefore more significant to our discussion. They come from a richer and wider environment, are more developed personalities, than their conforming comrades. They do not share in the moral naïveté of the first class; sometimes they do not share its moral scruples either. The boys of this group identify religion with a half-romantic, half-mystical allegiance to impressive and picturesque institutions. They link up this allegiance in their minds with subscription to creed, a sort of class allegiance to the formulae promulgated by an imperial and established organization. There are certain classic statements of the Christian faith. They move the imagination, both subdue and elevate the minds of sensitive and reflective youth, partly by their aesthetic and mystical appeal, partly by the very prestige of their antiquity. They are the confessions of faith of a splendid and imperial standing order. They appeal to the best in the aristocratic impulse, its sense of the continuity of life, its perception that you must not divorce the present from the past, its understanding of

the slowly refining, carefully garnered deposit which makes up all that is best in human experience.

These youth are not moved by any terrific moral struggle or by the evangelical passion for soul-saving. The prophetic note in them is absent. They are Churchmen; social and religious Conservatives. Sometimes when they grow older they, like John Neville Figgis, carry side by side with medieval forms of religion quite radical views in political economy and social science. But essentially religion is to them a perpetuation of an established and authoritative order.

When these men enter the ministry, they become not so much the shepherds of sheep as spiritual governors of parishes. The world regards with something of reluctant admiration, something more of covert hostility and distrust, their amalgam of the urbane manners and self-assurance of this world, with the offices of priest and preacher. Boys whose religious instinct expresses itself in these ways are increasing among us and they are turning naturally to the Roman and Anglican communions. The main current of our age flows steadily and relentlessly against the institutionalist and his type of religion. But there are many cross-currents in any generation and a new exaltation of institutional religion is one of them which is discernible at this moment. As the American home becomes more and more sophisticated and society becomes older, more highly developed and rigid in its customs, allegiance to all established institutions grows among us. It represents the determined effort of a relatively completed and well adjusted social order to defend itself, its achievements no less than its privileges, from the crudeness and destructiveness of the new forces now struggling upward in society. Most men who have gained anything of permanence hate and fear change. They identify the accompaniments of a new order, its bohemian living, its flippant and reckless iconoclasm, its attacks upon special privilege with the order itself. This,

they think, is all there is to it. So they withdraw into the citadel of institutional orthodoxies.

A fair number of college men who are now entering the ministry are of this group. It does not matter much what learning they receive in college which seems to vitiate either the historic pretensions or the intellectual statements of their faith. They have already cast in their lot with the older order, they are not inquirers so much as they are partisans. They will by no means be a negligible force in the coming generation. By no perceivable possibility can they become the leaders of the age into which we are now advancing. But they will skilfully and resolutely oppose it; they are far more formidable opponents than their simpler brethren of the first group, and they will have considerable influence.

Third: there is the young humanitarian. He is a common and obvious type of undergraduate, more in evidence a decade ago than now, the boy who expresses his religion through its substitutes, who meets his spiritual problem by evading it. He puts effects in the place of causes; practical efficiency takes the place of spiritual insight. The ardent if superficial humanism of recent years has produced the youth who identifies religion with social reform, piety with organized benevolence, and spiritual leadership with administrative efficiency. To work is to pray, social service is character, a rarefied amiability is faith.

Such a lad is a past master at planning a missionary campaign, engineering a student conference, and "promoting" a Bible class. He knows how to "swing it right." He sees nothing incongruous in organizing a risqué undergraduate vaudeville show to raise money for the support of a settlement house. He will be found teaching at a down-town mission, or acting as scoutmaster for local gamins, or installed as a religious work director. He is a wholesome and aggressive youth, friendly, rather too approachable, amazingly able and

resourceful in practical affairs. He has character, is not imaginative, is terribly at ease in Zion. It is largely from this group that the ever-to-be replenished ranks of student Christian association secretaries, graduate secretaries, student-volunteer leaders, are recruited.

These men, for the most part, accept the essentials of the present order. They do not scrutinize the intellectual and emotional sources of our present religious and economic structure. They would rather mitigate its abuses than reform its principles. They are natural if unconscious pragmatists. Their passion is for action; they want always to be "doing things." The goal of social service, which is ever before their eyes and their passion for "results" makes them superficial leaders. They take refuge from the difficulties of thought in the opportunities of action.

A few of these men, not many, go into the ministry. Generally speaking, it repels them by its emphasis upon religious passion and spiritual insight. Also, they are contemptuous of what seem to be the lax business methods and practical inefficiency of the average church. They are not so large a group in the college as they were before the war, for its brutal dislocations shook this type of youth out of his notion of salvation by expansion and reformation by machinery.

III

Probably all the men of these three groups which we have been discussing represent when combined decidedly less than half the undergraduate body. The remainder of it, which is a substantial majority of the whole number, forms the group which is most significant to our purpose. It can be classified under two heads. First: there are the modern pagans. A large number of contemporary undergraduates are not irreligious today, they are non-religious. They are neither hostile nor contemptuous as regards religion; they are indifferent to it, they know nothing about it, they are relatively incapable

of experiencing it. There is much truth in the neglected Calvinistic doctrines of election and predestination. Probably all men cannot be saved; some of them are antecedently incapable of salvation. Such boys as I am describing are the natural product of the materialism and commercialism which represents one-half of the American character of the moment; they are neither very much better nor worse than the homes from which they issue. But this group of obtuse and unawakened lads is one of the most significant factors in undergraduate life, more characteristic of the immediate problem which confronts the college and the nation than any one of the other groups we have as yet mentioned. The grosser forms of immorality are not common among them, they are more vulgar than vicious, hopelessly secular, but not bad. Their language is callously profane and has a sort of a-moral coarseness about it. Their literature is principally *Snappy Stories*, the *Saturday Evening Post*, and the sporting pages of the daily prints. Their most natural occupations appear to be striving for some club, indulging in college gossip, or indefinite discussion of athletic events in which they themselves took no part, and alternating between the "movies" and innumerable dances.

In short, they are men in whom the aesthetic, intellectual, and spiritual interests are almost wholly undeveloped and to whom organized religion makes no contribution and for which they feel no slightest need. Religion in general would seem to have no *quid pro quo* to offer them. The number of these men has very largely increased in the American college. They are changing its habits of thought and conduct, its scale of values as regards courses, the whole aesthetic and emotional level of the group. They undertake their four years of college life mostly for social or practical reasons and they leave college nearly always for business or for law.

If organized religion wants to test out how much of a power it still is in the college, let it see if it can evangelize this group. Success or failure with them would be an actual measure of its

vitality, a real snatching of brands from the burning. The other groups we have discussed are temperamentally disposed toward some sort of acceptance of the churches. This group is one of the two for whose salvation the churches specifically exist. We should never draw many leaders from its numbers; can we recruit the laity from it? It is significant that at present this group remains almost wholly untouched either by college preaching or by the Y.M.C.A. activities of the undergraduate body.

Finally, there are the intellectual and aesthetic radicals. This group probably comprehends by far the largest number of valuable men in the college community. It is composed of the boys who have both intellectual and emotional equipment and along with their brains and their heart, they have the accompanying spirit of the adventurer. Such youth are natural come-outers. They are possessed of character as well as intellect. Their moral code is often not that of their elders and they are sometimes rather brutal in their disdain of inherited prohibitions. But they have a code of their own, they govern their lives, keep their appetites within reasonable bounds, respect themselves. They have a passion for intellectual integrity and for accurate appreciations and judgments. They are unsentimental by nature, and dislike, as they dislike few other things, the boy who is only temperamentally or emotionally religious. They have a disconcerting habit of ignoring the considerations of expediency or the sensitiveness of their interlocutors when scrutinizing a conviction or analyzing an institution.

Now the most significant fact we have yet touched upon is that these men also are almost wholly outside the influence of organized religion. The first reason for this is either the lack of any religious training in their homes or church in their earlier youth or, as is more often the case, their having received a training which has been both mistaken and inadequate in content. Neither Sunday school nor minister ever pointed out

to them the difference between scientific and religious truth. Scientific truth is the exact agreement of observation and judgment with fact. It is an affair of the intellect, it calls for mental accuracy, is capable of precise demonstration. Ethical truth is the harmonious adjustment of conduct to the moral and social constitution of man. Insight into the nature of this adjustment is as much, if not more, an affair of the imagination than of the mind; the allegiance to ethical truth might be called more of a practical than an intellectual experience. Moral truth is not capable of mathematical demonstration, but only of a gradual and relative verification in experience. Religious truth again is the perception of the right relations between man and the universe as a whole. Such truth is generally presented to mankind in the form of personalities, it comes in the guise of personages who by their imaginative insight, their spiritual intuitiveness, have worked out or grasped an attitude both toward men and God which satisfies and interprets the lives and consciences of those who behold it. There are speculative, mystical, and aesthetic values in religious truth which do not enter into scientific observation of fact. The imagination plays a part here which it does not play with the natural investigator.

Now such fundamental distinctions are primary elements in religious growth and education. But for the most part they are not given by churches or parents. Able youth are sent to college believing that the truth of religion stands or falls with historical accuracy of the gospel narrative or with the correctness of inherited systems of opinion. They have been encouraged to identify religious truth either with theological beliefs or with faith in some inerrant writings or with the concept of an omniscient Christ. When the church says that Jesus is the truth, it is talking of truth as a form of personality, as a system of relations, and of the Lord Jesus as being, by the common consent of human experience and observation, all that a man ought to be in

these relations. He is truth in its final form, a true person. All this, these men have not been taught; they suppose that what the church asserts is "true," is some particular brand of theological or ecclesiastical orthodoxy. Thus, their teaching before ever they come to college has given them no preparation for what they will find there; it not only has been deficient but it has been positively false.

The inevitable of course happens when these boys of potential intellectual and aesthetic power are introduced to the free intellectual processes and stimulated by the sudden expansion of scientific knowledge which come to them as undergraduates. They quickly perceive how far the thought and feeling and knowledge of their day have outstripped the creed and practice of ecclesiastical, as of other contemporary, organizations. They perceive that to some real degree the churches are outmoded in conduct and reactionary in belief. They are aware how far contemporary psychological and social science has advanced beyond the consciousness of most preachers and how dreadfully it discredits their usual concepts regarding nature and human life. They have an acute and somewhat exaggerated perception of how discarded is the philosophic view of the world which lies behind classic systems of theology and they see how inconsistent with the ethics of Jesus is both the theory and the practice of our imperialistic and ruthlessly competitive society. They are aware that consciously or unconsciously the laity support the churches quite as much for social and economic as for religious reasons. In short, they perceive that their inherited ethical, theological, and ecclesiastical orthodoxies will not stand the test of scientific investigations and they think these are to be identified with religion. Hence, not understanding the nature of religious truth they soon lose any sense of the value of it. In the beginning, they look with scorn upon the minister as the official of an order of ideas which he must know is no longer defensible and they regard the church as a drag upon society.

Now these are able boys. And before they are through their Senior year they have become more or less aware of the difference between religion and theology, an art and its science, the self-verifying moral and spiritual experience of the Lord Jesus and any particular philosophic or practical implications with which men have clothed it. They have come to perceive the difference between religious and scientific truths. But it is then, for the most part, too late to reclaim them, because their active lives have already gotten substitutes for the faith which they discarded. They are absorbed in intellectual pursuits. Just as we are told of Darwin that his early and vivid delight in music became entirely atrophied through long absorption in purely scientific pursuits so the interest of these youths in the distinctively religious expression of their ethical and imaginative life has perished. They give themselves to philosophy or economics or political science; they are still devoted men but their devotion is to wisdom, they worship truth, not the God of truth. They are young men of character, but it is respect for themselves and humanity, not awe and loyalty in the presence of a holy being, which is alike the motive and the sanction of their conduct. Some of them give a genuine discipleship to the old classic ideals of beauty and of justice. They prefer this to the personalized and too often the timid and obscurantist religion of the churches.

Other men in this group, not possessing as great intellectual power or as keen scientific interests, hold aloof from organized religion for aesthetic reasons. They are sensitive to the various aspects of beauty. Indeed, boys who understand the significance and value of the aesthetic world are rapidly on the increase in this group. To them the stenciled walls and carpeted floors, the anomalous furnishings and frock-coated officials, the popular romantic and quite irreligious music of the average Protestant sanctuary are both ludicrous and repellent. With all the joyous cruelty of youth they pitilessly analyze and condemn it.

More and more the college is training these abler youth to a critical appreciation of the intimate and significant relationship between sublime ideas and deep emotions and a restrained and beautiful, an austere and reverent, expression of them. The very age itself, with its immensely increased interest in the dramatic and plastic and descriptive arts, tends more and more to feed their imaginative life and to make the standards of that life more consciously exacting. But our average non-liturgical service has not much to offer their critically trained perceptions. They find little of beauty or of awe in the Sunday morning service. Indeed our church habits are pretty largely the transfer into the sanctuary of the hearty conventions of middle-class family life. The expressions and attitudes of life which are precious to such youth, the subtle and precise and mystical ones get small recognition here. They feel like uncomfortable outsiders or truculent misfits in the Sunday morning congregation. Therefore, partly for reasons of intellectual integrity and partly for reasons of a genuine and aesthetic distaste and partly because organized religion has been crowded out by other interests which also feed mind and spirit they avoid the Christian church. It does not seem to move in their world. They are quite aware that it tries to stand for, and once did stand for, real values. They, too, think those values are real but that they are no longer within its custody.

It is conceded that very few of the abler men in college today, either the students of distinguished intellectual or creative capacity, are turning toward the Christian ministry. It does not seem to me difficult in the light of what we have been saying to understand why. It is not because these men are devoid of religious capacity or of ethical loyalties. Quite the contrary; they are the men who are going to be the leaders of the higher life of their generation. But modern life offers many new professions and occupations into which imaginative spirits and keen minds may enter. The new engineering pro-

fessions, the opportunities of big business, give scope for the work of the constructive imagination and the analysis of the keen mind, which an earlier and simpler age denied. Political and economic reform calls for the highest moral and mental qualities. Hence it is not altogether consonant with the genius of our day that it should produce such conventionally religious spirits as medieval civilization gave birth to. Nevertheless, the general defection of this group upon the Christian ministry and the churches is gravely significant as to the probable immediate future of organized religion. For if we have lost our hold on men of this sort, then, whether or not we win the battle at any other point of the line, our real success in controlling the thought and feeling of society is problematic indeed. If we have lost these men as both laymen and leaders in the churches, all other gains are gravely diminished thereby.

It would not be true, I suppose, of this group, that they would say that the ministry is not a "man-sized" job. They began, in the first flush of intellectual activity in their Sophomore year, by saying that, but now they would be quite aware that religious and moral leadership of this generation offers a herculean task. But they have become indifferent to it and are rather of the conviction that the churches are neither able nor indeed anxious to really undertake it. There is plenty of dormant religious capacity in this group, much unexpressed spiritual ability. But it regards the only ministry possible for it in this generation, because the only one compatible with clear thinking and fine feeling, as one outside of the ecclesiastical institution. This is obviously a half-truth, by no means a perfectly just attitude. But then all human convictions are combinations of half-truths; vague hearsay, blank prejudice, fond fancy, are component parts of all our thinking and feeling. We shall never gain the men of this group by railing at them or by pitying ourselves for their unsympathetic attitude or by denying the large measure of justification that lies beneath it. If we ever do win back their allegiance

it will be by a generous and frank appreciation of those very gifts of intellect and character which have turned them away. And we shall make a grave mistake if we suppose that in any age of the world keen minds and tempered spirits have been shut up to our expression of the higher life.

My general attitude must be clear from the foregoing observations. The attitude of college students toward organized religion is very far from what we should like it to be, but the trouble is not so much with these young men as with our own organization. Able and sensitive youth are naturally religious. They are also naturally scrupulous that whatever of religion they bring themselves to openly espouse, shall be candid in spirit, intelligent in content, beautiful and dignified in expression. If there is to be again a warm and confident alliance between academic and ecclesiastical life and if the ablest youths are again to enter the ministry, the churches will have to change more than the colleges. In so far as religious institutions adapt their interpretations of religious experience to the world-view of today, according as they promulgate a moral code not formed to meet the problems of a vanished and simpler order of society but adapted to the new and urgent problems of an urban and industrial civilization, and in so far as they can recognize that the beautiful has as much place in life as the holy and the good, they will interest and attract undergraduate life. There is an infinite pathos in the wistfulness with which many idealistic boys regard the church today as an organization hostile to mental freedom, indifferent to beauty, and insistent on a procrustean morality; there is something deeper than pathos in the indifference and almost contempt which exists between so many youth in the coming generation and the Christian church. In their heart of hearts these boys would like to worship, to believe, to openly espouse a holy and a sacrificial life. If that be true, what is the reason the church can do so little with them?

THE INTIMATE SENSES AS SOURCES OF WISDOM

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It was a significant event in the history of thought when Locke bore down with renewed vigor on the doctrine that all knowledge is of sensory origin. A highly disciplined psychology is hardly possible so long as the intellect can draw its wisdom from innate ideas, a priori postulates, and ready-made categories and can "participate in" the treasure house of static absolutes. That there is nothing in the intellect which was not first in the senses was a dictum that set free important consequences for scientific psychology and for reconstructions in philosophy and theology.

I should propose a restatement of the Lockian slogan, but with mindfulness that there are not just "five windows of the soul" nor even a mysterious "sixth sense" but that we have at least ten well-defined types of sensory mechanism, each busy all the time reporting to us the outside world and conditioning our response to it. The traditional five could fairly well bear the burden placed upon them because of the prevailing intellectualistic psychology that made the cognitive functions too nearly identical with the larger field of mentality. Latterly, genetic psychology has shown clearly enough that the thought processes are specialized strains and currents in the wider, deeper stream of consciousness that has not been and perhaps never can be caught up into specific descriptions and representations. All the subtle and indefinable processes of the mind in so far as they have value in life adjustments are conditioned as truly by the special senses as are those belonging to cognition. Our statement would then be that there is nothing in the mind that was not first in the ten or more senses.

In addition to the five senses: sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch (pressure), recent psychology fully recognizes several others. They are pain, temperature, equilibrium (static), kinaesthetic (muscle), organic. They are all well-defined senses. The criterion of a special sense is that it has a specialized set of end-organs or receptors for reporting to the organism certain kinds of exciting objects and that it is connected through the central areas with a particular kind of response.

Cutaneous pain is not to be confused with touch. The warm and cold nerve-endings are different from each other and are distinguished from both pain and pressure. The end-organ for equilibrium is the semicircular canals, a special sense that is not connected with that of hearing whose nerve-endings are in the cochlea. Functional psychology has been much helped by the differentiation of the kinaesthetic sense whose end-organs are found in the striped muscles and especially in joints and tendons. Almost revolutionary in psychology is the discovery of the organic sense with its myriad of receptors in stomach, intestines, diaphragm, lungs, heart, arteries, veins, the glands throughout the body, including the sweat-glands, whose stimuli are constantly flooding the central mechanism and by a marvelously fine set of interactions conditioning the inner and outer adjustments of the organism.

Of the special senses the kinaesthetic and organic are among the oldest biologically, are most widespread throughout the body, bear the heaviest burdens in the animal economy, and perhaps do more work than any of the others in furnishing content to the higher mental life. At the same time they have been almost completely ignored in psychology. This strange neglect has been due to the arrogance of sight and hearing whose imagery is spectacular and, being describable, is capable of readier introspection and is more convenient as a mechanism of discourse. But in spite of their handicaps it is the organic and kinaesthetic senses that condition the essential types of behavior which make up the body of human endeavor and

achievement—war, love-making, the care of children, the amassing of wealth, adjustment within the group, and worship. It is the restlessness, the innervations, the tensions and recoils, the needs and their possible fulfilment, the hungers and their satisfaction, that furnish the incitations to action, and are the constant criteria of successful accomplishment. All these are under the control of the organic and kinaesthetic senses that use sight, hearing, and the others as the servants, tools, and instruments.

It has been customary to classify the senses as, first, the “higher” (sight and hearing) and, secondly, to group all the others together as the “lower.” The terminology indicates the anatomical position of the two favored senses in the body and signifies as well that they have an honored rôle in mental activities.

I would suggest a reclassification of the senses on the basis of the way they handle their materials. Sight has won a high place for itself in evolution and in animal economy because of its skill in *defining* its objects, and setting them off in spatial relationships to each other. Color, form, extension, distance, directions, relation, number—these are the qualities in objects it is fond of discovering and using. It has been claimed that it can detect 40,000 discriminable qualities. Something of the same propensity for definition is found in hearing. It sets objects off against one another according to their intensity, pitch, and timbre, and conspires with vision in arranging these qualities in accordance with their position, relation, and number. The kinaesthetic sense, still less adept than sight and hearing at definition, nevertheless takes note of units of succession in experience and, working along with the others, creates and discovers a time-scheme with spatial units superimposed upon it. Pressure specializes in units of resistance, and in many ways aids the other defining senses in formulating a world of discrete objects with specific relations. In so far as a receptor discriminates qualities in objects and perceives their kinships it


may be called a *defining* sense. Since all the senses possess this power to a certain degree it is more fitting to speak of *defining sensory processes*.

Some of the other senses are concerned with the interpretation of objects and of their qualities *immediately* without defining them or setting them into spatial and temporal orders, or relating them in anyway schematically. The objects just are. Their qualities are *directly* regarded as agreeable, or indifferent, as desirable or undesirable, or otherwise fitted to the well-being of the organism. In so far as a receptor reports to consciousness directly or immediately qualities of objects together with cues of right response, it may be designated an *intimate* sense. Or again, since all of the senses have in greater or less degree this propensity, it is better to speak of intimate sensory processes. All the so-called lower senses belong predominantly to this class. The organic sense is almost purely of the intimate type. Stimulations and corresponding responses from thirst, satiety, breathing, assimilation of food, reproductive needs, glandular secretion, circulatory tone, and other functions that involve the organic sense-receptors and bulk so large in the day's life are little capable of definition or even of symbolization in speech. That foods are too sweet, that condiments are too sour or bitter, that flavors are just right, are immediate verities, quite undefinable but usually dependable. The warm and cold mechanisms report directly, instantaneously, and reliably that the room is too hot, too cold, or just right. As an after-thought one may seek to fortify the judgment by some measuring stick like a thermometer.

The accompanying diagram indicates the relation of these two functions to each other and to the special senses. It is evident that the classification cuts across each of the senses somewhat artificially. All of them are concerned with defining their objects and all are capable of acting as intimate senses. Vision is clearly at one extreme in the list and the

organic sense at the other. The relative length of the line *ab* as compared with *bc* under sight would signify its high skill at definition. On the other hand the insignificance of *ab* under organic sense as compared with *bc* means to symbolize its incapacity at description. The other senses form a series between these two extremes.

The thesis of this discussion is that the intimate sensory processes are the direct and important sources of meaning, of worth, and of value. They are sources of wisdom in morals, aesthetics, and religion. Our estimates of the beauty and rightness of objects, of admiration and of worship are not compelled to subject themselves to the technique of the defining senses.



Worth and meaning are *sui generis*. They stand upon their own feet. Their characteristics are reported directly through the intimate sensory processes without mediation. The defining functions are often essential to art and religion and sometimes indispensable in giving cogency to their content and in furnishing instruments of criticism and in supplying them with a language for expression.

Rather than degrade the intimate senses to a minor place in life as a whole, it is more in accordance with the facts to say that in certain spheres they are primary and that the defining senses play a minor rôle simply as mechanisms of articulation.

The upshot of our discussion shall be that the two types of sensory behavior are both high each in its own way when dealing with certain sorts of objects. There has been a double line

of development and evolution equally important: the one moving fast and far in the direction of description, scientific analysis, practical manipulation, logical construction, and system-building. The other line has achieved equal success in interpreting its objects and their meanings in subtle and skilful ways and in holding the individual in right relationship to his world of experience. The language of intimate-sense wisdom is *symbolism* that can hint and suggest meanings that are indescribable. Characteristic outputs of the defining functions are science, mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. The human product of the intimate functions is art, morality, and religion. The supremely right attitude of the human being in the one sphere is that of endless patience in analysis and formulation; in the other it is a sensitive attitude of receptivity toward seemingly life-giving objects and toward adjustments that promise fulfilment.

In morality these intimations of right adaptation have organized themselves into "conscience"; in religion the true way on and out has been described as that of trust, confidence, faith, and hope.

In this divergent, two-fold line of evolution each set of functions has been conditioned by its own centers of neural organization and control. The central mechanism of the defining processes has the central nervous system with the cerebrum and its association centers as its highest structure. The neural mechanism of the intimate senses is the autonomic, or sympathetic, system and its connection with all the viscera and the smooth muscle tissues of the body. The interaction and interdependence of the two systems is indicated by the fact that the sympathetic is biologically in the line of direct descent from the primitive pressure and chemical senses, and that latterly in the course of evolution its ganglia are derived from migration of cells from the spinal cord, and that anatomically it must be considered as an extension of the central sensory motor mechanism. Keeping pace with the evolution of the

sympathetic system have come the liver, adrenals, the pituitary body, the thyroid and other duct and ductless glands that are able to inject into the blood stream a variety of chemical substances that serve for the interactions of the various parts of the organism. The proper functioning of these organs is vitally significant in the adjustments within the body, and adaptations to its world. They are properly regarded as conditioning, if not determining, factors in the functioning of the organic sense.

In elucidation of the fact that we have here a descriptive approach to the source of valuation, we shall indicate in the first place the direct appeal of religion and art to the intimate senses and later refer to their use through the symbolism of the imagery connected with these senses.

In the first place, then, it is a significant and not a curious fact that religion and art have found ways of exciting all the intimate senses. The use of sweet incense, flowers, perfumes, and burning substances has been widespread throughout the cults as stimulus to worship. "Smell, the fallen angel," is able apparently to suffuse worship with a delicate sort of poetry. The soul, it has been said, is a sort of refined odor. Likewise, the gustatory sense has been an easy avenue of approach in worship. Tasting together a delectable viand or the blood of an animal or a human being has proved a useful seal of the social bond and a means of communion with the gods. The taking of sacraments, whether Christian or pagan, inducts the devotee into the very heart of the mystery of life. The value of pressure contacts is shown in the laying on of hands, in touching hems of garments, and in grasping and holding relics and sacred symbols. The successful in religion as in art is, by and large, measured by the degree of ingenuity in playing upon the pain nerves, whether it be cutaneous pain or the deeper-seated pain receptors. On this lower level religion has enjoyed a deal of satisfaction in the infliction of actual bodily pain. As it develops it contents itself with stirring the most

intense emotions to the point of strain that awakens the sense of pain. The two most widespread religions have been fullest of acute pessimism. Rodin, who has a right to speak for the world of art, says "Yes, the great artist, and by this I mean the poet as well as the painter and sculptor, finds even in suffering, the death of loved ones, the treachery of friends, something that fills him with a voluptuous though tragic admiration. At times his own heart is on the rack. Yet stronger than his pain is the bitter joy which he experiences in understanding and giving expression to that pain. . . . His ecstasy is terrifying at times but it is still happiness because it is the continuous admiration of truth."

The kinaesthetic appeal is shown in genuflections, in the rhythm of music, of the dance, in great processions, and in the tense nerves throughout the organism that religion and art have strung up for action. This aspect of art has been worked at by experimental methods. Feré, for example, has shown that even the untrained musician while listening to agreeable qualities of tone has his power to do muscular work practically doubled, while in listening to a dissonant tone his power of execution is essentially cut in half.

It is perhaps the organic sense that is most intensely stimulated by art and religion. Those who really enjoy music are rather apt to confess to some bodily marks indicating a response of smooth muscle tissue in which the organic sense is involved. Among such marks are cosmic thrills along the spine, tingling of the skin, deepened breathing, vibrations in the chest, diaphragm, or abdomen, quickened pulse, a glow of warmth, and many others. Mr. Beaunis, in analyzing the musical emotion, speaks of "This vibration of the whole being, this nervous exaltation, these shivers that run down from your head to your feet—all this emotional state that absorbs your whole being, that carries you out of yourself and constitutes one of the most vivid pleasures it is possible to feel."¹ There

¹ H. Beaunis, *Rev. Phil.*, LXXXVI (1918), 353.

is an endless array of references in the literature of religion showing how directly it has constantly appealed to hungers, thirsts, the tearful eye, the parched palate, the quickened pulse, the condition of heart and liver, and to essentially all of the viscera and organic functions.

A story of unmistakable significance is indicated by an analysis of the intimate sense-imagery of art and religion. If anyone should take a work of art of acknowledged worth and analyze the imagery the artist has used in symbolizing some significant attitude toward the work of art and toward life, he will find to his surprise the relatively high part played by the intimate sense-imagery. Shakespeare's familiar song in which he pictures the meanness of ingratitude, runs as follows:

Blow, blow, thou winter wind,
Thou art not so unkind
As man's ingratitude.
Thy tooth is not so keen
Because thou art not seen,
Although thy breath be rude.

Heigho, sing heigho unto the
green holly
Most friendships are feigning, most
loving mere folly.
Then heigho the holly,
This life is most jolly.

Freeze, freeze, thou bitter sky,
Thou dost not bite so nigh
As benefit forgot,
Though thou the waters warp,
Thy sting is not so sharp
As friend remembered not.

It is clear from the foregoing that when the true artist attempts to express ingratitude he succeeds by chilling the skin with it, by lacerating the flesh with it as with a tooth, by pressing it against one like a chill wind, by making one feel

the roughness of its breath, by twisting one with its strain as if it were the torsion of a sheet of frozen water, by stinging him with it as with the prick of an insect, and the like. By the time he has finished with his intimate sense-appeal he has led one into acquaintance with the nature of ingratitude that excels any possible description of it.

Eight students skilled in psychological analysis and trained in introspection evaluated in terms of intensity and meaning of the different kinds of sensory imagery in this poem with the results as shown below. Each word or phrase that in reading the poem constituted a unit of interpretation was studied to see what imagery it called out. The meaningfulness to the poem of each image was indicated by an Arabic numeral from 1, signifying "present but indifferent," to 5, which meant as vivid as a perception. The individual variation was considerable. The composite picture of the rôle of the various types of imagery is as follows:

| Vis. | Hear. | Press. | Taste | Smell | Temp. | Pain | Equil. | Kinaes. | Organic |
|------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|---------|---------|
| 25 | 15 | 8 | 3 | 2 | 15 | 15 | 4 | 20 | 27 |

The significant result is that in spite of the ease of introspection of the visual and auditory imagery, four of the intimate senses were doing each its full share as bearer of meaning of the poem. Let the reader try out his own self-observation with this and other Shakespeare selections and he may be convinced that when this consummate artist spoke of "our five best senses" he might have doubled the number but for the fallacies of the conventional psychologizing of his time.

I have made various sets of observations on the imagery involved in some of the best-loved bits of religious literature, as, for example, the Twenty-third Psalm, and the Beatitudes. The outcome seems invariably in keeping with that indicated by the analysis of some choice bits of "secular literature." The average for thirteen well-trained students who worked out their introspections on the Beatitudes gives the following

list of numbers for the imagery connected with the various senses:

| Vis. | Hear. | Press. | Taste | Smell | Temp. | Pain | Equil. | Kinaes. | Organic |
|------|-------|--------|-------|-------|-------|------|--------|---------|---------|
| 71 | 24 | 12 | 6 | 4 | 4 | 11 | 2 | 37 | 48 |

The high place of visual imagery in this selection as compared with the Shakespeare poem is due largely to the fact that we were careful to include verses 13 to 16 that make an unusually direct appeal to the imagery connected with that particular sense. It is interesting to speculate in this connection that the thing most of all that made Jesus the incomparable teacher who could drive his message straight into the inner parts of the human being was his skill in appealing to and through the intimate senses. The reader will find entertainment and profit in following through his sayings and parables, keeping in mind such a method of interpretation. Indeed, it is an item for profitable speculation to inquire whether Asia has not proven the religion-producing continent because of the constant use of the imagery connected with the vital functions. We read, for example, in the *Upanishads*:¹

In the beginning this universe was indeed Brahman.
In the beginning this was indeed Atma, one alone;
That Atma is in the heart. . . .

This myself, dwelling in the heart, is smaller than a grain of corn, smaller than a mustard seed. This myself, dwelling in the heart, is also greater than the earth, greater than the atmosphere, greater than the sky, greater than all these worlds. . . . As vast as is this ether, so vast is Atma, dwelling in the heart.

Another example representing a rather prevailing tendency of the Eastern mind is found in the constant imagery of the liver and other vital organs, in the sacred literature of the Assyrians and Babylonians, as has been described by Professor Morris Jastrow.

One of the most telling contributions so far to the psychology of religion is that by Dr. E. L. Mudge in a volume as yet

¹ Translation by S. A. Desai, *The Vedanta of Shankara* (London, 1913), pp. 64 ff.

unpublished, on "The Lower-Sense Complexes Conditioning the God-Experience." Among other things he discovers that by actual confession of cultivated people one's visual imagery connected with the God-experience plays essentially no part at all, while it runs up high in the experiences of younger folk. Children in the grades describe the God-experience so that it has apparently about 77 per cent of value. Among high-school students it has fallen to 47 per cent. Sophomores in college describe their God-experience in such a way that it seems to have fallen to 11 per cent, while for graduates and for other cultivated adults it has no recognized place.

Before closing this hasty discussion, which is meant only to lay in the rudest way certain foundations as a point of departure for further thought, I should like to correct four psychological astigmatisms that stand in the way of the right application of the point of view herein set forth.

1. It has constantly been claimed that the defining senses are objective, while the so-called lower senses are personal and subjective. It has likewise become a habit to assert that the feelings, which, according to our description, are based essentially upon the intimate sense-responses, and apart from their functioning are as nothing, are subjective. On the contrary, the intimate senses are as consistent in their objective reference as are the defining senses. It is only in exceptional cases and in their near pathology that they concern themselves with the states and conditions of the self as such. Under normal conditions one does not say, "I am undergoing a state of excessive warmth," but "This *room* or this *climate* is too hot." The gustatory sense judges qualities of food regarded as objects of approval and disapproval. The organic sense reports hunger for this and that particular kind of sustenance. In like manner the artist is constantly evaluating the worth of aesthetical objects; the religionist is concerned about his relationship to God or to his fellows and is busy with real adjustment to outer conditions as truly as is the scientist who seeks to master

some problem. When in extreme forms of mystical fervor one reaches that state of ecstasy in which the chief passion is the nursing of a state of inner blessedness, religion has either ceased to exist or has ceased to be wholesome and is approaching a condition of abnormality.

2. It has constantly been wrongfully claimed that the so-called lower senses, and the feelings, are ephemeral, unorganized, and untrustworthy. Such a notion fails altogether to discriminate. They are quite helpless, unaided by definition and description, to handle the spatial and temporal units and the relations and qualities of objects *after these have been chopped out and set in order by the cognizing functions*. When this world of discrete data comes to exist, partially discovered and partially created, then it is cognition alone that can manipulate them aided and directed as they are by the delicate judgments of fitness furnished by the refined activity of the intimate senses. Before the chopping and dissecting is done, however, these more sensitive processes are skilful enough in working out adjustments to the ordered world of spatially and temporally arranged objects, and they do it often essentially without the help of the "higher" senses. Fish migrate out of their creek into the river, through the bay and a hundred miles or more about the ocean, then retrace their course—enough of them to preserve the species—into the original habitat for the next season's spawning. By no stretch of the imagination could one suppose that they chart their course and in any wise consciously hold to it.

White rats bereft surgically of sight, hearing, smell, and touch, still find their way through a complicated maze toward the food-box with the same success as do their kindred who have all the defining senses intact.¹ It has been amply proven by Professor Watson that sea terns do not depend primarily, and in many respects not at all, upon vision in finding their

¹ J. B. Watson, *Kinaesthetic and Organic Sensations: Their Role in the Reactions of the White Rat to the Maze*, Lancaster, Pa., 1907.

way out to the feeding grounds and back again to their nests. A parent tern shut into the hold of a vessel and transported one or more day's journey away will find its course back to its nest in essentially the flying time of the distance.¹ There is written somehow in its inner members, perhaps kinaesthetically, its relationship to its environment and what to do to preserve its right adjustments.

So much for indicating that the organism can and does, with immediacy, adapt itself to space, which is the favorite object of the defining senses. When now we consider those aspects of experience for which the categories of space and time have no descriptive significance, like the vital and mental processes, like personality and goodness and beauty, it is the intimate senses, and they alone, that can handle them. These are all real facts of an objective order but they flow through and past space and time as if they did not exist, and burst through definitions and descriptions and leave them helpless. Now the tables are turned. The intimate senses feel at home with life-processes, as Bergson has pointed out, and can enter into them directly, while cognition can only symbolize them with its scientific technique.

By controlled observation and experimentation it is found that when hogs are given free access to a great variety of foods they will select, guided by a refined hog-wisdom that no one so far has been inclined to ascribe to so lowly a beast, and which generations of domestication has not been able to destroy, such foods and in the right quantity, as will excel the accumulated wisdom of chemists and physiologists in devising "balanced rations."² The wisdom of these creatures is objective and is sufficiently trustworthy for their purpose. The biochemist will still stay in the game; and he might not be at fault did he, like Crichton-Browne and Woods Hutchinson,

¹ J. B. Watson, *The Behavior of Noddy and Sooty Terns*, Carnegie Publications, Washington, 1908.

² J. M. Evvard, "Is the Appetite of Swine a Reliable Indication of Physiological Needs?" *Proceedings of Iowa Academy of Science*, Vol. XXII, 1915.

encourage folk to follow a finely attuned feeling for the diet they need. Religion has not only tried to place human beings in a sensitive attitude toward dietetics but toward love, personality, beauty, and all those indescribable objects that are perhaps the realest of the reals that make up the world in which we live.

3. A third fallacy that needs correcting is that the intimate sense experiences are private and incommunicable while the "higher" sense-objects are shared by others. For example, Mary Whiton Calkins in her *Introduction to Psychology* says that "vision therefore is a higher sense than the others, only in so far as it is more often shared. . . . This is the reason why it is a more significant social material of intercourse, art, and science. Pressure and warmth, on the other hand, are less valued, because they are less often actually shared and, therefore, less easily verified and less frequently described." If one might take exception to such a statement, it would be to observe that all sense-experiences are private and all can be shared. Each of the arts, including spoken language, the highest of all, has been invented in order, in the first place, to objectify and fix the ten types of perceptions and images and, furthermore, to render them communicable. Religion has appropriated and sanctified nearly all the arts and has created a new one, the ritual. Religion and the arts are among nature's most successful discoveries in effecting the socialization and organization of the group. In their collective appeal they reach their end more through the use of intimate sense-imagery than otherwise. Such a statement of course needs extended analysis. The fact can be suggested, and passed, by reference to an illustration from the graphic and plastic arts that are, at first thought, supposed to be almost purely visual arts, while as a matter of fact they receive their worth and content from the senses we have been describing. Rodin claims that the soul of the statue is in its suggested movement from the act that has just taken place toward the one just about to happen. He confesses that

the birth of his career as an artist dates from the day when a humble artisan in the studio reminded him that he was carving only in surfaces. He must treat his figure in a third dimension and, feeling out the action of moods and muscles underneath, work from there out toward the surface—a distinctly kinaesthetic act.

The error in question may be illustrated by reference to the art of spoken language. It stands the miracle among the arts as an almost incredibly skilful instrument of intercommunication. In explaining the origin and use of language, evolutionary psychology has been undermining the intellectualistic conceptions and substituting in their place the "bow-wow," "pooh-pooh," and "goo-goo" and other more adequate theories that represent language as the accidental trial-and-error product of the deeper-lying and instinctive and impulsive movements. Language, to be sure, has set the human spirit free partially through its success in analyzing objects and qualities, defining meanings, clinching those meanings in concepts, and using these as topics of discourse. Equally remarkable is its success in suffusing words and sentences with hissing *s*'s, rumbling *r*'s, bumping *p*'s, moaning *o*'s, and other direct kinaesthetic and organic appeals so that the symbols almost burst with meanings. These are harvested up and intensified in concepts and are induced in the hearer too directly to be considered as acts of cognition. The expression of a judgment in a sentence, which is the root-principle of language, is fundamentally a kinaesthetic act and is performed usually for the sake of intercommunication.

4. "Knowledge" and "wisdom" are not simple in terms of thought. There is a wisdom also of a more intimate sort. Wisdom might fairly be described as a body of organized and deepened information that gives one a workable hold on "truth"—whether that baffling word should stand for a static absolute or for centers of relative constancy in a changing world of experience. Just as ideas grow into knowledge and

ripen into wisdom, so the direct valuating functions organize and integrate themselves into higher apprehensions of meaning, and into the wisdom "of the heart." This sort of wisdom arises sometimes with the aid of the thought-processes, sometimes independent of their participation.

A passing word may be in order about the bearing of this fresh step in "criticism" upon the problem of the nature of reality. There are many consequences. It will be sufficient to suggest only a few of the most obvious. It is clearly fatal to the all-sufficiency of naturalism and mechanism. It is equally unfriendly to intellectualistic absolutism. On pluralism it is silent; since there is more than one way of interpreting the outer world of experience, the ultimate reason for it may be that there is more than one sort of objective reality. The intimate senses are objective and dependable, and our analysis therefore leads in the direction of realism. It is friendly toward personalism and other philosophies that find reality to be akin to life-processes, for these are the primary concerns of consciousness, while the defining functions serve as their instruments of expression. The most considerable outcome is a wholesome distrust of mysterious and mystical "higher" sources of truth and wisdom that have no connection with the ordinary facts of common human experience. Religion can save all its values, even its highest objects of adoration, without accounting for its ineffable experiences in terms of a subjective mysticism, or attributing them solely to a transcendental being. With a sufficient description of mental processes, religion and the best in common life may become identical.

THE FUNCTIONAL VALUE OF DOCTRINES OF THE ATONEMENT

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I

Volumes upon the atonement are all but innumerable, and among them are several good historical treatments. With the exception of Franks' *History of the Doctrine of the Work of Christ* no English work is comparable with the volume of Dean Hastings Rashdall, *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*. The volume is made up of the Bampton Lectures delivered in 1915, in that strange world which was before the war. It is an example of solid and sane British learning. Dean Rashdall's use of materials, especially the teachings of church fathers prior to Augustine, is satisfactorily complete, although it is to be regretted that Scholastic and Reformation teachings are not expanded on the scale of those dealing with earlier theories.

The volume is historical in its encyclopedic ability to arrange details in masses, and in its capacity to see events in causal relations. Particularly in the treatment of Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen, does the treatment rise even higher in that it sees relations between doctrine and the contemporary social mind. But Dean Rashdall's prevailing interest is a legitimate desire to find an interpretation of the death of Christ which shall be acceptable to modern thinkers. At this point his historical knowledge is the basis of his criticism and his theology. He properly makes moral appeal and revelation the center of the New Testament interpretation of the death of Christ. This moral estimate he

discovers persisting throughout Christian history although obscured by reference to substitutionary, penal suffering and the satisfaction of God's honor or justice. His own view is expounded at length in his concluding chapter. He finds it expressed in the words of Abelard and especially in those of Peter the Lombard: "So great a pledge of love having been given us, we are both moved and kindled to love God who did such things for us; and by this we are justified, that is, loosed from our sins we are made just. The death of Christ therefore justifies us, inasmuch as through it charity is stirred up in our hearts." Or to put it in a sharp antithesis, Jesus did not save because he died, but he died because he saved. And this messianic work as savior lies in his teaching as truly as in his death. "The atonement is the very central doctrine of Christianity in so far as it proclaims and brings home to the heart of man the supreme Christian truth that God is love, and that love is the most precious thing in human life."

With this statement few of us would disagree. But, even if we give Christ the divine significance Dean Rashdall ascribes to him, have we in it the complete meaning which the various doctrines of the atonement have sought to embody? It does not seem to me that we have. For each of these doctrines has had the same specific function. It has endeavored not only to set forth God's saving, forgiving love, but also *to meet objections springing from contemporary moral practice directed against his moral right to forgive.*

A historian of doctrine who wishes also to be a constructive theologian must not separate doctrines from their socially functional purpose. Again and again Dean Rashdall comes within sight of recognizing this, and occasionally he formulates what might become a germinal thought for such an evaluation of the material which he is treating. But he never quite recognizes that the truth of a doctrine lies in its function rather than its definition, in its success in ministration to a need of the Christian community rather than in its vocabulary.

The foundation for the historical study of the Christian religion is the recognition of loyalty to and faith in Jesus as savior as the vital center of Christianity. Men who have this faith, however, have never been able to use permanently a formula with which they express one or more of its aspects. Christian faith has always been subjected to questions which sprang from different angles of interest, different social circumstances, and different world-views. Particularly is this true of formulas not given full dogmatic standing but forming a part of the religious inheritance of the Christian community. Therein has lain the need of further exposition and defense. Thus the doctrine-making process as a whole can be described as a series of attempts to legitimize intellectually the Christian religion as held by some society of Christians. The doctrines of the atonement are perhaps the best illustration of this process.

Every doctrine in its earliest period is both apologetic and a means of preserving the integrity of some religious society. It not only seeks to defend faith but also to exclude from a group those whose experience or intellectual beliefs are of a different sort. A doctrine prevails in Christian history as long as it satisfies the religious needs of some creative social mind. Orthodoxy represents the doctrines that have satisfied the successive social minds that made western civilization. Dogma is such doctrine as has been given authority by dominant religious groups, often because of motives and powers quite other than theological. But whatever the course of events resulting in such authority, doctrines at the start at least had functional capacity. They protected religious faith from misinterpretation and attack as well as conserved the solidarity of the group holding them—in the case of orthodoxy this group being the Catholic church.

The theological meaning of the death of Christ has never been erected into any dogma like those contained in the Nicene and Caledonian creeds. It has never been standardized, and to this day it is susceptible of a number of interpretations,

any one of which would be regarded as scriptural. But this is not to say that these interpretations are functionally different. Whoever sees in Christianity a developing religion conditioned by and expressing social forces, finds in the doctrines of the atonement the expression of a permanent value vastly greater than the concepts in which it has been expressed. For all these doctrines spring from and variously express the desire to make clear that God's forgiveness does not contravene his moral order.

It is from this point that in the search for its permanent value the history of the atonement can most intelligently be written, and on its results a doctrine for our day can most confidently be based. The elements of that history are simple and biblical. Christians are conscious of having been saved by faith in Jesus, who had been crucified and had been raised from the dead. If conscious of salvation they have been assured of forgiveness—the conclusion which Paul so urgently argued in Galatians and Romans. But when one thinks of forgiveness he at once recalls preconditions to forgiveness in social practices. Not only that, but he begins to query whether those preconditions have been met in the forgiveness of God which he enjoys. Unless they have been met, such forgiveness must appear morally unjustifiable. Each and every doctrine of the atonement is an answer to the need of such moral justification of God's gracious act.

The social origin of a doctrine of the atonement is thus apparent. Customs followed in the forgiveness of injuries are extended to God's action. He, like kings and common men, finds therein the conditions which make forgiveness moral. God's pardon, like men's, is justified by conforming to those social presuppositions which insure the maintenance of rights, law, honor, or sovereignty. God is conceived of as forgiving in accordance with socially approved practices. This makes his action morally acceptable to those who recognize the legitimacy of such conditions.

II

1. The New Testament exposition of the death of Christ illustrates this fact. The Christians were conscious of having received a new life in Christ. This they argued must indicate forgiveness, or in messianic terms, acquittal at the coming judgment. Here was a reconciliation with the deity which at first glance ran counter to the universal conditions of obtaining reconciliation. Jesus had justified belief in God's readiness to forgive by pleading parental analogies. But this analogy failed to satisfy his disciples. Recourse was made to other customs. Among both Jews and Greeks God's forgiveness was conditioned upon sacrifice. This sacrificial gift was accepted by the priest in the name of the god. The reconciliation was regarded as complete. This social practice was so universal as to determine the exposition of forgiveness on the part of God and its basis. There must have been a sacrifice. The Jewish Christians at first insisted that such sacrifices as were provided by the Mosaic Code should be offered. Paul's reply was that Christ was the Passover. Thus from a social practice there was drawn an analogy which helped Christians to make intellectually acceptable the grace of God which had already been shed abroad in their hearts. The preconditions of divine forgiveness had been met. How far this sort of apologetic can go is to be seen in the letter to the Hebrews, where the analogy tends to literalization, and Christ is given both the value of a sacrifice and that of the priest.

To say that this conception as set forth in the New Testament is of a piece with theological dogma is quite to distort its significance. In a world where divine forgiveness was conditioned by sacrifice, the forgiveness which had come was naturally considered dependent on sacrifice. It is interesting to note that Paul's explanation of the death of Christ is always figurative, for to him as to us the death of Christ as a sacrifice does not fulfil the ordinary conception of sacrifice. He was not offered by those forgiven on an altar nor by a priest. As a

matter of fact, his death was an execution. But the analogy helped to make God's act appear moral (Rom. 3:23-25).

Dean Rashdall finds substitutionary elements in the Pauline teaching. Undeniably there are expressions of Paul which are susceptible of such interpretation, but it is also clear that Paul never enlarges upon the substitutionary meaning of the death of Christ, and in my own opinion, it would be possible to explain all of his so-called substitutionary references as drawn from the practice of sacrifice.

2. While sacrifice continued as a social practice, it carried a definite meaning, and the church was content to refer to the death of Jesus as sacrificial. All the pertinent material in the patristic literature makes this apparent. There is no standardized exposition, nor is there any attempt at dogma making. Even when appeal is made to the Old Testament, it is not so much for the purpose of discovering an interpretation of the death of Christ as an argument to prove that Jesus fulfilled the messianic prophecy. The prophets had foretold that the Messiah was to die; Jesus had died.

Beyond this interpretation of the death of Christ as satisfying the requirements of divine forgiveness set by current customs of worship, and as fulfilling prophecies, the early interpretation of the death of Christ made use of other social practices but above all that of releasing captives through payment of a ransom. The New Testament had spoken of Christ's death as a ransom. It never says to whom the ransom was to be paid, nor is a fair interpretation of the various references to ransom likely to show anything more than the high cost of doing a great service to someone else. But when the preacher appeared and effort was made to give something like practical bearing to the death of Christ beyond the allusion to it as sacrifice, the figure of ransom at once attracted attention. It is a military practice with which all the ancient world was familiar. The captive was held by his captor until ransomed. Here lay an explanation of the death

of Christ. In some mysterious way God recognized that Satan had control of pre-Christian believers in the underworld. Christ died that he might give his life as a ransom to Satan for these incarcerated worthies, and then broke away because of his divine power. It is not necessary to recount the various ingenious and sometimes shocking ways in which this dramatic illustration is evolved into something approaching a doctrine. They vary from the rather noble conception of Irenaeus (for here I venture to differ from Dean Rashdall's estimate), to the mouse-trap and fish-hook interpretations of the later Fathers. But the service which the analogy rendered is plain. The release of Old Testament worthies, not to mention possible others, presented a question demanding answer. That they had been saved was beyond question. Christ's death as a ransom to Satan helped the church to justify the church's confidence in that fact. The custom of the battle field and the slave mart was translated to a superhuman transaction between God, Satan, and Christ. Satan had to be persuaded to waive his rights and release his captive. It certainly is an effective bit of *haggadah* as any reader of the *Gospel of Nicodemus* can testify. That it had functional power is evident enough from its persistence until the twelfth century, in the thought and apparently with the respect of practically all the church fathers.

3. But sooner or later it was bound to lose its power, as Christian thinking passed over from the consideration of salvation as the giving of immortality to the judicial conception born of Latin Christianity. From the day of Augustine onward, theology became increasingly a transcendentalized politics—a pardoning of sins. Transactions of the state were read into religion, both in the organization and administration of the church, and in the doctrines which were enunciated by the church. In the same proportion as the judicial and political ideas developed did Christian doctrines need new defense. These doctrines had accumulated as means of protecting the Christian faith, but had of themselves become

identified with that faith. This made the apologetic task of the twelfth century more difficult than that of the third century. Practices of the church served as a stabilizing and even dominant defense of many of these doctrines, for men always hold tenaciously ideas which lie back of customs. The transformation of the dogmas into church life, rites, creeds, and customs, served to protect the faith as delivered to the twelfth century by the past, but they did not meet objections raised by those who were outside the Christian community. To commend to them the incarnation, one could not appeal to the Bible, but must find something in the incarnation itself capable of meeting the objections to it. It was just this which Anselm set forth in his *Cur Deus Homo*. He did not in that tract undertake to show that there had been an incarnation and that the incarnate God-man had died a sacrifice to sinners. All that was included in the Christian dogma and buttressed by the Christian practice. What he endeavored to do was to find an argument for the incarnation that should have functional worth with "infidels." Again the argument is an extension of social practice as a means of understanding the relations between God and man. The explanation Anselm finds in the conditions demanded by forgiveness. He assumes the unquestioned view of feudal society that injury to one's honor demands satisfaction. This satisfaction in the case of God would be that of an infinite honor. Without it forgiveness was impossible. It required a man given infinite value to make such satisfaction, since man who had done the injury alone could render it. Therefore the Son of God became a man, so to suffer that it would be permissible for him to forgive sinners.

It will be noticed that this inhibition to forgiveness seems not to have been recognized by a civilization which was not feudal. The difficulty which feudal society saw in human forgiveness they read into divine forgiveness. The requirements by which that difficulty of forgiveness is resolved in

social practice is raised as a presupposition into a doctrinal explanation of the right of God to forgive. Love is thus seen to meet the requirements of what was unquestioned morality. And despite differences this presupposition is to be found in Scotist as well as Thomist theologies, and extends its unbiblical, baneful influence over theology to our own day. Whenever it is preached men are asked to believe that the Heavenly Father is no freer to forgive than was a feudal lord. Yet, when such belief exists that God cannot forgive until his honor is satisfied, the Anselmic view gives moral grounds to divine forgiveness.

4. Probably the most striking difference between the Europe of feudal power which Anselm served, and the Europe of the sixteenth century is the appearance of the national king. Monarchy in the nationalist sense was a new phenomenon in history. There had been kings and emperors, but never a sovereign like those of the sixteenth century. When the national replaced the feudal order, the power of punishing became almost the essence of the new monarchy. Sovereign right had to be maintained by the enforcement of the sovereign's law. The legitimacy of a king's government was deemed in proportion to his ability to punish those who refused to respond to the royal law as dispensed by the king's judges and enforced by the king's officers. There was always danger lest pardon should argue fear of one's administration. The king might be merciful, but he had to be just. The days of the arbitrary personal rule of oriental monarchs was replaced by statutory control, enforced by fear.

It is easy to see how this social attitude extended itself to the idea of divine administration. God was supreme sovereign; he maintained his authority by punishment. The world was rebellious and the world was under his displeasure. If he elected some to enjoy his favor and forgave them their share in universal rebellion, it was because the punishment due them had been inflicted on their representatives. God, like the king,

could be merciful, but he was compelled to be just, that is, punitive. His punitive justice as well as his honor had to be satisfied. From this point of view, the striking sermons of Luther and the closely argued expositions of Calvin are explicable and representative. The only hope which any member of a condemned race could have under a sovereign capable of administering punishment was that his punishment had fallen on one capable of satisfying a sovereign God's obligation to punish every infraction of his law. That this punishment fell on an innocent person did not weaken its effect. Divine punishment had followed human disobedience; God's punitive justice was satisfied; he was free to forgive those whose punishment had been borne by Christ. Thus the substitutionary doctrine came to a world which could not believe that free pardon was compatible with justice. It is to be borne in mind that the underlying motive was not to find a way in which God might forgive, for there never was any question as to his forgiveness of those who had faith. The real difficulty was how to make plain to minds obsessed with the punitive obligation of a sovereign that the divine sovereign had a moral right to pardon. And such a difficulty the reformation doctrine of the atonement met and continues to meet where men still think of God under the rubrics of sixteenth-century monarchy.

As a phase of this extension of political inhibitions into the field of divine forgiveness, mention need be made only of the theory of Grotius. It is more philosophical than that of the reformers, and more in accord with the general social tendency which was producing democracy. With Grotius there was the presupposition that any relaxation of punishment would bring law into discredit. It was natural that a social order just beginning to feel the significance of law as such should have these apprehensions. Even more was it to be expected that, as the idea of democracy developed, anxiety for the maintenance of social authority should be felt.

This anxiety was carried over into theology. God had forgiven, but he must needs punish in order to vindicate the sovereignty of his law. It was not necessary from such a point of view that the identical punishment of sinners should be borne by Jesus. It was enough that his suffering was judged of sufficient worth to exhibit God's respect for the inviolability of his law. He was free to forgive those who had violated the law, because sovereignty of law had been vindicated in the eyes of the world.

Here the function of the doctrine of the atonement is evident. God is not made propitious by the death of Christ. His punitive justice is less threatened than his status as a law-giver. Christ's death maintains the sovereignty of his law, and therefore the pardon of God is seen to be in accord with those conditions which in a political realm would make pardon defensible. The inhibition to forgive lest his love should be mistaken for disregard of law has been removed. God's moral integrity has been vindicated in human opinion.

5. In the eighteenth century the bourgeois class sought to replevin natural rights. Their success was also a triumph of commercialism. These two elements of a creative social mind set up their own qualifications for every sort of forgiveness. A debt, whether of rights or money, had to be paid. Until this was done a debtor was at the mercy of his creditor. The debt could be paid only by the actual transfer of assets. If the debtor himself could pay, he became free from the debt. If he could not, someone else could pay if he were able and disposed. From the middle of the seventeenth century, theology became unconsciously commercialized. Obedience became a debt, and good deeds in excess of obligations became transferable merit. The need of something in Protestant thought to offset the effective penitential system of Rome contributed to this commercialization. In the original Reformation movement faith had been counted for righteousness; in the course of time it was the righteousness

of Christ that was so counted. The relations of man to God were expressed in terms of debtor and creditor. Justification became a kind of book-keeping. The merits of Christ were transferred to the sinner, and what was lacking in the sinner's righteousness was thus supplemented. The possibility that God could forgive a sinner depended upon the existence of that which could be transferred to the sinner's credit. The theologians easily found the death of Christ not only substitutionary and sacrificial, but his righteousness and merits were transferable to men. Thus again the grace of God in the act of forgiveness was deemed to be vindicated ethically. He was free not to punish the sinner because the sinner's debt had been paid. The methods of the court and of the accounting room suggested and removed moral objections to God's right to pardon.

III

Thus these typical doctrines of the atonement have for their main purpose to make plain to the believer that God has met the conditions which any given social order sets to the act of pardon and forgiveness. As the conception of social morality varies, the doctrine of the atonement itself varies, in order to show effectively the integrity of God's action. His life is not mere good nature. His forgiveness is law-abiding. Doctrines of divine forgiveness are drawn from social experience which at the moment is socially creative. As social custom lays less emphasis upon inhibitions to forgiveness, and under the inspiration of Jesus' own teaching theology emphasizes the necessity of forgiveness in immediate response to repentance, it is clear that the doctrine of the atonement will continue to assume new forms. It is quite impossible to convince a man who understands the teaching of Jesus that forgiveness must wait upon the establishment of certain conditions outside of the desire of reconciliation. Our penal code is recognizing the right of pardon, or at least parole,

for those persons who have shown any indications of reformation. The appeal to physical force in education and family discipline is being rejected by those who have discovered the better way. In other words, in our modern world social inhibitions to pardon, such as marked prior civilizations, have all but disappeared. We can no longer find sovereignty sufficient to express our belief in God's position in the cosmos. Outgrown political practices and concepts no longer function as means of co-ordinating our religious faith with our thinking and our social order.

Yet we still find ourselves seeking to justify the ethical meaning of God's forgiveness by such standards as our own social practice demands. Are we not seeking to determine the proper method of pardoning criminals and personal and international enemies? Out from this attempt there are sure to arise tests which we shall unconsciously demand the love of God must meet if it is to satisfy our ethical sense. Its morality will be determined by our idea as to what seems to us to constitute morality. That is to say, any theory of the atonement which is simply an expression of God's love, will not satisfy the man who is keenly aware of the evil in the world, both individual and social. He will demand that the forgiveness of God shall be shown to be of such a sort as does not leave evil a free field or substitute indifference for moral direction. Just what that sort of atonement doctrine will be I have not space to set forth, although the teaching of Jesus will be its heart and center. But functionally I am convinced that it will be the same as these former doctrines. It must satisfy the moral sense of our own day. Such satisfaction can lie only in a theory which indicates the relationship of love and reformation to evil and degeneration. Whether or not individual teachers and preachers may like to admit it, no theology will function satisfactorily in the Christian community unless in some way it brings divine-human relations under the general categories of social sanctions and inhibitions.

It is from this point of view that it seems to me that Dean Rashdall has failed to grasp how significant for constructive thinking are the materials which he has so admirably set forth. A moral influence theory is good so far as it goes, but no doctrine of the atonement is likely to function in our world which does not integrate the divine forgiveness with our best moral practices. The beliefs that God needs a sacrifice of some sort to be propitious, that he is a sovereign with an honor that needs to be satisfied, that he is under a necessity to punish whether or not he chooses to be merciful, or that in some way it is possible to transfer merit and righteousness from Jesus to other individuals, reflect past ideas which have proposed moral impediments to the forgiveness of God. They have functioned; creative concepts must supplant them. Already God's forgiveness is beginning to be set forth from one or more of the social attitudes which determine our morality. As the total Christian movement becomes affected by the social readjustments, these formulas will naturally grow helpful. They will meet the need men feel of being convinced that God's love is moral. These formulas some day will doubtless be outgrown in the same way that their predecessors have been outgrown, but they will accomplish for our day what these other views accomplished for their day. They will serve to remove from the mind of the Christian difficulties in believing in the divine forgiveness, which are the outgrowth of pardon-practices in our own social order. They, like their predecessors, will show that the forgiving love of God, about which the Christian is sure because of his experience, is in accord with a moral order in which sin brings suffering.

RELIGION AND THE CONCEPT OF PROGRESS

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The closest logical relation subsists between religion and progress because both words express a process of evaluation. Progress is not to be conceived apart from one's own scale of values. Things are progressing or retrogressing according to the point of view of the beholder. But religion also names a more or less subjective fact. It is understood, in the present discussion, to mean the complete, whole-hearted reaction which a human being makes to life and the universe in its most significant aspects, especially the attitude which seeks to *appreciate* rather than to analyze or utilize, and which strives to relate one's self to reality in its final and permanent and inmost meaning, as the individual and his group may conceive it or feel it. Religion is thus seen to be a matter of appreciation in the widest and deepest sense, and is primarily a process of evaluation. So true is this that when people say that such and such a thing, eugenics for example, "ought to be made a matter of religion" it implies a recognition of the fact that religion *is* the organization of the supreme values of life, and simply amounts to saying that the program of eugenics is sufficiently important to find a place among those values.

It is thus apparent that both progress and religion reduce to processes of evaluation, of judgment of worthfulness or its opposite, especially as applied to the most permanent and important aspects of experience. Consequently we need not expect to formulate a concept of progress without finding it necessary to reckon with religious considerations. Since religion is essentially the total reaction of human beings in terms of worth, value, and ultimate significance, it follows

that social philosophy cannot shrink from the attempt to formulate the nature of social progress, even if some eminent sociologists have despaired of the task. That the problem has proven too elusive for sociological methods of thought, at least as developed thus far, is recognized by Professor Ross, when he confesses that

it is hopeless as yet to look for a test of progress that shall be objective and valid for all. Since change is a matter of observation, whereas progress is a matter of judgment involving the application of a subjective standard, those who desire to see sociology a true science are justified in insisting that social dynamics deal with the factors and manner, not of *social progress* merely, but of *social change*.¹

This is perhaps entirely legitimate for sociology, in so far as it aspires to become a quantitative science rather than a philosophy, but its abandonment of the one field makes its success all the more contingent on an early conquest of the other. On the other hand, religious and social philosophy is left to shoulder alone the task of attempting a comprehensive formulation of the goal of our collective striving. For religion does not refuse to put forth at least an earnest effort to infuse some definite meaning into the vague term "progress," with which every man on the street, as well as every scholar in his study or classroom, attempts to conjure, while not one knows what he, himself, much less his interlocutor, means by the word. We have here therefore a yet unfinished task for theology and social philosophy. Not that they, in themselves alone, are capable of such a prodigious task. That is

¹ *Foundations of Sociology* (1912), p. 186. In his latest work, however, Professor Ross takes a somewhat more constructive position, in a chapter which bears the significant title, "Re-Shaping." "What is the use," he asks, "of working out causes and effects, of discovering how things hang together in society, if we are to do nothing with this knowledge? In this time of social self-consciousness and quick and easy dissemination of ideas are we to content ourselves with the tardy and uncertain improvements brought about by blind social evolution? There is, in fact, no alternative but to leave society in self-ignorance or to acquiesce in its reconstruction by the intelligent collective will" (*Principles of Sociology* [1920], p. 545). There is no essential incompatibility between these two statements, but a policy of deliberate and collective reshaping does seem to imply, as a condition precedent, some generally accepted working theory of social progress.

something which will require the combined efforts of many thinkers in many fields.¹ But something is gained when sociology, which has least to be accused of in the way of modesty, definitely relinquishes a piece of territory so vitally connected with social thinking.

Starting, as it did with Comte, upon a distinctly materialistic and positivistic bias, sociology was not greatly spiritualized in the hands of Spencer and Ward—the other two of the first great sociological triumvirate. It should be noted, however, that we use the word “spiritual” here in its narrower and more commonly accepted meaning, for when one considers the wider problem of the relative preponderance of blind material forces on the one hand and those of mind, i.e., the “psychic factors,” on the other, Ward’s noble championship of the latter sets him in the forefront as the transcendent figure of sociological theorizing.

But we are speaking here of the distinctly religious aspect of sociological thinking, and on this point Ward himself perceived the brutal inadequacy of the scientific, or naturalistic, concept of progress, and in his memorable work, *Applied Sociology*, he passed beyond it into a strongly *ethical* conception of social improvement as the true goal of all sociological reasoning. In so doing, after quoting Spencer’s essay on *Progress, Its Law and Cause*, he remarks that Spencer “goes on to show that ‘organic progress consists in a change from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous’ and says that ‘this law of organic progress is the law of all progress. . . .’” “In dealing with that branch (i.e., pure sociology) I have even gone,” continues Ward, “farther than Spencer, and shown that perfection of structure is only a means to the ulterior end of converting the maximum quantity of inorganic into organic matter.”

In the context of this passage, and elsewhere in his writings and university lectures, Ward confessed the somewhat sordid

¹ Cf. Small, *The Meaning of Social Science*, for a masterly presentation of this thought.

nature of such conceptions, and later on in the passage quoted he questions whether the word "evolution" would not, in this instance, better suit the case than the word "progress," reserving for the latter a meaning such as we find expressed in his *Dynamic Sociology* and later works, wherein he clearly affirms that "social progress means more than the mere maintenance of the social organism, just as individual life means more than the bare conservation of the bodily existence. No progress is real that does not constantly show a reduction of the aggregate suffering or an increase of the aggregate enjoyment throughout society," coming finally to the unequivocal assertion that "human progress may . . . be properly defined as that which secures the *increase of human happiness*. Unless it do this, no matter how great a civilization may be, it is not progressive."¹

The hopeless materialism of Mr. Spencer's world-view has been relentlessly exposed by the Scottish philosopher James Ward, in his *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, as well as by a host of lesser thinkers. The conception, worked out by Spencer, of an endless series of evolutions and dissolutions, covering millions of years, whereby all the inconceivable variety and richness of our planetary world is slowly evolved only to be dissolved instantly into world-dust by some stellar catastrophe, and thus endlessly evolving again to repeat the process—all this presents a series of rhythmic risings and fallings which ends always in a chaos as utterly meaningless as that with which it began. At every stage, and in every cranny of the world-wide unfolding which constitutes any such cycle, there is indeed an inexhaustible meaning which it is the very business of science to discover and promulgate in terms of the whole self-environing, self-conditioning process. But the process itself, as a whole, though it consume billions of aeons in its evolution before being shattered into world-mist and star-dust, presents absolutely no meaning satisfying to the moral yearnings of mankind, or capable of being expressed by reason in

¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, II, 174.

terms of permanent worth and value. According to the naturalistic conception of the world, nothing in the universe possesses an abiding value or meaning of any sort whatsoever. With progress at every step, there is total absence of progress in the entire movement as a whole. We have thus the one case in the universe in which the whole is not equal to, but infinitely less than, the sum of the parts!

Nowhere, probably, has this aspect of materialism been more eloquently pictured than in the following passage from Professor James, which is well worth the space, as much for its literary beauty as for its philosophic insight.

Theism and materialism, so different when taken retrospectively, point, when we take them prospectively, to wholly different outlooks of experience. For, according to the theory of mechanical evolution, the laws of redistribution of matter and motion, though they are certainly to thank for all the good hours which our organisms have ever yielded us and for all the ideals which our minds now frame, are yet fatally certain to undo their work again, and to redissolve everything that they have once evolved. You all know the picture of the last state of the universe, which evolutionary science foresees. I cannot state it better than in Mr. Balfour's words: "The energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. 'Imperishable monuments,' and 'immortal deeds,' death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as if they had not been. Nor will anything that is, be better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have striven through countless ages to effect."

That is the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the cosmic weather, though many a jeweled shore appears, and many an enchanted cloud-bank floats away, long lingering ere it be dissolved—even as our world now lingers, for our joy—yet when these transient products are gone, nothing, absolutely nothing remains, to represent those particular qualities, those elements of preciousness which they may have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone utterly from the very sphere and room of being. Without an echo; without a memory; without an influence

on aught that may come after, to make it care for similar ideals. This utter final wreck and tragedy is of the essence of scientific materialism as at present understood. The lower and not the higher forces are the eternal forces, or the last surviving forces within the only cycle of evolution which we can definitely see. Mr. Spencer believes this as much as anyone; so why should he argue with us as if we were making silly aesthetic objections to the "grossness" of "matter and motion," the principles of his philosophy, when what really dismays us is the disconsolateness of its ulterior practical results?

No, the true objection to materialism is not positive but negative. It would be farcical at this day to make complaint of it for what it is, for "grossness." Grossness is what grossness does—we now know that. We make complaint of it, on the contrary, for what it is not—not a permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a fulfiller of our remotest hopes.

The notion of God, on the other hand, however inferior it may be in clearness to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical philosophy, has at least this superiority over them, that it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A world with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution not the absolutely final things. This need of an eternal moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast. And those poets, like Dante and Wordsworth, who live on the conviction of such an order, owe to that fact the extraordinary tonic and consoling power of their verse.¹

It thus appears that materialism, or naturalism if preferred, really lacks the logical basis for a conception of progress. Religion, on the other hand, is in a way to the manner born, its very breath of life being that evaluating attitude which is so essentially involved in such a process that some sociologists, as shown above, would reject the word. But whether religious philosophers can reduce the *spirit* of their world-view to the terms of a convincing and definite formulation of the legitimate goal of human group strivings is another question. The concept will doubtless need to be consistent with the accepted philosophy of evolution, yet it must escape the fatal tendency

¹ *Pragmatism*, pp. 103-7.

of such thinking to conceive of a process which ends only in destroying its own products—a monstrous proletariat which devours its own offspring! For this is precisely the tragic outcome which is presented to us in the spectacle of humanity toiling painfully from the level of the clod and the beast of the field to a dignity of moral and spiritual aspiration which crowns men and women with “the upward looking and the light”; which builds in the human soul the “music and the dream”; which comes so “trailing clouds of glory” that the soul may walk in “the light that never was on land or sea”—and then suddenly dashes the whole spiritual beauty of life into the débris of an infinite world-wreck without the turning of an eyelash. Under such an outlook no reasoned view of progress is possible except by parts and piecemeal. The evolutionary process evolves beings capable of cherishing thoughts almost divine, and then calmly tramples them into the muck of infinite helplessness and despair. The travail of ages is thus for naught, and nothing can have value except as it fits the moment and the temper of the beholder.

But at this point the protest arises that the yearning for immortality, even though it be conceived in the broadest and most impersonal sense, is a mental state peculiar to certain races and generations of men, or at least to certain individual temperaments, and that it fills no such place of importance in modern times, either logically or psychologically, as assumed in this discussion.

This objection has been partially anticipated, however, by Professor Alexander, in his paper on “The Belief in God and Immortality as Factors in Race Progress.”^{*} Recognizing that moral bankruptcy of naturalism which has been sketched above, Professor Alexander points out that, according to such philosophy,

the man of the future is to be one willing to devote himself to the development of an efficient physical life on this earth. He is to do this, aware

^{*} In the *Hibbert Journal*, October, 1910, pp. 169 ff.

that in the course of nature all his material works, all his physical achievements, must come to naught. A dead and ruined planet is the ultimate goal of his physical efforts.

Now if such end and such result were to be his sole inspiration, I believe and affirm that his rôle would be an impossible one. . . . The physical life, the life of the great Commune of Man here on earth, must be valued not for its own sake but for the sake of the ideal human character which such a life is to develop.

He next shows that belief in a world-intelligence to which the plan and purpose of each human life is important, and a faith that this world-intelligence, which is really God, will guarantee "a consummation of the life here begun in a world to come," is necessary "in order to satisfy reason." Without asserting "any a priori certitude" as to the existence of such a Being, Professor Alexander sees in such beliefs a positive and valuable equipment for the will to live, and to live with zest and efficiency. In the light of these convictions he is led to affirm that "nature decrees that the man who survives, the race that persists, must believe these things, they are a part of the equipment of the fittest to survive."¹

In this brilliant paper Professor Alexander has urged with great cogency some exceedingly important considerations. From an a priori standpoint his reasoning seems quite convincing, but perhaps a final decision cannot be won apart from an appeal to statistical evidence, which in this case would be hard to get. It may come down in the end to the question whether modern men tend to attach greater or less importance to such beliefs, as compared with earlier generations. While time alone can provide the answer, some argument, if not actual evidence, has already appeared.² By some it is maintained that the desire for immortality is declining among the most progressive races. But the experience of multitudes who have gone through the horrors and sorrows of the recent world-war would indicate quite the contrary, and tends to show that

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87.

² See the article "Apathy about Immortality," in the *Literary Digest*, April 20, 1912, p. 814; also *Belief in God and Immortality*, by James H. Leuba, 1916.

the soul thirst of heartbroken human beings for "the *living* God" is not less fundamental or less imperative than in the days when the Psalmist of Israel longed for God as the hart panted after the water brooks. It is recognized, however, that this will be held to be a natural outcome of the present reversion to a pain economy, and that mankind will regain its spiritual indifference as it regains its fatness and security.

However it may be as to the actual prevalence, under normal social conditions, of such a mental experience, the answer is of considerable logical importance for a theory of social progress. For, as Professor Perry shows in his searching chapter on "The Moral Tests of Progress,"¹ progress is really a quantitative conception, inasmuch as it signifies an *increase* of the good of life, whatever that good may be. Consequently, the question of the value of a sense of God and immortality assumes a position of the utmost importance for our theory of progress. Is such a belief among the real goods of life? Is it not the highest good, the finest product of evolution, when abstracted from all superstitions, fears, and sectarian dogmatism and left to stand in its simple dignity as the most comprehensive, elevated, and mentally chastening value-judgment and worth-reaction of which conscious life is capable? If so, then we are led to conclude that religion has an inextinguishable importance, an indispensable function, in human existence. So full of meaning is it, upon this hypothesis, that the naturalistic philosophy really pictures to us an immeasurably vast process of evolution, which works up from the primeval chaos, through countless ages, to the creation of a being whose exalted conception of duty and destiny constitutes, even for his own happiness no less than for his moral discipline, the supreme good of life, and yet this very process requires for its completion the uttermost shatterment of that supreme good, along with all the lesser goods of life. And this, say the prophets of materialism, is *progress!*

¹ See *The Moral Economy*, 1909.

The legitimate conclusion from these reflections seems to be that the definition of progress in adequate and comprehensive terms is logically impossible apart from that appreciating, evaluating reaction of the whole man, including his emotional nature, toward life and the world, which is the soul of religion. Consequently "progress," for irreligious thinkers, must of necessity remain a term which, in spite of its constant use, can have no definite content. And it is quite evident, moreover, that the constant use of "evolution," as signifying "progress," by scientific thinkers is entirely without logical warrant or justification. The truth is that no one can affirm that the human species, the social order, or the world as a whole will continue to develop toward higher levels, rather than lower, without an exercise of *faith* in some ongoing aspect of the universe which guarantees the permanency of the values of existence. But such a belief is essentially religious, so that we are led to the conclusion that apart from the religious attitude as herein defined no such thing as progress can be logically conceived or even consistently believed in.

Professor Alexander's conviction, that religious faith is an important factor in fitness for survival in the struggles of life, is very clearly shared by the authors of a recent textbook on sociology.¹ It is there forcibly argued that religion has actually so figured in the past. In fact, its very prevalence among men is taken as an evidence of its value in furthering group welfare. "As an instrument armed with which the natural powers of men may prove equal to a need or crisis it has survived."² Religion, according to this argument, has been preserved, and not eliminated, through social selection, because optimism is a more successful frame of mind than pessimism, and it is his trust in the help of higher powers and his belief in a heavenly hope even when every earthly good seemed lost, which has made of man the unconquerable battler against every wind of circumstance. But that attitude of

¹ Blackmar and Gillin, *Outlines of Sociology*, 1915.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 310.

mind is in its very essence religious, and therefore it is that religion, whether true, in the metaphysical sense, or merely a beneficent illusion, "has proved to be a working philosophy of life." It is a postulate which works out constructively and successfully in experience, and is consequently, in the view of the present writer, of precisely the same validity as the theory of electrons or any other working hypothesis of science.

In this connection it may be permissible to notice the fact that many people hail the zeal for social service manifested by many non-religious persons as evidence that religion is not necessary as a motive for such a work and life. This may be true, but it must not be forgotten that many, if not all, of such servants of humanity derived their moral enthusiasm and impetus from the godly homes or schools in which they were reared. It remains to be seen how long it will take for the moral and spiritual power of the generation just passing away to become a spent force. Furthermore, probably all truly ministering spirits who report themselves as holding to no religion, really cherish a cheerful faith in Evolution, Progress, or some other capitalized word which guarantees a fruitful outcome for their unselfish labors; a confident optimism which renders one essentially religious in the meaning of the term as used in this essay.

The notable statistical studies of Professor Leuba concerning the actual prevalence of the belief in God and immortality seem to indicate that such conceptions are declining in modern times among college students and scientific men. His data, resulting from the extensive use of questionnaires, seem further to indicate that, so far as *psychologists are concerned*, these beliefs are found to be most diminished among the *more eminent* men in that field.

This study offers a significant contribution which cannot be ignored, and in so far as the facts are really established by correct and adequate statistical methods it would be futile to quarrel with them. Indeed, they simply tend to establish

the existence of a movement in modern thought which seems more or less plain even to casual observation. But while *facts*, so far as established, must be faced rather than argued with, it would be a misfortune to adopt in the same way every logical *implication* involved. Such an unwarranted inference in this instance would be to conclude that, inasmuch as the "more eminent" psychologists, or other scientists for that matter, indicated less interest in God and immortality than their lesser colleagues, these beliefs are thereby and to that extent invalidated from the point of view of their philosophical integrity or sociological value.

The fact that "more eminent" psychologists discount more fully the belief in God and immortality may simply register the fact that eminence in psychology demands more and more a temperament and intellect which find their natural medium in quantitative measurement of physical phenomena rather than in the philosophical interpretation and evaluation of the less tangible and more elusive, yet even more significant, aspects of human experience. In such a case, the conclusion should not be that the more eminent (and presumably more able and authoritative) men of psychological science have least use for the religious conceptions in question, but, conversely, that men whose natural temper and training gives them least interest and ability in the methods of thought indispensable to philosophy are by that very fact those who attain, other things being equal, eminence in psychology, allowance being made for notable exceptions.

This hypothesis is borne out by the well-recognized fact that psychology has steadily drifted away from its original mother, which is philosophy and metaphysics, and has moved toward physics, biology, and physiology.¹ An examination of the subjects developed in leading psychological monographs and articles for the last ten years will impress on any observer

¹ Cf. the presidential address of Professor J. M. Sterrett, in the *Psychological Review*, XVI (1909), 85 ff.

the astonishing preponderance of physical measurements, especially as applied to minute studies of the more strictly individualistic and materialistic aspects of the various sensations, perceptions, and higher intellectual processes. In the vast, rich field of the emotional life, the field of the sentiments, and the supremely significant but difficult realm of group experience, psychology, in the strictly orthodox sense, had, until recently, done very little. Yet here is precisely where the great problems of religion lie. Our conclusion then is that even while accepting the facts established by Professor Leuba's research, we shall indeed be quite unphilosophical, and consequently superficial, to accept any indifference toward religion on the part of scientific men as valid evidence against its social value or even its absolute truth.

The significant suggestion from the situation seems to be that the supreme task of the present century will have to be the construction of a spiritual view of life, a task for which physical science, including most of current psychology, is entirely disqualified, but which will have to be the work of a truly *scientific* philosophy and metaphysics. The course of evolution has maneuvered mankind into an exceedingly dark blind alley in these later days. The brutes have no knowledge of death and hence no fear of it, or need of a remedy. Less sophisticated men are aware of their impending doom, but religious faith in God and immortality robs the grave of its sting. The thoroughly modernized man, if the inference from Professor Leuba's studies is to hold, contemplates the extinction of all his works without remedy—the one redeeming feature being that he seems, according to the figures, to be inclined not to care. In this situation, nothing but a rehabilitation of religious faith, or the widespread promulgation of a philosophy of indifference and resignation, can meet the prospect before the world as the darkness of scientific enlightenment continues to gather. Whether our refuge will be in faith or in resignation depends upon whether

Professor Leuba's indifferent man of scientific eminence represents the type of the future humanity, or whether the latter is more nearly exemplified in Professor William James, the greatest psychologist of them all, yet a profound philosopher, whose works on the whole tended, as he himself remarked, to loosen up the joints of this old cast-iron universe, and leave a little room for personal faith. After all, perhaps a scientist, in the security of his laboratory and the lustiness of his health, is a poor spokesman for humanity as it actually exists. Moreover, the testimony of the world-war corroborates our most fundamental premise, that religion is the most profound reaction an individual or a group can make toward life and the universe, especially in its unknown and more critical aspects. The fact that God is not found at the bottom of a test tube or at the end of a logical syllogism does not diminish the supreme necessity of religion for the ongoing daily life of the world. And this would seem to be true whether we think of life in terms of concrete activity or try to conceive of it abstractly as a process to which there attaches a comprehensive meaning which is partly expressed in the term "social progress."

SOME RESOURCES OF THE MODERN PREACHER

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Christian ministers are very conscious today of looking out on a world that is dark and discouraging. There are, however, fundamental reasons for expecting within the lifetime of those now preparing for the ministry unusual success in the great work that they have undertaken. Success comes through intelligently facing the great facts of life, and men know more today about three of these facts than ever before.

1. We know more about what we mean by *the will of God*. Our idea of what we mean by "will" comes to us from experience with our own wills. The will is the intelligent push of a personality on its environment, the set of a personality toward a goal. The will of God is a form of energy in the midst of which we live, which is set toward the securing of an honest and friendly world. It tends to rise in every individual, claiming him for the honest and friendly life. It tends to rise in the common life of man, to make all social institutions, laws, and customs honest and friendly. In ways that are sometimes gentle and sometimes rough it is crowding men up against the necessity of working with it to make truth and beauty, in moral relations honesty and friendliness, universal and secure in the civilization of the world.

The minister's great and indispensable work is one of leadership in making the masses of men, into whose hands power is so rapidly passing, aware of the will of God, aware of an energy near enough to them to give them being and keep it going, distinct enough from them to give them a chance to be themselves. Our better understanding of what we mean

by the will of God enables us to show men where to look for it, how to recognize intelligently the "feel" of it, and how to share in its great push toward the honest and friendly world. The Christian minister can interpret the will of God to men in terms of that which is most real to them, the universal experiences of plain daily living.

2. We know more about *the nature of man* than we ever did before. We have not only the results of psychological study but we have seen the naked nature of man uncovered by the war. We have seen man's lust, his greed, his brutality, and we have seen his high purpose, his idealism, his self-sacrifice. We have seemed to see these qualities in the same individual. We have seen "bad" men catch a glimpse of some phase of the great vision of an honest and friendly world and under its inspiration in the brutality of battle go stumbling and cursing on their way into some vital accord with the will of God.

We are seeing this same incongruous combination of the good and bad of human nature in whole nations. During the war the great idea of co-operation for the creation of an honest and friendly world entered for the first time in a dominant way the practical politics of the whole world. All nations and tribes of the world felt its influence at the same time in their practical politics. Mohammedan chieftains from the heart of Africa and Arabs from east of the Jordan discussed President Wilson's "fourteen points" with keen interest. And now this insistent idea is compelling nations and tribes in all the world at the same time to bring all phases of their life before its judgment seat. All things good and bad in political, industrial, social, and international relations must appear in bewildering confusion, and experience some new degree of adjustment to the great idea—adjustment to the unfolding will of God.

Here is our great chance as Christian ministers, specialists in character, to work with new knowledge of human nature and

fresh hope of success for the moral evolution of the individual and the race.

3. We know more than we ever did before about *the religious experience of Jesus Christ*. The tendency to investigate the life that expresses itself in literature has operated in the study of the Christian gospels. As a result we are slowly making our way into the presence of the religious experience of Jesus. We begin to see the hard problems that he faced, the fierce temptations that he resisted, the vague ideals that he made definite and secure, the processes of moral redemption that he wrought out in personal religious experience. He has become for us the world's supreme leader and savior in the great push of the will of God in the life of man toward an honest and friendly world, because he had the supreme religious experience with the will of God; and because through the influence of his immortal spirit he has been able to lead men into a morally redeeming share of his own experience.

And so, although we have come to a place where the world looks dark and discouraging, it is a place where long avenues of growing knowledge and power converge. In this place the Christian minister stands, with a larger chance than ever before to contribute to the moral evolution of man.

CHRISTIANIZING ASSAMESE FOLKWAYS IN MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

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Undoubtedly no two persons would ever give exactly the same reasons for desiring to enter upon missionary work in a foreign country. Speaking generally there are two objectives, either or both of which might be emphasized. Formerly the chief interest of many who entered upon foreign missionary work was in the securing for men at the time of their death an entrance into an ideal world, the Kingdom of Christ, or Heaven. There was little concern for the present world except as it served as a means to that end. Any social work that was undertaken was done with this end in view, rather than with the idea of making earth a better place for men to live. The surest and quickest way of accomplishing the missionary purpose was to induce men to turn from their idols and heathen gods and become at least nominally Christian. In fact, very often after the baptism of a convert to Christianity, little further responsibility was felt for him. His entrance into an ideal future state was assumed to be his sole deliverance from his wretched state in this world. But there has been an increasing concern with the present life of those whom the missionary endeavors to help. Today the primary interest of many workers is in the improvement of social conditions as part and parcel of the program of evangelization. It seems self-evident that Christianity should aid people to come to their fullest self-realization, and enable them in their higher development to make some permanent contribution toward the development of the human race as a whole.

In the province of Assam, the first-mentioned phase of missionary work has been strongly emphasized (for the reason perhaps that the scarcity of workers forbade emphasis upon both, rather than that the workers themselves had no social consciousness) so that today after eighty years of missionary effort there is a Christian community of 30,000 out of a population of 3,000,000 where, with the exception of a few social changes wrought by the British Government, conditions and social customs in the non-Christian Assamese home are almost the same as they were a century ago. With one or two exceptions it is even difficult to note any marked improvement in social conditions among the Christians; and where a change can be noted it has been brought about by the slow process of teaching and encouragement rather than by the drawing up and carrying out of any special social program designed to create a new environment in which a new order of society would naturally be born and thrive.

It is encouraging to note, however, that the greatest social evils which corrupt society, namely those connected with marriage and family life, are the very evils which the church has been most successful in eradicating among Christians, and which they have the greatest hope of uprooting very early among the non-Christian people by means of the establishment of schools for girls throughout the province.

The Assamese home, to begin with, is not founded on love and fellowship. The contract for the marriage is almost always made by parents, relatives, or friends. Usually the two who are to become intimate partners for life do not see each other (though they have heard much of each other) before they meet for the marriage ceremony. The principal concern of the parents in selecting a daughter-in-law is her caste, her capabilities as a cook and housekeeper, and the prospects of her being able to bear children. The parents of the girl consider the man's caste and his ability to provide her with a home, which means shelter and food. Practically no thought is

given to the consideration of whether they will be congenial or not. Of course all parents have affection for their daughter and they try to select a man who will not beat her too often or too hard. These marriages always take place when the bride is very young. Often girls are engaged when they are babies, nearly always before they reach the age of puberty. Soon after that time they are married—usually at the age of from ten to thirteen years. Early marriage is the method by which the Assamese keep their girls morally clean. After marriage a wife is kept under the strictest vigilance of her husband, and no man except her father or brother is ever permitted to even set eyes upon her. Girls are often married to men of thirty, thirty-five, or even older. Naturally, fallen girls and illegitimate children are almost unknown; but the early marriage of girls pitifully shortens their childhood. A young schoolgirl of about twelve years recently wrote an innocent note to one of the boys who was about seventeen. Her father said, "She will be doing wrong the first thing I know, so I'll marry her off." He did; but not to the boy to whom she had written the letter, for he was still in school and had no employment. She became the wife of an older man for whom she had no fondness whatever, gave birth to a child before she was thirteen, and in every respect was about the saddest little girl that one could imagine. She sometimes came to the gate of the high wall built around her house to keep her from the eyes of the passing world and called to her former playmates of the mission school as they passed by chattering and laughing.

It is interesting to note that the husbands of these child-wives are often men who may be considered very highly educated. The government has spared no pains to put educational opportunities within the reach of the masses of India; and, since the average Assamese would rather have a degree from a university than sufficient food upon his table, this opportunity has been seized by vast numbers. Primary schools for the

country and village boys are found at principal centers. Every town of any size has its grammar school with the seven grades, and in every town of three or four thousand there is a high school. Practically every high-caste boy goes through high school and the majority of them enter the universities. The type of education given, however, is along classical and cultural rather than practical lines and is not so beneficial as it might seem. This is one of the chief grievances of the people of Assam as well as of all India and is one of the reasons why the people of India are insisting upon their right to control the educational department of the government. The number of positions open to men with high-school and college educations is very limited and the country is getting top-heavy with education. The towns fairly swarm with lawyers, and the medical profession is becoming more and more popular. The schools, the railways, the postal and telegraph systems, the medical department, the department of justice, and the administrative department of the government all offer employment to this new type of man, and yet the number of positions is very small compared with the number of applicants. Besides, the Assamese are less keen, ambitious, and reliable than their neighbors, the Bengalis, and consequently many of the best positions even in the Assamese centers are filled by Bengalis who are crowded out of their own country by the same kind of an economic situation.

In spite of this extensive educational program for the boys of Assam, education for girls was until very recently almost unheard of. The government has lagged behind the Christian mission in the provision for the education of girls. Even yet only a very small percentage of the girls ever enter school at all. Of these, with the exception of the Christian girls and some of the non-Christians who attend mission schools, the great majority are very irregular in attendance when they are enrolled, and finally drop out entirely at the age of ten or eleven, if not before. The Christian girls do not leave

school when they reach the age of puberty as do most of the non-Christian girls; but they finish the grammar-school, and almost all of them now take normal-school training or go to high school, some even advancing to college. Others are taking up the study of nursing and medicine.

Speaking generally, it may be said that the non-Christian mother in Assam can neither read nor write. Even this statement fails to express the degree of her ignorance. When one imagines a high-school instructor, a superintendent of schools, a doctor, a lawyer, or a judge married to a woman who if she signs a legal document must do it with a thumb impression, he may gain some idea of the limited range of the common interests between man and wife. These men always apologize for the ignorance of their wives, but give as their excuse that there were no others for them to marry. They are victims of a custom in which they do not really believe, but from which they have not the moral courage to break. If they are to be released from its bondage it must be through social changes which no individual can be expected to initiate. A British officer once said that so far as he was able to understand the mind of an Assamese man on this subject, he believed that every one of them approved of educating and giving freedom to every woman but his own wife.

The inevitable consequence of ignorance, poverty, and early marriage is disease. With a humid tropical climate in which every imaginable kind of disease germ thrives, the state of health of the average family is deplorable. It is rarely that any household is at any one time entirely free from sickness. The main diseases commonly found in Assam are cholera, amoebic dysentery, pneumonia, tuberculosis, hookworm, and many kinds of fever diseases. Besides these native infections are the common European diseases, such as chickenpox, mumps, measles, and whooping cough. The death-rate is very high; in fact Assam is a country of the survival of the fittest. Instead of wondering why so many come to an early

death a foreigner is much more apt to express surprise that so many live as long as they do. Deaths of infants and of the young mothers at the time of childbirth are very common. Then, too, physicians are very scarce, especially women physicians, and men will not permit their wives to be treated by men. The people have no knowledge of sanitation or hygiene, and the germs with which they are surrounded find good camping grounds in bodies which are naturally weak and unable to resist. The government provides sanitary inspectors for the larger towns and has also free hospitals and dispensaries. There are no women nurses in these hospitals, so these might as well not exist so far as benefiting the women of the country is concerned. The most that can be said for the medical profession is that it succeeds in relieving some of the minor sufferings of the people but is not yet fully awake to the great task of wiping out disease. The training of women physicians is the great need of the day. The churches are even slower than the government, for in eighty years they have not sent one medically trained woman to this country.

One would not naturally expect to find much social life among a people where boys do not mingle with girls nor men with women. From early childhood groups of little boys and groups of little girls play separately. The principal social life of the home is the gathering of the mother, her daughters-in-law, and other relatives of the household at various intervals during the day for rest, for gossip, and for the chewing of the famous betel nut. Neighbor women sometimes go back and forth by means of a back entrance if they are sure there are no men at home.

An important social occasion is the "coming-out" or rather "going-in" party of the girl when she reaches the age of puberty. To this all the friends of the girl and her mother are invited. This event concerning which Western peoples are very reticent is in Assam proclaimed, as it were, from the housetops. This is the way a parent has of proclaiming to

the world that he has a daughter of marriageable age. The women who are invited are able to report to any sons or brothers just what kind of a wife the young lady will make. The girl dresses her best at the party and tries to make a good impression. It behooves her to do so. If a girl is engaged before this time the occasion is called her "first marriage." Weddings are always great social occasions, at which the women, in separate quarters, gather and compare garments and jewels, chew betel nut, and gossip. The men meet in a separate place and smoke, talk, and sing.

As to general recreation this, too, is organized so as to keep the sexes separate. In the afternoon the boys of the high school may be found on the athletic field engaged in football, cricket, hockey, or tennis. In the evening, if they meet, it is for eating, smoking, or singing to the accompaniment of organ, fife, drum, tambourine, or all of these instruments together. On the mission compound the girls also may be found engaged in their play at the evening hour. They skip rope, ride on the merry-go-round, slide on the toboggan, play bad-minton, volley-ball, and basket-ball. Girls other than those who attend the mission school know nothing of play.

What part should Christianity play in improving such social customs? As has already been intimated, the greatest hope of changing the ideals of the Assamese home lies in the establishment of Christian schools for girls. The mission school has as its main objective the improvement of the home. More definitely stated, it aims at the enrichment of child life, the extension of the period of childhood—which means the postponing of the day of motherhood—the training of the girls to be better mothers and home-makers, their preparation for entrance into training schools for nurses and doctors, the creation of educational and social leaders, and the awakening of a social consciousness which will widen the interest of the people from self and family to that of their neighbors and community.

It will suffice to indicate some ways in which these schools are actually changing social behavior. Even the mature girls and boys are now mingling more or less, although reservedly. They go to the same church service, even though the boys sit on one side of the room and the girls on the other. The boys have sports which the girls go to watch; they give programs and concerts which the girls attend. Recently a more advanced step was taken when the girls gave a program and invited the boys to come; of course they came. Meetings and conferences are held at which the boys give talks and do chorus singing, and sometimes the girls also sing in groups at the front of the audience. Church celebrations are given which both boys and girls attend, and where they may make passing remarks to each other although they would not stand and talk as American girls and boys might. In this way they get to know each other fairly well and are beginning to have their own opinions concerning possible marriage. The parents, of course, wish to see a child happily married and unless there is some strong objection usually let the preference of the young people stand.

Within the last year there have taken place two marriages which strikingly demonstrate the change that is taking place among the Christian people. In the one case a man of the age of thirty-two, who was a graduate of a college and in addition had taken two years of advanced normal training, married a girl twenty-six years old, who was a graduate of a high school, and of a normal school and who had taught two years. The other marriage was between a high-school graduate, twenty-five years old, and a girl of nineteen years who had finished grammar school, taken normal training, and had taught a year. Only a few years ago both of these girls would have been considered old maids at this age and men would have been ashamed to marry them. The influence of the older social custom had been broken because the men were busy with their studies and the girls had an abundance of

other interests. Marriage was delayed because the girls were happy in their school life and did not wish to marry earlier.

This is the method by which the missionaries hope to break up the early marriage system in both the Christian and the non-Christian homes. Schools aim to give the girls some interest to fill up their lives until a more suitable marrying age, and in the meantime to furnish a type of training that will help them in their home life when they do marry. Formerly girls have had nothing but marriage to think about; it was talked to them from the time they were able to understand. Since their childhood was dull and uninteresting, they looked forward to the wedding day as the time when they would be initiated into a fairy world of happiness and pleasure. They little realized the suffering and miseries into which that day would introduce them. But today many girls because of their school life are having an entirely new world of interests opened up to them; they enjoy their school and are genuinely sorry if they must leave it.

At the Mission School for Girls at Nowgong provision is being made to meet the popular feeling that girls must not be seen on the streets after reaching maturity. A dormitory for non-Christian girls has been established on the school compound under the direct supervision of the women missionaries. This plan has been tried out for three years, and there are now twenty girls taking advantage of it. This plan enables the girls to remain in school without being compelled to travel on the streets. Another plan about to be put into effect is that of having a curtained motor car in which all girls who wish to continue their studies but do not wish to live away from home may go back and forth. A special curriculum has been drawn up especially adapted to the needs of girls who are looking forward to marriage rather than to teaching or to taking advanced study. This curriculum provides for the teaching of such subjects as hygiene and sanitation, treatment of simple diseases, characteristics of

child life, history of Assamese arts and industries, decoration of the home, music, simple sociology, ethics, and religion.

There is little trouble in getting the Christian girls to move along almost any educational lines suggested, and many of them are teaching at least a year before marrying. A few of the less conservative non-Christian girls are also taking advantage of the normal-training course and are teaching in their home towns. They go back and forth to their schools daily, escorted of course by elderly women. No insults or disturbances have ever been reported by them. Most social reforms must come by shocking the conservative element at first and the feminist movement in Assam is no exception to this. People are now getting accustomed to seeing grown women in public, and if nothing tragic happens they will all gradually come to approve it, at least in moderation, which is all that even the church approves until the entire moral standard of the country is raised. About the most advanced step yet taken by the Assamese public in showing their approval of the public appearance of women was taken last spring when the teachers and girls of the mission school were invited to attend a joint student conference of men and women. A few of the older girls went. They were given front seats, which is a mark of great respect, and when mention was made during the meeting that this was the first time in the history of the town that men and women had ever assembled together in this way, the men all arose and cheered, and as the girls left before the meeting was over, the men stood as they passed by.

This is the part that Christianity is playing in the transforming of the Assamese home and there is great promise that there will be a new day for Assam when its girls take advantage of the kind of education Christianity has to offer and when men and women mingle sufficiently to enable them to select their own life-partners and to found homes on a greater maturity of experience.

CRITICISMS AND QUERIES

IS THERE A RELIGIOUS BREAKDOWN OF THE MINISTRY?

My colleague has given us a trenchant article, and I find myself in hearty accord with his main contention that "the minister is a guide and inspirer of social ends and motives," and that there is lamentable ignorance among the members of our churches of what are the Christian social ends to be sought, and what are the Christian motives by which they can be attained. The most serious weakness of current preaching is that it so seldom enlightens. It exhorts too much and informs too little. One rarely learns anything from the average sermon. Preachers take for granted that their congregations know what the Christian life is, and expend their energies in urging them to it. But the Christian life is, as its earliest devotees termed it, "the Way"; and the road enters a different stretch of country with each generation, and must be laid out for them. It is always "towards Christ," but the Christian ideal has to be interpreted afresh in view of the contemporary situation. In 1620 it meant for our Pilgrim Fathers voluntary exile from their loved native land and the attempt to set up in a new world the divine commonwealth which they found planned in the Bible. In 1920 it has meant to many of us the gathering of the nations, with their industries and commerce, their homes and schools, their whole life, into a world-wide commonwealth inspired and governed by the spirit of Christ.

It is the interpretation of what this reign of God involves which is too rarely given. What are the ends a Christian citizen must seek for his country and his community? What are his duties in the industrial world as a producer, a consumer, an owner, an investor, an employer, or an employee? These and kindred questions must be dealt with explicitly in the light of the gospel of Christ. And because they are not thus handled there is much vagueness as to what is meant by "accepting Christ," and the members of our churches are hazy as to the purpose to which they have committed themselves. Dr. Coe correctly stresses the supreme need of a teaching ministry, and of instruction along the particular lines which have to do with our economic and political life. No church is worthily fulfilling its duty in supplying inspirations and guidance to citizens of a democracy which fails to render this informing service.

There are minor points in Professor Coe's article which raise some questions. Is his title aptly chosen? Does not a "breakdown" imply a previous healthy functioning of the ministry? and has there been any time in the recent history of the Christian church when its ministers gave an adequate treatment of "social ends and motives"? Was not the lack of such teaching throughout Christendom a primary cause of the recent war, and of our inability to arrive at a satisfactory peace? Is not such an article as Dr. Coe's a wholesome indication that our generation is turning its attention to the development of this sorely neglected and urgently needed element of the Christian message?

Again, is the "breakdown" (for which I should prefer to use the word "weakness") as Dr. Coe analyzes it "religious"? Is not his diagnosis of the situation ethical rather than religious? Christianity is an ethical religion, and ethics and religion are inseparable in it; but "social ends and motives" as he has treated them seem to lie within its sphere as ethic.

And this brings me to the main addition I should like to make to the discussion which he has so admirably opened. In my judgment there is a serious "religious" weakness in many ministries, and it is sometimes apparent in those which devote much preaching to "social ends and motives." The Christian life is a fellowship through Christ with God and with his children in his purpose. Dr. Coe emphasizes the necessity of making clear the purpose. I should like to add also the necessity of teaching Christians to realize their fellowship with the living God in that purpose. Every pastor is aware how many of those reared in our Sunday schools and fairly frequent in their attendance at church services do not know how to find reinforcements and guidance in God. Christianity is both a faith and a purpose, and without the faith the purpose can never be bravely and hopefully enterprised. "The people that know their God shall be strong and do exploits." Here again what is needed is a teaching ministry. It is not enough to harp constantly on the necessity of communion with God, but to show men who he is, and what are his relations with them and with the world. This is the preaching of Christian doctrine, as Dr. Coe commends the preaching of Christian social ethics. We have to teach men what may be theirs in the life with God through Christ, that they may be induced to explore for themselves and make their own enriching discoveries.

A democracy makes a huge demand upon faith—faith in the capacities of plain men and women, faith in the power of ideals, faith in the universe as friendly to a fraternal commonwealth. The Christian conception of God supplies this faith—faith in him as incarnate in a

plain Man, faith in him as the inspiring Spirit of Christlike ideals, faith in him as Lord of heaven and earth. One is often disheartened to observe how many Christians lack a thoroughly Christian conception of God. When once they possess that, they can be shown "social ends" that he and we can share, and "social motives" in which we may expect his empowering Spirit.

I agree with my colleague that much of the preaching during the war was very remotely Christian. Many of the utterances were B.C. rather than A.D. I am not prepared, however, to agree wholly that "the clergy did count, and that splendidly, but it was not their religion that counted." When the clergy counted splendidly, it was not when they voiced on Sunday the same sentiments with which the press was filled throughout the week; but when they faced the ethical perplexities in which Christian consciences found themselves, pointed out that war was not and could never be called a Christian method of solving an international problem, but might under the circumstances be the less un-Christian method of ending an intolerable situation. On the one hand the minister had to preserve Christian standards when the psychology of war was destroying them; and on the other hand he had to show his people the course which lay in the Christian direction through circumstances in which an ideally Christian method was not one of the alternatives presented. And further he could assure them that in moving in the Christian direction, they could rely on the assistance of the God of righteousness. Where such discriminating preaching was given, and it was given by many pulpits, it was surely the religion of the clergy that counted. They linked the social end of the nation with the will of the God and Father of Jesus Christ.

But my criticism of an occasional phrase in my colleague's article only serves to show my agreement with his main aim. He is pleading for an interpreting type of preaching and teaching which makes clear for what followers of Jesus must stand in the situations in which we find ourselves as kinsmen, citizens, workers, and churchmen. Only where such guidance is given, are Christians who "understand what the will of the Lord is" likely to be produced. The failure of the churches to produce enough Christians of this intelligent variety is probably their most serious weakness. May Dr. Coe's plea send us preachers to our proper task with renewed resolve to "teach every man in all wisdom that we may present every man perfect in Christ."

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Professor Coe's vigorous discussion of the spiritual leadership of the ministry today will induce much soul-searching on the part of men eager to be true to their responsibilities. Stimulating as his discussion is, I question whether it has really touched the kernel of the matter.

In the development of Christianity we are in the process of transition from a religion of authority to a more democratic type of religion. On the basis of an authoritative system the leadership of the minister is a relatively simple matter. Without regard to his own personal qualifications he may become the mouthpiece of an imposing divine authority. Professor Coe recognizes this type of leadership in his footnote on page 23, when he says:

Every intelligent Catholic has definite and correct ideas as to what his priest stands for, and of the meaning of membership in the Catholic church. This gives the advantage of a unified and determined front, indeed, but the ulterior problem here concerns the ends prescribed by the hierarchy to the faithful. To save one's own soul by obeying an autocratic spiritual authority, and to contribute to the final and complete triumph of this autocracy—this conception of spiritual life, duty, and destiny makes the problem of the priest too simple. He can fulfill his essential functions by performing certain doctrines and duties already strictly formulated. The problem of the Protestant minister goes many fathoms deeper than this.

The thing which interested me in this footnote was Professor Coe's recognition of the fact that such kind of leadership is impossible for a Protestant minister. Indeed by implication such leadership is regarded as mechanical rather than spiritual.

And yet is the article not really an arraignment of Protestant ministers because they are unable authoritatively to define what is and what is not Christian? To be sure, Professor Coe insists that it is unjust "to demand of ministers such fabulous wisdom as to be able to tell just what to do in every troublesome situation." His duty is rather to discern ends which are worthy and to judge what kind of social organizations will promote these ends. And yet Professor Coe's culminating demand is to know whether "a system in which one works for wages, and another for profits, is fundamentally Christian, anti-Christian, or neutral."

Now if the minister were in a position to quote the word of God on the subject, he could speak with the old-fashioned authority. But, again, this would be, by Professor Coe's own standard, mere mechanical dogmatism. The only alternative left, then, seems to be the possession of such knowledge concerning the intricacies of the wage system as will give one a right to pass judgment. But is any living man competent

for this task? Have the implications of the wage system been sufficiently analyzed and considered to furnish the data for any final judgment in so complicated a matter?

Those who have studied religion from the point of view of history and of psychology are perfectly familiar with the thesis that religious values are worked out with very much of the trial-and-error method in the process of social development. It took three centuries for religious leaders in the ancient church to determine just what was the "Christian view" of the nature of Jesus. How long did it take the church to ascertain whether slavery was or was not in accordance with Christian ideals? The fact is that by all the laws of social psychology the real leader must be a member of a democratic society working out problems along with other people rather than an oracle capable of deciding questions by means unknown to people as a whole. If it be true that during the war the Christian pulpit had no distinctively Christian message (a thesis open to serious question), may not the explanation be that the influence of centuries of Christian idealism made possible under the stress of a great emotion a popular *Christian* appraisal of the disturbed situation in which humanity found itself? What finer expression of genuinely Christian ideals could be found than in the extraordinary sense of consecration to the cause of *human* values which pervaded our country?

Instead of speaking of the religious breakdown of the ministry, would it not be truer to speak of the beginnings of a new kind of religious leadership? For better or for worse, the type of Christianity in which Professor Coe believes has turned its back upon the conception that solutions for our problems can be brought *to* us, as the Catholic church furnishes programs for its members. Solutions must be worked out by social co-operation. As we all struggle together for better light, gifted individuals here and there will appear who with peculiar insight voice ideals and values toward which we all are groping. But in a democratic society, it is not to be expected that these leaders will all come from the ministry. Indeed, it would seem that a peculiar responsibility for developing such leadership in relation to problems of industry rests upon those who know industry best. President Wilson was the real prophet of a humane internationalism. And when thousands of pulpits reinforced and interpreted his prophetic words, was the leadership of the pulpit any less religious because the ministry did not *originate* the message?

It is somewhat surprising that Professor Coe, who knows so well that religious values are socially created, should perpetuate in his

article the picture of a "Christianity" so distinct from the social development of which it is a part that it can furnish authoritative judgments; and to demand of the ministry a quasi-official ability to declare what is "Christian," as if complicated questions could thereby be settled. The "religious breakdown" of that kind of pretension is inevitable in a democratic society. It scarcely deserves the attention which Professor Coe bestows upon it. Our present understanding of the social character of religion reveals the positive value of a ministry which struggles for light in a struggling world, and which serves to give publicity and religious carrying power to the messages of hope and courage and determination which, of course, are uttered by any- and everyone in a democratic society.

Let me ask again, are we not really facing the beginnings of a new kind of religious ministry? And its day will be hastened if we frankly accept the "breakdown" of an impossible pretension instead of suggesting that we ought by some frantic means to reinstate it.

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It seems to me that Professor Coe considers too lightly the work which he admits the church is doing in the realm of individual upbuilding. At the center of all moral and religious life must of course stand the will to do right. The church seems to me to be doing much more in arousing and strengthening that central purpose to do right than we sometimes realize. I am well aware of the ignorance—on the part of young people everywhere—revealed by the answers to questions asked of soldiers during the war. For four months I myself worked among soldiers. It is true that very few could make any sort of statement as to what the purpose of the church is, or should be. But it is also true that almost all would quickly condemn meanness or smallness on the part of the professed Christian. "He's a pretty sort of Christian, isn't he?" would be the almost invariable comment on the professed Christian who fell short. And by the time the one voicing such a criticism had finished it would be tolerably clear that he expected professed Christians to try to act like Christ. That general expectation the church has, I think, sunk deeply into the common consciousness. Moral and spiritual progress consists, it is obvious, in informing more and more of our acts with the moral spirit and in bringing more and more persons within the sphere of Christly contact. The sad fact is that the central will to do right—as demanded by the church—reaches out to such a limited circumference.

There is a prophetic accent in Professor Coe's word as he rebukes us all for the breakdown of the church in the presence of some moral issues growing out of the war, and in the presence of the need of the reorganization of society and industry on a more Christian basis. While I appreciate the moral fervor which prompts Dr. Coe to cry aloud and spare not I do not find it possible myself to get into quite such an attitude of condemnation. The trouble does not seem to me to be so much a moral fault as an intellectual shortcoming or inadequacy. Looking back now we can see that the world-war came as the logical culmination of the forces of economic imperialism, but not all of us saw this at the time. It was a great deal as, if some supernal meddler had got hold of the levers of planets and had switched the earth out of its orbit in toward the sun with a change of time measures and of the seasonal processions and with a fearful increase of the heat of the climate. Everybody was at a loss, not so much morally as intellectually. Professor Coe has "come to" sooner than some of the rest of us.

The Professor puts very sharply the question as to whether a profit-seeking industrialism can be thought of as Christian. Here again I do not think the trouble with the ministry is so much a moral breakdown as an intellectual unpreparedness, for which the ministry is not altogether to blame. What Professor Coe really calls for is a message which challenges the entire attitude of practically all America toward industrial processes. I trust he will not become too impatient with me when I suggest that the mass of American preachers will have to get very considerable mental enlightenment before they catch the force of the Professor's questions, or discern the implications of them. It is sometimes said that the United States is backward in the popular understanding of the issues at stake in industrial and social conflict. If this is true we must remember that the generation in the United States which has just passed off the scene completed the conquest of the frontier under conditions which called for and gave free play to individual initiative, and which produced an individualist type of democracy. The present generation indeed faces a new task. A more socialized type of life—political, industrial, social—is the next requirement. But the whole atmosphere in which the present generation has been reared has made for individualism, and for the search for as much personal profit as can be found anywhere. The rule has been, "Every man for himself and the devil take the hindmost." The fact that the devil has got not only the hindmost but more than he should of the foremost has not indeed disturbed us as it ought; but still the need is fundamentally for sound instruction from a changed point of view. The problem is that of the transformation of an entire social climate.

The hope in the situation comes from lifting the whole problem up to that emphasis on the human values which is essentially Christian. My official duties have made it necessary for me to travel about forty thousand miles a year for the past eight years, dealing almost wholly with ministers and their problems. As soon as a social question is seen by ministers to be clearly moral there need be no doubt as to the attitude of most of them. Professor Coe was good enough to refer to the Inter-Church Steel Strike Report. As chairman of the Commission that made that Report, may I state that the Commission expected severe cudgeling—and got it. It may be of interest to know that those who went out of their way to express encouragement to some of us on the Commission were mostly ministers—ministers, too, from the centers of the steel industry.

I have read everything that Professor Coe has ever published and am greatly in his debt. My interest in this present article is not merely in the fact that it is Professor Coe's but also in the fact that it comes out of a theological school. The theological schools more than any other agencies bear the responsibility for the change of emphasis which we need. How many of us who left theological school a quarter of a century ago had had any hard training in the social sciences? One of the good signs of the times is that an article like this has been written by a theological professor and that it has been published in a theological journal. Inasmuch as the problem is so largely intellectual it is necessary that intellectual agencies take the lead. Granting all that the article says about not expecting the minister to be an expert on programs of social reconstruction we all nevertheless expect to find such experts on theological faculties. There is a growing indisposition among the most earnest spirits in the ministry to talk unless they know what they are talking about. R. H. Tawney, foremost advocate of the nationalization of England's coal mines, has recently urged upon us that in so complex a problem as that in which he is most interested, the use of hazily defined terms by high-minded reformers is doing more harm than good. He urges the advocates of the reform to learn exactness and precision of speech. Professor Coe's entire career has been given to like emphasis. There is immense heat in the conscience of the ministry but it will burst into the flame that really gives light only under expert guidance.

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UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

WHY DO RELIGIONS DIE?—A REPLY

Before we shall be able to answer the question, Why do religions die? we must ask for clearer definition of what a religion is and what it means for a religion to die. Human life has persisted on the planet because man has come to terms in some way with the realities of his environing world. This complex of customs which give security to life is at the basis of his religion. It is this social organization which meets the life-needs, embodies life's ideals and provides the technique of security, which endures. It is to these age-old habits and customs that the emotional life is attached. It is this structure which offers the resistance to new conceptual interpretations of cosmic realities and it is this which must be changed when a new religion is introduced or religious reformation accomplished. The religious idealist who is unable to embody his religion in social organization in such a way as to transform the old order remains merely a voice. The experience of Ikhnaton in Egypt is typical. Confucius died broken-hearted; the Han dynasty provided the social organization and Confucianism became a reality. Meh-ti's glowing idealism remains no more than a historic fragrance. Will anyone maintain that the Christianity of the Mediterranean world of the first three centuries was the simple religion of Jesus of Nazareth? Or that orthodox Zoroastrianism of the Achaemenian empire was the high ethical monotheism of Zoroaster? Or that the Christianity of Abyssinia is the Christianity of the Quakers of America? The ultimate factor is always the social order which is the bearer and embodiment of the fundamental interests of life. On this account the question of the life or death of a religion will always be a specific problem in a specific environment. There is no psychic disease which infects religions. When a social order is transformed by the impact of external forces, by the rise of new interests, by new embodied ideas and ideals, the old form of a religion is on the way to death if it fails to come to terms with this new organization of life. This is the problem which faces historic Christianity in our Western world. The "revival of Shinto" and the "secularization of Shinto" are ways of saying that the Japanese leaders are embodying the traditional naturalism of old Japan and the national hopes of new Japan in a new religion under an old name. The so-called

death of Buddhism in India is an excellent illustration of the relentless control of a social mind set in old forms. The soul of India always underlay the agnostic ethical way of salvation of Gautama and when, after a few centuries, the ontology of Buddhism was assimilated to the philosophic idealism of the old world-view and Buddha was represented as an avatar of the Supreme, there was little left either for the intellectuals or for the populace to differentiate Buddhism from the Hindu systems, philosophic and sectarian. It was not so much death as absorption.

The case of an invading or missionary religion furnishes another illustration. There are two possibilities—either to transform the social order or to adopt it and give it a new name. The latter is the usual method in historic fact. Did paganism die in northern and central Europe or was it christened? The laments of John Chrysostom and the advice to missionaries from Catholic leaders to embody the old forms are revealing. Under many of the saints, under Hallowe'en, All Souls, Easter, is the evidence of what took place. Lawson's studies in modern Greece show that the old folk-religion still lives after all the centuries. The case of Buddhism in Japan is clearer. The old religion was not uprooted but overlaid and renamed. A modern Japanese intellectual may turn to the sun as the material symbol of the Absolute Buddha, Dainichi, but the non-philosophical populace still feels the heart thrilled by devotion to the sun-goddess Amaterasu. Can a religion be said to die because it is given a new name?

When the basis of religion in life and life's needs and its embodiment in social customs are neglected it is easy to think of a religion in terms of doctrine and cult. This presents a difficulty, for changes *do* take place. Then comes the search for an "essence" or "type" or "fundamentals" as the meaning of the *real* religion. It is a fruitless quest. Doctrines, devitalized institutions, and forms die: but the religion of a people does not die, for our religion, the world over, is just the way we orient ourselves to cosmic realities in the interests of our larger life. A growing religion adjusts itself to the new social order and the new world-view and the old name carries on. So Christianity and Buddhism have, in the past, died that they might live.

The normal program for a modern religion, then, would be to discover what cosmic realities may be depended upon, to face life's problems, to survey human resources, to formulate ideals and then seek ways of social organization for the co-operative realization of them: this would be our religion under whatever name. Such a program is made extremely difficult for some of the great religions because of their insistence upon

eternal truths and supernaturally revealed ways of salvation which must not change. Here they face a modern crisis in their history, for life will not be denied—but that is another problem.

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A. EUSTACE HAYDON

DOES A PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS TEND TO UNDERMINE THE CHRISTIAN FAITH IN A PERSONAL GOD?

The Christian religion has its center of gravity in the belief that the highest existence is personal. That is to say, the Christian reposes his trust in a being who has in the highest degree those powers of self-consciousness and self-direction which we prize the most in ourselves. It is in the exercise of these powers that we come into inner relations with one another and into outer relations with things. Existences which come into conscious relations with one another we call persons. When we call the highest existence (God) personal we mean that we may have in the exercise of our highest powers an experience of relations with him of the same kind as those which we have with human beings at the best.

To the Christian, God truly exists. This is not to say that he exists in the sense in which some object of common knowledge—say, the sun or moon—exists or that our knowledge that he exists is the same in kind as the knowledge that such objects exist. We mean, rather, that the self-conscious self-direction which we ourselves exercise is of the same kind as that which constitutes the universe of things and that the being who exercises it exists for us in the sense in which other self-conscious beings like ourselves exist, namely, that without them our lives could not have the meaning they now have. In both instances the affirmation of existence is an act of faith—we are able to live the life we now consciously live by the confidence that they too exercise the same kind of activity as ourselves. Were it not so, the world would be to us a wilderness and ourselves without any reason for being here.

I call this a Christian faith because Christians, the world over and in all times, have seen in the personality of Jesus (whatever may have been their explanation of his career) an expression of God's own character—his good purpose toward them, his self-communicability to them, his estimate of their worth, his direction of the powers of the universe to their good. The whole meaning of the Christian life of service to men and confidence in one's own ultimate well-being would be thoroughly changed, were this faith to be lost.

Whenever the world of a man's thinking undergoes an appreciable change, this faith in a personal God undergoes revision and, in some instances, it seems to disappear. At such times arguments for the existence of God arise to reinforce the faith. Among these is what is called the moral argument. This argument, taking for granted the (substantially universal) distinction of right and wrong and recognizing its indispensability to mankind if men are to live together in peace, contends that a supreme personal moral ruler is necessary. Otherwise there could be no assurance that moral distinctions are anything more than maxims of convenience or that evil shall be requited and good rewarded. When the difference in the consequences disappears the distinction itself loses its supposed place among the realities of the universe. The ultimate and only guaranty that the moral distinction shall be vindicated—and, consequently, be actually valid—is to be found in a supreme ruler who is himself a moral personality. This is in substance the moral argument for the existence of God, whether it find expression in the popular expectation of a judgment day and future rewards and punishments or in the highly philosophical doctrine of Kant founded on the "categorical imperative."

Now, it is evident that the feeling or moral assumption of responsibility underlies this argument. The power for good it has effected in the minds of men is undoubtedly very great. It has brought steadiness to our thinking and conduct. Religious trust and moral conviction have been brought into alliance. It has humanized the universe. It has exalted the sense of personal worth to supremacy over all that is non-personal. It has led us to the view that material nature is made to serve a moral end. But a philosophy of morals must not be allowed to come to a standstill or be reduced to a repetition of platitudes—and this for the special reason that true morality itself never comes to a standstill or a round of prescribed duties. Indeed, movement is of the very essence of morality. May it be, then, that a growing philosophy of morals will tend to dissolve the well-known moral argument for God's existence and require a reconsideration of the whole doctrine of the personality of God, which seems at first sight implicitly dependent on the moral argument?

In order to the very inception of a philosophy of morals two definite processes of investigation are necessary, viz., first, a study of the history of morals and, second, an analysis of the fundamental moral concepts. The first of these is not so much concerned with the history of theories of morals as it is with the actual practices which men in great communities have been accustomed to approve or disapprove and have sought by

means in their power to maintain or suppress. The investigation may begin, for example, with the community we call a nation and trace the customs it enforces upon its citizens back through earlier stages of its career till the point is reached where it is as yet undifferentiated from other peoples. When this course of investigation has been carried out broadly by an examination of the life-story of many peoples it may bring us, conceivably, to a state of humanity in which the moral consciousness as we know it, that is, the firm distinction of right and wrong, was as yet unknown to men. It may be that we should find men starting with the appetites of the animal in control and seeking as their aim simply physical comfort. It may be that the original evils to their minds were the purely physical and that the demands that we call moral were just the ways of succeeding in their aim. Thus it may turn out that the morals of men have their ultimate basis, not in the inviolable will of a supreme legislator but in the desires of men to live. If so, a system of morals seemingly becomes purely the creative act of the will of men.

If, in the second place, we analyze, say, the concept of responsibility, we seem to find it a figure of speech based on the scenes of the courtroom with its accusation, trial, and sentence. It may be that the age-long experiences of the race, beginning with parental discipline and ending in great international tribunals of justice, have been crystallized in the imagination of men till they have taken the form of an abstract principle. Moreover, we find that what we call the sense of responsibility has undergone a radical change. Under a monarchical government it was easy enough to conclude that a single monarch presides over the deeds of men and their consequences, but under a democracy in which the laws arise out of the people's will and the criminal himself is one of the makers of the laws, the sense of responsibility becomes the affirmation of the purpose to be true to one's own best will. Is there any place left for a single supreme will to which men are purely subjects and not legislators? If so, how does a philosophy of morals affect belief in a personal God?

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CURRENT EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

One Hundred Years of Missions in Madagascar.—"The Centenary of Missions in Madagascar" is discussed by F. H. Hawkins (*International Review of Missions*, IX [Oct., 1920], 570-80). During the month of October the Island of Madagascar observed the completion of a century of successful mission work. A very extensive evangelistic campaign, the contribution of large sums of money for the promotion of benevolent and educational programs, and an extended series of special thanksgiving services are the special features of the celebration.

The progress of missions in this "great African island" since its beginnings in 1818 is a story of great interest. It falls into four periods: (1) The period of planting (1818-35), during which the first missionaries, chiefly Welshmen, laid a splendid foundation for the years to come. (2) The second period (1836-61) was one of very severe persecution, under new royal families; but in spite of martyrdoms, imprisonments, and tortures, the Christian forces multiplied tenfold. (3) The years 1862-95 cover an era of progress and expansion. They saw the flocking of thousands to the Christian church in mass movements. Despite the inadequacy of workers in the various missions the results of these movements were conserved in a marked degree. (4) Since 1896 the French have had control of the island. This change brought international difficulties, followed by a strong Jesuit propaganda and a great materialistic and atheistic campaign. In recent years, however, the French rule has done much to facilitate the spread of missionary enterprises.

At present Anglicans, Lutherans (American and Norwegian), Friends, the Paris Evangelical Missionary Society and Roman Catholics are conducting missions. The various Protestant bodies are co-operating in a number of specific tasks. Evangelism, education, hospital work, and the publication of great quantities of Christian literature are prominent phases of present activities. The methods used in religious education, both in Sunday schools and for higher theological training, seem to be particularly efficient and modern. The outlook appears encouraging for continued advance.

The Will to Be Religious.—In "The Place of the Will in Religion" by Professor George A. Wilson, an article in the *Methodist Review*

(CIII, [Sept.-Oct., 1920], 687-98) a suggestive emphasis appears. Because the emotional element often is regarded superficially as the essence of religion, and because traditional thought has directed men to intellectual assents as the sources of religion, this author finds a need of considering the place of man's volitional nature in religion.

The conative, volitional nature includes all propulsive forces of subconscious life, possesses complete motor equipment for making choices, evaluations, decisions, carrying out purposes, creating and organizing activity. Religion in its significance and motor force belongs to the deeper stratum of life where also the will is at home; thus religion in its inner life becomes will rather than feeling or intellect. As the will gathers up the latent powers, so religion centralizes and unifies life. On the contrary, ordinary experiences distract and scatter life; worship is comparatively more difficult for the person of a highly developed and complicated life, as his defective will is unable to dominate the distracting and distorting cross-currents of life.

The will does what needs to be done in religious life. When the self becomes restless and longs for the ideal and spiritual, the will seeks what can satisfy, and under proper direction lays hold of the satisfactory meanings and interpretations of life. Therefore, to relegate the will to a subordinate place in religion means the progressive devitalization of religious life. If intellectualism is enthroned, the result will be intellectual division or self-deception. If emotionalism reigns supreme, moral aberrations and abnormalities, based on selfishness, will develop. In healthy religion the will is supreme, emotion sweetens the act, and intellect furnishes the necessary framework and articulation of religious experience to guide and protect the active nature in realizing itself.

Two practical bearings are suggested. In conversion experiences the decision should be made only when the will is in control of the situation. Prayer is a conference of the person's will with the supreme will of the cosmos, which resides in the cosmic mechanism, rendering the universe hypersensitive to will-attitudes. This cosmic will is headed toward the realization of a kingdom of wills.

A World of Creative Evolution.—An article entitled "The Conservation of Values in the Universe," by J. E. Turner, in *The Monist* (XXX, [April, 1920], 203-19) suggests an optimistic view of the conception of Evolution. The splendid conquest of science has been followed by a strange aftermath of philosophical hesitancy and even pessimism because of the rareness of the best. Yet the idealistic or monistic philosopher, worthy of the name, may proclaim that universal change brings

about a never-ceasing heightening of values, making ultimate retrogression an impossibility. Each generation is enriched by the preceding one. The individual is equipped with values of the past; in him they are further developed, the highest being rare and restricted; such development taking place universally unites in producing better individuals, and the process continues from this advanced starting-point.

Metaphysically this reasoning is established as follows:

1. Reality is at once both diverse and unified. The universe is a complex of inter-related, individual systems, each connected with and expressive of the whole outside itself.

2. The dynamic of the universe is the increasing complexity in each system or sector, adding new characteristics present in some other sector. The addition is caused by the response to the strange characteristic. This being a universal occurrence means a heightening of localization, specialization—values. The continuous process is insured in the fact that the entities of the lower scale are stimuli and determinants of higher and more complex systems.

3. This evolutionary advance is a necessity. Each instant of cause and effect is determined by its predecessor, in which predecessor the totality of each phase of the whole is present. Each system owes its nature and character to the whole. Every change, effected by new connections between sectors, is a response to an alteration in the environment; hence the response itself changes. In this changed response is the nucleus of a new system—making for increased complexity.

Idealism Invincible.—Despite the many attacks leveled against it, the position of modern idealism is more secure at the end of the decade, 1910-20, than at its beginning. Recent developments are reviewed in an article entitled "Modern Idealism," by E. S. Brightman, in the *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods* (XVII, no. 20 [Sept. 23, 1920], 533-50).

Idealism is hard to define, as there are at least four main types: The Platonic, with its emphasis upon the objectivity of values; the Berkeleyan, insisting that consciousness is the essence of all knowable reality; the Hegelian, which asserts that the only value is the totality of experience; and the Lotzean, finding in selfhood or personality an ultimate fact of fundamental significance. A vague working definition of idealism is belief in the ultimate reality or cosmic significance either of mind (in the broadest sense) or of the values revealed to and prized by mind.

Some main characteristics of idealism during the years 1910-20 are the following: (1) Its struggle with realism, where idealism has

fought to save mind or consciousness from being dissolved into elements only neutrally, externally, not mentally, related to each other. (2) The peculiar treatment of epistemology, in that both the Hegelian or speculative idealist and the new realist are interested in the nature and function of knowledge and yet try to reject epistemology. The outcome has been a new kind of epistemology with the activity of the self still a factor in knowledge. (3) A renewed emphasis on the philosophy of values has arisen especially among the speculative and personalistic (Lotzean) idealists. The concrete must receive primary recognition, value is fundamental in knowledge and reality, transcends the career of the finite personality, and should be preserved both in finite personalities and in objectivity. The personalist further gives ethics the preference over logic, and holds that meanings are acts of the self. There is no value except as embodied in personal life.

The Death of Some Noted Scholars.—During the past year the world of New Testament scholarship has suffered severe loss through the death on March 15 of Professor W. Bousset of Göttingen, on May 25 of Dr. E. Preuschen, and on September 16 of Professor W. Sanday of Oxford. Sanday had reached the ripe age of seventy-seven, while Bousset was only fifty-four, and Preuschen fifty-three.

Professor Sanday won distinction in 1872 by a volume entitled *The Authorship and Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel*. But perhaps of even more scientific value was his book on *The Gospels in the Second Century*, published in 1876. Among New Testament students he will be remembered especially as the author of the article in Hastings' *Dictionary* on "Jesus Christ," and his excellent *Commentary on Romans* in the series of "International Critical Commentaries."

English readers are acquainted with Bousset in two popular books under the titles respectively of *What Is Religion?* and *Jesus*. His place in the world of scholarship has been made secure especially through the publication of *Die Religion des Judentums, Hauptprobleme der Gnosis und Kyrios Christos*.

Preuschen was the founder and editor of the *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, and he also rendered excellent service through the publication of his *Griechisch-Deutsches Handwörterbuch zu den Schriften des Neuen Testaments*.

Principal W. H. Bennett of Lancashire Independent College, Manchester, England, died in the latter part of August, and a few days later his predecessor, W. F. Adeney, also passed away. The work of these English scholars covered both the Old and the New Testament fields,

and they will probably be remembered chiefly through the *Biblical Introduction* which they published jointly, and Adeney's *Greek and Eastern Churches* in the "International Theological Library."

Village Education in India.—An article by Sir Michael E. Sadler, in *The International Review of Missions* (IX [Oct., 1920], 495-516) reports the findings of a commission appointed last year by the Conference in Missionary Societies of Great Britain and Ireland, in co-operation with the Foreign Missions Conference of North America to study educational conditions in the villages of India, methods of meeting these needs, and ways in which the Missions may co-operate. The Commission made its study of Indian problems in the light of a previous survey of education in the United States, Japan, the Philippines, and Ceylon. Their attitude of approach was one which considered education as one phase of the whole complex social life in India, and all recommendations were made with this strictly in mind.

A very instructive section of the report deals with the relation of the Missions to the government under the new laws which place education under the control of Indian ministers. Several practical methods of co-operation were suggested, especially with reference to movements for social reform, and in the work of the rural co-operative credit societies. The need for more local compulsory education laws and for Indian Christians trained for educational and social leadership in village life are also stressed. The plea for a larger and more responsible place for Indian Christians in all movements for social welfare is another indication of the keen understanding and balanced judgment of the Commission. These all tend to bring out the latent initiative of the Indian and furnish channels for the development and expression of his personality; in which we shall find the key to a great deal of India's progress.

The chief ideas in the report centered around making the village school an organized center for promoting all of the physical, economic, social and moral interests of the community. Thus it would include adults as well as children. The teachers should be trained for this social leadership, if possible by a year or more in some good socialized rural schools in the United States. Missionary organizations could aid in this by supporting promising teachers during their period of training. For higher education, vocational middle schools are recommended. There would be but one of these for each district of several villages. In these the students would earn some money by manual labor. This would do much to dignify labor as well as to train the people for greater industrial efficiency. The schools of a large district would be under

supervisors, in a system very much like that in the Philippines. These men would be well trained, and would receive a salary and occupy a position commanding the respect of all. It is suggested that the missionary societies can do much to inaugurate this system and show its possibilities for extending and socializing Indian education. The results of the commission's report will be watched with the keenest interest by all who are keeping in touch with missionary progress.

The full report is published under the title *Village Education in India* (London and New York: Oxford University Press).

How Can the Church Promote Wholesome Recreation?—Many suggestions are found in a plea entitled, *The Justification of Play* by O. F. Lewis, War Camp Community Service. The new application of an old element—that of play—was greatly stimulated during the war. The movement continues to challenge attention. While play or recreation is not the most important thing in life but, along with religion, family, and work, is one of four essentials to human happiness. Those who are dealing seriously with this subject include in the idea of play not only physical sports and games, but play also through diversions, hobbies, and cultural satisfactions. It has been thought that play is largely for the child, but we are seeing with the increase in leisure time its place in adult life. It is exceedingly important that the churches make a contribution toward enriching and ennobling the leisure time of the men and women of the nation. The fact that there is going to be much more leisure time for most people than there used to be is in itself a challenge to us. Will this time be spent destructively or will it be utilized in behalf of better citizenship and finer life?

The church will help to answer that question by helping to provide means whereby people may profitably spend their leisure time. This means not only study classes but also profitable amusements, recreational games, and sports. We see that fun cannot be eradicated from the human heart, for commercialized amusements form, perhaps, the largest single industry in the country. As communities we should be able to create for ourselves many simple, interesting amusements that will increase neighborliness and community spirit and make for a more wholesome life.

Many of the churches did this kind of work during the war. A number of the churches are making ample provision for it in their budgets and programs at the present time. It has been started by the churches in Bridgeport, Connecticut. At a joint meeting of the governing bodies of two churches in Buffalo, a budget of \$13,000 for moving

pictures and other activities was voted. In Salt Lake City; Seattle; Flint, Michigan; Fredericksburg, Virginia, and in many other places the movement is making real headway, and is powerfully affecting the neighborhoods. The Community Service, Incorporated, which has had a splendid experience in this field stands ready to assist and give counsel to the church organizations in vigorously attacking the problems of leisure time by means of a constructive recreational program.

The Psychology of Propaganda is discussed in an article by Raymond Dodge, in *Religious Education* (XV, 241-52). Propaganda is the art of making up the other man's mind for him by capitalizing his prejudices. An antipathy for a thing can be derived by subtly associating it with a prejudice that the other is known to possess. By the mechanism of emotional transfer there is the tendency to suffuse all the field of immediate association with the strong emotion of the prejudice. Thus the bond is emotional rather than logical. In much propaganda the prejudices to which one is appealing are so hidden that they cannot be proved. Through this medium facts are distorted consciously or unconsciously. The unscrupulous use of this suggestibility has brought most of the present indignation against propaganda.

The emotional factors exploited include the self-preservative, social, and racial instincts; outstanding racial traditions and tendencies such as Germany's consciousness of racial superiority and the Yankee's moral superiority consciousness; and every phase of individual experience, bias, and prejudice. The mechanisms of emotional transfer are primarily laws of the mental life which propaganda exploits for its own ends.

The processes of propaganda have three limitations: emotional recoil or the overloading of the association; the exhaustion of the motive force by too frequent appeals; and the development of internal resistance or negativism which is the aim of counter propaganda.

Propaganda contains two great social dangers: its great destructive power may be unscrupulously used and there is little protection that does not imperil free speech; the second danger is the tendency to overload and level down great incentives in behalf of trivial ends. These great springs of action must be protected from destructive exploitation for selfish, commercial, or trivial ends. Properly disciplined by noble motives there is a legitimate place for this mode of appeal. While systematic moral education lacks much of the speed and picturesqueness of propaganda it is a necessary pre-condition for the effectiveness of the latter and is a far more dependable social instrument.

The Future of Liberal Judaism.—"Has Judaism a Future?" is the title of an article by C. G. Montefiore (*Hibbert Journal*, XIV, [Oct., 1920], 28-41). The following considerations favorable to the future of Liberal Judaism are urged:

1. Its life is not impaired by the results of criticism and history. It is free to accept the good and reject the bad.

2. It is capable of expansion and absorption, being able and willing to learn from Christian, Greek, Indian, or other sources, whatever is not inconsistent with the Jewish fundamentals.

3. It adopts a more intelligent attitude than does orthodox Judaism toward Jesus, Paul, and the New Testament, recognizing that the proper evaluation of the founders of Christianity does not disqualify for the name "Jew."

4. Though a *liberal* Judaism, it has a historical past, and is the heir of many ancestors.

5. This historical connection is interpreted by faith. In possession of this faith the person is a Jew, while without it, though entertaining other Jewish doctrines, one can hardly be a Jew. This faith, illuminating the past, sanctifying the present, and guaranteeing the future, is the belief that God has intrusted Israel with a commission which has never been canceled: "Thou, Israel, art my servant. Ye are my witnesses."

6. It is able to universalize and spiritualize its particularistic and nationalistic elements. From being a race or people, Israel is broadened out into a human, religious community, the bond of union being membership in the common faith.

Thus alongside of liberal Christianity liberal Judaism may find a place, if only a modest one. Perhaps, also, liberal Christianity and liberal Judaism may influence each other and gradually converge without actually meeting. Each may emphasize its own special values without onesidedness. Liberal Jews and others will need to bear their witness of truth as they see it.

A New Beginning of International Missionary Co-operation.—In the *International Review of Missions* (IX [Oct., 1920], 481-94), J. H. Oldham reports the doings of the most significant gathering, in its relation to the international missionary situation, held since the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh. This Conference convened last June at Crans, near Geneva, Switzerland. Representatives were present from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Holland, Finland, Germany (unofficially) South Africa, India, China, Japan, Egypt, and Pretoria.

The purpose of the Conference was a review of the missionary situation throughout the world and the adjustment of mission policies on a large scale to the new international conditions in the period of world-reconstruction.

Many new problems have arisen which require consideration from the international point of view. The establishment of the League of Nations with its system of mandates raises problems of missionary co-operation. The inauguration of new policies of government, such as in India, where many of the functions formerly under the control of the missionary societies are now to be administered by popularly elected legislatures, requires some far-reaching changes in missionary programs. The question of religious toleration in China, and of the relationship of missionary societies to one another and to governments in China, Korea, and Japan presents another critical issue. The whole problem of the relation of missionary organizations toward political questions is especially acute in India where there is an ever-growing national consciousness and desire for self-government. In America and other countries the immigration of alien peoples raises another important issue. Probably the most delicate problem to receive consideration was with reference to the continuation of German missions in allied territory.

The chief task accomplished by the Conference was that of making provision for a careful study of these various questions. The following plan was adopted for carrying this into effect. Each national missionary conference and committee, in addition to its own specific task, is to make every possible effort to develop more of the international outlook through keeping closely in touch with the International Committee. They can, through this organization, establish a vital contact with the other national conferences and come to a fuller appreciation of international problems. Supplementing this form of co-operation, there is to be an international meeting either annually or every two years for further conference and united action. Further forms and methods of organizations will be left to grow up as the changing situation demands.

With reference to the German missions the difficulties were frankly recognized and the issues of the present squarely faced. It was agreed that no general, immediate solution of this complex problem is possible. However, a few suggestions were made with reference to a *modus operandi*. (1) That missionary societies taking over (or that have taken over) German missions get in touch with the German societies which established them and confer regarding their administration. (2) That, as far as practicable, the denominational character of each mission be retained. (3) Several questions raised by the German

representatives at the Conference were referred to the national missionary organizations concerned.

The chief contributions of the Conference to missionary progress lie in the spirit of mutual understanding, brotherhood, and co-operation which characterized all sessions, in the possibilities which it presents for facing the task of world-missions with a unified purpose and a world-outlook, and in the provisions made for common study of the common problems. If the ideals and purposes of this gathering can capture the imagination and enlist the loyalty of the national missionary societies, a new era of international missionary co-operation and progress should result.

An Unexplored Religious Literature at Our Doors.—In an article, "The Two Mexicos," by Charles Johnston in the *Atlantic Monthly*, for December, 1920, attention is called to the culture of ancient Mexico, which is still a closed book to the world. Only a few pioneers have even realized its presence. This is the Mexico of the obscure districts, populated by aborigines, the seat of ancient civilization and learning. Scholars have but recently brought to light the existence of the Popol Vuh, the ancient scripture of the Guatemalans, which shows striking resemblances to the Puranas of India. Karl Lumholtz, the Norwegian explorer, has discovered another series of wonderful books which contain hymns addressed to the very deities of the Rig Veda, the Sun-God, the Rain-God, Father Heaven, and Mother Earth. Many other such treasures are waiting to be deciphered and used for the enrichment of our knowledge of the life, government, language, institutions, religion, and races of the aboriginal inhabitants. Here may be found materials of inestimable value to the student of religion.

Who Was Anathyahu?—A. Lemmonyer has an article in the *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, IX (Oct. 1920), 581-88, on "La Déesse Anath d'Eléphantine," pointing out that Anath is of fairly common occurrence in Old Testament names of places and persons, and further that it is the name of a well-known goddess among the Semites, not however to be identified with the Babylonian Antu, nor with Jeremiah's Queen of Heaven, but apparently a warrior-goddess. There is no profound or ancient connection between Anath and Yahweh such as might be suggested by the coupling of their names in the Elephantine Papyri; such a relation is wholly adventitious and a matter of cultus, and thus represents a deviation from Yahwism.

BOOK REVIEWS

A NOTEWORTHY INTERPRETATION OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE¹

In few fields has American scholarship distinguished itself more notably than in the psychological interpretation of religion. From the very beginning of such study down to the present, the psychologists of America have very generally manifested genuine insight, independence of viewpoint and method, and keenness of analysis combined with lucidity and aptness of description. These characteristics are conspicuous likewise in Professor Pratt's *The Religious Consciousness*. Because of them the book will be of interest, as well as of instruction, to the general reader no less than to the technical student of religion.

Professor Pratt approached his task with an exceptional equipment: with a philosophical training, and hence the cultivation of reflective, self-critical thought, of broad perspective, and of the courage to face problems in all their baffling complexity; with extensive psychological knowledge, and long practice in applying this to religious problems—his *Psychology of Religious Belief* appeared in 1908; with a first-hand acquaintance not merely with numerous occidental varieties of religion but with oriental cults as well—witness his *India and Its Faiths*; and, finally, also with a deep appreciation of the value, the beauty, and the holiness of religion—with the recognition, to quote a sentence from his present volume, that “there is hardly an aspect of our changing life with which religion does not come into touch and which it may not bless and consecrate” (p. 121).²

¹ *The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study*. By James Bissett Pratt. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1920. ix+488 pages.

² Another passage may be added, since it both presents the author's attitude toward religion and also suggests his conception of it: “When one compares the deeply religious and spiritual person with the best and bravest of those who are not religious, one sees, it must be confessed, that the former possesses something which the others lack. It is not that he is any better morally than his non-religious brother, nor any more appreciative of beauty and love nor any braver. It is, rather, that he has a confidence in the universe and an inner joy which the other does not know. He is, perhaps, no more at home in this world than the other (perhaps he is not so much at home here), but he seems more at home in the universe as a whole. He feels himself in touch, and he acts as if he were in touch, with a larger environment. . . . He

In some quarters the various philosophical disciplines are regarded as parts, or aspects, or extensions of psychology, and such discussions of the more ultimate religious problems as are conceded to be legitimate are therefore assigned to the psychology of religion. Professor Pratt, however, sharply sunders psychological from philosophical tasks. He confines himself to description and analysis in empirical terms, leaving entirely to one side, as outside the province of his inquiry, all questions relating to validity or to metaphysical reality.¹ In his judgment all attempts, such as that recently made by Professor Macintosh, to treat theology as an empirical science are misguided. Our author's empiricism, moreover, is very thoroughgoing. Generalizations and subordination to the fundamental laws of psychology are sought, but no effort is made to bridge over, by speculative constructions, any gaps appearing in religious experience. A degree of fragmentariness is preferred to such continuity and system as can be achieved only through guesswork or imaginative effort.

In distinction from such writers, for example, as Höffding and Stratton, no basic law or principle is championed; no fundamental thesis is defended. In distinction from Ames and King, from Coe, from Durkheim, from Wundt, and from numerous Freudians, no particular "brand" of psychology is permitted to dominate the situation. In this there are items of disadvantage: the facts are knit less closely together, and the relationship between the major topics, and that between religious experience as a whole and other types of experience, are less clear. But there are more than merely compensating gains. There is a wider hospitality toward all sorts of facts and of divergent aspects, and a greater willingness to let facts tell their own story.² Furthermore, the place of intellect in relation to desire, of creed in relation to practice and to cult, of the individual in relation to society, and of religion in relation to science is adjudicated without initial theoretical bias. Hence

has an inner source of joy and strength which does not seem dependent on outer circumstance, and which in fact seems greatest at times when outer sources of strength and promise fail. He is, therefore, able to shed a kind of peace around him which no argument and no mere animal spirits and no mere courage can produce" (pp. 35 f.).

¹ For example, "Whether the mystic in his ecstasy really *knows* any genuine *truth* or merely seems to himself so to do is not our question" (p. 405).

² Pratt is surely in the right when he maintains that "religion is almost as many-sided and inclusive as life. When we come to this realization, how pitifully narrow and unaccountably blind seem the various attempts that are always being made by enthusiastic and scholarly doctrinaires to deduce the whole of religion from some single human influence" (p. 121)!

the findings seem unusually fair. Though defined as an attitude, religion is said to involve the whole man. While contrasted with "content," as "the relatively passive element in sensation, the accepted and recognized," religion is said always to presuppose an object and to involve some sort of content. "Religion is the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies" (p. 2). Ames's identification of religion with social morality is therefore sharply rejected. Religion, it is insisted, has a conscious concern for ultimate cosmic problems. This concern, according to Pratt, is not with the problems on their own account—herein religion differs from philosophy, theology, and science—but because of their bearings upon practical and personal life. Religion, that is to say, is not a theory but a reality. Nevertheless, it "is a reality which includes a theory. . . . [It] is not satisfied with being simply comforting and "useful"; it means to be also *true*. . . . And if it be said that the *value* of religion at any rate is subjective, then at least religion must not know that this is the case; for if it learned the secret both its value and it would cease to be even subjective" (p. 7). A similar conclusion is reached in the chapter on prayer. "If the subjective value of prayer be all the value it has, we wise psychologists of religion had best keep the fact to ourselves; otherwise the game will soon be up and we shall have no religion left to psychologise about" (p. 336).¹

Unambiguous as Pratt is in his contention that religion is an attitude rather than a mode of knowledge, a life and reality rather than a theory, he nevertheless assigns to cognition a not unimportant rôle. He indeed admits that the dominant feature of working ideas of God is practical; it "is to be found not in what God is conceived to *be* but in what He is relied upon to *do*" (p. 206). Nevertheless, he maintains that it is both bad psychology and bad epistemology to identify God with human attitudes and values, as is done by King and Ames, and thus to overlook

¹ While the author, as mentioned, does not enter upon philosophical issues, a few intimations which he occasionally gives may be of interest: "The psychologist of religion must remember that explanation through the Supernatural, though quite possibly true, is not psychology" (p. 37). "A superhuman source of revelation, though something in which the philosopher may well believe, is not something which the man of science can ever verify" (p. 63). "There is a kind of worship that is perfectly objective and sincere and that is quite as possible for the intelligent man of today as it was for the ancient:—namely that union of awe and gratitude which is reverence, combined perhaps with consecration and a suggestion of communion, which most thoughtful men must feel in the presence of the Cosmic forces and in reflecting upon them" (p. 308).

or explicitly to deny that, to the religious consciousness, God has existence of some sort—that He is not a mere idea but “something genuinely transcendent” (p. 209). Moreover, the influences shaping ideas of God are logical, as well as sociological and psychological. “The development of rational thought, seeking to make its world consistent and to avoid the consciously incongruous, has played a more important rôle than any other one thing in making older ideas of God incredible and in developing new and genuinely vital beliefs” (p. 204).

Independent of a fixed psychological system, and following solely the lead of fact, our author is enabled to recognize the fundamental importance of social factors in the religious experience of individuals while yet repudiating the extreme claims of the Durkheim school. The *form* of religious life, it is maintained, is due to the inborn nature of the individual—to his reason, the precondition of any experience of a human sort, and to various innate tendencies and instincts. The *application* made of these instincts—that is, the *matter* of religious experience—is determined *chiefly* by society. And yet only chiefly. Mr. Ballard and Mr. D’Estrella are evidence that a deaf-mute of average mentality can develop for himself some sort of religious view. If this is so, then

a fortiori can the religious genius, taking the materials which society furnishes, work them over into new forms, put upon them his personal impress, and adding his own intuitions give back to society points of view, concepts, and plans of action which it never had before and which it never would have attained to but for him or for someone like him (p. 73).

The author’s concreteness and psychological catholicity likewise stand him in good stead in his analysis of the typical aspects of religion. These are said to be four: the traditional, reflecting primitive credulity; the rational, based purely on reason and the facts of verifiable experience; the mystical, derived “from a peculiarly subjective experience and one not scientifically verifiable”; the practical or moral, emphasizing what must be done, in distinction from believed or felt.

The highest and healthiest type of faith in the spiritual world, a faith that is warm but without fanaticism, reasonable but not coldly abstract, courageous yet never self-deceived nor disloyal to truth, calmly confident but never blind, and neither slavishly servile to authority nor yet lonely and separatist,—such a faith must draw its strength from all four of the sources (p. 223).

This fourfold division is used also as the framework of the discussion as to why people continue to believe in God (pp. 209–23) and as to the

sources of the belief in immortality (pp. 225-38); to a lesser degree it serves also in the analysis of the absence of belief in immortality (pp. 238-47). The distinction is likewise said to have genetic significance.

The child is characterized almost entirely by traditional religion, the adolescent is an especially good example of the rational and sometimes of the mystical aspects, while in middle life any one of the four aspects may be most prominent, and here the practical or moral element certainly gets its best development (p. 14).

Correspondingly, Pratt emphasizes four temperamental kinds of religion, giving illustrations both personal and institutional. In all of this there seems to be a slight concession to the temptations of schematization. Even so, however, the record of the volume as a whole is in this respect not at all a bad one, though it is to be regretted that the author lost an opportunity to develop the fine analyses suggested by Höffding in his *Philosophy of Religion* (cf. pp. 120-34).

The present volume comprises twenty chapters. The first two define the nature of religion and of the psychology of religion. Immediately following is an admirably lucid account of the rôle played by the subconscious. In the sense of a fringe or background, as also in that of the "physiological" or "unconscious," the subconscious is held to be an extremely significant factor in religion. The latter is described as bound up with the whole psycho-physical organism. "Truly, he who loves God loves Him with all his heart and soul and mind and strength . . . [and] with his body too. Our religion . . . involves our individual, and even our racial, history, it is one aspect of what we are and all we hope to be" (p. 60). A third conception of the subconscious, that of "unconscious psychical states," is dismissed, perhaps altogether too summarily, as unintelligible. A fourth use of the term subconscious identifies it with co-consciousness. The latter is said to be rare in normal individuals and, wherever it occurs in abnormal cases, to give little evidence of superiority. Nevertheless, it is conceded that such dissociated states may at times have special value and that it is only fair to judge them by their fruits. The latter, though most generally bad, have indisputably been the reverse in numbers of conspicuous instances. In the reviewer's judgment, the meanings of the subconscious distinguished and evaluated by Pratt fail to include the "subliminal" as this term is used by James and Starbuck. It is difficult, moreover, to accept the contention that the "great source of the content of the subconscious is . . . the conscious" (p. 63), if the latter term is used as the equivalent of attentive consciousness.

Chapter iv, "Society and the Individual," succeeds well, as has already been intimated, in holding the scales evenly. Unfortunately there is no discussion of Starbuck's and Hocking's theories of central instincts; no attempt is made to enumerate the instincts fundamental to religion, nor is there any elucidation of the way in which the latter develops from the former. It is not criticizing Durkheim, as Pratt supposes, but echoing him to say that the "object toward which the religious man maintains his characteristic attitude is not the historical source of 'the sacred' but rather the hypothetical power which he considers the Determiner of Destiny" (p. 80; see Durkheim's *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, pp. 418, 425).

The two chapters, "The Religion of Childhood" and "Adolescence," refrain from subdividing either childhood or adolescence into sharply demarcated periods, as is so commonly done. As a consequence, the descriptions are in some respects rather more faithful to life in its complexities and varieties; yet there is a serious loss in that definiteness of which most minds stand in need, whether as a preliminary to thorough comprehension or as a basis for action—in this instance, for religious education.

Chapters vii and viii, dealing with conversion, make a valuable distinction between two types of this experience. In the one, there is a more or less clear apprehension of a desired experience, together with an effort to attain it; the search is not for an emotional change but for something far more objective, for a new principle of activity and a new kind of being. Contrasting with this is the conventional conversion "predetermined by an accepted and unquestioned theology"—an emotional drama of three stages (neutral, depressed, elated) without fundamental growth in insight, character, or unification of purpose. James and Starbuck are criticized for overlooking the importance of the distinction between the two types of conversion and for basing their descriptions and building up their norm on the second instead of the first, thus accepting "the conventions of theology as the principles of human nature" (p. 150). The succeeding chapter on "Crowd Psychology and Revivals" presents a conspicuously fine account of revivals in their dependence upon the law of rhythm in human life and upon crowd psychology.

Two chapters, x and xi, discuss the belief, respectively, in God and in immortality. Here too there is so much of the excellent that criticisms dwindle into insignificance. But why is the origin of the belief in a God or gods left "to the anthropologists and the historians, not to mention the theologians, the sociologists, and the philologists" (p. 200)?

Both of the chapters, as well as a later chapter on prayer, repeatedly introduce the results of questionnaires, yet almost as frequently express skepticism with respect to the value of the figures compiled from them. In numerous instances it seems useless, if not indeed positively misleading, to give figures if these are not an index of actual conditions. In passing, the reviewer would remark that the figures and numerous facts emerging from 297 replies to a questionnaire on immortality prepared by him some years ago diverge in numerous respects, which the limits of space prevent him from here indicating, from those of Professor Pratt.

Two chapters are devoted to a study of the causes and functions of cult; in the succeeding chapter an important distinction is made between objective worship, which aims at producing some kind of effect upon the Deity or at communing with Him, and subjective worship, which seeks only "to induce some desired mood or belief or attitude in the mind of the worshipper" (p. 290).

The five last chapters, comprising 123 pages or 30 per cent of the volume, present a lucid and sympathetic account of what is distinguished as a "milder form of mysticism," a description of persons commonly known as "mystics," a detailed and valuable analysis of ecstasy and the mystic life, and an appraisal of mysticism. "It is a dangerous thing to lop off any of one's mental powers or reduce to any extent the mind's moral activity; and so far forth as the ecstatic trance is induced by this kind of mental malpractice it is in a real sense pathological and stands on a par with hypnosis" (p. 386). On the other hand, as the final paragraph of the book re-emphasizes,

every age has need of "the contemplative life," and ours is no exception to the rule. It might, in fact, be maintained that our twentieth century stands in special need of it. . . . The soul . . . needs a chance for spreading its wings, for looking beyond itself, beyond the immediate environment, and for quiet inner growth, which is best to be found in that group of somewhat indefinite but very real experiences—aspiration, insight, contemplation—which may well be called the mystic life (p. 479).

Some may wish that the author had not so lightly committed to other sciences various problems relating to origins; others, that he did not make larger use of genetic description; still others may deplore his failure to appreciate fully the standpoint of those who, like Wundt and Durkheim, believe that religion must ultimately be interpreted in terms of the collective consciousness; and there will be those also who will regard a single brief and incidental paragraph altogether too little to devote to phenomena as significant as prophets and religious leaders.

Many may chide the author for not utilizing the methods and the concepts of the "new psychology" and thus attempting explanation as well as bare description and analysis. No one, however, can give careful study to the volume without realizing that, within the limits it sets itself, it offers a rarely judicious treatment of the more fundamental aspects of the religious life and that, in addition, it presents not a few contributions of permanent value.

EDWARD L. SCHAUB

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A JEWISH VIEW OF JESUS¹

Dr. Enelow, one of the rabbis of Emanuel Temple, New York City, has made a notable addition to a small class of comparatively recent books by distinguished Jewish authors contributing to the better understanding of Jesus. It ought to be expected that light would come from the long line of devout scholars, kinsmen of the great prophets of Israel and modernized heirs of the Jewish thought-world in which Jesus lived and taught.

The spirit of the author is finely expressed in the words from the closing paragraph:

Who can compute all that Jesus has meant to humanity? The love he has inspired, the solace he has given, the good he has engendered, the hope and joy he has kindled—all that is unequalled in human history.

Yet the author feels that of course no Jew could accept the divinity of Jesus; neither does he find in Jesus any realization of the ideas associated in the Jewish mind with the Messiah. The Jewish idea of the messianic age is "a period of human perfection and peace." "Such a period not only failed to commence with Jesus but to this day it has not come."

One of the best points in the book is its repeated emphasis of the "personal element" in Jesus' teaching. Most Jewish teachers "from the prophets down" "were interested in principles, in doctrines, in ideals," while Jesus spoke from the standpoint of his own religious experience. While Moses spoke of the "God of your fathers", Jesus always spoke of "his own God, his own Father." "The prophets were friends of the poor," "Jesus not only championed the poor, he lived their life; he not only pitied sinners but mingled with them."

In a book of this size the author naturally could not indicate the extent to which he had based his conclusions on an intensive critical

¹ *A Jewish View of Jesus*. By H. G. Enelow. New York: Macmillan, 1920. 181 pages.

study of the gospels. There are several places where many New Testament scholars would question his conclusions. For instance, the oldest sources do not seem to warrant his supposition that the same group hailed Jesus as a hero upon his arrival in Jerusalem and a few days later applauded his crucifixion.

It is a historical fact that the personality of Jesus has been the channel through which a unique abundance of morally redemptive power from the unseen world has poured into the lives of multitudes in many nations. Dr. Enelow's book contributes something to the explanation of this fact, but it is nevertheless chiefly valuable as a fresh challenge to Jewish and Christian scholars to prosecute the inquiry still further and state the results in terms of modern thought.

EDWARD I. BOSWORTH

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OUR CHANGING RELIGION

Religions flourish and die; religion remains and changes, for religion is a function of life. As a vital relationship of sympathy and co-operation with those cosmic realities in which man feels his life and destiny to be involved, religion must grow and change with the developing life of man. During the last fifty years there has been a rapid enlargement of human vision. The technique and method of science, the evolutionary world-view, the social ideal of democracy, the dream of economic freedom, the hope of international co-operation—these are the sources of the new religious idealism. Within the boundaries of the old religious institutions and theologies it is no longer possible to embody this new life of the spirit. Yet the established religions are conservative, resisting change, even while life flows on and away from them and this attitude seems to the fervent champion of the new vision of life to be a betrayal of truth—the great refusal. He finds it difficult to be tolerant of a too tenacious past. Three recent publications¹ attempt to present the new meaning of religion, yet with patient appreciation of the past.

Edward Carpenter reads our human story as a slow development of consciousness from the non-self-conscious life of the prehistoric group, through the tragic stage of self-consciousness which created our modern

¹ *Pagan and Christian Creeds*. By Edward Carpenter. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. 319 pages. *The Social Evolution of Religion*. By George Willis Cooke. Boston: The Stratford Press, 1920. xxiv+416 pages. \$3.50. *Some Religious Implications of Pragmatism*. By Joseph Roy Geiger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919. 54 pages. \$0.50.

civilization to a more complete stage in which the individual, while not losing his consciousness of self, will sink self in the consciousness of unity with the universal cosmic life. The light of this new day is now at hand. With a wealth of material drawn from the history of religions and carefully selected he shows the one human life creating its similar forms the world over. With evident joy he reduces the dogmatic arrogance and secure supernaturalism of Christianity and sets it in the milieu of historic human religions. The dawn of self-consciousness, when fear entered, was the sign of sorrow for man and, while necessary, it nevertheless gave rise to all the evils of civilization—selfishness, lust, greed, tyranny, pride, ambition, and desire for property. Yet, through it all, religion kept some symbols of the old unity of life. The hope of our age is that we shall be able to pass to the third stage of solidarity, co-operation and love in which the individual will find his satisfactions in the common good and his spiritual glory in conscious unity with universal life. There are many suggestions for the psychologist in the book. The stamp of Vedantism is upon Carpenter. He still trusts too implicitly the ultimate goodness of cosmic life. It is probable that the disillusioned modern thinker will hesitate to surrender to even this rechristened Absolute and will prefer rather to ground his hope for the future upon the creative, intelligent direction of cosmic life by man.

Its title interprets Mr. Cooke's book. Religion has significance only as it expresses the meaning of life for a group. In a survey of the history of religions he traces the enlarging of the human group, co-ordinate with the enlarging of the meaning of the world. Man is an earth-child and his religion has been tribal, feudal, national, international, and now must be universal or cosmic. This is the heart of his prophecy. We have outgrown the old gods, the old loyalties and traditions, the need of the sanction of immortality—to find our real satisfaction in a religion as wide as the new ideal of humanity. "These masterful ideas, of beauty in the individual life, of a spirit of loyalty and devotion, of brotherhood and fellowship throughout the world of humanity, of peace among all nations, of world unity and a parliament of man, of freedom and opportunity"—are the creative forces in the new religion of human, social solidarity.

While Dr. Geiger approaches the problem from the standpoint of philosophy, being a pragmatist, his results are similar. The sources of religious satisfaction are to be found in empirical, practical social values. Vital, life-giving activities are at the basis of religion and modern life has grown marvelously with new elements. The pragmatist insists that religious realities are empirical, the immediately experienced

meanings and values of social life. It is inevitable, therefore, that modern religion should express the new relationship to social, democratic values. God must be democratic. "The most effectively divine power in the world today is the social consciousness of a genuinely democratic community." The task of modern religious leadership is to create a new form, a new creed, a new mode of expression for the devotion to social and shared values ever growing through co-operative human effort, to use science to compel the external world to come to terms with human ideals in the interest of the good life for all men.

These three books are signs of a larger appreciation of the growing unity of ideal and of the vital significance of religion in the life of modern man. They point to a new Humanism.

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NOTE.—For review of *The Idea of Atonement in Christian Theology*, by Hastings Rashdall (New York: Macmillan, 1919, xx+502 pages, \$5.50), see article, "The Functional Value of Doctrines of the Atonement," by Shailer Mathews, page 146 of this issue.

BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.]

BAKETEL, OLIVER S. (ed.). *The Methodist Year Book*. 1921. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1921. 340 pages. \$0.50.

BARING-GOULD, S. *The Evangelical Revival*. London: Methuen, 1920. xvi+360 pages. \$6.00.

An extended study of the evangelical elements in the message of Wesley, Whitefield, and the evangelicals, with considerable emphasis upon the fruits of the Revival.

BATIFFOL, PIERRE. *Le Catholicisme de saint Augustin*. Paris: Gabalda, 1920. 2 vols., viii+276 and iv+278 pages. Fr. 14.

These volumes constitute the third part of this scholar's studies in the early history of Catholicism. They are worthy successors to the two previous volumes on primitive Catholicism and the peace of Constantine.

BECKH, HERMANN. *Buddhismus, II*. Berlin: Grunter, 1920. 142 pages. M. 40.

The second of two handbooks on original Buddhism, this volume dealing critically with the fundamentals of the teaching.

BRIDGMAN, HOWARD A. *New England in the Life of the World*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1920. xvii+395 pages. \$4.00.

Popularly written essays setting forth the contribution of New England to the several states of the American Union and to the Orient.

BROWN, CHARLES REYNOLDS. *Living Again* ("Ingersoll Lecture," 1920). Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. 58 pages. \$1.00.

An eloquent exposition of the reasonableness of our instinctive longing for immortality, reinforced by the argument drawn from trust in God's care for persons. The phenomena of spiritualism are discredited.

BROWNE, G. F. *King Alfred's Books*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. xxxii+390 pages. 30s.

A translation without introduction or annotations of six of Alfred's productions—*Soliloquies of Augustine*, *Dialogues*, *Orosius*, *Bede*, and *Boethius*. Extremely handy for investigation purposes.

BROWNE, LAURENCE E. *Early Judaism*. Cambridge: University Press, 1920. xiv+234 pages.

A scholarly study of the *Old Testament* literature of the Persian period with some new interpretations.

BURTON, ERNEST DEWITT, and GOODSPEED, EDGAR JOHNSON. *A Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels in Greek*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1920. xxx+186 pages. \$3.00.

A minutely worked-out arrangement of the texts of the gospels designed to show their literary relations to each other. It is based on the Westcott and Hort text.

CHAPIN, LUCY STOCK. *The Cradle Roll of the Church School*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1920. xii+106 pages. \$1.25.

Suggestions for developing the religious organization and education of the babies belonging to a congregation.

CLUETT, ROBERT. *Day by Day with the Master*. New York: Association Press, 1920. 199 pages. \$1.50.

Daily devotional studies based on incidents and teachings in the gospels.

COHU, J. R. *The Bible and Modern Thought*. New York: Dutton, 1920. xi+341 pages. \$6.00.

A new edition, thoroughly revised, giving a general survey of the literature, history, and religion of the Old Testament.

COLSON, ELIZABETH. *A First Primary Book in Religion*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1920. 260 pages. \$1.75.

A very usable series of lessons, each lesson a full program for the day, based on the child's relations to his world. Partly biblical with many other suggested stories of nature, etc. Thoroughly wholesome.

COWLEY, A. E. *The Hittites* ("Schweich Lectures," 1918). New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. viii+94 pages. 6s.

A technical study of the Hittite inscriptions, largely concerned with decipherment.

CRAWFORD, LEONIDAS W. *Vocations within the Church*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1920. 211 pages. \$1.25.

The author first analyzes good vocational choice, showing how every young man and woman should approach the choice of a life-work. He then presents the wide variety of vocations—preaching, teaching, college presidencies, editors, executive secretaries, doctors, publicity agents, etc., etc., open in the church. It is a strongly written book which places church vocations on the same plane as other vocations.

DANIELSON, FRANCES WELD, and STOOKER, WILHELMINA. *The Good American. Vacation Lessons*. Boston: Pilgrim Press, 1920. 105 pages. \$1.00.

Eleven lessons, or rather programs, for primary and junior children, based on Hutchins' *Children's Code Morals*. Splendid for summer sessions or a short-term course in Christian citizenship.

DOLGER, FRANZ JOSEPH. *Sol Salutis. Gebet und Gesang im christlichen Altertum*. Münster: Aschendorff'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1920. xi+342 pages. M. 25. *Die Sonne der Gerechtigkeit und der Schwarze*. Münster: Aschendorff'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1919. xii+151 pages. M. 10.

The author is one of the best known Roman Catholic authorities in early Christian archaeology. The present volumes make a valuable contribution to the study of the conceptions of "light" and "sun" in the liturgy of early Christianity.

FARQUHAR, J. N. *An Outline of the Religious Literature of India* ("Religious Quest of India Series"). New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. xxviii+451 pages.

A much-needed historical survey of the religious literature of India from the Vedas to the eighteenth century. It is not a history of Indian religion but a history of the literature written by one who knows the religious development.

FELDKELLER, PAUL. *Die Idee der richtigen Religion*. Gotha: Perthes, 1921. viii+147 pages.

A detailed critical examination of various current explanations of religion, with a view to distinguishing clearly between explanations which virtually displace religion and an interpretation of religion itself.

GARVIE, ALFRED E. *Tutors unto Christ*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. viii+242 pages.

A general introduction to the study of the problems and psychology of religion written with an apologetic interest.

GUNN, J. ALEXANDER. *Bergson and His Philosophy*. New York: Dutton, 1920. xxii+190 pages. \$2.50.

A discussion of Bergson's philosophy arranged, in the main, under captions drawn from Bergson's own definitions of problems, and concluding with a discussion of some social and political implications.

HASE, KARL VON. *Dein Alter sei wie deine Jugend. Briefe an eine Freundin*. Leipzig, Koehler, 1920. xii+116 pages.

A compilation of letters written by Karl von Hase to his friends during the period 1883-89, with a prefatory appreciation of the writer by the editor.

HOUSE, ELWIN LINCOLN. *The Glory of Going on*. New York: Revell, 1920. 256 pages. \$1.75.

Popular, short addresses on various themes.

JACQUIER, E. *Études de critique et de philologie du Nouveau Testament*. Paris: Gabalda, 1920. vi+515 pages. Fr. 10.

A survey and estimate, from a Roman Catholic point of view, of books and articles that have appeared during approximately the last fifteen years in the various fields of New Testament study.

KINCAID, C. A. *Tales of the Saints of Pandharpur*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1919. 120 pages.

A translation of a collection of the devotional writings of Mahipati, the eighteenth-century Marathi poet.

LAMBERTSON, FLOYD W. *The Rules of the Game*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1920. 208 pages. \$1.25.

Thirty-two lessons seeking by use of hero stories and conduct-study to exalt the rules of the game of heroic living. Half the lessons are based on biblical material.

The Rules of the Game (Teacher's Manual). New York: Abingdon Press, 1920. 77 pages. \$0.90.

This manual states the aim together with a suggested development of each of the lessons in *The Rules of the Game*.

LAWLOR, H. J. *St. Bernard of Clairvaux's Life of St. Malachy of Armagh* ("Translations of Christian Literature"). New York: Macmillan, 1920. lxvi+183 pages.

Translations in Series V, "Lives of the Celtic Saints," of *Malachy's Life* by Bernard, also of letters and sermons, with a lengthy introduction, annotations, and additional notes.

- LEE, FRANK T. *Old Testament Heroes of the Faith*. Boston: Stratford Co., 1920. xiv+291 pages. \$2.50.
Popular sketches of the lives of the patriarchs, prophets, and heroes of the Old Testament from a practical and homiletical point of view.
- LEIGH-BENNETT, ERNEST. *Handbook of the Early Christian Fathers*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920. xii+340 pages. 21s.
A biographical history of Christianity from Clement of Rome to Augustine.
- LEIPOLDT, JOHANNES. *Jesus und die Frauen*. Leipzig: Quelle & Mener, 1921. 170 pages.
A critical and well-documented discussion of Jesus' views on women and marriage.
- LOCKTON, W. *The Treatment of the Remains at the Eucharist after Holy Communion and the Time of the Ablutions*. Cambridge: University Press, 1920. viii+280 pages.
A detailed historical investigation of regulations and practices with reference to the treatment of the unconsumed remains of the Eucharist.
- MCCONNELL, FRANCIS JOHN. *Church Finance and Social Ethics*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. 130 pages. \$1.50.
A valuable and searching inquiry into the moral aspects of soliciting, handling, and expending money in the Christian church.
- MOODY, CAMPBELL N. *The Mind of the Early Converts*. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1920. xiv+310 pages. 15s.
A well-informed survey of the first two centuries of Christian doctrine biographically approached.
- PATERSON-SMYTH, J. *A People's Life of Christ*. New York: Revell, 1920. 505 pages. \$3.50.
An uncritical interpretation designed for the edification of the general reader.
- RECCORD, AUGUSTUS P. *Who Are the Unitarians?* Boston: Beacon Press, 1920. 134 pages. \$1.50.
The author answers his query in seven stimulating and scholarly sermons on what Unitarians believe about God, Jesus, the Holy Spirit, the Bible, prayer, salvation, the future life.
- SAUNDERS, KENNETH J. *Gotama Buddha: A Biography*. New York: Association Press, 1920. xii+113 pages. \$1.50.
An attempt to give a lifelike picture of Buddha as a creative personality.
- SMITH, W. WHATELY. *The Foundations of Spiritualism*. New York: Dutton, 1920. v+123 pages. \$2.00.
A careful critical survey and estimate of the psychic phenomena on which spiritualism bases its claims. The author acknowledges that there are real facts to be explained, but he strongly deprecates the sweeping claims made by spiritualism.

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RELIGION AND THE NEW CULTURE MOVEMENT IN CHINA

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Among the several noteworthy events in China during the last two years has occurred a surprising intellectual movement, so vigorous in character, so many-sided in interest, so eager in its search for novelty, so buoyant in its enthusiasm as to elicit for itself in some quarters the name of a veritable renaissance. It was precipitated at this time, no doubt, because of the conflux of events coming at the close of the Great War which aroused all classes particularly in the great cities to a consciousness of new forces sweeping through the world. But it has its roots farther back in the slow but steady development during the last twenty years of an intellectual class in China versed in modern science and in the affairs and culture of the Western world. It is one of the early explicit results of the gathering of forces within that growing body of students returned from Western lands, who more keenly than other members of their race, must bear within their own mental experience the intellectual conflicts inevitable when two great cultures meet.

Since the Chinese Revolution of 1911 it has been a type of student more highly trained in the learning of his own people that has come to the West for advanced study. This has tended to correct the earlier mistake of sending young students who became westernized at the expense of losing insight into

the meaning of their own civilization and so failed to function on their return. During the last five years this newer type of "returned student" has been coming back from France, England, Germany, and America. Equipped with the tools of new analytical methods it was inevitable that its representatives should look upon the immemorial traditions, customs, and institutions of their country in a manner impossible to their untrained confrères. Quite naturally, some of them came to join themselves in a common liberal program to rejuvenate and stimulate the thinking of their people. Through the pages of their chief periodical, *La Jeunesse*, they began to subject institutions and social habits of all sorts to searching criticism, translating pertinent Western articles, and discussing the classical ideals of the family and of the state from novel points of view. The work centered in the efforts of a group of young professors in Peking National University. Particularly did they concentrate on what was called the literary revolution, which was really a vigorous attack upon the older, difficult, literary forms, and the advocacy of the use of the vulgate or spoken tongue in all branches of modern Chinese literature. This bold move brought down upon the leaders the severe condemnation of the *literati*. The editors of one of their magazines were censured by the Ministry of Education. One of the professors was compelled to leave the university for a time in order to save the institution from too severe attack. The chancellor had to make a firm stand in defense of the reformers and to insist on the principles of impartiality, toleration, and intellectual freedom.

The end of the European war came like the bursting of floodgates for the new culture movement. The defeat of Germany startled the nation, conservative Confucian scholars among the rest, into a realization that autocracy with its oppressions and unthinking obedience to authority was being condemned before the democratic consciousness of the world. The entire student class of the country was swept into the wave of a great hope that it might somehow have something

to contribute to reform in a new era. The result was striking. The vulgate tongue whose use had been derided and scorned by the classical scholars became the popular instrument not only in the magazines that issued from Peking National University but in a host of lesser periodicals that sprang up all over the country. Writers multiplied, students as well as teachers joining in the task of discussion, translation, and criticism. Attacks upon the old order became more fearless and outspoken. Criticisms began to reach down into the basic principles of Chinese life. The concept of filial piety was invaded and the question asked whether it is not a reciprocal relation in which the parents have proper obligations to their children as well as children to parents. Dissatisfaction was expressed with the aristocratic phases of Confucian teachings in other regards. Ideas of change, progress, and reconstruction were expounded, with whatever crudity and superficiality, over against the habitual ideals of stability and order.

Into this agitation came yet another impetus. The decision of the Paris Conference with reference to Shantung hurled international questions into the forefront of the students' consideration. Why this defeat on the theater of world-relationships? The students fixed the blame on three high officials at Peking. Then by parade, mass meetings, telegrams, popular agitation, and, lastly, universal strike they brought pressure to bear upon the central government to have them dismissed. By the time the merchants throughout the land joined the strike also and closed their shops, the government, fearing lest the forces of revolution be unloosed, yielded and dismissed the "traitors" from office. The result of this was to make the students conscious of themselves as a class and of their opinion as a potent factor in the affairs of the nation.

One very striking fact in connection with this so-called "student movement" in its intellectual aspect was the arrival in China, almost at its inception, of Professor John Dewey, of Columbia University. Coming originally at the invitation of the Chinese government schools to lecture on educational

problems, he found himself called upon to speak to the youth of the nation in the ferment of a great patriotic agitation. His response to the situation was the presentation of the familiar philosophic principles for which he stands. In various ways he pointed out that circumstances of change and uncertainty are at once the occasion and the summons for the exercise of intelligent control in reforming conditions that are no longer serviceable. His careful unfoldment of the categories of his pragmatic logic seemed somehow to formulate the attitude for which the students were feeling in the midst of the new situation in which they found themselves. His lectures proved astoundingly popular. He traveled in all the main cities of central and north China and whether he lectured on education, social philosophy, history of philosophy, logic, or more popular themes he was greeted everywhere by crowds of enthusiastic students. His thoughts were translated into the best modern Chinese and widely published in newspapers and periodicals throughout the country.

Since its beginning the new culture movement has broadened remarkably. The number of new periodicals has been estimated to be between four and five hundred. *La Jeunesse*, the *Renaissance*, the *Journal of the Young China Association*, and the *New Education* are outstanding. The questions discussed are more extensive than ever, dealing with the problems of population and labor, industrial reconstruction, the railroads, the Freudian psychology, militarism, freedom in love and marriage, the dramas of Ibsen, Hauptmann, and Shaw, coeducation, the emancipation of woman, translations from Kropotkin, Tolstoy, and other Russian writers, and attempts to analyze the inner meanings of bolshevism, syndicalism, socialism, and anarchism. Just within the last few months Bertrand Russell has come to Peking University at the invitation of the Chinese and his lectures on scientific and social philosophy are having their share of attention in the periodicals and newspapers.

It is probably too early adequately to estimate the bearing of this movement, briefly sketched above, upon religious thinking. There is something incalculable in the spread of ideas. They may be effective in determining action in their own behalf; or they may be chiefly instrumental in evoking other and different conceptions. But one thing is certain. The new tendencies among the student classes in China today cannot be ignored. The group concerned may be small, but it is the class which more than any other is responsible for working out and shaping the new concepts, economic, political, social, and religious, in terms of which the most constructive thinking of the future must go forward. For those who are sincerely interested, therefore, in religious values in modern China, reflection on the religious bearings of the new culture movement will not be a matter of indifference.

So far as the original leaders of the movement are concerned, no particular program for religious reconstruction has been put forward other than that of stressing the necessity of critically examining any and all religious teachings before acceptance. This has given a negative turn to many of such articles as they have devoted to religion amid the press of many interests, and has caused the movement to be characterized in some quarters as irreligious. The essay of Chancellor Tsai Yuen-pe'i which assimilates religion to a form of the aesthetic interest reminds one of Santayana's type of aesthetic naturalism where religion becomes essentially the poetry of the spirit. The reproduction of arguments from Haeckel's philosophy of monistic materialism seems to sound a hostile note. But it is doubtless an exaggeration to declare that the new culture movement is irreligious or anti-religious. The truth seems to be that the interest in the subject is of an objective philosophical type rather than a concern with the problems of cult and organization. The tendency is in the direction of massing an amount of material from many sources (four great religions of the world face each other in China, be

it remembered) for the purpose of comparison in order to sift out a rational basis for religion. It is the interest of the scholar who seeks a coherent view for intellectual satisfaction.

That this attitude is bound to have its effect upon the student class in China is certain. The way of criticism and examination is always interesting to the young and particularly so in a world where there is much that is criticizable. We may expect therefore that the categories of the philosophy and psychology of religion will have to be reckoned with more and more by those who seek to deal with students in religious matters. Not only so, but the emphasis of the movement on social reconstruction will also have an effect on the conception of the function of religion. The influence of the new ideas comes out very well in the following list of questions which was prepared by the Christian Chinese students in Columbia University for a series of forums on religion. The questions were formulated by going over a large number of the new periodicals from China and so reflect, in a measure, the issues raised in connection with Christianity in the student mind:

Is religion necessary at all? Will not education and the general enlightenment of a community gradually eliminate religion from society? Cannot the fine arts give to man satisfaction which religion is supposed to give? In what way, if at all, is the morality of a community dependent on religion?

Does China need Christianity? In what ways, if at all, are the native religions defective? Is Christianity in a position to supplement the native religions? What, in concrete, are some of the things that Christianity can do for the common people of China?

Is not Christianity retarding modern progress, especially progress in forming scientific habits in the solution of problems, by asking men to accept such statements in the Bible as the story of creation, the virgin birth of Jesus, and such creedal doctrines as trinity, resurrection, etc.? Are not such practices in Christian churches as public prayer, sacrament, and baptism reactionary from the point of view of a scientific ordering of life?

In face of the persistent missionary movement in China what should the Chinese people do? How can the Chinese prevent the loss of elements in Chinese civilization which, though "alien" to Christianity, seem desirable? How can the Chinese keep China free from those

Western denominational schisms which rose from historical reasons having little application in China?

The list is formidable. What strikes one about it is that most of the questions raised are not peculiar to China. They are of our age. They are simply being realized with fresh poignancy by the intellectual Chinese at this time because some of the implications of the impact of scientific culture are beginning to be felt. It becomes a practical question for the Christian teacher of Chinese students to know what attitude to take when he finds that such questions are really beginning to be seriously considered by them. There are three possibilities which seem to be open.

1. *The attitude of indifference.*—The assumption is sometimes made that young people naturally go through periods of doubt and questioning from which they bravely emerge after a while, so it is not necessary to take too seriously their raising such problems as the above. The wisdom of such a view is naturally questionable anywhere, but it is particularly so in dealing with the Chinese students of the present day. That it seems to work sometimes in America is due to the fact that the inquirer is carried along by the life within the church and affiliated institutions and comes to forget his intellectual questionings in the practical participation in the activities of his religious group. But in China the individual does not have that environing atmosphere of a strong organization. The student's questions are often startlingly naïve and direct on that account. Indifference on the part of the teacher, or failure to deal with the question in relation to such scientific concepts as the student knows gives the impression either of ignorance or evasion.

2. *The attitude that the student needs instruction in dogmatic apologetics.*—If this is found incongruous and ineffective in dealing with college and university students in America it is all the more so in approaching such students in China. Where the spirit of free inquiry is exalted, and the principles of the

experimental use of ideas are being set forth by one of the foremost exponents of the pragmatic logic, it is idle to attempt by any a priori procedure to convince really thoughtful students for any length of time. They will find more interesting intellectual stimulus in the discussions of their current periodicals than in their religious instruction. And if it is difficult to deal with students in missionary schools on this basis, the problem of making an adequate intellectual appeal to those outside is simply enormous.

3. *There remains the attitude of sympathetic co-operation.*—This means the recognition of the fact that the matters raised are problems for open discussion rather than questions for which there are closed answers. It means that the teacher toils with the student to find an answer which will really satisfy. More widely, apart from the immediate problem of teacher and student, it means that the Christians of China who appreciate the masses of material that are being introduced into China by the new culture movement will co-operate to make the new knowledge significant for a timely interpretation of Christianity. If they really have faith in their religion they will not fear the outcome of subjecting it to any criticism, however drastic. They will welcome the comparison with Buddhism, Mohammedanism, Confucianism. They will reflect that if Bergson and pragmatism and neo-realism, have been found to furnish conceptions that are suggestive in handling the problems of political, social, and ethical reconstruction, they can be found to be no less suggestive for the reconstruction of our religious thinking. And they, themselves, as being among those who most dearly cherish the values of the religious consciousness, will rejoice to have a share in working out the application. This last attitude is already effective in a group of well-educated Christians in Peking who have organized themselves together to do what they can to interpret Christianity for their fellows in terms of the knowledge of our modern age and in terms of the genius of the Chinese spirit.

THE HISTORICAL RECONSTRUCTION OF HEBREW RELIGION AND ARCHAEOLOGY

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In every age the study of the Bible has been greatly influenced by the prevailing theological, philosophical, or scientific trend of thought. In an orthodox age and environment the Old Testament was interpreted from an orthodox standpoint; witness, for example, Puritan exegesis. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, J. D. Michaelis entitled the opening paragraph of his *Mosaisches Recht*,¹ "The knowledge of Mosaic law is useful, if one wishes to philosophize about laws in general after the manner of Montesquieu."

The middle half of the nineteenth century was the age of scientific agnosticism and iconoclasm. Nothing was true which could not be proved absolutely. The rising natural sciences demanded that every realm of thought be governed by the principles which they laid down. From Thomas Paine to Ingersoll it was the fashion to apply the laws and established facts of natural science to the Old Testament narratives, in order to show that the latter must be false, and that orthodox religion, therefore, was unfounded, untrue, and misleading.

Both Old Testament and religion weathered the storm. And, as usual, the storm cleared the atmosphere. Freed from the shackles of many disproved dogmas, religion was enabled to take mighty strides forward. Loyal students of the Old Testament found themselves compelled and impelled as never before to analyze the contents of the Bible, to classify and co-ordinate, and to reinterpret the Bible in accordance

¹ Second ed., Reutlingen, 1785.

with scientific principles. The agnostics had shown quite clearly what the Old Testament was not, and that its authority was not altogether what orthodoxy had claimed. The science of Old Testament interpretation, born in this period of storm and stress, under the influence of the prevailing tendency toward unrestricted, scientific research, and largely out of the opposition of these natural scientists and the growing general consciousness of the insufficiency and inaccuracy of literal, unquestioning acceptance of the Old Testament narratives, accepted the challenge of the age, and set itself to establish upon scientific principles and through scientific research what the Bible really is, and how it may be interpreted authoritatively, positively, and constructively.

In the last half-century, more or less, Old Testament interpretation has devoted itself in the main to two specific problems: the establishment of a correct Old Testament text and the determination of the literary history of the Old Testament books. The best authenticated and most generally accepted solution of the latter problem has been commonly called "the documentary hypothesis." The term is inapt, first, because the word documentary conveys the rather misleading impression that every book of the Bible must be a collection of independent documents, worked together by an editor, and that the problem is finally solved when these original sources have been determined, and, second, because for the vast majority of Old Testament scholars the premises and conclusions of this so-called "hypothesis" have long since ceased to be hypotheses and have become, within certain broad limits, established, and, for the latest generation, almost axiomatic truths.

The determination within broad lines of the sources of the Hexateuch and of the other Old Testament books revolutionized the cognate fields of Old Testament science. In the early eighties began the new Old Testament history, archaeology, and theology.

Until this time the chief supplementary sources of Old Testament knowledge had been the classical writers, including Josephus and the church fathers. Occasionally some mite of information was adduced from a Syriac or Arabic source. The development of Assyriology marked a new departure in Old Testament historiography. At first enthusiastic Assyriologists naturally magnified the importance of their science and the significance of its discoveries. The extreme hypothesis of astral religion and pan-Babylonism arose. This, of course, aroused intense opposition on the part of some of the former leaders of biblical science. They looked with distrust upon Assyriology and its many extreme and ill-established conclusions and claims. Nor could many of them extend their own vision beyond their personal problems of textual emendation and delimitation of documents. Happily the last fifteen years have seen much of that first natural exaggeration, misunderstanding, and distrust disappear. We realize now that instead of there being anything hostile and irreconcilable between the contributions of Assyriology to biblical science and the earlier textual and documentary research and conclusions, they supplement each other. With their proper correlation, a new epoch has begun in our science, marked not only by a broader and deeper interpretation of biblical literature itself, and also by a larger and more correct reconstruction of Old Testament history, archaeology, and theology, but marked also by a thoroughgoing investigation of the origins and relationships of the Babylonians and Israelites, unmistakably kindred peoples, and of their religions, laws, literatures, and other cultural institutions. This work, so rich in promise, is still in its incipency.

In the last twenty years another important field of research has been developed. Although others before him had perceived the principle and had applied it here and there, Gunkel was the first who distinguished systematically the original form, early growth, and oral transmission through successive

generations of Hebrew myths, legends, and traditions, from their final, literary form preserved in the Old Testament.¹ Actually, this is merely an extension of the methods of the documentary hypothesis, a projection of written biblical literature into the remote periods of oral transmission, when, although still unwritten, it was literature none the less. In this way we are able to evaluate much of our biblical literature anew and more correctly, and to distinguish between myth, folk-tale, legend, and history, and thereby to extend considerably the range of Israel's cultural evolution.

During the last generation another science has developed which has never been exactly designated by any one title. Anthropology is altogether too broad and inclusive a term, while comparative religion is in one sense likewise too broad, and in another sense too narrow. Actually it is the scientific study of the comparative cultures of peoples, for the most part primitive, or of the early, historical period. It seeks to ascertain the common forces, biological, psychological, environmental, and historical, in the lives of these peoples which have determined their cultural evolution, and the origin and history of their institutions, social, economic, and religious, many of which have continued in some form or other into our own day, and still affect our modern religious and social belief and practice.

The pioneer in the application of the principles of this new science to Semitic life and religion was, of course, W. Robertson Smith. In fact *The Religion of the Semites* and *Kinship and Marriage in Early Arabia* made him one of the recognized pioneers of the new science itself. Robertson Smith's chief merit lies in that he dared to be a pioneer in this new field rather than in the unfailing correctness of his conclusions. *The Religion of the Semites* was never completed, and some of his main hypotheses and conclusions have been proved unten-

¹ *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit*, 1895; *Genesis*, 1st ed. 1901, 2d ed. 1902, 3d ed. 1910.

able, notably those in regard to sacrifice and totemism among the Semites. This was to be expected. It would ask too much of a pioneer in any field of research that he furnish the correct and final answers to all the great and intricate problems which he is the first to propound.

Robertson Smith was really a generation too early to accomplish more than he did. Among the early Semites, possibly to a greater extent than among any other primitive people, religion was absolutely inseparable from life in general. A full and perfect understanding and presentation of Semitic religion necessitate a fairly full knowledge of Semitic life. Robertson Smith's chief sources were the Old Testament and Arabic and Syriac literatures, for Assyriology was then still in its infancy. These are important and indispensable sources, yet altogether too meager for the immense task to which he had devoted himself. A literature alone, no matter how vast, is insufficient to reconstruct fully the life and culture of an ancient people.

Similarly the Old Testament gives no full and adequate picture of the life of ancient Israel. Scarcely 5 per cent of the Old Testament comes from the Northern Kingdom, and yet the Northern Kingdom probably contained at least 75 per cent of the people of Israel. And the remaining 95 per cent of the Old Testament gives only a very one-sided picture of the daily life, beliefs, and practices of the Southern Kingdom. For all this literature, vast though it may seem, and unquestionably nationalistic in character, is composed, with the exception of a few old passages, entirely from a prophetic, priestly, or scribal point of view, and is consequently intensely subjective, instead of purely objective. A literal study of the Old Testament unfolds a picture of that ideal national and individual life which the prophets proclaimed and which the later priests and scribes sought to legislate and moralize into being, rather than that practical existence which the people actually lived day by day. Between prophetic and priestly life and religion

and folk-life and folk-religion there was a vast difference. And to comprehend the prophetic and priestly standpoints, activities and literatures completely, in other words to interpret the Old Testament correctly, we must know far more than merely the correct text of these prophetic and priestly writings and the approximate periods of the authors themselves and of their documents and the processes by which these were combined, edited, and collected, until the Old Testament came to be. All this is indispensable and basic. But our task is incomplete, and we cannot understand the Bible correctly nor interpret it authoritatively, until we have reconstructed the daily life of ancient Israel in all its manifold and complex phases.

We used to speak of Old Testament archaeology, i.e., the reconstruction of the life of ancient Israel almost entirely from Old Testament material, supplemented by a modicum of confirmatory and illustrative information, culled chiefly from the classics. The documentary hypothesis enabled us to distinguish in a general way between archaeological conditions in the successive epochs of Israel's literary history. But still the field was limited, and this was still only the archaeology of the Old Testament, the archaeology of a book, the fragmentary and one-sided picture which a restricted literature gave, rather than the full life of ancient Israel.

Now the field has expanded immeasurably. And in this task of reconstructing the life of ancient Israel the Old Testament, although the basis and ultimate goal, is hardly the starting-point of our investigation. Nor is this starting-point Assyrian-Babylonian literature, vast, complex, and illuminating though it is. Nor is it Arabic and Syriac literature, as Robertson Smith believed. In fact it is no literature at all.

The starting-point of this investigation must be the life which the Semitic nomad or Beduin lives today. The common expression, "the unchanging East" is, like most epigrammatic expressions, only approximately true. The Orient, and

even the nomad, have changed somewhat in the last few thousand years. But measured by this great expanse of time, and the radical changes it has seen in other civilizations, it may well be said that the life of the Semitic nomad is practically the same today as in Bible times. Even Islam has merely grazed its surface, but has hardly penetrated to its roots. Possibly history furnishes no more convincing illustration of the truth that national culture is largely the product of physical and economic environment, and that religion, especially in its early stages, far from being a primary determining force in the evolution of a culture, is merely an element thereof, and consequently also a product of this same environment and subject to the same laws of evolutionary growth as other correlative phases of this culture. Only secondarily is religion a force making for further cultural development.

One historical fact the Old Testament attests with absolute certainty, that before entrance into Palestine, whether under an Abraham, a Joshua, or various tribal leaders, Israel had dwelt out in the desert, and there had lived the simple, nomad life, the only life which the desert environment permits. In this stage of cultural evolution its economic institutions, religious concepts and practices, social organization, and moral and ethical principles must have been strikingly similar to those of the present-day Beduins. By correlating with the direct and specific information about early Israelite institutions, beliefs, and practices, which the Bible gives, all that we know of Beduin life, as described in Arabic literature, and in the works of modern travelers and observers, we are able to reconstruct fairly adequately the early life of the tribes of Israel in the period before they entered Palestine, and to determine very much of their earliest religious beliefs and practices, social organization, economic institutions, and moral ideas and principles. In this way such questions as the original conception of Yahwe and of other tribal deities, of taboo, sacrifice, circumcision, and kindred rites, of birth, marriage, and death

practices, of family, clan, and tribal organization, of the beginnings of law, of the functions of the priests, elders, heads of families, and military leaders, of hospitality, chastity, democracy, and other moral virtues can be answered, and from this starting-point it is not difficult to advance step by step in the unfolding of Israel's cultural history, and particularly in the history of Israel's religion.

To illustrate: One of the most interesting, as well as most important and difficult problems of biblical science is that of the origin and earliest conception of Yahwe. Most scholars have approached this problem from the philological side. They have attempted to determine the original conception of Yahwe by analyzing the name grammatically. The precariousness of this method is best shown by the multitude of mutually contradictory hypotheses which have been advanced, each quite as correct from the grammatical standpoint as the others.

Other scholars, with somewhat more reason, have combined with this method an analysis, or supposed analysis, of the Old Testament traditions bearing upon this question. But although theoretically this method of investigation has more scientific justification than the purely etymological, none the less its advocates have come to conclusions no less confused, contradictory, and ill-founded. Thus, for example, the hypothesis first advanced, I believe, by Eduard Meyer,¹ and more recently energetically advocated by Gressmann,² that Yahwe was originally a volcano deity, rests for the most part upon an interpretation of Exod. 3:1-6 and chapters 19-20 manifestly false because it fails to take due account of the composite character of these chapters, or rather, because it analyzes these chapters in accordance with its own preconceptions. Actually not one of the component sources, unless possibly the Elohist, contains anything which might even

¹ *Die Israeliten und Ihre Nachbarstämme*, pp. 69 ff.

² *Mose und Seine Zeit*, p. 468.

remotely suggest a volcano in action. Furthermore, I have found not a single instance nor even the slightest indication of the conception of a volcanic deity among any Semitic tribe or people. This is perfectly natural. Volcanic religion existed among the natives of Hawaii, just because volcanic activity played such an important rôle in their lives. But while volcanic activity was at one time common in western Asia, as witness possibly the Dead Sea region, and certainly the Hauran, the Leja, and other districts east of the Jordan, and also the Harras of northwestern Arabia, still this volcanic activity had ceased almost entirely long before the historical, or even the immediately pre-historical period of Semitic life. I have found but one or two references to volcanic eruption in Semitic literature, few enough to indicate that volcanic activity played an absolutely negligible rôle in Semitic life. Of course it might be argued that Yahwe-worship began in a tribe which dwelt in the vicinity of a still active volcano. But this would be a pure guess. And opposed to it would be the incontrovertible facts, (1) that in the period of the formation of primitive Semitic religious ideas no volcanoes seem to have been sufficiently active to have materially influenced the life of any Semitic tribe, and to have therefore directly affected primitive Semitic religious concepts; (2) that no comparable concepts of volcano deities seem to have existed among any other Semitic people; (3) that this hypothesis completely ignores the question of the daily life which a Semitic tribe must have lived in the desert, even though in the vicinity of an unknown and still occasionally active volcano, and which must have been the primary factor in determining its conceptions of deity and manner of worship; and (4) that it fails to consider the earliest rites and forms of Yahwe-worship as indicative of his original nature and function. Robertson Smith was far more correct and scientific when he undertook the study of early Semitic life, belief, and practice in general as the necessary preliminary to the investigation of all particular phases and problems

of Semitic religion. This must be the starting-point of the investigation of the question of the original conception of Yahwe.

Upon their entrance into Palestine the tribes of Israel, however they may have been associated and interrelated out in the desert, speedily resolved themselves into two distinct groups, determined by the topographical nature of the different parts of the country, and their effect upon the cultural life of the respective tribes or group of tribes. Southern Palestine, Judaea, is more rocky and sterile, and has a scantier permanent water supply than northern Palestine. Therefore the tribes resident there, which later constituted the Southern Kingdom of Judah, lived a pastoral, rather than an agricultural life. In consequence their culture remained dominantly pastoral, and as such differed only in degree, but not in essential principle, from what it had been out in the desert. Yahwe-worship, modified only slightly from its desert form, flourished in the south, and religion was inseparable from the other phases and activities of daily life, social, economic, and moral. The example of the Rechabites, while extreme, was nevertheless typical. Not only the religion and mode of worship were thought to have been instituted by Yahwe, and therefore to be pleasing to him, but the entire daily life. The people of the south at first lived the Yahwe-life naturally. Then, as their culture necessarily expanded, they strove consciously to maintain this life. And finally, as their culture developed still further, due largely to intruding foreign influences, and they of necessity outgrew the old, simple standards and modes of existence, they were bidden and urged to continue to live this life, just as it had been lived out in the desert. This was the underlying principle of the prophetic movement, with its uncompromising opposition to all that was new and foreign and smacked of outside, non-Yahwistic religious origin and influence, of royalty and class domination, and with its steadfast approval of all that was rooted in the old desert life,

now, of course, idealized, and with its oft-repeated reference to the desert days as the time when Israel still walked with Yahwe. Jeremiah's commendation of the Rechabites is typical of the general prophetic outlook. It is easily comprehensible why, with the exception of Elijah—himself a shepherd, however—Elisha, and Hosea, all the great prophets sprang from the Southern Kingdom. Manifestly the natural and logical point of departure for the correct, historical study of prophecy in Israel is the early, pre-Canaanite life of the Israelite tribes out in the desert.

The majority of the tribes of Israel, however, settled in northern Palestine. That was the more fertile and attractive part of the country, and was capable of supporting the largest population. It was inevitable that these tribes speedily exchange their nomad, pastoral life for the agricultural. And not only did these northern Israelites have to become farmers, and have to learn the processes of agriculture from the Canaanites, but they had to accept the whole, or practically the whole, of Canaanite agricultural civilization, including religion.

The Canaanite religion, both god-conception and manner of worship, differed radically from that of nomad Israel. With the adoption by the northern tribes of the agricultural life, there began a rapid fusion of the old, simple, pastoral culture with the far more advanced, complex, agricultural, Canaanite culture. Tribal organization and social relations gave way to village and city organization and relations. Unsettled tent abodes yielded to fixed homes, with their more varied and refined mode of living. Established centers of worship, with large and affluent temples, steadily growing bodies of priests and complex rituals superseded the simple, natural desert shrines. And above all else, the agricultural Canaanite trinity of gods claimed the leading place in the reverence and worship of the northern Israelites, which their outgrown desert, tribal god or gods had formerly held.

Not that they yielded their old god or gods and their old culture completely. And not that the resultant culture was entirely without elements surviving from the nomad life. But in every phase of life the agricultural elements predominated. The religion of the northern agricultural tribes was in practice a thinly disguised Canaanite agricultural religion. The name Yahwe was commonly used, but the deity in question was primarily a composite Baal, Astarte, and Adonis. Yahwe was endowed with practically all the powers and attributes of this Canaanite trinity and was expected to discharge practically the same functions and confer the same agricultural blessings. The old Canaanite shrines became the centers of this composite Yahwe-cult, and the old Canaanite religious rites and institutions such as, for example, the three great annual harvest festivals, *Maṣṣōth*, *Qaṣīr*, and *'Asīf*, became integral parts of Yahwe-worship. Correspondingly outgrown pastoral rites, the *Pesaḥ* festival for example, were gradually relegated to a subordinate position.

This became the religion of the great mass of the people of Israel, against which the prophets protested and strove. In contrast to the religious principles and practices approved by the prophets, which may well be called the prophetic religion, this religion of the masses, largely Canaanite in origin and character, may well be called folk-religion. To understand the prophetic movement aright, we must know not only for what the prophets strove, but also against what they strove. For this folk-religion of northern Israel and, in the prophetic period, of southern Israel also to a marked degree, the point of departure is Canaanite culture and religion.

But the task of reconstructing this Canaanite culture and religion is difficult indeed. The Tel-el-Amarna letters give an excellent insight into political conditions in Palestine in the period prior to the advent of the Israelite tribes, but beyond the names of a few deities, such as Ashirtu, they tell almost nothing of the religious life, and comparatively little of the

economic and social life of the Canaanites. Nor do the Egyptian, Assyrian, and Babylonian monuments furnish much more information about the culture of this period. In fact it may be remarked in passing, that for the early, pre-Deuteronomic period of Israel's culture, the Assyrian monuments offer very little information. Even the Hammurapi Code is interesting chiefly in comparison with Old Testament laws and customs. But of direct influence of the Hammurapi Code on pre-Deuteronomic, or even pre-priestly legislation there is little if any evidence. Close and continuous contact of Israel with Assyria and Babylon began only with Hezekiah, and only in the period subsequent to this; and in the late Jahwistic, Deuteronomic, and priestly writings and the works of prophetic writers of this period can decided evidences of preponderating Assyrian-Babylonian influence be found. And only in this comparatively late period did Assyrian-Babylonian culture and religious practice react upon the life of Israel. But for the early period, and especially for the reconstruction of Canaanite culture and religion, Assyrian literature offers little assistance.

Recent excavations in Palestine have brought to light a few monuments of interest and value, such as, for example, sacred standing stones and other equipment of places of worship, and an ancient Canaanite agricultural calendar of the months and seasons. But as yet, the contribution of the excavations to our knowledge of Canaanite religion, though rich in promise, is on the whole comparatively meager.

In the almost total absence of direct sources we must rely upon indirect sources. These are, however, quite ample. The primary source is the Old Testament itself. It is surprising, when we first isolate that which is of unmistakably nomadic origin and then make due allowance for the prophetic or priestly purpose and point of view of the remainder of the biblical material, how much information about Canaanite religious beliefs and practices we can gather. Thus, for

example, the institution of sacred harlotry which, the Bible tells repeatedly, was a part of Baal worship, or rather of the worship of the mother-goddess, was entirely of Canaanite origin. By comparing this institution with parallel manifestations among peoples living upon a corresponding plane of cultural development, and particularly with sacred harlotry among the Babylonians and northwestern Semites and contiguous peoples, we are able to get at the original meaning and purpose of this strange rite, and also to correlate it with other attendant rites. In this way much of Canaanite religious and social belief and practice is established.

Time does not permit consideration of all the elements of Canaanite religion and culture which may be directly elucidated from the Bible. Suffice it to say that all elements of Israelite religion and culture in the pre-Deuteronomic period must have come from one of three sources, either from the desert nomad life before entrance into Palestine, or from Israel's Canaanite predecessors in Palestine, or they were developed spontaneously by Israel itself after its settlement in the land. What is of nomad origin is easily determined. Nor is it difficult to distinguish between that which springs from each of the other two sources. In general it may be affirmed that those cultural elements which Israel possessed by itself, and which had no kindred nor analogous forms in the cultures of neighboring Semitic peoples, were unmistakably of Israelite origin. Thus prophecy, as distinct from divination, was an institution altogether Israelite in character. How prophecy developed out of divination, and the relation of this pre-prophetic divination to divination among other Semitic peoples, is an altogether different subject of investigation. But after thus isolating those elements in Israelite culture and religion which were of nomad origin, or which developed spontaneously in Israel after its settlement in Palestine, there remains very much that is unquestionably Canaanite in origin and character, and which may be used in the reconstruction of Canaanite

culture and religion. And by correlating this judiciously with parallel institutions and practices among other Semitic peoples, we progress further in our task.

Considerable information may be gathered from the little that we know of the religion and culture of the Phoenicians, Aramaeans, and other neighboring and contemporary peoples with whom Israel came into contact in the early period of its history. The Elephantine papyri give a considerable number of Canaanite and early Israelite deity-names. The Greek and Latin writers of the early pre- and post-Christian centuries, notably Herodotus, Lucian, Strabo, Plutarch, and others, likewise offer much that is valuable. For the most part, they describe the Syriac religion and culture of the Hellenic period. But Hellenism was only a thin veneer and the old Semitic religion and culture were but little affected thereby. The deity whose worship Antiochus Epiphanes sought to force upon the Jewish people may have gone by a Greek name; but he was nevertheless the old Canaanite Baal in a slightly altered dress, and his festival upon the twenty-fifth of Kislev was, it can be shown, an old Baal-Astarte-Adonis solstitial festival.

Useful information can also be gathered from the early church fathers, both those who wrote in Greek and Latin and those who wrote in Syriac. The latter particularly, members of the Eastern Church, came into direct contact with the still surviving Syrian religion, which flourished in such centers as Harran until the advent of Islam, and their references to this religion and its practices are most illuminating. Similar references of great scientific value exist in Muslim writers.¹

The descriptions of travelers of the life, manners, and religious practices of the settled, agricultural peoples of the Orient are illuminating, both those of mere passing visitors and of systematic observers such as Curtiss for the peoples of Palestine, Lane for those of Egypt, and Doutté, Westermarck, and others for those of Morocco and neighboring states.

¹ Collected by Chwolsohn in his *Die Sabier und der Sabismus*.

Curtiss has shown conclusively that, just as Hellenism in an earlier period, so Islam in more recent centuries has merely laid a thin veneer upon the religious life of the peoples of the Semitic world. Here, too, there is ceaseless contrast between official, theological religion and folk-religion, between the cult of the mosque and that of the wely. The former is Islam. The latter is to a very large extent nothing but the survival in folk-practice of ancient Canaanite belief and ritual. Even in Egypt and the Berber states this principle holds true. After due allowance is made for ancient Egyptian and Berber elements in the folk-religion of these countries, there remains a large residuum of belief and practice, clearly Semitic in character and obviously related to similar beliefs and practices in other parts of the Semitic world, Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia, and also, though to a less degree, Abyssinia and southern Arabia. All this must be regarded as the survival of ancient Semitic religion. Partly it is of nomadic origin. But in the main it springs directly from agricultural Semitic religion and practice.

It may be objected that this leads rather far afield from specific Canaanite religion. But such is not the case. The ancient Canaanite religion and culture were natural products of the Semitic religious spirit and outlook upon life reacted upon by agricultural environment. The religious beliefs and practices of agricultural Semitic peoples display as marked a uniformity as do the beliefs and practices of nomad Semites. The same god-conceptions, the same rites, the same sacrifices, the same festivals appear among the Babylonians, Canaanites, agricultural Israelites, Syrians, Abyssinians, modern Egyptians, Algerians, and Moroccans. This is hardly due to direct borrowing or transmission, but rather to the same first principles and theories of existence being acted upon by similar agricultural environmental forces and agencies. The Canaanite religion was a typical agricultural Semitic religion. By comparing it with other agricultural Semitic religions, or

with surviving elements of other agricultural Semitic religions, additional material of incalculable value for our study can be gathered.

There remains one source, by no means the least important in the extent and significance of its contributions. I refer to post-biblical Jewish literature, including the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Josephus, the New Testament, the Talmud and kindred works, the Midrashic writings, and the compendia of Jewish laws and customs such as the *Shulhan Aruk*. Many orthodox Jewish practices as, for example, the fasting of the first-born sons and the burning of leaven on the day preceding the Passover can be traced back to Canaanite origins. Furthermore, the ritual of the second Temple contained many elements not provided for, nor even referred to, in any of the biblical codes. For the most part, these were survivals of early Temple practice from the pre-Deuteronomic period, and go back to Canaanite origins. As always, the uncompromising theories and iconoclasm of the prophets eventually resulted in practice in a tacit, and probably largely unconscious, compromise with folk-religion. Thus the dances of the maidens of Jerusalem in the vineyards on the Day of Atonement, about which the Old Testament is silent, but which are described in detail in *Mishna Ta'anith*, IV, 8, and in the *Gemara* to this passage, were the survival of an important rite of the pre-exilic Succoth-New Year festival, originally performed in honor of the Semitic mother-goddess and closely associated with the institution of sacred harlotry.

Likewise the complex ritual of the water-drawing during the Succoth festival, culminating in the peculiar rites upon the seventh day of the festival, is described in detail in *Mishna Succah*, V. The Hebrew codes contain no mention of these rites, and this very silence justifies the inference that the Old Testament authors were conscious of their non-Yahwistic origin and character, and withheld approval of them. The rites were undoubtedly pre-exilic, and survivals of early

Canaanite practice. *Mishna Succah*, V, 4, states that the solar rites described in Ezek. 8:16 were part of these complex ceremonies of the water-drawing on the Succoth festival. In all likelihood, too, Isa. 55:1 ff., "Ho, all ye that thirst, come unto the water,"¹ and also Isa. 50:1 ff., "Arise, shine, for thy light is come," were spoken to the multitude gathered in the Temple at Jerusalem for the celebration of some Succoth festival and the ceremonies of the water-drawing and the accompanying fire rites. We have already begun to appreciate the significance of the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha for biblical study. The time is fast approaching when we will recognize equally the value of the talmudic and midrashic literatures.

Finally, as a help in the reconstruction of Canaanite culture and religion, there is the use of anthropological methods and material. By comparing Hebrew and Canaanite rites and institutions with the rites and institutions of peoples living in a similar environment, additional light may be shed upon Canaanite or general Semitic beliefs and practices. But caution must be exercised in the employment of anthropological methods and materials. Only where direct evidence from Semitic sources fails or is insufficient or leaves an otherwise unbridgeable gap in the solution of the problem should recourse be had to the cultures of non-Semitic peoples, unless, as in the case of the Persians, they came into direct contact with Semitic peoples and exchanged cultural possessions with them. To my mind the methods of anthropology are still too vague and inexact and the rules which govern anthropological research and conclusion in general too unsettled to warrant immediate and unqualified acceptance of its findings. The very confusion and disagreement among anthropologists in regard to many of their main problems, such as the relation of magic and religion, the meaning of totemism, and the origin of sacrifice, show the need of conservatism in the employment of the

Cf. John 7:37.

methods and material of this still youthful science. Certainly wherever the necessary material can be drawn from Semitic fields alone, or fields related by historical contact, it should be done. And in most cases this is possible.

With these helps ancient Canaanite culture and religion can be reconstructed fairly completely and systematically and its influence upon Israelite life and thought can be measured and the many religious, economic, and social institutions of ancient Israel which were of Canaanite origin, many of which continued in post-exilic Judaism and some of which survive in Jewish practice still today, can be determined. The process is reciprocal. Many otherwise obscure biblical passages are thus illumined and, in return, this increased knowledge of the Old Testament opens up paths to new knowledge of Canaanite and Israelite culture.

As has been said, with the reign of Hezekiah, Israel—or what remained of Israel—came into contact with Assyria and Babylonia direct and unbroken for almost two centuries. For the correct understanding of this period and interpretation of its literature, a knowledge of Babylonian life, religion, and literature is indispensable. In this period the worship of Ishtar, the “queen of heaven,” denounced by Zephaniah and Jeremiah, entered into Israelite folk-religion. In this period, too, Babylonian myths and legends such as the flood story, the legend of the pre-diluvian patriarchs, and the creation story made their way into Israelite literature. Toward the close of this period Babylonian religious elements likewise entered into the cult of the Priestly Code. Due also to this contact with distant and mightier nations and the consequent broadening of horizon, a marked tendency toward universalism manifested itself in Israelite thought, found literary expression in the Jahwist portions of the first eleven chapters of Genesis, and culminated in the preachment of Deutero-Isaiah.

With the close of the exile came the Persian period and Persian cultural and religious influence. By this time,

however, due to the priestly movement beginning with Ezekiel, or even with the Deuteronomic reformation, and culminating in the Priestly Code, Judaism had become well defined, and its practice or cult fairly well fixed. In consequence, Persia did not influence Jewish religion as did Babylonia. Persian elements in the religious practice of Judaism are few indeed. But Persian influence upon Jewish religious thought and theology was far-reaching; witness, for example, the unmistakably Persian character of Jewish angelology and the developing figure of Satan in Jewish literature.

This was followed by the Hellenic period. But, as said before, this was no pure Hellenism. It was rather Hellenic thought, philosophy, and art linked with a peculiar Syriac culture and religion, in which Persian, or Babylonian-Persian, elements were conspicuously present. Due largely to Chasidism and to the Maccabean wars, this Hellenic influence was combated quite successfully. The religious practice of Judaism was but little affected by it, although it did give to Judaism one old Syriac or Canaanite solstitial festival, *Chanukah*, the "feast of lights." In the realm of thought and theology, however, its influence was far-reaching, and paved the way for the doctrines of sin, atonement, retribution, future life, and others.¹ This Hellenic period saw the close of Old Testament literature and the beginning of apocryphal and rabbinic literatures.

In fact the Hellenic and rabbinic periods overlap. No hard and fast line of demarcation can be drawn between the authors of the secondary strata of the Priestly Code and the scribes and other leaders of the Great Synod,² the first of the long line of rabbinical teachers who evolved the oral law, recorded in the Mishna, Gemara, and kindred works. Undoubtedly the *soferim*, the scribes, and the other *'anshe k'neseth hagg'dola*,

¹ Cf. Kohler, *Jewish Theology*.

² Cf. Lauterbach, "Midrash and Mishna," *Jewish Quarterly Review* (new series), V and VI (1915); and my "The Sources of the Creation Story," *AJSL*, XXXVI (1920), 169-212, and especially 176, n. 1.

the men of the Great Synod, were the very authors of much of these latest strata of the Priestly Code. Such laws as "You shall kindle no fire in your homes on the Sabbath day" (Exod. 35:3) significantly anticipate the minute provisions of rabbinic legislation. It must have been these same scribes who, by virtue of the authority which they enjoyed in their day, closed the Pentateuchal canon. This act marked the beginning of the oral law and of the eventual talmudic literature. Again we see that no hard and fast line can be drawn between biblical and post-biblical literature and life, that the entire Bible is only a part of the national literature of Israel, and gives but a cross-section picture of the life of ancient Israel. Rabbinic literature is the sequel, or rather the next volume, and is in turn followed by other volumes and the story of Israel is not yet complete. And just as one volume of a large, comprehensive work cannot be properly understood without reference to the other volumes and without correlation with the full story or history or scientific discussion of which it records a part, so too the Bible cannot be completely nor correctly understood and interpreted without appreciating in full measure that it is merely the first volume in the life-story of Israel and Judaism, and without reconstructing as fully as possible, with the help of every available source, the life of Israel in all the periods of its history, biblical and post-biblical, and in all the stages of each period, nomadic, agricultural, commercial, exilic, and post-exilic, and interpreting the Old Testament from the standpoint of this life. In the final analysis, textual criticism and documentary hypothesis are merely means to an end and that end is the correct, historical, constructive interpretation of the Bible and the application of the knowledge thus gained to our own religious problems and life today. This is the standpoint from which, in this age of comparisons, of comparative religion, comparative folk-lore, comparative racial psychology, in other words, in this age of anthropological research, we are constrained to study the

Old Testament and to apprehend the new and stimulating truths it discloses, and to use them for the readjustment of our own religious beliefs and observances in order that we, of this generation and the generations which shall come after, may advance still farther in the knowledge of God and of the true purpose and beauty of life, the real goal of all religious thinking and striving.

Just this is the aim of Hebrew archaeology in this newest and broadest phase. In all our study and in all our teaching we should never lose sight of this ultimate fact. Perhaps it is a truism to say this. But, after all, truisms are the truest truths. And at times we fail to see the forest because of the trees; and quite as often we fail to see the trees because of the forest. The full truth consists in seeing and comprehending both trees and forest together.

THE RELIGIOUS APPEAL OF PRE- MILLENNIALISM

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Millenarianism is a doctrine which attempts to premise the Kingdom of God on earth. It exercises a fascinating interest over the minds of those who accept it. Its religious appeal grows out of the fact that it presents a clear, concrete, and comprehensive program of the purposes of God respecting the past, present, and future; it enlists the imagination, stirs the emotions, and challenges the disciple to co-operate with this program of the divine will. To appreciate its religious appeal one must have some understanding of what may be called the philosophy of millenarianism. As a doctrine, it is not a vague, mystic hope, but a definite scheme of historic unfoldings. There are many Christians who read the Bible in a disjointed fashion and associate the "Return of the Lord" with hazy notions of the end of the world. They believe that Jesus will come again in bodily form to judge the living and the dead and assign them to their respective destinies. They may even regard this event as impending and be numbered with millenarians; but they are such only in a nebulous and ambiguous way. Real millenarians hold a distinctive philosophy which is only apprehended by those who "rightly divide the word of truth"—a cardinal Scripture text with them.

In this dissection and relocation of the Scriptures, certain dispensations are sharply differentiated from one another. Each dispensation is a distinctive régime in which God is dealing with the human race according to some peculiar

principle. In a general way these dispensations are as follows: First, the Edenic. Man was in a garden and innocent. He was tried under one prohibitory law, forbidding him the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Failing under the test, man was banished from this primitive paradise, but not until God had promised a "seed of the woman" which should bruise the serpent's head. All the subsequent unfoldments have been and are the issue of this promise. The closing of the garden under the guard of the cherubim ended the first dispensation.

Second, came the antediluvian world. The righteous seed, represented by Abel, Seth, Enoch, and others, was persecuted by Cain and his progeny who filled the earth with violence. The judgment of the flood swept the earth clean once more and gave the race a new start.

Third, we have a new world under patriarchal rule. The fathers are the priests in their families. Abraham is called to walk by faith and becomes the "Friend of God." His family is chosen to become an elect people. His seed is to be innumerable and inherit the world. New covenants are established between God and Abraham's children. Jacob becomes a "Prince of God," but his sons fail in their conduct toward Joseph, and they are brought to Egypt. The dispensation ends with Israel as slaves in the brickyards and the Patriarchs in their coffins.

Fourth, we have the Mosaic or legal dispensation. Moses achieves the emancipation of the chosen people and on Mount Sinai receives the decalogue, or covenant of the law. Israel's tenure of the promised land and the blessings of Jehovah are conditioned upon obedience to the statutes. Here there arise the prophets who announce the divine will, herald the "Day of the Lord" and the coming of the Messiah. But again the people fail, and are sold into bondage and become vassals to successive conquerors. These four distinctive periods are covered by the Old Testament Scriptures. Man proves a

failure in every dispensation. But God is not taken by surprise. He foreknows that man will continually fail and brings on a series of successions, changing the stage, in order to prove man a sinner and himself a God and Savior under any and all circumstances. The scenery ever changes, but the play is the same, viz., the tragedy of human sin and helplessness. Against this background God will demonstrate his faithfulness in the fulfilment of his promises, and manifest his glory in the sovereign establishment of his covenants.

Fifth, there comes the messianic dispensation, which reaches from the manger to the Cross. The Son of God, the seed of David, Abraham, and the woman, is in the world. Jesus offers himself to the nation as its Messiah and King. He fulfils certain characteristics predicted in the writings of Moses, the Psalms, and Prophets. But the people are blind and know not "the day of their visitation." They crucify the Son of God, the Prince of Glory, and push away the millennial kingdom. The disciples ask Jesus concerning this kingdom and he indicates that it is to be postponed. He vanishes behind a cloud and another régime passes away.

Sixth, we come to the dispensation of the Holy Spirit. We must be quite clear as to the sharp distinction between the purposes of God with respect to this age in which we now live, and the millennium which is immediately to follow. Here is the very crux of the millennial hope and passion. The expectation of Israel had been that the Jew and the Gentile would ever remain distinct. In the "acceptable year of the Lord," Israel is to be a crown of glory in the hands of Jehovah and the head of all nations of the earth. But now, under the dispensation of the Holy Spirit, a new purpose, not known in other ages, comes over the horizon. The Holy Spirit has broken down the middle wall of partition between Jew and Gentile and is making an election out of every nation, kindred, tribe, and tongue of those who own Christ as a Savior. This new spiritual body is known as "the Church of God."

We cannot overemphasize the importance of recognizing, that from the millenarian point of view, God is not purposing to convert the world in this dispensation. He has not changed the nature of the kingdom from an outward manifestation of his glory, to a spiritual and gradual conquest of the earth. He is making an election; and the one business of the church is to preach the gospel and fulfil the chosen number. The true millenarian knows that he has no business trying to clean up the Augean stables of the world. Like every previous dispensation, this one also will end in judgment. Evil will increase with accelerated speed and power, and culminate in the advent of the antichrist. During his régime, apostasy and atheism will be rampant and bring on the "great tribulation." All this becomes the background of the millenarian's hope—the epiphany of the Lord who will overthrow antichrist and initiate his kingdom on earth.

Seventh, comes the millennial reign of Christ. The cardinal event ushering in that age will be the Second Coming of Christ. That is the goal of the present age and becomes the hope of the church. Just what the characteristics of the millennium will be, or what details may focus in the imagination, need not detain us. It is the hope and prospect of that triumphant coming of Christ which creates a religious appeal for the millenarian. It must be apparent that to those who sincerely accept this outworking of such a divine program the premillennial coming of the Lord must be aflame with appeal and enthusiasm. Of course I have in mind those to whom this hope is a vital reality and not an academic question. For here as everywhere, it is possible to accept some *a priori* assumptions and then rationalize certain academic conclusions. Any interest thus derived is only an intellectual fancy and not religious passion. But for one who holds the hope as a vital certainty it is a living hope, stimulating personal virtue, inspiring evangelistic zeal and missionary enterprise. The religious appeal grows out of indirect con-

firmations of the faith, and direct urgings to holy living and diligent work.

For the devout millenarian the Bible is the inspired, inerrant word of God. He is unconcerned about its historic backgrounds, the study of which he regards with suspicion, and he is indifferent to the many discrepancies found within the book itself. To him it is a divine book, above human wisdom, and sometimes too profound for human understanding. Hence he can dismiss these infelicitous difficulties without impairing his faith. The Bible is a revelation in which are unfolded the maturing purposes of God. It is not the result of man feeling after God. He only gropes in blindness, touches the torso of a stone, and calls it God. God knows the end from the beginning and it is plainly written in the word. The promises and prophecies can never fail. They may be drawn out, postponed, or discover larger horizons, but "the Scriptures cannot be broken." They are the source of all light, the one and final canon of appeal concerning all matters of faith, hope, duty, and destiny. They never abrogate the promise of the kingdom but with growing emphasis confirm it. According to both the Old Testament and the New Testament, that kingdom is to be ushered in and established by the returning Lord. This canon of authority has a deep religious value for the believer in that it certifies his hopes and keeps his anchors from dragging amid all the vagrant currents of speculation, criticism, doubt, and agnosticism. All things can be referred to the law and the testimony.

Since the Bible is the word of God, inspired by the one and selfsame Spirit, it is equally trustworthy in every part; and all the passages that can be allocated around this subject can be used to formulate a doctrine. It can be shown that Jesus spoke of his return; that his apostles wrote clearly concerning his imminent and speedy coming, and that the early church expected his sudden advent for their redemption and glory. Later and modern disciples have not been privileged to see

Jesus in the flesh, but like Paul, they know him in spirit and can affirm, "Whom having not seen I love." Love craves to see the object of its affection and longs to see him that is altogether lovely. When any loved one is expected home, the passing hours are fraught with interest and preparation. So the heart that "loves his appearing" turns longingly toward the day. It rejoices in the tokens of his favor, but more earnestly desires the presence of the lover himself.

The bride eyes not her garments,
But her dear Bridegroom's face;
I will not gaze on glory,
But on my king of grace.

The desire for the speedy advent of Jesus is deepened into a consuming passion when it is conceived as the one great event in which all the comforting and triumphant issues of the gospel are converged. In a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, the mortal life will be swallowed up in immortality. The generation that remains to his coming will, like Elijah, outlive the grasp of death and cheat the grave of its spoil. The dead in Christ, who bivouac in God's acre, will hear the sounding of the reveille and rise every man in his regiment and join the triumphal procession. The painful struggle with temptation may tomorrow be swallowed up in conquest. The laborious effort to be decent and imitate Christ will instantly be changed and the Christ image flash forth in an abiding transfiguration. All the long-drawn hopes of the ages will be realized and the far-off interest of tears and sorrows be gathered. All that heaven has meant to the imagination and affections will become an immediate possession.

The Lord shall come to be admired in all his saints. The judgments of the Lord will have fallen upon all ungodly souls and unrighteous acts and the Christian's faith, hope, and patience will be vindicated before an assembled universe. Every disciple who kept his face toward the morning and watched in faith; every missionary who stood on the far-flung

battle line of service; every martyr that perished amid fire and persecution; and all the dear and holy dead who fell asleep in Christ will be gathered about the glorified Lord. Then will the Cross prove to be the foundation of the throne; the crown of thorns exchanged for the diadem; the reed laid aside for the scepter of universal authority. Then will the eternal God say to his Son the Savior, "Thy throne O God is forever and ever." No reverent soul can honestly contemplate such an imminent dénouement of the present crisis without feeling a burning heart and realizing a strong religious appeal.

This appeal is emphasized in the divine urge which this expectation lays upon believers. Millenarians insist, and rightly so, that in the Scriptures every admonition to fidelity and every stressing of duty is linked up with the thought of his imminent appearing. They can cite verse after verse in proof thereof. This is just the logic of the position. Who would not wish to be at his best, be able to render a good account of his stewardship, and be found about the Master's business when he comes? His acceptance with the Lord and his position and reward in the kingdom will depend upon his loyalty to duty and service while waiting.

Moreover the crisis of his coming may be hastened by faithful co-operation with him. By living soberly, righteously, and godly in this present age the watchers are preparing a highway for the King. By evangelizing all nations and gathering the elect they are making the Bride ready against the day of nuptials. For these and other reasons, together with many allied associations and interests—the very naming of which would carry us far afield—the believer in the premillennial coming of Christ must experience a strong religious appeal.

So far I have indicated the matrix and nature of the religious appeal in millenarianism from the premillennialist's point of view. This appeal may become anaemic, vitiated, or may completely lapse. The theory gets such strong possession of

some minds that it cancels the motives of sympathy and brotherhood, and becomes harsh and intolerant. Such a premillenarian stands on the side lines with the program of events in his hands and watches the procession of the divine purposes go by. To him it is all so clear that any man who sees it in any different form or perspective is blind and working at a useless task. He judges his fellow-Christians as disloyal and apostate, deluded by Satan, who transforms himself into a counterfeit minister of righteousness and an angel of light. He becomes critical, censorious, and exclusive until unconsciously he develops into a Pharisee and, despite his boasted fidelity, the religious motive is vitiated.

Many who call themselves premillenarians are better than their theory. But the thoroughgoing confine the ministry of the gospel to a narrow and superficial form of evangelism and limit the power of the divine Spirit. They utterly repudiate any sympathy or co-operation with a social gospel, mislabel any movements outside their type of evangelism, and attribute them to blind and malevolent inspirations. The religious appeal associated with the hope as held by the earliest Christians degenerates into a pharisaic zeal without knowledge.

Admitting that the early Christians were stimulated by the hope of the speedy return of the Lord, were they deceived by holding such millennial expectations? Not so! It is at least questionable whether the early adherents of this thesis held any such definite scheme of events as is held by pre-millennialists today. Their theory was an illusion not delusion. Delusion is something essentially false, while illusion is a conception which has at the heart of it something greater than the mind can at the moment apprehend. There is something in the Kingdom idea which millenarianism symbolized. But the reality and fulfilment will be greater than the millenarian imagined or thought. The religious appeal of the Kingdom has completely shifted its ground.

The long period of time which has elapsed and the many developments which have taken place since the apostolic days

do not fit into the primitive conception of the Kingdom. Not only the apostles, but every generation after them who cherished the hope of his coming in their day, have been disappointed. To say that it is a corporate hope and that they were not disappointed, but will through a resurrection have part in the advent is a begging of the question. If the judge stood at the door in the days of James, he has been standing there a long time. It seems probable that either he changed his mind or that they misread the signs.

The millenarian dream was conceived in minds laboring among the limitations of primitive knowledge. The investigations and discoveries of science which have changed our conception concerning the universe, space, and time could not but effect a change in this theory. For those who keep in step with the modern mind and have any acquaintance with modern learning, this doctrine has receded into the perspective and lost its outward significance. Where the doctrine has faded the religious appeal has completely changed.

The critical study of the Scriptures and their sources has brought into the field of vision the historic backgrounds and conditions out of which these Scriptures—including this doctrine—have grown. The apocalyptic writings current for two centuries B.C., but not included in the canon, threw their color if not their forms into Christian thought. In proportion to one's acquaintance with the sources of these writings as viewed against the background of modern knowledge, is the millenarian view completely outgrown. It can only maintain its hold and interest over belated minds which are still moving within the horizons of primitive knowledge, and hold their hopes by the canons of literal interpretation. For all who arrive at any knowledge revealed by science, discovered by historic methods and held by the lovers of facts and truth in all departments of research, the conceptions of the Kingdom of God shift their bases from the doctrine of premillennialism, and the religious appeal must be molded by something different from that one-time stimulating, but now archaic dream.

RELIGION IN TERMS OF SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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As a working conception of religion I offered some years ago this statement, "consciousness of the highest social values."¹ By consciousness was meant appreciation and the active attitude of supporting and perpetuating. There was no expectation of bringing all students of the subject to agreement upon that definition, but it is surprising to see how varied and lively the disagreement has been. Much of it has been due to neglecting the word "highest" and not a little to different uses of the term "social."

Among the recent critics of this conception is Professor James B. Pratt, whose book *The Religious Consciousness* was the most important contribution of last year to the psychology of religion. His treatment of "society" and the "social" is not always easy to understand. A comparison of different passages suggests that the difficulty of understanding him springs from a conflict in his own thought. After defining religion as "the serious social attitude" toward the Determiner of Destiny, he remarks that he uses the word social with considerable misgiving. He asserts that the religious attitude has only a "faint touch" of the social quality and in a merely incipient way. His general psychological position is responsible for this. That view is of the older individualistic type in which the individual is represented as in possession of certain instincts from birth the expression and direction of which are largely due to the influence of society. Having made sure of this individualistic equipment to begin with,

¹ *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (1910).

Professor Pratt becomes quite enthusiastic concerning the value of social experience. "Once we have recognized the original psychical endowment of the individual, the influence of society in making him what he is can hardly be exaggerated"—society "to some extent genuinely constitutes him."

Professor Pratt here follows William James whose view of the instincts was formulated before the development of recent important conceptions of social psychology in this field. James enumerated a list of instincts belonging to the individual as if they were separate, discrete functions. Later investigators are dropping the notion of specific instincts. They speak of impulsive tendencies and attitudes as phases of complex organic behavior. Moreover, these tendencies are conceived as elicited and conditioned by social experience. In this view human nature is always and thoroughly social, involving the interaction of social stimulus and response. Thought, of the most private character, becomes a conversation between the different "selves" within the imagination. These selves are developed through participation in social relations, and consciousness is itself an interplay of rôles gathered from intercourse with one's fellows. The force of this position may be emphasized by trying to imagine what would happen in the oft-conjectured situation of an infant left absolutely alone and yet maintaining life to years of maturity. We have no reason to suppose he would possess any human traits. It is not justifiable to assume that such a being would possess a "rational nature." But positing for him only the normal brain and nervous system of the human animal and the ordinary social medium, the infant becomes rational and sympathetic and civilized. The individual is not then to be set off against society, nor counted simply as one unit which may be associated with similar units to produce an aggregate called society. The mind and "soul" are social through and through. The individual is real enough, but his reality is within the social situation. Professor Pratt does not take

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seriously enough the following words which he quotes with approval from Professor Cooley: "A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something-apart from individuals."

In the definition religion is identified with the *highest* social consciousness—not with social consciousness in general. By "highest" is meant the most intimate and vital phases of the social consciousness. This highest social consciousness is not the same in all peoples and times, but every people and every time have a scale of values in which certain interests are felt to be the most important. These constitute their religious values. There is here suggested an index to the religion of any race in any stage of development. To discover the religion of the natives of Australia, examine their ceremonials and their social organization and find what they are most concerned about. The same method is reliable for studying the religions of India and the United States. It is of course recognized that modern society is complex and really consists of many groups. The religion of any group in American life is found when the deepest common interests of that group are discovered. So far as we have a national religious life it may be seen in those most dominant concerns of the whole people. Some observers think our God is Mammon. Some think it is Efficiency. Some think it is Democracy. But the truth is that the national consciousness of this country is not sufficiently unified and homogeneous as yet to afford clear and convincing evidence of what is the highest American social consciousness. And for that very good reason we are in a profound transition period attended with much confusion as to what our religion is or should be!

This suggests why religion is identified in modern society with morality.¹ Religion is older than critical, reflective

¹ J. H. Leuba, in "The Meaning of 'Religion,'" *Journal of Philosophy*, February 3, 1921, objects to this use of the term religion. It is hardly a greater change, however, than in the word "government" to denote democracy as well as monarchy.

morality; but when the highest social values are lifted out of the realm of custom, religion tends to become identified with the more consciously chosen ideals. Superstition and magic atrophy and the rationally appraised and experimentally evaluated focus attention. Morality is enlarging into social idealism in the modern world and this social idealism is precisely the quality of religion.

Other criticisms may be met by pointing out that the conception of religion in terms of the highest social consciousness affords a new and fruitful view of the meaning of God. It is interesting to note that Professor Pratt defines religion as "the serious and social attitude of individuals or communities toward the power or powers which they conceive as having ultimate control over their interests and destinies." That is a good definition. It may be used with entire satisfaction by one who identifies religion with the ideal social values. These values are embodied in different objects according to the life-habits and political organization of the group. For the Malay rice is the god; for the American Indian, corn; for the Aino, the bear; for the primitive Hebrew, the sheep. For the later Hebrew, God is in the form of a man and a king. Whatever the symbol, the substance of the idea of God, the objective reality, is the Spirit of the group whose awesome will is enforced through the commandments of social custom. Social approval and social ostracism are the flaming swords which guard the sanctities of life both in savage and in civilized communities.

Professor Pratt calls this conception of God "subjective," but it certainly is not subjective in the sense of being individualistic. And it is obviously not a "mere" idea—occurring simultaneously in the heads of a number of men. It is the Determiner of Destiny, to use his favorite expression. An analogous case may be found in the familiar use of "Alma Mater" to designate an institution of learning. Is the Alma Mater a *mere* idea? Is it a fiction? Is it subjective? Has it not all the reality of the college buildings, the faculties,

donors, students, and the social influence which flows through the whole body of traditions? Viewed in this way, an alumnus may have perception of his Alma Mater, may derive help from her in the form of recommendations, may sing praises to her and be responsive to her will and thought. Hearing a company of students singing, a spectator might wonder whether they thought there actually was a particular woman to whom their songs were addressed. But he who should decide that the Alma Mater was therefore unreal and merely subjective would also be mistaken. Professor Pratt insists that his definition includes among the religious many an atheist (p. 5). Such an admission raises serious questions concerning the nature of the Determiner of Destiny. At least the highest social values do not admit of their negation on the part of those who are religious. To be antisocial is far deeper heresy than to be atheistic with reference to the Determiner of Destiny as often conceived!

Another misapprehension with reference to the social appears in the conception of its relation to the cosmos or nature. Durkheim and Cornford have shown that the cosmos is socially determined.¹ They hold that for primitive races the notions of space, time, force, motion, and material objects, are conditioned and comprehended within the social. Here, to be sure, arises all the array of conflicting metaphysical theories. But nevertheless the realist who prefers to insist that the order of nature and material objects exist independently of the social medium precisely as he conceives them assumes the burden of proof. That is supposed to have been shown long ago by Immanuel Kant. For him nature is phenomenal. The sociologists of the Durkheim school have given an empirical psychological account of the way in which nature is conformed to the notions and attitudes of the social group. What, in these scientific days, is regarded as an

¹ Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*; Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*.

independent material order appears in their writings as a complex of social concepts—collective representations. This does not make nature subjective in the sense of reducing it to images in the brains of men. It only points out that objects as known are objects of social usage and convention. They are matters of value and not only matters of fact.

The crux of the problem largely concerns the doctrine of creation and the enigmatic question of bare existence. The picture of a Deity fashioning the worlds and all that in them is, is so vivid that few realize that it has little if any place in a genuinely scientific view of the world. The idea of the beginning of matter and of life is an abstract metaphysical question probably beyond the possibility of any real answer. The kind of answer which the mind frames is a poetic, imaginative account cast in the mold of the prevailing culture. Primitives tell marvelous tales of how a giant rabbit or beetle or kangaroo or a very anthropomorphic god created all things out of dust or mist. All such stories bear the marks of the social group from which they arise. They gain religious significance in so far as they aid in maintaining taboos and in magnifying reverence for the totem deities. This poetry and imagery of the evaluating social consciousness continues in chastened and elevated forms, as in the writings of Dante and Milton, to serve social, idealistic ends, but it is not to be mistaken for literal representation of "things in themselves."

The practical attitude of the modern social spirit toward nature illustrates still more impressively that nature is instrumental for the great ideal ends of religion. Instead of an external, providential order before which man is dumb and submissive, nature has become increasingly flexible and subservient to social requirements. We no longer regard disease as the visitation of the wrath of God upon men for their sins. We look for the causes and elicit by experimentation from nature herself means of prevention and cure. Nature has been changed so that some diseases no longer occur. She is

made to yield crops where formerly all was desolation. New species of plants have been grown. Unimagined highways have been opened in the air and over seas and through the mountains. Human beings have made nature serve their social needs by marvelous means of communication and by wonderful devices for preserving records of experience in the printed page and in pictures. Miracles have been performed upon the human body and others are in preparation. The mind itself is in the making through better understanding of methods of education.

The sense of participating in a social experience of this character and magnitude is not lacking in genuine religious significance. It generates an impressive mystical quality and furnishes the elements of a vital and reasonable faith. The finest devotional moods, including prayer and meditation, are vitalized and refined. The meaning of God as the Common Will and the Great Companion furnish conceptions of the divine which are at once intimate and commanding.

THE BIBLE AND THE PROLETARIAN MOVEMENT

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The proletarians were defined long before Marx gave them their classification in modern industrial society. In ancient Rome the *proletarii*, as the term clearly indicates, were those who had nothing to give to the state but their children. In a time when citizenship meant rendering service to the state they were without civic standing. Having no property, they could neither pay taxes nor make contributions. In early times they were exempt from military service, being considered unfit for such arduous duty—as they doubtless were. Their labor was not counted as a contribution to the state. Later they were given some slight representation in the parliamentary assembly and were called into military service, but they remained a propertyless class with practically no social or civic privilege. Their protest against their lot is registered in the record of successive slave revolts and labor wars.

The modern proletariat cannot be so sharply defined despite the attempt of Marx and the scientific school of socialism to limit the classification to the wage-workers created by modern industrialism, most of whom have no property stake in the commonwealth, owning neither land, house, tools, nor a job. The proportion of the propertyless to the entire population in this country increasingly approaches the situation in Europe and increasingly includes others than the industrial wage-workers. In this classification the tenant farmer mostly belongs, and also that overwhelming proportion of farm owners whose net labor income averages around five hundred dollars a year. Moreover an increasing number of professional

workers have nothing to contribute to the state but their children, and not many of them, as the cost of living increasingly limits the realization of their ideals of life. The economic classification of the proletariat, however, cannot be limited to the propertyless. It must include all those who are unable to acquire sufficient property for family security or for the realization of any influence in the control of community life or the state.

The real line between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is not, however, economic but psychological and ethical. It marks the difference between those who possess a consciousness of needed social change and those who have none, being perfectly content with things as they are; between those who want power transferred from the few to the many and those who believe in the divine right of the select, self-chosen minority to rule; between those who are continually haunted by a sense of injustice because of the inequalities of life and those who enjoy them without compunction, though with much gratuitous compassion for the less fortunate; between those whose spirits constantly rebel against the social results of the capitalist mode of production and distribution and those who accept the present social order as ordained from the beginning of things and destined to continue while life remains upon this planet.

In due course the proletariat has caused a proletarian movement, a movement seeking a better social order, struggling for more freedom, more justice, more fraternity, for all people and believing that this cannot be realized without a reordering of the economic affairs of the world. This movement is world-wide and constitutes the largest single grouping of beings upon this planet. Its different divisions are increasingly in contact with each other, and while they differ radically and violently concerning strategy and tactics, yet on the whole it moves steadily in one direction—toward the securing of increased welfare and power for the masses of humanity. Increasingly this movement draws into its service literature,

art, religion, and science. For these, if they are true to themselves, must serve the many and not the few. They live and move and have their being only as they pass the barriers of class and nationality and race and become the servants of universal humanity.

This proletarian movement constitutes a social phenomenon whose like the world has not yet seen. Other social orders have felt the strain of protest and sustained the shock of revolt from the suffering and oppressed, but never before has the age-long organization of society to give power and privilege to the few sustained the impact of an educated, enfranchised, proletariat, increasingly conscious of the causes of its situation, of the goal toward which it needs to travel, and of the means of social change. Already the proletarian movement is the deciding force in European affairs, and its day is only dawning. In the very nature of the case this movement will shape the society of tomorrow; it will determine the manner of living in the near future for the greater part of the world because it contains within itself the undeveloped forces of humanity.

If this be the situation, or indeed anywhere near to it, then those who are studying, teaching, and preaching the Bible because they believe it contains the truths by which alone the feet of humanity can be guided into the way of life will need to inquire what relation, if any, there is between the principles taught in the Bible and those around which the proletarian movement is forming, and also what likelihood there is that the teaching of the Bible will influence a movement which has already become so powerful.

On the Continent of Europe the attitude of the proletarian movement toward the Bible ranges from indifferent cynicism to violent antipathy. This attitude is the product of the state churches, and in this respect there is little to choose between the Roman, Greek, or Lutheran organizations. As institutions they have been about equally successful in generating hostility not only to themselves but to the religion they

represent and the book they teach. The Tolstoian interpretation of the gospel, the work of a few genuine Christian socialists in Central Europe—particularly in Switzerland—has scarcely dented the hostility or penetrated the suspicion which the ecclesiastical hierarchies of Europe have for centuries been breeding in the minds of the awakening proletariat.

As usual, the church's sin of omission has been greater than its sin of commission. The attitude of European socialism toward the Bible is based upon ignorance, and for this ignorance of course the church is responsible. The intellectual leaders of the proletariat of Europe do not know the Bible as it is known to modern scholars nor even to children in modern American Sunday schools; but they do know how the Bible has been used in Europe—at its best to furnish a scheme of eternal insurance for the individual, and at its worst to provide a religious sanction for the existing order, to sustain alike the aristocracy of feudalism and the plutocracy of industrialism while urging the subjects of both to be content with that station in life in which it has pleased God to place them. From the day when Luther first turned against the peasants and encouraged the nobles to slaughter them, to the day when the Roman church organized labor and Christian socialist movements under its own control in order to prevent fundamental economic change, the main social function of the official teachers of the Bible in Europe has been in the eyes of the leaders of the proletarian movement nothing but the betrayal and defeat of the common people. It is due to this historic record and to their ignorance of any other meaning or use for the Bible that they are instilling the socialist movement of Europe with hostility toward it as a name and passing on a heritage of indifference toward its contents.

In the English-speaking world the situation is somewhat different, due to the connection in England between the pre-reformation attempt to give the Bible to the common people and the proletarian struggle over the land question. The work

of the Lollards and of Wycliffe was intimately associated with the successive protests and rebellions of sturdy English yeomen against the encroachments of a decadent feudalism and later a rising monarchism upon their ancient privileges and possessions, particularly the latter. The "poor preachers" both read the Bible in the villages and urged the people to take back the land which belonged to them. The slogan of that struggle was a scriptural allusion: "When Adam delved and Eve span, who was then the gentleman?" It is on record that when one of the later attempts to seize the land was put down, scores of priests were hunted out and hanged as being the prime movers in the rebellion.

From these historic beginnings a religious strain has always run deep through the English labor movement. The relation between the development of lay preaching in the evangelical revival and the subsequent leadership of the trade union and socialist movements in England is another link in the chain which binds together the proletarian movement in Great Britain and the teachings of the Bible. Save for a small secularist wing, whose influence is practically negligible, the literature of the labor movement in England continually appeals to biblical ideals, and the addresses of its leaders, like so much of the best public speaking in England, are saturated with the phraseology of the King James Version. It was therefore no accident that one of the counts in the indictment against one of the ministerial leaders of the general strike in Winnipeg was that on his desk were found leaflets containing a quotation from Isaiah—nothing else—and that when public meetings in the open air within the city limits were prohibited the working people gathered by hundreds outside the city limits and sang, "Faith of our Fathers living still, In spite of dungeon, fire and sword," and a Scotch workingman led in prayer, being "reminded of the covenanting days when they drove our fathers out on the moors."

In the United States the attitude of the proletarian movement to the Bible, like the movement itself, is a conglomerate of all that is to be found in Great Britain and in Europe. The foreign-born section is mostly antagonistic. A Protestant preacher of Russian birth came before a large audience of Russian radicals with a Bible in his hand. When they found out what it was, they yelled, "Take it away, don't dare to come before us with that outworn Book." But they agreed to listen to one sentence and when they heard, "Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free," most of them agreed to join with the preacher in a common search for the truth. Among the American-born proletarians most of the leaders were raised in church and Sunday school in the days when individualism and otherworldliness were dominant. They left in despair or disgust before historical or social science had touched the message of pulpit or Sunday-school teacher; and the kind of pulpit utterances that get into the Monday-morning papers have not changed their view. One of the theological students sent last summer by certain home-mission boards to work and observe in the lumber industry of the Northwest has recorded the attitude of his fellow-workers, mostly I.W.W.'s, toward those appointed to preach to them:

The chief objection to the logging preachers was that they tried to make the loggers believe that the world was created 4004 B.C., that the sun stood still, that prophecies of the Bible have all come true, or will come true, and that God created the world. I heard many long discussions about what fools preachers were to believe such stuff, and then they would turn to me to see whether I was shocked, and try to get me to argue. Needless to say, it didn't take long to convince them that I had heard of the recent discoveries of modern science and also, before long, several of them came to me secretly and got me to read the Bible and explain it to them.

There are some other elements whose strength cannot yet be determined. The farmers of this country are fast becoming proletarians in fact and in thought. They are now mostly in church and Sunday school and supposed to be getting Bible

teaching. It remains to be seen whether this will affect their economic and social program, or whether, as it did with the industrial wage-workers, the church will let them drift away and work out their social salvation without any religious consciousness. There is also considerable strength going into the American proletarian movement from the ranks of applied science, because of the fact that science seeks the good of all and, to effect its program, must align itself with the many rather than with the few. It is likely that the American proletarian movement will be much more genuinely scientific than that of Europe, because its science will be less dogmatic and more specific. This wing is largely indifferent or hostile to what it believes to be Bible teaching, because of the mishandling of the Bible to which it has been subjected. Its ideals and principles of life are, however, biblical in a large degree, though not recognized as such.

There is yet another element to be reckoned with. There are a few preachers who have left the church and chosen the labor movement as a field for spiritual leadership. There are some others who have stayed in the pulpit and have gained the ear of the proletarians to a remarkable degree. These two groups of men have a common spirit and aim. They know the results of modern biblical criticism, they have read and weighed Rauschenbush, Kent, Peabody, Wallis, Soares, and Bouck White. If any connection is to be established between the proletarian movement in this country and the teachings of the Bible, it will be through the work of these men and their successors. Through them the social need and aspiration of the present may be nourished and guided by the ideals and experience of the past.

The method by which alone this desirable result can be achieved is clearly indicated by the present situation. It will not be through the appropriation of scriptural language as in England, for the growing use of new and improved translations prevents it. It will not be the proof-text method, taking some

particular teaching evoked by an ancient social condition and using it in a situation entirely different to sanctify some particular scheme, for the reason that most of the schemers have no biblical knowledge, and those proletarians who have it utterly repudiate such unhistoric and unscientific procedure, being quite content to leave that method to the expository preachers of the individualistic school. The method that is being used by those preachers who have acquired any influence over the proletarian movement is to ask what are the general social principles of the Bible, to trace their historic development in the scripture records, to analyze our modern society in the light of them, and to ask what kind of a social order they require us to seek.

The result is not pattern or plan but movement and direction. The study of the scripture record, compared with such other records of the past as we have, shows us the main direction in which the ideals and aspirations, the hopes and strivings, of humanity have pointed, shows us also some progress in fact. The goal is not clearly seen, "it doth not yet appear what we shall be," but not a few preachers have found that when the social principles of the Bible are revealed to the proletarians they recognize that these principles point to a way of life in which they want and need to go, and in which in the main the proletarian movement is trying to go. Witness the appropriation of Jesus by the English-speaking proletarian movement, despite all the materialistic propaganda of scientific socialism. This movement claims Jesus not for a scheme or a program, as the ecclesiasts and exegetes of all schools have constantly done, but as the voice of the needs, longings, and hopes of the common people, the embodiment of their ideals, the champion of an order of life which would bring more good to them and their children than they have ever had.

Of course such a mass judgment is uncritical, of course it is based more on sympathy than on knowledge; but who shall say that it is farther from the truth concerning the human

Jesus than the work of those who have turned a carpenter into a king to sanction imperialism in church and state? Is it not considered an evidence of the spiritual authority of the Bible that the individual soul can turn to it for comfort in every experience? Why, then, should not the mass movement of humanity find similar comfort, and with less danger of misleading, since the Bible is the record of the progressive experience of God in the life of a nation, a community, and a world-wide fellowship, since it discovers and emancipates the individual as a member of this fellowship, which a monarchical heritage insists upon calling "the Kingdom of God"?

The affinity between biblical teaching and the proletarian movement and the possibility of relation between them in the future appear at once when we ask, What were the ruling principles, the chief features, the dynamic motives, of the kind of society that was sought by the law and the prophets; what kind of social order would follow from the teachings of Jesus, what kind has been aimed at by those who have definitely endeavored to put his teachings into practice? If this question is put negatively biblical teaching and the proletarian movement cover more common ground than when it is put positively. Both of them are continually protesting against the world as it is, because of the amount of injustice and oppression, inequality and suffering, that is in it. The mint and anise and cummin of biblical criticism may now and again be tithed for the world as it is, but no one can make the prophets of Israel stand for the privileges and powers of kings, emperors, or plutocrats, turn the Hebrew codes into instruments for the perpetuation of slums and devitalized countrysides, or transform Jesus into a court chaplain of the rich and the powerful. Not all the softening of the Third Gospel because of its Ebionitic character (it is passing strange to hear trained scholars speak of the "socialism of Luke") can soften the impact of all the Gospels against the manner of life of the rich and powerful and against its consequences for the many.

Was it instinctive or conscious self-preservation that so long made it a crime for the common people to read in the vernacular "that he hath put down the mighty from their seat and exalted them of low degree," while it was constantly chanted to them in Latin?

On the positive side, the outstanding fact is that the biblical teaching makes for a fraternal organization of life, it conceives religion and social organization alike in family terms, it seeks to produce the fraternal individual in the fraternal community, finally on a world-wide scale and for endless time. Its goal is a divine society in which God dwells with all men as his children. This concept of social solidarity, this ideal of a fraternal community and a world-wide family, makes for equality. That it should be claimed in support of impossible schemes of equalitarian communism is not so important as that those who accept it are impelled to move against the inequalities of life and for the extension of privilege steadily in the direction of equality. At this point the biblical ideal has a clear and strong affinity for the proletarian movement which is seeking to bring great masses of men up from the bottom of society into a larger life. The whole missionary and educational program of modern Christianity is thrown in this direction, but here the biblical teaching brings the experience of the past to help the present, avoid an imminent danger—the danger of seeking a short cut to solidarity and universal well-being through class control sustained by force.

The Hebrew law stands for the producer as against the possessor, because its ideal of life is production as against possession, creative service as against sensual enjoyment and power. The gospel teaching warns us that solidarity can no more be achieved by the dictatorship of any class than by the rule of the strong men of old; that the proletarian movement can succeed only in so far as it is for the interest of the whole, only as it can produce more creative service than any other movement. This is the wisdom of experience, because the

biblical ideal of solidarity is historically rooted in the unity of the patriarchal family, the clan and the tribe, whose ethic the Hebrew religious teachers kept alive in their nation through all submissions to ancient imperialism and its class-divided society, because they put behind it, "thus saith the Lord." From this background Jesus came to know that those who would unify society, instead of seeking to rule it must be willing to serve it and, if need be, die for it. He came also to know that a fraternal world cannot be secured by force and violence or any other form of external compulsion. From the ancient *lex talionis* the Bible teaching moves away until it reaches the New Testament principle of overcoming evil with good and subduing hate with love; but those who have been using the Bible to justify and sanctify the use of force for nationalistic ends are somewhat disqualified from proclaiming to the proletarian movement that the teaching of Jesus is against the use of force for social ends.

Unless the central truths of the Bible can become the conscious principles of the proletarian movement, unless that movement can be made aware of the relationship, both historic and factual, between biblical teaching and its own aspirations and needs, it is likely to repeat the mistakes of the past and perhaps on such a scale as to make them irreparable. To do its part in averting such a disaster the church needs to train and set loose a body of men competent to carry the living word to a living movement, that both of them may make for a growing society.

THE COMMON PROBLEMS OF THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLS¹

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I am to speak of the things which we have in common. This conference, as we all know, sprang from a common need, our need of acting together during the war. There were interests of importance to each of us which we could not adequately safeguard alone. There was a service we desired to render for which some organ of common expression was necessary. This double need justified our coming together. The report which we have already heard from our secretary shows that the anticipations we then entertained have more than justified themselves in fact.

The question still remains to be decided whether the interests which led to this first meeting still continue, or, if not the same interests, interests similar in nature. Are there still needs which we can best meet together, a common service which we can render? This question will be discussed in detail by others when we consider the future of this conference. What I have to offer here is a modest contribution to the discussion in the shape of an analysis of some of the factors which must determine our judgment. What action they may invite I do not here venture to suggest. It will be enough if I can describe the facts correctly.

In one sense the question may seem superfluous. Here we are, a company of theological teachers, facing the problem of the education of the American ministry in the momentous years after the war. What interests have we in common?

¹ An address delivered at the Conference of Theological Seminaries, Princeton, New Jersey, June 17, 1920.

What have we not in common? As Christians, as educators, as teachers in theological seminaries, there would seem to be no limit to the subjects in which we have a common interest. If we were to be here for a month instead of for three days the time would not be long enough for the half of them.

But in fact, as we all know, the matter is not so simple. We are busy men, all of us, and cannot afford to take time for anything that does not bear directly upon our work. To justify the continuance of such an association we must show not only that we have general interests in common, but that there are special objects to be met by our coming together, definite ends which our discussion may help us to realize.

It is clear that these ends must be one of two kinds: theoretical or practical. We are interested all of us, in a clearer definition of our task as theological teachers. We are interested equally in anything that we can learn from any quarter which will help us to discharge that task more effectively.

But no sooner do we begin to make earnest with either of these aspects of the case than we realize how serious are the obstacles to be faced. To begin with the theoretical difficulties. We are all alike Christians. We accept the principles of the Christian religion and have consecrated our lives to promote the advance of Christ's Kingdom in the world. We feel that the welfare of mankind depends on its accepting the message we have to bring and conforming its life to the principles we advocate. But alas! We are not ourselves fully agreed as to what that message is or what the acceptance of these principles involves. Our views differ as to matters of the deepest import for our common faith—as to the seat of authority in religion, as to the person of the Master we serve, as to the nature of the salvation He brings, as to the acceptable method of worshiping God, and above all, as to the institution which He has established as the organ of our common service and our common worship. And these differences do not concern the circumference of our faith merely. They penetrate

to its very core and center. There are acts of worship than which none are more sacred in the whole range of Christian experience that our consciences will not allow us to perform together. There are beliefs touching the central fact of our Christian faith on which we differ so widely that it is not possible for us as yet to live together within the bounds of a single Christian communion. How can we hope, differing as widely as we do, to find topics for consideration which we can approach with the freedom which is essential to profitable discussion without being brought face to face with such impassible barriers as to make further progress impossible?

On the practical side the difficulties are scarcely less serious. These grow out of the wide differences in the constituencies which we represent and the particular angle at which the educational problem presents itself to us. Some of us are teachers in denominational schools, training men for the service of a single Christian communion. Others are teachers in universities where theology is considered primarily as an academic subject and the problems of ecclesiastical relationship are negligible, while still others have consciously adopted the ideal of interdenominational religious education. We are training men side by side for the ministry of different churches with the double ideal of fitting them to serve intelligently and loyally in their own church and of giving them a sympathetic appreciation of the history and ideals of other churches. Again the preparation which our students bring with them differs widely. Some of us can take for granted a college education. Others accept men with less advanced preparation and must shape their curriculum accordingly. It is clear that the problems of the different groups differ with the differences in the subject-matter with which they have to deal. What interests one will be unimportant to the other. Where, then, shall we find common ground from which to start?

When a theologian is in trouble he is always inclined to go back to Schleiermacher. Good old Schleiermacher, who lived before the questions which divide us from so many of our fellow-teachers across the sea had risen above the horizon, and who can, therefore, be cited even in such an hour and such a gathering as this without fear of embarrassment. When Schleiermacher faced a difficulty he looked it in the face and turned it into a friend. "You despise religion," he said to the cultivated readers to whom he addressed his "Reden." "As a man interested in religion I want to find a point of contact from which we can both start. Very well, let us agree upon your contempt as something we can both take for granted."

Imitating Schleiermacher, I propose to you, as the first of the common interests which justify us in continuing our association of theological seminaries our differences. I mean this very seriously. I think the time has come when progress in theological education all along the line, in theory not less than in practice, depends upon an intelligent, painstaking, and sympathetic study of differences. Two attitudes have been taken in the past toward theological differences. On the one hand, men have condemned them; on the other, they have ignored them, or, what came to much the same thing, have made light of them as unimportant or negligible. Neither of these attitudes is adequate to meet the present situation. The differences are here and they are formidable. Condemnation will not remove them. Depreciation will not minimize them. It is time to understand them, and for this such an association as this offers us a unique opportunity.

It has always been important to do this. Unfortunate in its effects upon the man who is obliged to face the real issues of life, the departmental conception of education is never more disastrous than in religion; for religion is of all interests the most comprehensive. It affects the whole life and professes to make man acquainted with the all-embracing reality.

Especially is this true of a religion like Christianity which claims to give knowledge of the God who is all men's Father. For the Christian with the memory of Christ's high-priestly prayer vivid in his consciousness, differences of religious conviction are more than a puzzle. They are a tragedy, for they separate those whom it is God's will to join together. It becomes, then, a primary duty of the Christian to understand the differences in existing religion that so far as possible he may learn how to remove them, or, if that be not feasible, to minimize their divisive effects.

I say so far as possible, for there may be differences which it is beyond our power to minimize, far less to remove—such a difference, for example, as that between imperialism and democracy—the theory which insists that men fulfil their destiny as they submit their wills blindly to the direction of an autocratic state and the theory which sees in the state the expression of the common will of all the people as it has been ascertained through free discussion and expressed through representative institutions. Such a contrast as this—a contrast which expresses itself in religion, in the antithesis between ultramontaniam in all its forms and that impulse of the free spirit reaching out after immediate contact with God which gave birth to the movement which we call Protestantism and which in a hundred forms is today still struggling to find more adequate expression; such an antithesis as this, I repeat, admits of no resolution. It presents us with an alternative which cannot be evaded. It can be dealt with only through the submission or the conversion of one or the other of the two parties to the case.

But there are other differences not unimportant or recent in origin, differences rooted in fundamental qualities of temperament or age-long associations of history, whose significance is altered by understanding. I am thinking of such differences as those between the different types of the religious experience, between the mystic, the legalist, the

sacramentarian, and the unmetaphysical, common-sense type of Christian who finds his conception of religion best expressed in the definition of the writer of the Epistle of James. And those other differences, even more far-reaching in their effects because they are social as well as individual in character, the differences which grow out of historic tradition, and express themselves in the denominational loyalties which bind men to churches as different in their habits of thought and feeling as, let us say, the Protestant Episcopal and the Baptist. These differences in the form in which they meet us today are anything but negligible or unimportant. They keep people apart who ought to be working together. They limit our freedom of common action in those great corporate matters where Christians must speak and work together if speech or action is to be effective at all. They are, so far as we can see, permanent differences, as likely to last as the differences in color or type which separate the races. But that is no reason for believing that the effects which these differences now produce in sentiment or action will necessarily continue in their present form or that some way may not be found to make it possible for the unity which exists in spite of them, rather let me say through them, to express itself in common action and, what is quite as important, in common feeling.

How can we tell whether this will be so or not? Clearly in one way only, by understanding what these differences really are and whence they come; understanding them not in the abstract form in which they meet us in books where idea is set against idea in logical thesis or antithesis, but as they meet us in living men to whom they have emotional values as well and for whom they constitute integral parts of the complex of feeling, desire, aspiration, and loyalty that we call human life.

That, as I see it, is the first and greatest opportunity which this conference offers us—the opportunity of understanding one another better. For, we are all men who have

set our hands to a practical task of momentous importance. We are interested in our profession not simply as an occupation of the mind, a matter of natural interest and curiosity, but as a contribution to the great task of making the world a better place, and we want to know who are the men with whom we can co-operate in this enterprise, the men who share with us our major interest so keenly and intelligently that they will go to the limit with us in finding some way in which this dominant sympathy can express itself in spite of difference.

I say, we are men who are united by a practical purpose of far-reaching significance. There is, for example, the interest of securing the common recognition of the supreme place of religion in life. It was this which brought us together in the first place. We wanted to see that our boys whom the draft had taken from their homes and plunged into conditions of unexampled difficulty and responsibility were still surrounded by the safeguards which the home religion afforded. And when the war was over and the armistice came and the interrupted studies were taken up we wanted to see to it that those men who were looking forward to the ministry as a profession should have the same right to study under teachers of their own profession as was granted the engineer or the lawyer or the physician. And now that the armistice is over, and the world is turning to the tasks of peace, the same interest continues in an intensified form. We want to see to it that religion has its rightful place in this country of ours and makes its contribution to the ideals and purposes that are to shape our national future. We have learned from the study made by our Committee on the War and the Religious Outlook that religion is still a natural human interest, deep-seated in the human heart, only waiting the occasion to express itself, But we have learned also how weak and ineffective is the hold of the Church upon the imagination of the rank and file of our young men, how indefinite and vague are the conceptions which they hold of the central verities of our common faith,

and we desire to impress upon the imagination of men in general the fact that no solution of the great tasks which lie before us can be adequate or effective that ignores the dynamic which is laid up for our use in the religious nature of man or dispenses with the appeal which is provided by the institutions of historic religion.

But for this we must find some way of acting together in peace as we acted in war, of making the things that we hold in common, faith in God, in Jesus Christ, in the meaning of the universe, in a moral order, in the sinfulness of sin, in the ultimate triumph of right—we must find some way in which to make these things stand out before the imagination of the American people so that place shall be made for them as an integral element in the education of the rising generation.

Or again, take the interest that we have in securing and maintaining an educated ministry. Widely as we may differ in our conception of the kind of training that is desirable or the amount of knowledge which it is practicable to require of men who are to enter the ministry of the Christian church, we are at one in deprecating the growing tendency to short cuts into the ministry. There will be brought before this conference at another time certain facts as to the present source of supply of candidates to the ministry which give cause for serious thought to all who believe in maintaining the professional standards which have obtained in the past. There is a definite attempt being made on the part of a large and increasing number of institutions to claim for their own graduates full ministerial qualifications without putting them through the discipline which we have hitherto regarded as necessary for the preparation of the minister of the gospel. This movement raises questions too serious and far-reaching to be adequately dealt with by any individual seminary or group of seminaries. It is only as we come together, studying the whole question of theological education in all its bearings as it affects preparatory school and college as well as the

seminary curriculum itself that we shall be able to stay this tide which is sweeping us from our educational moorings and to maintain in forms the standard of an educated ministry adapted to the new conditions of the new age.

This does not mean that our present theological curriculum will continue unchanged. There is a whole group of questions that spring to mind on which I cannot even touch in this connection, questions as to the place of the study of the original languages, of church history, of systematic theology, and the other studies of the older curriculum in their relation to the newer studies which are growing up beside them and claiming to supplement if not to supersede them. But whether we believe that more or less radical changes in the curriculum are necessary we shall all be at one in feeling that if we are to stem the tide which is sweeping us from our moorings, we must in some way relate our theological teaching more definitely to the real world in which men are living today and to the vital interests which engross their most serious attention.

And this brings me to a third of the major interests which we have in common, the only one of which I shall have time still to speak, and that is the interest of securing the wider acceptance in our political and economic as well as in our social life of the principles of brotherhood, service, and faith that we all agree are central in the Christian religion.

There have been two great tendencies which have characterized the history of religion in the past. We may call them the otherworldly and the this-worldly, the tendency which thinks of religion as a means of fitting man for another world and a different life and the tendency which would use religion to transform this world and this life. This contrast is, I believe, so deeply rooted in human nature that it will never be outgrown. In Christianity as in other religions there will always be Christians of these two types and we shall make little progress in our effort after unity if we ignore this fact or

try to force either group into the mold of the other. But whether our Christianity be of one or other of these two types, whether religion mean to us fundamentally a way of fitting men in this world for life in another or a way of making this world over after the pattern set in the mount we shall all agree that *while we are living in this world* Christians should live according to Christian principles and that their lives in all their different aspects of them should conform to the standard which Jesus has set. And this, we must regretfully admit, is not the case today, for what we profess on Sunday of brotherhood and service is too often contradicted by the very conditions into which the necessities of our life plunge us on Monday. We are living in a world where competition in the most rigorous and uncompromising forms rules our business and our politics. We are living in a time of peace under an ethics which is at heart, as we are coming to see more clearly every day, an ethics of war, and we realize, even the most conservative of us, that if we are to make Christianity mean what it must to the great mass of men and women who are struggling for a better social life in a world where there is so much that would crowd it out, we must find some way of giving united witness to that eternal principle of love which lies at the very heart of our Christian faith and makes it what it is.

Only in the light of these great common purposes can the importance of the differences of which I have been speaking be fully appreciated. For these differences, I repeat, are not only differences of theory. They are definite obstacles which prevent us from working together in the very fields where unity is most important.

Take any one of the fields in which our students will be called upon to work—the pastorate, teaching, missions in the largest sense—and we are face to face with the disheartening and hampering fact of the differences between Christians. There is the matter of the local church. What a scandal it is

that where there are such areas of unoccupied territory we should be wasting our energies in maintaining in a single country village or small community three or four struggling and competing churches, no one of them paying its minister a living wage, no one of them rendering the many-sided and comprehensive ministry that would be possible if all were combined. We recognize that the present situation is intolerable and yet we do not correct it. Why? Because we have not yet learned to see things in their proportion and feel the problem of Christianizing America as a single problem at which we must work together if we are to succeed at all.

There is the matter of religious education, in all its many phases, in the church, in the community, in the theological seminary itself. How inadequate, for example, is the modern Sunday school for the burden of responsibility which is placed upon it and what thousands and hundreds of thousands of children there are in the congested districts of our great cities who are not in Sunday schools at all. There are the boys and girls in our high schools and colleges, the young men and women in our state universities, the great mass of foreigners coming to this country without knowledge of our institutions or sympathetic understanding of the genius of our free Protestantism. There are the earnest men and women in the labor movement working in their own way to secure a better social order and to realize the ideal of democracy in industry, but too often alienated from the church and in ignorance of her ideals. Surely, if we are to deal adequately with a situation like this, we must do it together. We who are the teachers of the teachers of religion must together study the field as a whole, map out a nation-wide program and train the young men under our instruction to take their part in carrying it out.

Why do we not do it? Again because of the differences which divide us; because we have not come to see eye to eye ourselves as to the great objective; because we have not discriminated clearly between the differences that grow out of an

irreconcilable conflict of conviction and those which, while formidable, are yet consistent with mutual sympathy and cordial co-operation in pursuit of the greater ends we hold in common.

What is true of the pastorate and of education is true of Christian missions in the widest sense. Here at least it is clear that if we are to succeed at all we must work together. It is from the foreign field that the call to unity sounds most clearly. It is in the foreign field that the most significant experiments in union are being tried. It is in its bearing upon the missionary enterprise in the largest sense that our home differences become most formidable and most disheartening.

Who is to deal with such a situation if not we? We, I repeat, are the teachers of the teachers of religion. We are training the men who are to mold the Christian sentiment of the future. It is from us that they must learn the meaning of the differences that divide us, that they may be taught how to overcome them.

For they are being overcome; that is the interesting and inspiring feature in the situation. The movement toward Christian unity of which I have been speaking has long passed the experimental stage. For generations we have been studying this problem of unity in difference and we have gathered a body of experience which ought to be part of the curriculum of every theological seminary in the country. There is the co-operative movement in the foreign field which expresses itself in such great facts as the Edinburgh and Panama conferences, and the various organizations to which they have given rise, the Continuation Committees, the Foreign Missions Conference, the Laymen's Missionary Movement, the Missionary Education Movement, not to speak of the different union institutions on the foreign field. There is the co-operative movement at home which expresses itself in the Federal Council, the Home Missions Council, the Council of Church Boards of Education, and the various local federations

of churches multiplying rapidly in our great cities. There are the great lay organizations, the Young Men's and the Young Women's Christian Associations. There is the movement for organic unity in all its different forms. In addition, no less instructive because not yet so fully in the public eye, there are the various local experiments in unity which are being tried all over the country in constantly new and surprising ways.

The impulse to unity which had already found these different forms of expression has been mightily reinforced by the experiences of the last six years. Here, as in so many other sides of our Christian life, the war has been a great teacher. Things that seemed impossible before proved feasible when we faced what all recognized as an unescapable duty. Beginning the war each with our own independent organization, before the armistice came we had developed machinery through which we could function as one.

And yet this great story, so fascinating in its suggestion, so rich in its instruction, is far too little known. What place have we as yet made in our seminary curriculum for the study of the co-operative movement? Above all, what have we done to teach men the philosophy which underlies successful co-operation so that they may approach its difficulties understandingly and plan with some hope of success? Is it too much to say that one reason why the Interchurch World Movement failed to reach the great success which its advocates anticipated was for lack of the preliminary study of the conditions of success? More is needed for unity than good will, however essential this must be. There must be a knowledge of the nature of the difficulties to be overcome, a willingness to learn from the past, a disposition to build upon whatever has already been attained that we may go on to something better.

Is there not here, I repeat, an opportunity for such a conference as this? For the problem of unity in difference

which as Christians we face in the church is only part of a larger problem of unity in difference which meets us the round world over, and there as here there is no short cut to success. It is not only for lack of good will that the League of Nations which opened so promisingly is for the time being under a cloud. It is because the difficulties in the way were underestimated and a short cut sought to ends for which the needed understanding had not yet been reached, or the needed preparation been made. But the way is forward, not back, and it is we who must point the way. With whatever else we may be able to dispense in the new world that is building, the teacher certainly must hold his place. For it is the teacher who takes the long look and it is the long look which determines in the end where men will go.

THE PROBLEM OF THE PERSON- ALITY OF GOD

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Behind the specific problems of the Christian evidences lies a deeper and more fundamental problem, and the answer to it will determine our whole attitude to religion. It is notoriously a difficult problem: I refer to the question whether God is a person. The issue here raised is of paramount importance if religion is to justify itself as a way of life. That God is personal is the working postulate of spiritual religion, the foundation on which the religious temple is built. For the religious relation, as we envisage it, is a relation between persons, between God on the one hand and man on the other. I do not, of course, mean that this holds true at every stage of man's history. The lower nature-religions, for instance, move in the region of a vague spiritism, and their gods are relatively characterless beings. But, except in the case of pantheistic and nihilistic systems, such as Brahmanism and Buddhism, the growing religious consciousness has more and more clearly defined the religious relation as a personal one, the *I* of the worshiper and the *Thou* of the Deity. Prayer and worship, revelation and inspiration, become unintelligible on any other interpretation. If the values which are bound up with these movements of the religious spirit are to be conserved, then the movements in question must refer to and be justified by the reality of a personal God. If you hold that the predicate "personal" when applied to the Deity is only a convenient fiction, or handy symbol to cover human ignorance, the conclusion follows that the main development of the religious consciousness rests on an illusion. And the inference is inevitable that religion, if it is to survive, must be transformed into something radically different from what it has been in the past. The continuity of religious development must be sacrificed.

It has been suggested that this is not necessary. Some modern thinkers suppose that personality may be denied to God and yet a

kind of continuity in religious evolution be preserved. Religion, they tell us truly enough, has passed through certain stages of growth. At a low level deities are sub-personal; at a higher level they are endowed with personality; but even a religion which conceives its deity as one and personal is not final: it belongs to the stage when the religious mind is still a slave to figurative representations and is quite uncritical in its use of images. An old habit is hard to discard, and Mr. Bradley has told us that "we are everywhere dependent on what may be called useful mythology."¹ But these images, though they serve a purpose for a time and have thus a kind of justification, are neither adequate nor really true, and the way of progress lies in gradually setting them aside. One of the images in question is a personal Deity. In future, men of enlightenment will think of God as an impersonal Spirit or an unconscious Mind. So, for example, Von Hartmann has told us.

One might raise the question whether the notion of an impersonal spirit is less difficult and more consistent than that of a personal Deity. Without, however, entering on this matter at present, let us note a current of modern thought, more practical perhaps in its origin but yet tending to the same negative conclusion. The movement in question is critical rather than constructive; its natural issue is agnosticism. Its apostles dwell much on the vagaries and contradictions of popular thinking, and they point out how deeply the ordinary mind is committed to the free and uncritical use of analogies. Man never knows how anthropomorphic he is; he began by reading his own life into things, and he has gone on to fashion his gods in his own image. In a well-known passage Matthew Arnold has informed us that "we construct a magnified, non-natural man by dropping out all that in man seems a source of weakness, and by heightening to the very utmost all that in man seems a source of strength." Following the bent of their fancy men have drawn a confused and inconsistent picture of God, and have invested him with the virtues as well as the defects of a human being. You merely conceal your ignorance from yourself when you project an image of your own personality into the transcendent world. The argument is that we should not pretend

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 431.

to know when we really do not know, and the conclusion is a plea for agnosticism as the only sane philosophy of life. For what applies to God applies to theology in general. "There is," says Leslie Stephen, "no proposition of natural theology the negative of which has not been maintained as vigorously as the positive." This is a train of thought which appeals to many in these days, and even to some who, ostensibly at least, have not broken with the Christian religion. In men and women haunted by these "obstinate questionings," the religious outlook is darkened by glowing clouds or becomes dim in a feeble and uncertain twilight. It will not be denied, therefore, that anything that can be urged which makes faith in a Divine Personality easier and more reasonable is a real gain to spiritual religion.

At the outset let us bear in mind that nothing will be won by ignoring the difficulties involved or by summarily treating doubt on this subject as a wilful and perverse skepticism. The objectors are often quite honest in the perplexities they feel, and the fair-minded apologist will admit they are not to be disposed of in a high-handed fashion. The argument from authority will not meet their case, and one must try to understand their position. Let it be granted, then, that the use of human analogies in reference to God has obvious limitations and easily leads to contradictions. On the other hand one cannot blink the fact that the idea of an impersonal God or Absolute raises other difficulties of the most serious kind. If the world-ground is impersonal, the emergence of persons within the world-process is a baffling phenomenon for which it is hard to assign a sufficient reason. Moreover, if agnosticism or pantheism is right, the claims of the spiritual values cannot be effectively maintained, and it is not easy to see why they should ever have come to be made. If the Supreme Good is a human abstraction and not a Personal Spirit, the whole system of religious values is undermined, and the whole structure of human faith must ultimately collapse.

In this situation the religious thinker is called on to justify, if possible, his right to speak of God as a personal Being. He must try to give a reason for his faith, if he can. Before we go farther, then, let us be clear as to what we mean by personality, let us under-

stand just how much we suppose is involved in the idea. The term is sometimes used loosely; it may mean self-consciousness simply, or it may denote something more. Yet a deity who is self-conscious and nothing else—as, for instance, the god of Aristotle, who is simply thought reflecting on itself (*νόησις νοήσεως*)—is not all that the Christian means when he says that God is personal. For he implies by the word that God is not only self-conscious but is an ethical Will and exercises a purposive activity. So much at least is involved in the conceptions of divine revelation and divine providence. Now here we have to meet the objection that we are carrying over into the divine or transcendent sphere ideas and activities which have no intelligible meaning save in the mundane sphere. Thinking and willing imply data and limitations, which are present in the case of man but cannot be supposed to exist in the case of God. The objection is definite, and if we are to meet it we must scrutinize the conditions under which human personality develops, that we may decide how far these conditions are essential to any and every form of personality. It may be possible that the human type of person is not a perfect type nor the only conceivable type.

Beyond dispute personality in man is a development within the wider whole of experience. Animals and infants are centers of experience, but they do not exist *for* themselves, and we cannot speak of them as persons. They are individuals, however, for they possess an inner life, and as inner unities they are definitely distinguished from what we call things and from other beings of the same class. Individuality is not personality but it is the pre-supposition of personality; it is on a pre-existing individual basis that a personal life develops. Personality is an enlargement of individuality, or, if you like, it is individuality raised to a higher power. The person has a being for himself. He has a definite character and sphere of action, with rights and privileges and corresponding responsibilities, and he distinguishes himself from and relates himself to other persons. In common parlance a personality denotes a man of pronounced character. A personal life is a life realized in a society of persons, and it is through this social reference that the life of the individual man receives a

specific personal content. The famous ethical precept, "Be a person and respect others as persons" recognizes this social implication.

What then appear to be the specific conditions which make the development of a finite personal existence possible? From what has been said I think we may conclude that a twofold dependence is involved. (a) There is first the contrast to an external world of facts or objects which are recognized to be other than the self. Persons stand over against things. It is the task of the psychologist to trace the steps of this process of differentiation by which the self comes to oppose itself to the not-self. Obviously one of the first stages is the distinction of the body from its environment, the perception that it belongs to the active individual in a way that other objects do not. A further stage is the recognition of the self as an inner center of ideation and desire; and finally we rise to the thought of a pure ego or self which sustains and unifies all its activities. As Professor Ward puts it: "We begin with self simply as an object perceived or imagined, and end with the concept of that object as subject or myself."¹ It is clear, then, that the development of this duality of subject and object is not accomplished by us apart from the contrast of the non-ego, and it is through this contrast that we eventually reach the conception of the self as an inner center which is distinguished from the content of its experience. Were there no distinction in reality the emergence of the distinction in idea would lack a reason. It is by marking off a region of the experienced world as belonging to the not-self that we define the sphere of the self. (b) In a somewhat similar way the self comes to recognize itself as personal in connection with and in contrast to a society of other persons. If we interpret others through ourselves, the knowledge of others also reacts on our self-knowledge. Broadly speaking, we may say that personal and social development advance *pari passu*, and, apart from intersubjective intercourse taking form in language, the individual would never advance to a generalized conception of himself at all. "Iron sharpeneth iron; so a man sharpeneth the countenance of his friend." It is especially through the relations, positive and negative, to other persons in a social system that the concept of

¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 363.

personality as an ethical unity implying rights and obligations is developed. The character and content which are involved in the notion of a person could never be evolved by the self in isolation; its intrinsic resources do not suffice for that.

So far, at least, one would expect general agreement about the interpretation of the facts; the next step, however, raises a question of critical importance. The ego, we admit, comes to a developed knowledge of itself through its relations; but does this mean that the self is a pure abstraction apart from these relations? Some contend that it is so; the relation to the non-ego, they argue, is essential, and apart from it any self becomes a mere fiction. The not-self and the self are as inseparable as, say, the outside of a thing and the inside. And they conclude that the Absolute or God, as the all-embracing Whole, transcends the contrast of ego and non-ego, and therefore cannot be self-conscious and personal. Personality, it is said, is the specific subsistence-form of the finite spirit, and has no application to God who is infinite and absolute.¹ The premises of the argument, nevertheless, may be called in question. We may maintain, with Lotze, that the self is more than the relations into which it enters, and that the ego as in some sense real is the condition of its sustaining relations at all. In fact relations without a *fundamentum relationis* are a sheer abstraction. Moreover, if there were not an original feeling or experience of self, the process by which the self is discriminated from the not-self would lack a basis on which to develop. To put it in a slightly different form, the conceptual process by which the ego defines itself is made possible by the contrast with the non-ego; but the conceptual process only comes into operation because there is a primary and original feeling or experience of self which is the condition of the process.

In his *Microcosmus* Lotze argues in a suggestive way that the function of the non-ego in developing the general consciousness of the self is a note of the limitation which attaches to finite personality rather than the essence of personality. It will serve our purpose at this point to indicate briefly, and in our own fashion, the line of argument.

¹ So Biedermann, *Dogmatik* (1869), pp. 559 ff.; cf. MacTaggart, *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*, p. 68.

The mark of perfection in personality is internal consistency and completeness: the perfect self fully penetrates, organizes, and owns its content. The finite self never achieves this. It depends for its internal development on stimuli coming from without, stimuli which it often can neither avoid nor control. It is constantly hampered and thwarted by an external environment which it masters incompletely and can but partially transform into a means for its own ends. The body is an imperfect instrument of the soul, and serves only as the basis of an intermittent self-consciousness. It seems to be a condition of our conscious life that there should be regular lapses into the region of the unconscious or the subconscious. Again, man conserves his mental resources for present use by dropping out of memory much that he once knew; in the history of a personal life multitudes of experiences are thus forgotten, and the self, even when it remembers earlier phases of its experience, may lose the power to enter into and sympathize with them. This lack of inner completeness and consistency appears especially in the moral sphere where a struggle goes on between a higher and a lower self, or, in Pauline phrase, between the spiritual and the natural man. This conflict is never crowned by the full and final victory which is presupposed by a perfect ethical self-determination. Hence under mundane conditions the human self never attains to inner harmony, and never perfectly unifies the content of its experience; personality remains an ideal only partially realized. This is what we should expect when we remember that the finite self does not contain within itself the conditions of its own existence. For this reason we cannot suppose that personality in man is more than an imperfect analogy or defective copy of personality in God. The limitations to which we are subject cannot have a counterpart in the Divine Nature, and this is the reason why some prefer to speak of God as supra-personal. There need be no objection to the word, as long as the elements of ethical and spiritual value connoted by personality are conserved in the conception of the Deity.

The crucial question is: With what modifications can we take the category of personality known in our experience and apply it to God? The theistic conception is that of a Being who is ground of

all that exists, but is only limited in so far as he limits himself. God, therefore, cannot be confronted, as man is, with an independent not-self which is the condition of the development of his self-consciousness. But is self-consciousness conceivable on these terms? Here let us bear in mind that even in man an original self-experience was the presupposition of the evolution of self-consciousness. And though the process of development was mediated by the not-self, yet this dependence constituted a limitation. The more a man is conditioned by external facts and impressions, the weaker is his personality. The growth of personality in man takes the form of a development toward internal completeness, unity, and self-determination. The ideal that man strives after, then, in the temporal process of experience must be an eternally complete reality in God. A difficulty would no doubt still remain if we suppose that God is a pure unity from which every element of difference and change is excluded. But this is not a possible conception. The difference involved in self-consciousness falls within the divine nature; it is given in the distinction between the divine self and its changing states. The contrast between the divine and the human ego would lie in the fact that the divine consciousness is continuous and complete in itself, while that of man is broken and dependent on conditions outside itself. The divine self-consciousness would be a perfect self-consciousness, since it is entirely self-contained and self-conditioned, and perfectly unifies its own experience. For the element of dependence on what lies beyond the self, present in the case of man, falls away in the case of God.

Yet there is more in personality than pure self-consciousness. As we saw in the instance of man, it was the practical relations of social life, the interaction of wills in a social system, which developed and gave content to the idea of a person. The concrete conception of personality implies action; and when we think of God as personal we think of him as an active and ethical Will who is ground of both the world of existences and the realm of values. The static idea of God, the idea of a Being resting in the eternal contemplation of himself, is more in harmony with deism than with a genuine theism. To the theist God is essentially active and creative, the living and ever-present ground of the universe which he sustains.

We entangle ourselves in intolerable contradictions if we suppose that God rested in the contemplation of himself for an indefinite time, and then, suddenly quickened to activity, brought the world and finite spirits into being by an arbitrary act of will. It is impossible to conceive an explanation of this abrupt outbreak of creative activity at a particular point in time; for, if the creation of the world meant the realization of a good, then we must suppose that prior to the creative act God was content with a defect of good. The difficulty here is partly due to the fact that we imagine our concept of time, gradually elaborated on the basis of mundane experience, existed prior to the experience out of which it was developed. Augustine, following Plato, sought to obviate this perplexity by saying that God brought time into being along with the world: *non in tempore sed cum tempore finxit Deus mundum*. The truth seems to be that we cannot fit the divine creative activity into our time-scheme at all; the more adequate idea is to think of God as the eternally creative ground of the world and finite spirits. In other words, we must abandon the static conception of God and hold that it belongs to his character to be self-revealing, to actualize his Will in a world of interacting things and persons. In the Christian doctrine of the Logos, and in the recurring thought of Scripture that God is love, there is the suggestion that self-communication is a need of the divine nature. The spiritual and ethical idea of God is not that of a Being who is self-centered but who is self-manifesting. In the case of man ethical personality was developed in relation to a society of persons; the individual personality is enlarged and enriched by the social relations into which it enters. And there is something in the human analogy which is helpful to us here. God as an ethical and spiritual person is manifested in the world of spirits that he sustains and redeems. Apart from this expression of himself in the world of souls that he disciplines and inspires the Divine Personality would lack fulness of meaning and content.

The line of thought that I have been trying to suggest receives support, I venture to believe, from Christian experience. The conception of the personal God in which the Christian rests and finds satisfaction is that of the God who reveals himself in and to

man, whose goodness and love are reflected in the face of Jesus Christ. To justify as far as possible on general grounds the conception of personality as applied to God demands, as we have seen, metaphysical thinking; and against Ritschl and his followers we must insist that theology cannot be divorced from metaphysics. On the other hand Ritschlian theologians are right in claiming that the Divine Personality can only receive its full ethical meaning and content when brought into living relation with the revelation in Christ. But this supreme revelation has its presupposition in that wider activity of God in virtue of which he sustains all souls and works in and through them.

The view here outlined has to be carefully distinguished from the speculative idealism which merges all spirits in the Absolute Spirit and treats them as phases or moments of its life. On this theory finite minds are differentiated from God and one another by standing in organic relation to material bodies; but their being for self is only apparent, and in the end they all fall within the Absolute Mind. In other words religious communion between the human and the Divine Spirit is construed as a process of identification. Though the language of some mystics gives countenance to this idea, it does not truly express the normal religious consciousness, which involves a real element of difference as well as a relation of dependence. The view here suggested is definitely distinguished from this theory by the acceptance of the conception of God as the Creative Will who gives reality to a dependent world and a kingdom of finite spirits. I am far from supposing that the idea of creation raises no difficulties—as a matter of fact we can only think of it through imperfect analogies—but the point is whether any other idea does not raise still greater difficulties. It has been justly said that if, in trying to apprehend the relation of God to the world, “the idea of creation will carry us farther, and if nothing else will, then the idea . . . is rationally justified though it be not empirically verified.”¹

In harmony with this the divine immanence must always be taken in connection with the divine transcendence. The so-called indwelling of God in man’s spiritual experience cannot mean that

¹ Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 246.

that experience is simply God's experience; it does mean that there is an activity of the Divine Spirit making itself felt in quickening and inspiring human spirits. The religious man does not seek to become God; he aspires to a concord of life and will with God.

The personality of God as an ethical Spirit is expressed through his manifold dealings with the great company of souls who owe their being and life to him. And man's response to God is seen in his age-long endeavor to transcend his narrow individual existence and gain a full spiritual and personal life. It is the great Godward movement of souls. The direction of the movement is best defined through the historic revelation in which God's personal character is expressed, for if man seeks God if haply he may find him, God in turn seeks man. It is through the increasing spiritual apprehension of the seeking and saving God revealed in the society of redeemed and upward-striving souls that man advances to the fruition of his personal life. Apart from God, the perfect Personality, our broken and fragmentary personalities cannot reach completeness and fulfilment.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

THE PROBLEM OF ISAIAH

For some years I have been occupied with the problem of the significance of Isaiah the son of Amos in the development of the religion of Israel. Probably more attention has been paid to Isaiah, especially by English-speaking scholars, than to any other prophet in the Old Testament, yet I cannot find any adequate attempt at a methodical investigation of the complex problems presented by the oracles attributed to this prophet. The reason for this is possibly the fact that the most of Isaiah study as, indeed, the most of the study of the prophets generally, is even yet conducted in the commentary form, chapter by chapter and verse by verse. But commentaries give only a piecemeal view of a prophet's significance. The time is rapidly approaching when the conventional commentary must give place to the monograph in which the raw material of the commentary can be worked up into a living picture of the prophet and his work. Almost thirty years ago Hackmann wrote such a monograph (*Zukunftserwartung des Jesaia*, 1893) and it still remains the most instructive study of Isaiah's religious significance. But it is time for Hackmann's work to be brought down to date.

What are some of the problems which such a monograph should discuss?

1. There are two very divergent schools of criticism in the interpretation of Isaiah. One of these, earlier championed by Wellhausen and Robertson Smith and later by Stade and Marti, to mention the more outstanding names, would emphasize the historical and ethical features in Isaiah's life and work. The rival school charges this interpretation with being an attempt to modernize Isaiah; he is not to be regarded as a modern preacher but is still an ancient *nabi*. His significance does not lie so much in his high ethical conceptions; these he shares with his predecessors. His significance lies rather in the fact that he is the founder of eschatology. He is himself an "exstatiker." Duhm is the great protagonist of this view of Isaiah, though he is supported to a certain extent by the *religionsgeschichtliche Schule* as represented by Gunkel, Gressmann, and Hans Schmidt. Which of these interpretations is the more accurate? Isaiah study at this point is

strikingly prallel to the study of the Gospels. The *Quest of the historical Jesus* has its Old Testament counterpart in the *Quest of the historical Isaiah*.

2. Again it is the fashion among scholars, or rather it is a critical dogma, for it is more fixed than a fashion, to hold that Isaiah was absolutely opposed to the ceremonial and would do away with the entire system. Superficially there is strong evidence for this. Nothing could be expressed more absolutely than the repudiation of the ritual in 1:10-17. Yet the same scholars who advocate this view insist with equal emphasis upon the nationalist character of Isaiah's religion. That is, he is supposed to be thinking rather of the citizen than of the individual soul, of the obligations of the Israelite rather than of the man. Religion with Isaiah is therefore still quite objective. It is in reality a religion of the state. But if this is so, how can such a religion be expressed otherwise than in some sort of a ceremonial system, especially in ancient times? Furthermore it is a curious fact to which too little attention has been paid that when Isaiah describes the most important experience of his life he does it in terms of the cult. His inaugural vision is a temple vision and his consecration is a purification. If he so despised the ritual as is commonly supposed, would he have pictured his own call under the symbolism of the ceremonial system? Have we, then, in Isaiah an extreme radical with respect to organized religion and the forms in which organized religion has always been embodied, or must we qualify the inferences usually drawn from his attack upon the ritual.

3. Closely connected with this problem is the problem of his conception of the Remnant. It is true that we are on difficult ground here. The evidence is scanty and perplexing. Yet the subject is so important that it deserves a far more careful discussion than is usually given to it. For example, even in the third edition of Duhm's great commentary (1914) and in his *Israel's Propheten* (1916) one misses any clear analysis of the idea of the Remnant. Is it more nearly related to the state conception of religion or to the individualistic conception of religion? Is the Remnant the germ of the idea of a supernatural messianic state, or is it the germ of the idea of a church historically developing and distinct from the state? The Wellhausen-Smith interpretation connected the Remnant with the band of Isaiah's disciples (chap. 8) and thus arrived at the conception of a historical Remnant ethically prepared for the future and gradually differentiating themselves from the state. This is in keeping with their historical and ethical interpretation of Isaiah, but is this identification justifiable? If it is, we have at this point a doctrine closely related to individualism in religion and the conception of Isaiah's

religion as a purely state religion would have to be qualified and Isaiah would become the precursor of that development which led to Jeremiah's profound views of the inwardness of religion.

4. The same question again emerges in connection with Isaiah's doctrine of faith. Is Isaiah's conception of faith a simple adhesion to Jahweh's voice through the prophet and to signs and wonders which guarantee that word, as it would seem to be in chapter 7, or is it that experience of inward peace and trust in God which we associate with the idea of faith, as it would seem to be in 8:16-18? In the latter case the nationalistic theory of Isaiah's religion would again have to be modified by a more individualistic theory.

5. Closely related to the same problems is the question of Isaiah's quietism as seen in his constant warning against all foreign alliances, and compare 30:15. Was this quietism founded on his belief in the supernatural, in a deliverance through miraculous intervention, or is it more related to a profounder view of faith and a more spiritual view of the Remnant?

6. What inferences does Isaiah draw from the localizing conception of religion apparently expressed in 8:16-18? Does he think, because Jahweh dwells in Mount Zion, therefore it is sacrosanct, inviolate? Have we, then, already in Isaiah the deuteronomic doctrine of the centralization of the cultus and the inviolability of Zion? In that case how is the attitude of Isaiah in the anti-Assyrian prophecies, for example, to be differentiated from the attitude of Jeremiah's opponents in Jer. 7? Is Isaiah to be made responsible, even "unconsciously" responsible (compare Duhm), for a dogma which gave Jeremiah so much trouble?

7. Finally, is the conception of a Davidic Messiah an original creation of Isaiah as Duhm would still have us believe, or is it an inheritance of Isaiah that came to him out of the popular mythology as Gressmann maintains, or is it a product of later ages incorporated into a collection of Isaiah's oracles as Stade and Marti insist? These questions remain unsettled. No general consensus upon them has as yet been obtained. Yet until this is done the outline of Israel's religious development must remain uncertain at some of the most important points and the final appraisal of the life-work of this remarkable man, who has exercised so great an influence upon Jewish and Christian thought, must be deferred.

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THE OBERLIN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

CURRENT EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Church League for Industrial Democracy.—To establish the principle of co-operation and the spirit of brotherhood in the realm of industry is the general object of this new organization consisting at present of sixteen bishops and about four hundred members of the Protestant church. Its president is the Rt. Rev. Charles D. Williams, D.D., Bishop of Michigan, and its executive secretary is Rev. Richard W. Hogue, D.D., of Philadelphia.

The League's objective and present lines of activity are indicated by the following extracts from its Statement of Principles:

We face a world in revolution. Some regret the fact; some thank God for it. Regret and gratitude are in a sense equally irrelevant; the Church is called to act, and the contemporary situation furnishes her with a challenge and an opportunity unsurpassed since Pentecost.

The purpose of this organization is to unite, for intercession and labor, those within the Episcopal Church who believe that it is an essential part of the Church's function to make justice and love the controlling motives in all social change, and who wish, as Christians, to promote all sound movements looking toward the democratization of industry and the socialization of life.

We affirm our belief that only that social order can properly be called Christian which substitutes fraternal co-operation for mastership in industry and life.

We believe that for us as Christians the proper procedure is not to formulate a social policy and then seek to justify it from our religion, but rather to start with our Lord's revealed will and to deduce from it our social program, with no equivocation or evasion.

In case of teachers and preachers in our own communion whose positions are endangered by reason of their social radicalism we promise to make investigation and if necessary to publish the facts; and to the limit of our ability we intend to give moral and practical support to those who shall clearly be seen to have incurred persecution through advocacy of social change.

Recognizing the earnest endeavor under difficulties of those working in our theological seminaries to train our coming Clergy for useful labors in the new age, we intend to work for such changes in management and curriculum as shall enable theological students to know, preach and practice the Social Gospel.

We pledge ourselves to investigate social and industrial programs as they may arise, to make contact with their leaders and authors and to spread accurate knowledge of them among our Church people.

How to Spend Sunday.—Recent discussion on the problem of keeping Sunday has led the *Independent* to ask its readers for an expression of opinion. A number of representative leaders of various religious groups responded with a variety of interesting suggestions, and these have been presented in the form of a symposium in the issue of January 1, 1921.

There is general agreement that Sunday is at present not what it ought to be; commercialism and worldliness have seriously interfered with the cultural and spiritual possibilities of the day; and that the development of religious life is very closely connected with Sunday. But there is much difference of opinion as to the type of Sunday we should have and the method of getting it. The answers may be divided roughly into three divisions though they overlap.

1. The Sunday of the legalistic religionists: Here is a strong negative emphasis. The whole day should be given to serving God and meditating upon the work of Christ for our salvation. The Sabbath is said by this group to be the foundation of the church and of all that is good in Anglo-Saxon life. Europe is immoral and wicked because it has abandoned Sabbath observance. This group believes in the enactment of severely righteous Sabbath laws.

2. The second group represents what may be described as modified Puritanism. Those in this group believe that narrow laws would make religion offensive to many. Sunday should be not a day of gloom and unnatural repression, but a day of decorum and restraint. Commercialized amusements should be forbidden and all noisy and exuberant recreation should be disallowed. It should be a workless day to the very limit of possibility, a day when the family together quietly seek intellectual and spiritual refreshment. It is the duty of the state to enact the kind of legislation that will make such a Sunday possible.

3. The third group represents a socially constructive point of view. Sunday should not be monopolized by the church by using the police authorities to close up rival attractions. A healthy church does not require such a policy. The day should be saved from pharisaism on the one hand and from commercial exploitation and unwholesome recreation on the other. As far as possible there should be a holiday which men may turn into a holy day if they will. This group would make a careful study of the complex situation that underlies the keeping of the modern Sunday. What is the need for such a day and what has been its history? What intellectual, ethical, spiritual, restful, constructive program can be made for the day in our common life? It is essential to co-operate with the community in providing on Sunday and other

days wholesome and unobjectionable forms of rest through recreation. This means a varied cultural and recreational program indoors and out of doors. Open libraries, art museums, symphony concerts, musical recitals, high-class plays and lectures, forum meetings, and athletic games may well form part of a Sunday program that will meet modern needs. Religious worship will be a vital feature of the Sunday program, but the churches must provide preachers who are better trained, more attractive music, more varied and rewarding forms of church activity, so that the churches may have a far more compelling magnetism than they now possess. This group desires the minimum of legislative regulation necessary to carry out such a program. The test of these laws will be what they provide rather than what they forbid.

What Else Must Be Done to Make This a More Livable World?—Having considered the year of freedom from the three main causes of misery—unemployment, low wages, and drink—Justice Brandeis asks in the *Survey* of January 1, 1921, pages 498–506, what else must be done to make this a more livable world. The *Survey* obtained answers to this question from publishers, teachers, judges, labor investigators, social scientists, poets, authors, religious leaders, artists, philosophers, and other representatives of various phases of American life. These answers cover the following interests:

1. *The checking of reactionary tendencies.*—Apparently we have forgotten what the war has taught about naval rivalries, trade imperialism, and the mental preparation for war. Since reaction is in control today both in politics and in the sphere of public opinion, we cannot do much more than retain the gains achieved. However we must fight reaction in legislation and industry. The relation between employer and employee must be so determined that workers may have an interest in their work. The big purpose of industry should be that of placing more solid economic foundations underneath the homes of the people.

2. *Scientific social research.*—The increase of knowledge of human behavior is one of the prime requirements of our time. With the coming of knowledge is the demand for expert practitioners. The function of philosophy is exceedingly vital. It is even claimed by some that our technique is in advance of our philosophy.

3. *Public interest in health.*—All the conditions necessary for the breeding of disease are present in great masses of huddled and unsanitary homes, and it is a tribute to the watchfulness of parents that so many children from such homes grow into decent manhood and womanhood. Interrelated with the problem of better housing is the matter of regular

work. The re-establishment of the federal employment service on a scientific basis would contribute to the solution of this problem quite as well the operation of barring or admitting a large number of immigrants.

4. *Emphasis on education.*—There is a firm belief that human nature can be changed—within limits of course—by the instrument of education. Two generations of education in a sane sense of proportion would cure most of the economic ills of society. Some go so far as to hold that a new economic code based on social welfare can be developed in five or ten years by the right use of press, pulpit, educational classes, colleges, and conferences in industrial communities.

5. *A sense of beauty and a sense of humor* are vital factors in the development of a more livable world. It is indeed joyous to be able to appreciate the wonderful and the beautiful, and there is a real demand in human nature for such a satisfaction. It is a narrow program either in city and state development or in education that leaves out the aesthetic and a warped human nature is the result.

6. *We need to discriminate between our ideals and our illusions.*—These ideals should be based on remorseless research. Only on such a quest for facts can we construct the ideals that can release the forces in individuals for their full contribution to society. It is knowledge and not speculation that can make feeling regenerative in action and creative in effect.

The Future of Religion in China.—What is to be the outcome of the conflict of religions in the Chinese Republic? Paul Hutchinson suggests an answer in the *Atlantic Monthly* for January, 1921. The chief religious forces in China are Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity. Buddhism is losing its hold on Chinese life because of the indolence, greed, and immorality of the priests, who retain their position only through playing upon the fears of the people. Taoism as a form of worship is very rapidly disappearing, though the belief in evil spirits which it fosters is bound to persist for generations. Islam, although numerically four times as strong as Christianity, has never touched the real life of China, for it has isolated its followers to a great extent.

The two remaining faiths, Confucianism and Christianity, must form the basis of the religious life of the new China. Of these, Confucianism will rightly continue to furnish the distinctive Chinese attitude toward life and the general moral basis of Chinese thought. This will be supplemented by the distinctive Christian ideals, which will be the natural fulfilment of the teachings of the Chinese Sage. Such elements

of Chinese life as veneration for ancestors will have a due place in the new religion. Moreover the Chinese church of the future will realize her greatest possibilities only under Chinese leadership. When the missionary has completely vindicated his civilization his task will be finished. Then China, under her own leadership, will continue to develop her own type of Christianity as modified by her heritage and her social mind.

How Can the Missionary Prepare the Way for Political Self-Government?—India is facing an era of reconstruction in all phases of her life. As she is being given greater responsibility in her political control, she is seeking it in other activities. How the readjustment should be made in the mission centers is suggested by Professor S. C. Mukerjee of Serampore College, in *Young Men of India*, XXXI (1920), 648-55. He analyzes the task of Christian missions as twofold: teaching the principles of Christianity and building thereon the social fabric of India. This is a task which must touch every activity of Indian life if it is to be completely effective. But the missionary forces must be unified and centralized in leadership and responsibility. At present there are two separate organizations, the Indian church organization and the Mission organization. These must be reorganized so as to make the Indian church the central power around which all missionary efforts revolve. This will give the Indian church organization the same type of responsible self-government as the nation is developing politically. It will remove all fear that Christianity attempts to denationalize India. The missionary will have an even greater opportunity for service, for he will not be considered a foreigner, as is often the case now. Professor Mukerjee would even go so far as to give to this organization many of the powers now exercised by the mission boards in the choice and direction of missionaries for Indian service. His plan is sure to be valuable in the stimulation of thought on this important problem.

A Stone Out of Place.—Kemper Fullerton contributes to the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, XXXVII (October, 1920), 1-50, "The Stone of the Foundation," an unusually keen and thoroughgoing examination of Isaiah 28:16b, 17a. This passage has rarely been controverted as an authentic utterance of Isaiah, largely because it seems to contain his characteristic teaching of the value of faith. But its meaning is not clear, nor is the text certain, and there are problems of etymology and syntax which are only complicated when comparison is made with the versions. Moreover it offers a promise where a threat is to be expected, and in so doing interrupts not only the thought of

the passage but also its poetic and rhetorical form. Interpretations of these verses are almost as numerous as commentators, most of whom agree only in attributing them to Isaiah, and in rejecting any messianic significance. Identification of the "stone" with the Messiah as an object of faith is, however, most probable exegetically, though most improbable critically. Professor Fullerton favors an emendation by Ehrlich which disposes of the Isaianic doctrine of faith in this section, which he concludes to be a late insertion, messianic in character. It represents a type of symbolism found elsewhere in both the Old and the New Testaments, in which the stone stands for dependable personal leadership, and as such is a symbol of the Messiah. Indeed, there is evidence of what may be called a well-developed system of *lithic* theology of which only fragments are preserved in the Bible.

Professor Fullerton is to be congratulated on the thoroughness of his investigation, and the convincingness of his presentation.

The Death of an Eminent American Scholar.—Professor B. B. Warfield of the faculty of Princeton Theological Seminary died on February 17, 1921. Professor Warfield was professor of theology in Princeton Theological Seminary from 1887 until his death. He has for a long time been one of the ablest exponents of Calvinistic theology in this country, and up to the time of his death he was an indefatigable defender of the ideals of theological orthodoxy. With his death the field of theological scholarship suffers a distinct loss.

Why Not Recognize Social Responsibility in Children?—The important question is raised by Professor George A. Coe, in *Religious Education*, February, 1921. The child is a member of the community and takes that membership seriously. Why should not part of his play be given to the construction of his own toys from provided materials? He is invited to take part in world-wide missions, why should he not be given an increasing part in the tasks of human welfare near at home? Can he not participate in the selecting of his school problems, reducing the formal and the coercive to the minimum? Professor Coe says "Yes," and gives some hints as to the method to be employed. In the vital experience of worship, childishness can be eliminated, and developing ethical meanings can be incorporated under wise leadership. Why should there be an extended use of unappreciated formal prayers? Coe gives a suggestive list of the items we need to know from intelligent observation in regard to the religious life of the child. Give the child an opportunity to live and help live by the stimulation of his own real

interests through a graded participation in a well-rounded life. Realistically, he has already entered into the responsibilities of life and does not have to wait to be shot into them from the mouth of an ineffectual pedagogical blunderbuss.

The Missionary Ideal in Terms of Social Psychology.—Following certain suggestions in Hocking's *Human Nature and Its Re-making*, Dr. J. H. Oldham, in *The International Review of Missions*, January, 1921, declares that all the instincts, sublimated under the aegis of the Christian ideal, converge in "the passion for souls." Ambition for Christianity is not a striving after precedence, wealth, office, public power. It seeks to remedy the faults of low-lying ambition, and the quest of ambition turns out in the end to be indistinguishable from service. It is the passion for the spread of the new community of giving or adding to the being of another. In this sense it is a passion for souls. It lays hold of the ideal world in such masterly fashion that it weaves its quality and principle into the fabric of human history. Saving one's soul as far as psychology can deal with the matter is the achieving of this passionate ambition to confer spiritual benefits upon another. Of course this is presumptuous, but has not Christianity ever been such? It is a presumption in the following terms: "Yet not I, but whatever I have found visibly divine in the world, worketh in me."

The Mother's Confessional.—A fruitful suggestion for religious training is given by Henry S. Curtis in the *International Journal of Ethics*, February, 1921. Psycho-analysis is simply the method of confession to the doctor. This new psychology has put the confessional on a new basis. Mr. Curtis gives instances of the troubles and fears of childhood, many of them groundless, but they are none the less harmful on that account. The mother is the safe confessor of childhood and she should aim to fill this position as perfectly as possible. The time for the mother to establish this confessional is the fifteen- or twenty-minute period before the child goes to sleep. The events of the day and the plans of the morrow can be talked over that the child may have a peaceful sleep and greet the new day with an untroubled conscience. If she is to be a real mother-confessor she must cultivate from the earliest years the practice of intimacy and show an interest in all the little events in the daily lives of children. If she does not show interest or is too much horrified, she will not be told. To maintain an attitude of constructive criticism the mother must always be in perfect sympathy with the child. This may solve many of the problems of delinquency and much of the unhappiness of childhood.

A Humanistic God.—"The Humanism" which is "an effort to put man in his rightful place in the world" has struggled on for centuries, and more recently finds its spirit expressed in the term Democracy—political, industrial, social, and religious. This is the observation made by L. L. Leh in his article, "The Influence of Humanism on Theism" (*Reformed Church Review*, XXIV, Oct., 1920). Though "the God of our Fathers" may have certain emotional value, he is in reality not a "lovely figure" to modern men but stands for many of those characteristics which they hate and which oppose Democracy. "As a living force he has passed away. People have lost interest in him. He is out of harmony with their new outlook on life."

The war evoked a "new religious fervor." Despite "an absence of pious phrasing to a delightful degree God could be felt," not a mean, petty God concerned with trifles, but one who "was interested in big things—in freedom and justice and man's struggle for a larger life and a better world."

For a long time the widely felt need has been for "a God as wide as life, . . . large in spirit, powerful without being arbitrary, . . . close to man and with a purpose for man which could move man to enthusiasm who would be worth while for modern man." Truly there is a reaction at present, not, however, to "the God of the Fathers," but away from God altogether, and this because "the new idea lacks the proper organization, leaders, and institutional backing that would make it effective among the masses at a time like this."

"The modern man wants a *God that he can believe in*," "a God who is doing things." This characteristic will exclude the ornamental superlatives of the traditional God. Instead, the modern, humanistic God must console and inspire men, fight with them against evil, take an active interest in the life-struggle everywhere, and so far from condemning men must be their friend.

The Heterodoxy of Esther.—Jacob Hoschander discusses "The Book of Esther in the Light of History" in the *Jewish Quarterly Review*, (XI [Jan., 1921], 307-44). Names like Mordecai and Esther show the influence of the civilization of Babylonia rather than of its religion, which the exiles strenuously opposed; they were more favorable to the Persian religion which was more like their own. The heterodoxy of Mordecai's attitude on intermarriage, on which the whole book hinges, accounts for the exclusion of the religious element.

BOOK REVIEWS

PROFESSOR BURTON'S COMMENTARY ON GALATIANS¹

Students of Paulinism, who for long have been looking forward to the appearance of Professor Burton's *Galatians*, will not, when they have studied this volume, regret the time they have had to wait. For very rarely in the history of the New Testament scholarship does a book appear which so remarkably reveals complete mastery of the material, scrupulous balance of judgment, and the capacity of stating conclusions in language which no intelligent reader can mistake.

The writer tells us in the Preface that he determined to give his chief attention to "fresh historical study of the vocabulary of the letter." And he has brilliantly succeeded in his aim. Many of the notes are most important contributions to the lexicography of the New Testament, and he has added full appendixes on some of the most prominent terms of Paul's vocabulary, such as *ἀπόστολος*, *ἐκκλησία*, *χάρις*, *ἁμαρτία*, *νόμος*, *δικαιοσύνη*, *διαθήκη*, and others, which are models of scholarly workmanship, and constantly most valuable studies of New Testament theology. Noteworthy in this respect is the elaborate appendix on "Titles and Predicates of Jesus Recurring in the Pauline Epistle."

As we might expect, from Professor Burton's past work, large emphasis is laid on grammatical considerations, and perhaps nowhere else does he achieve more satisfying lucidity. We are all acquainted with grammatical explanations that leave us utterly befogged. These often spring from lack of clear thinking. Dr. Burton has thought out his expositions to the end, and therefore is not contented with vague remarks. But this clearness is never reached hastily. Seldom have we come across a commentator who states his position with greater caution. Take, e.g., his view of the destination of the epistle. After presenting a very conclusive argument in favor of the South-Galatian theory, he sums up:

In view of all the extant evidence we conclude that the balance of probability is in favor of the South-Galatian view. The North-Galatian theory in the form advocated by Sieffert, Schmiedel and Moffatt is not impossible. If in place of the incomplete and obscure, possibly inaccurate, language of Acts 16:6 and 18:23 we had clear and definite evidence, the evidence might

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians*. By Ernest D. Burton. New York: Scribner, 1920. lxxxix+541 pages. \$4.50.

prove the existence of the North-Galatian churches founded by Paul before the writing of this letter. . . . But the evidence as it stands is not sufficient to bear the weight of theory which this hypothesis involves, including, as it does, the very existence of churches of whose existence we have no direct or definite evidence [p. xlii].

What a contrast to the dogmatic statement of partisans on both sides of this keenly debated controversy. Similarly, Dr. Burton, in deference to the evidence, does not hesitate to oppose the fashionable current of opinion regarding the explanation of the phrase *τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου* [Gal. 4:3]. After a most careful examination of all the facts, Burton concludes:

While . . . the discovery of convincing evidence that *στοιχεῖα* was in correct use as a designation of the heavenly bodies conceived of as living beings, or of spirits that inhabit all existence, might make it possible that it was to these that Paul referred, it would become probable only on the basis of new evidence, and even then the contextual evidence is against it [p. 518].

He agrees, therefore, with the older interpretations, as found in Tertullian, Erasmus, Lightfoot, and others, and translates: "The rudimentary religious teachings possessed by the race."

But this scrupulous respect for the evidence does not lead to any haziness of statement. Indeed, one of the special merits of this commentary is that the author invariably prints his interpretation of the passage under review in such a way that one can catch his meaning at once. But that meaning is reached by the most patient investigation. One only fears that in this hurried age readers may not be willing to follow the laborious steps of the editor. The only passage in which we ourselves must plead guilty of this impatience is the appendix on Paul's use of *νόμος*. We could not help feeling that that discussion was more hairsplitting than the facts demanded. Surely the apostle did not vary between such minute shades of meaning, as he dealt with the Law. We are inclined to think that Dr. Burton has not sufficiently realized Paul's final *antipathy* to the Law, as suggested by such passages as Col. 2:14 and Eph. 2:14-16.

We have little space in which to illustrate the richness of the exposition of the epistle. But we would call special attention to the notes on the difficult verse, 1:10, the examination of the phrase *ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῆς Ἰουδαίας*, the grammatical investigation of *ἡναγκάσθη* (2:3), the exhibition of the territorial rather than racial force of *εἰς τὰ ἔθνη* (2:9), the discussion of the chronology of the dispute at Antioch (p. 105), the meaning of the Jerusalem decision, "a compromise between contradictions," the validity of the Law, and its non-validity (p. 114), the remarkably acute estimate

of the argument in 2:16-17, the exact interpretation of 3:13 (p. 174). Peculiarly convincing is Dr. Burton's treatment of the term *διαθήκη* in the third chapter. He gives the clue to what it means on page 183: "In it God took the initiative, and it was primarily an expression of his grace and authority, not a bargain between *equals*." And again, in the Appendix, page 504:

It remains, therefore, that while it is by no means impossible that Paul should, availing himself of the more common usage of *διαθήκη* in the Greek-speaking world at large, have converted the "covenant" with Abraham into a "will," and based an argument concerning it on the usage of the Greek world in respect to wills, yet the evidence of usage and the passage tend strongly to the conclusion that this is not what he did, but that, though in 4:1 he arrived by successive shadings of thought at the idea of an heir, by *διαθήκη* (3:15,17) he meant not "will" but "covenant" in the sense of the Old Testament בְּרִית. It is to be hoped we shall have no more irrelevant Papyri evidence dragged into the discussion, in entire forgetfulness of the fact that Paul was far more a Jew than a Greek.

Dr. Burton inserts some unusually valuable notes when we should have scarcely expected them, e.g., that on *τὸν λόγον*, page 337, in which we have a most illuminating discussion of the elements that entered into early Christian instruction. We hesitate to differ from the editor on a point of grammar, but we are not clear that, to the extent he supposes, *ἐν* in the phrase *ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ* is intended "to mark its object as the causal ground or basis" of something rather than to mean "in fellowship with."

The book is excellently printed. We have noticed some trifling misprints (mostly in Greek words) on pages lxxv, lxxix, 54, 126, 166, 179, 192, 237, 240, 251, 256, 353, 450, 495.

H. A. A. KENNEDY

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THE PREACHER CONFRONTING THE MODERN WORLD¹

In the long and notable series of "Yale Lectures on Preaching," no volume is more searching and provocative than this. No man can read it and remain neutral. It demands either gratitude for a true diagnosis of world-wide soul-sickness, or resistance and rejection.

The lectures affirm that the modern preacher to be effective must understand the regulative ideas of the age in which he lives, and that those ideas today are largely pagan. For the last three or four centuries

¹ *Preaching and Paganism*. ("The Lyman Beecher Lectures on Preaching.") By Albert Parker Fitch. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. 229 pages. \$2.00.

the world has been dominated by humanism (the gift of the Renaissance) and by naturalism (the result of a purely scientific method and materialistic progress). Medieval theology has gone, and ought to go; but the medieval conception of a transcendent God and a supersensible world and more than human values in character and conduct must not go, unless we give up Christianity altogether. Hence Dr. Fitch, with ardent speech and passionate conviction, pleads for a religion that shall never be identified with natural virtue or natural progress or civic betterment or social aspiration, but shall cling to worship of the Absolute and to absolute surrender to Christ as the savior of men.

But if the reader expects that the advocate of such preaching is seeking merely a return to orthodoxy, he knows not Dr. Fitch. Nowhere is there a more interesting combination of theological radicalism with religious conservation than in this book. The advanced position is not obtruded, but is never concealed. He aligns himself with those who have "discarded scholastic theologies." He cannot hold to "a verbally inspired and hence inerrant Scripture," with its "naïve Semitic theophanies, its pictorial narrative, its primitive morality." He has no use for the older doctrines of an "absentee creator, a worthless and totally depraved humanity, a legalistic or substitutionary atonement, and a magical and non-understandable Incarnation which flowed from it." He rejects "the popular movements of the day which rest their summation of faith on the quadrilateral of an inerrant and verbally inspired Scripture, the full deity of Jesus Christ, the efficacy of his substitutionary atonement, the speedy second coming of the Lord." To him there was "once a doctrine of the Virgin Birth—no longer psychologically or biologically credible."

Is he then ready to accept the natural order as sufficient and to affirm that "who sweeps a room as for thy law" is rendering the only real "divine service"? The whole book is a protest against any form of naturalism, any acceptance of the cosmic order, any resolving of religion into ethics. Nowhere can there be found a more scathing indictment of modern literature from Rousseau to George Moore, modern philosophy from Kant to William James, modern art "for art's sake." The French realistic school of fiction is flayed; Goethe and Byron and Wordsworth are hopelessly "natural"; Arnold Bennett, Robert Chambers, and Gouverneur Morris are exponents of the same menacing tendency; Bergson ministers to the "solemn glorification of impulse."

The chapter on the "Sons of Zion and the Sons of Greece" brings Matthew Arnold's *Hebraism and Hellenism* up to date. The one on "Eating, Drinking and Being Merry" is a fine castigation of the whole

sweep of our material civilization. In the lecture entitled "The Unmeasured Gulf" he shows that nature is essentially cruel and alien to man, that the great need of our time is a God distinct from nature, and able to deliver man from what Huxley called the "infinite wickedness of the human story." With wealth of allusion and in glowing language he dissects the whole modern tendency and calls for a return to the proclamation of the "Almighty and Everlasting God" who alone can remove the dualism created by sin and give man real deliverance from sorrow.

Dr. Fitch's description of modern church activities is both humorous and searching. The morning service is often "a decorous sort of sociable with an intellectual fillip thrown in." "Our Protestant ecclesiastical buildings are all empty. They are meeting-houses, not temples; assembly-rooms, not shrines." Then follows a moving plea for worship, for a realization of the Presence, for penitence and self-surrender before the ineffable and infinite. Here surely is both challenge and summons to think and to act.

W. H. P. FAUNCE

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DID EZEKIEL USE TYRE AS A PSEUDONYM FOR BABYLON?¹

It has long been noticed that Ezekiel says nothing derogatory of Babylon and, while announcing disaster for other peoples, never threatens Babylon. It has generally been supposed that this silence was due to the wise discretion of Ezekiel who thought himself of much more value to his people alive than dead and therefore did not invite an untimely end by threatening his masters. On the other hand, Ezekiel devotes three long chapters (26-28) to a description of Tyre and her commerce and a prediction of her approaching downfall. Other peoples of similar insignificance like Moab, Ammon, and Philistia are disposed of in summary fashion in a few verses. Equally surprising is it that so great power and influence are ascribed to the "prince of Tyre"; at least, he is represented as thinking of himself in terms of an estimate out of all proportion to the actual historical place of Tyre in the world of Ezekiel's day. Further, he is associated with "Eden, the garden of God," which was thought of as having been located in Babylonia, and he is spoken of as "king," a term elsewhere applied by Ezekiel only to the rulers of

¹ *The Ship Tyre*. A symbol of the fate of conquerors as prophesied by Isaiah, Ezekiel, and John and fulfilled at Nineveh, Babylon, and Rome, a study in the commerce of the Bible. By W. H. Schroff. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1920. 56 pages. \$2.00.

Babylon and Egypt. Mr. Schroff would explain all these things by the theory that Ezekiel is in reality talking of Babylon all the time and using Tyre as a camouflage of his real theme. Tyre commercially represented Babylon, but Babylon found herself without a satisfactory share of the profits, which she was resolved to possess for herself alone. This will explain the readiness with which Ezekiel used the symbol of the good ship "Tyre" as representing the whole commercial structure of the Babylonians, and how, in prophesying from his residence upon the Chebar waterway the obviously impending doom of the city of Tyre, he was able at the same time to prophesy the approaching doom of Babylon herself."

In support of this interpretation Mr. Schroff cites the fact that the picture of the commerce of Tyre contains imports, but no exports and that the list of imports is only partial and coincides with the materials that went into the making of the temple and its equipment. "The ship 'Tyre' is a symbol of Chaldea; her cargo is a symbol of the institutions of the priesthood and principedom of Judea which Babylon had profaned; and her doom is the doom of Babylon herself."

This interpretation, which is certainly ingenious and supported by a good deal of research into the details of the ship's cargo is wrecked, as it seems to me, upon the great jutting rock represented in the fact that the downfall of Tyre is predicted by Ezekiel as coming at the hands of Nebuchadrezzar of Babylon. If Tyre is Babylon, it is surely strange that Babylon should deliberately set out to overthrow herself. The allegorical method of interpretation has always been alluring to Jewish minds but it is full of dangers. Mr. Schroff's treatment of algum wood, apes, and peacocks would gain much by reference to an article by Prof. Walter E. Clark in the *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures* for January, 1920, which appeared too late to be used in this book.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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THE CHARACTER OF EARLY JUDAISM¹

The study of Hebrew thought during the period extending from the latter part of the Exile to the close of the Persian period is of prime significance for the understanding of Judaism because this period saw the formation and development of the distinctively Judaistic type of religion. A new book upon this period is more than welcome. The new sources of information found during recent years and the various

¹ *Early Judaism*. By Lawrence E. Browne. Cambridge: The University Press, 1920. xiv+234 pages.

contributions of scholarship at different points have made necessary a new writing of the religious history of this period. Mr. Browne has done a good piece of critically constructive work. The identity of the authorship of the Servant Songs and the rest of Isaiah, chapters 40-55, is made clear by a convincing citation of parallel passages showing unity of thought and identical phraseology. This is important for the history of religion since it puts the missionary conception of Israel's task as early at least as the latter part of the sixth century B.C. In this connection a suggestion more ingenious than convincing is made, that the difficulty of the servant Israel saving the nation Israel is solved by making the two represent the Israel of pure stock as saving the half-blooded Israel that had mingled itself with non-Hebrew peoples. It is better, however, to remove the problem entirely by a different translation of 49:6. Haggai's parable of the clean and unclean is made to refer to the participation of the Samaritans in the building of the temple which rendered the whole enterprise unclean. Isaiah, chapter 64, is interpreted as a sermon by a Samaritan prophet. In this connection, Mr. Browne's question as to the improbability of a Hebrew prophet laying the blame upon Yahweh for leading Israel astray, as is done in Isa. 63:17, is easily countered by a reference to Ezekiel where precisely that charge is made. The building of the Samaritan temple and the final schism between Jerusalem and Samaria are rightly brought down to Alexander's time. The claim that Ezra's law was Deuteronomy only does not quite fit the facts. It has long seemed to me that Ezra's reform was based upon some earlier form of the Priestly Code than that which we now have.

The proofreading is good, but a few errors have crept in. It is not quite accurate to cite Driver as dating Daniel in 300 B.C. (p. 37); see Driver's *Introduction* (1914), page 509. On page 37, "try and find" should yield place to "try to find." On pages xiii and 43, *Bibliothek* is misspelled, and on page 55, *ceiled*.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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POPULAR INTERPRETATIONS OF OLD TESTAMENT THOUGHT

Mr. Cohu has written with the distinct aim of reaching the general public. The title of his book¹ is a bit misleading, since it confines itself to the Old Testament. But the point of view is genuinely historical and the method of treatment is such as to hold the interest

¹ *The Bible and Modern Thought*. By J. R. Cohu. New York: Dutton, 1920. xii+341 pages. \$6.00.

of the educated layman. The history of Israel is briefly outlined and each Old Testament writing is considered in the light of its historical background. The author stresses not literary and formal matters, but the religious and theological ideas and practices that the literature discloses. A high degree of accuracy of statement is assured by the fact that the author's manuscript was read by Professor C. F. Burney and by Mr. C. G. Montefiore.

Of course, no man may expect to meet with approval of all his opinions, and in such a broad survey of Hebrew literature and life as this there is naturally room for much difference of opinion. For example, with a more thoroughgoing criticism of the Book of Isaiah, it is doubtful whether we could rightly call Isaiah "the most optimistic of the prophets." The treatment of Ezra and Nehemiah is not quite in line with the latest findings in that period, which has been greatly illuminated by the discovery of the Assuan papyri, some mention of which should have been made in this work. But the book as a whole is worthy of high praise. It is far ahead of most popular books in its scholarship and it may be heartily commended to the public for which it was written.

Dr. Jastrow's commentary upon one of the world's masterpieces¹ is provided with an extensive introduction and a translation which is accompanied by explanatory footnotes. The whole is addressed primarily to the non-specialist, but it presents the results of long study and is therefore of interest likewise to the specialist. The process of literary analysis is carried farther here than in any preceding study of the text of Job not even excluding that of Siegfried in the Polychrome Bible. The drama of Job is dissolved into a symposium which in its original form included only chapters 1-27 and 42:7-9, i.e., the prose prologue and epilogue and the first two cycles of the debate. Indeed, it is with reluctance that the second cycle is allowed to stand to the credit of the original book. The third cycle, chapter 28, the speeches of Elihu and the Yahweh speeches, were all added later by writers who sought to supplement the thought of the original writer in various ways. Not only so but the Elihu speeches are themselves composite and the text of the original book has been doctored by orthodox editors who sought to furnish an antidote to the skeptical tone of the original Job.

The introduction is long, but well calculated to impress upon the reader the fact of the composite character of the book as the work of many hands. The original book was an out-and-out denial of the moral order of the universe. Such a message, however, challenged the

¹ *The Book of Job*. Its origin, growth, and interpretation, together with a new translation based on a revised text. By Morris Jastrow. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1920. 369 pages. \$4.00.

minds of many Jews, and as one after another sought to enrich the discussions by his own contribution the book grew to its present dimensions and character. Finally, it was completely transformed, or at least sufficiently so that its original skepticism escaped the eye of the common reader and awaited the discovery of the modern scholar.

The translation is very free. Emendation of the text is generously indulged in, most of the corrections being taken from Ehrlich's *Randglossen*; when the text is not changed paraphrase frequently replaces translation. The objection to this is that it substitutes the author's own private interpretation for the original text. We really have before us still another addition to, or revision of, the Book of Job. This may be seen from the treatment of the famous passage 19:25 f. which is rendered thus:

Then I would know that my defender will arise,
Even though he arise in the distant future.
Only under *my* skin is this indited,
And within *my* flesh do I see these [words].

The "would know" calls for an imperfect instead of the perfect of the text. "Defender" is rather weak for the text's "avenger" or "redeemer." "Will arise" is a very free rendering of "is alive" or "lives." "Even though he arise in the distant future" is very far removed indeed from the text's "and a later one will rise upon dust." The "only under" of the next line is clearly an emendation of "and after" (or perhaps, "and behind"). The "my" in both instances is in the text and need not be italicized. "Indited" is free conjecture for the present text which is untranslatable. "Within" is a very free rendering of "from"; and "God" has been ruthlessly eliminated to make way for "these [words]." Dr. Jastrow is probably right in refusing to credit the original Job with any hope of a future life, but his conclusion is not strengthened by such methods as these.

There are many useful and illuminating suggestions in this commentary which will make it of value to scholars, but it is too subjective and speculative to be a safe guide for the unwary layman.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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IMPORTANT STUDIES IN ANCIENT PALESTINIAN RELIGION¹

This is the first of a series which ought to continue and grow more and more valuable with succeeding years. This volume contains four

¹ *The Annual of the American School of Oriental Research in Jerusalem*. Vol. I (for 1919-20). By C. C. Torrey. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. xiii+92 pages.

studies by as many of the annual directors of the School in Jerusalem. Dr. Torrey, the first director, contributes a description and discussion of "A Phoenician Necropolis at Sidon" illustrated by four plates and other views of the anthropoid sarcophagi unearthed in the center of an open field by the director and his assistants in 1901. The fine photographs and descriptions make us indorse heartily Professor Torrey's hope that these splendid specimens of the art of Phoenicia, which are still in the hands of the natives, may be made accessible to students of art as soon as possible. Professor H. G. Mitchell, who died last May, after his article had gone to press, furnishes a description of "The Modern Wall of Jerusalem," splendidly and lavishly illustrated by seventy-one plates. Professor L. B. Paton discusses and illustrates some "Survivals of Primitive Religion in Modern Palestine," using materials gathered while in the company of the late Professor Samuel Ives Curtiss, in the summer of 1903. The volume closes with "Gleanings in Archaeology and Epigraphy" by Professor Warren J. Moulton, of Bangor. The "Gleanings" have to do with "cup-marks," recently discovered pyxes supposed to have been discovered at Beit Jibrin about 1912, some Palestinian figurines, and a Greek inscription from the village of Caesarea in Palestine.

The study of the walls of Jerusalem concerns itself chiefly with the types of masonry represented in them. The fulness of the description and the numerous excellent photographs combine to make the structure of the walls as vivid to the mind as it can possibly be made to one who has not seen the walls themselves. The most interesting section of this report to the student of religion is, of course, the section on "Survivals of Primitive Religion." This contains a full list of all the holy places of ancient Canaan named in the Old Testament, classified according as they were springs, trees, mountains, caves, graves, or holy stones. Each of these types of shrine is then discussed from the point of view of the practice of the modern inhabitants in treating it as a sacred place. Mohammedans, Druses, and Christians all alike have taken over more or less these ancient sanctuaries and have continued down to the present day the religious veneration accorded them in former times by Canaanite worshipers. In each case the rites are brought into some sort of external conformity to the worshiper's professed religion, though in most cases they are in essence markedly at variance with it. Ancient customs die hard and ancient religious customs are almost immortal.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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A STUDY OF THE LUCAN WRITINGS¹

There can be little doubt that the writings of Luke are assuming a central place of interest in recent New Testament study. The appearance within a period of sixteen months of three general books in English upon this early Christian writer is confirmation of this fact. Of these three works, that by S. C. Carpenter deals with the religious and personal aspects of Luke's teaching, that by A. T. Robertson with his qualities as a historian. The book before us is neither so edifying as the former nor so apologetic as the latter. Although it accepts the traditional authorship by Luke, it aims neither to expound his teaching nor to defend his historicity, but discusses a series of detached questions connected with his work. Dogmatic statements even on textual matters are avoided, but evidently the writer finds certain western readings interesting and perhaps authentic. These variants for Matt. 20:28 ff.; Luke 3:22; 6:5; Acts 11:28; 15:29 are discussed at length, and the inclusion by the Ferrar group of the *Pericope adulterae* in the text of Luke is vindicated by a consideration of its language. In one section have been collected cases where Luke has been suspected of showing knowledge of the classics, in another possible illustrations of humor, in a third similarities in thought and wording to the Wisdom of Solomon, in a fourth Aramaisms in Luke or in Mark. For much of Acts 1-15 McLachlan is inclined to accept Torrey's arguments for translation from Aramaic ("proved," p. 35), and for the Canticles in Luke 1 and 2 Aytoun's theory of translation from metrical Hebrew.

It is unfortunate, to use no stronger word, that neither the author nor the publishers give anywhere the slightest hint of the relation of this volume to Mr. McLachlan's earlier book (1912), *St. Luke: Evangelist and Historian*. The unsuspecting reader and buyer may suppose they are independent works, whereas the new book is only an expansion of the older one. Almost without exception every sentence in the older book reappears verbatim in the new one, sometimes rearranged and under new captions. The old text has been retained as a whole, errors and all, with additions chiefly in the first three chapters. These additions deal with philological and linguistic questions and quotations that the author has collected in the interval between editions, but they often are irrelevant and confusing. New also is the final excursus on the textual variants of the *Pericope adulterae*.

The book is not free from minor errors; some of them have crept in since the first form of the book (see, for example, the footnotes on

¹ *St. Luke, the Man and His Work*. By H. McLachlan. London: Longmans, Green, 1920. xii+324 pages. 7s. 6d.

pp. 186, 236, 248, 261); others are retained from the older work (see footnotes, pp. 244, 284). To the latter category belongs the misstatement that Luke is, "next to Paul, the most voluminous writer in Christian scripture" (p. 7; older book, p. 19). Unless one assigns Hebrews to Paul—and McLachlan does not—Luke's extant writings are more extensive even than Paul's. Elsewhere he accepts too blindly what he reads in others. On page 288 he quotes under (c) and (d) statements of Harnack which if tested would have been found incorrect. Similarly on page 14 he speaks of *ἀνατάξασθαι* as a current expression (following Wendland), while on page 77 (following Blass and Zorell) he assigns the word only two occurrences "elsewhere in Greek literature." As a matter of fact neither statement is correct. Nor is it true that Antipas was the only Herod to bear the title of Tetrarch (p. 30). The use of "agrapha" in the singular (p. 238) and the name "Seleucus Nicanor" (p. 12) can scarcely be blamed on the printer. The variation between "Antiochian" and "Antiochean" is unimportant, but the use of "Acts ii" for Torrey's "II Acts" and of "11-1 B.C." for Thackeray's "ii-1 B.C." is confusing. Also in dealing with the abbreviations for textual criticism carelessness is shown (e.g., pp. 99, 126, 292), in one case (p. 98) an "old German" version has been assumed apparently from Hort's *ger*, (i.e., a Latin codex Sangermanensis). In view of the emphasis laid upon textual matters these faults are not reassuring.

The beginner will not secure a clear and systematic idea of Luke's work from this volume and the scholar will not increase his knowledge by reading it. But the reader who is neither beginner nor scholar will find in it a number of interesting suggestions.

HENRY J. CADBURY

ANDOVER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

THE CATHOLICISM OF SAINT AUGUSTINE¹

In the present study, more than in the two preceding volumes of the series,² Batiffol's tone is that of the apologist rather than of the disinterested historian. In fact, he has written definitely in opposition to Harnack and Reuter, who are frequently mentioned; against whom Batiffol shows Augustine was not "the father of Catholicism," but the child; not "the desperate sceptic seeking a last resort in Church authority," but the enamored admirer, who "loved what he believed." It is this trait in Augustine that Harnack and Reuter missed and Batiffol

¹ *Le Catholicisme de Saint Augustin*. By Pierre Batiffol. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1920. 2 vols., viii+276 and iv+278 pages. Fr. 14.

² The first of the series was *L'Église naissante*, 1909, now in the seventh edition; the second was *La paix constantinienne*, 1914, now in the second edition.

makes us see. The book is not a life of Augustine, nor even an introduction to his writings; it is just what it claims to be—"St. Augustine's Catholicism." The evolution of Augustine's ecclesiology is traced through his struggle with Manicheism, Donatism, and Pelagianism. The first conflict brings out his ideas on faith; the second, his ideas on church unity, sacraments, priesthood, apostolicity; the third, his ideas on grace, and incidentally on the relation of Africa and the whole Catholic world to Rome. To Augustine the "Church and Christ are one person" (p. 546), whose living authority is what we needed to make us sure—*securus judicat orbis terrarum. Non intelligendi vivacitas sed credendi simplicitas* is the source of that *consensio populorum atque gentium* which "holds" him (p. 16). Out of this "simplicity of belief" grows that "universal and robust custom" (p. 32), and *mores perducunt ad intelligentiam* (p. 52). This understanding of the "true faith," *quod antiquitus veraci fide catholica praedicatur et creditur per ecclesiam totam* (p. 492), is the gift of the *Magister intus*, without whose teaching the preaching we hear is but *inanis strepitus* (p. 63). The very bishops and doctors of the Church thus do but "retain what they have found, teach what they have learned in the Church" (p. 488). Here is the force of Augustine's "love of what is believed." Love leads to "the understanding of what was formerly only believed" (p. 62). And so "we do not remain in beastly infancy"—*ne in bruta infantia remaneamus* (p. 61)—but advance in knowledge as we advance in love of the true and good, not by "correcting" the former beliefs, but by "emending" them—*ipsa plenaria concilia saepe priora posterioribus emendari, cum aliquo experimento rerum aperitur quod clausum erat et cognoscitur quod latebat*—"as new experiences reveal what was hidden and teach what was unknown" (p. 38). He does not mean we believe without reason—*turpe est sine ratione credere* (p. 9), and yet *nemo nisi per amicitiam cognoscitur* (p. 535). He does not question the truth of Cyprian's *extra ecclesiam nulla salus* (p. 545), and that the sacraments are efficacious *ex se* unless infidelity be an obstacle to grace (p. 160), but he is careful to observe that there are "incredibly many" pagans, Jews, and heretics, who are "saved by prayer." *Hos coronat in occulto Pater in occulto videns* (p. 248). Batifol's book should be a beneficent contribution to the religious literature of our day, insisting as it does on what we so much need—more ardent love of the true and good to enliven our cold intellectuality.

J. N. REAGAN

CHICAGO

BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.]

AMES, FISHER. *American Red Cross Work among the French People*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. xviii+178 pages. \$2.00.

A well-written account of this great humanitarian enterprise, marked by a keen appreciation of concrete details, showing the essentially human emphasis of the work.

APPEL, HEINRICH. *Kurzgefasste Kirchengeschichte*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1915. xx+712 pages. M. 10.

A textbook for students and classroom purposes, with elaborate classification, annotations, chronological tables, and bibliographical apparatus.

BACHMANN, PH. *Von Innen nach Aussen*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 70 pages.

An informing discussion of the crisis confronting the church in Germany since the revolution which destroyed the support of the imperial government and made imperative a democratic reorganization of the church.

Holy Bible. The Newberry Edition. New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1921. xii+728 and xi+214 pages.

A reprinting of the Authorized Version of King James, accompanied by certain orthographic signs indicative of Hebrew and Greek characteristics of language which cannot be reproduced in English translation.

CADMAN, S. PARKES. *Ambassadors of God*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. 353 pages. \$2.50.

Nine essays and lectures on aspects of modern preaching dominated by the conception of the preacher as the ambassador of God to men. It is rich in material, stimulating to independent thought, displaying wide reading and clear thinking.

CADMAN, S. PARKES, and Others. *The Problem of Christian Unity*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. x+127 pages. \$1.75.

Seven lectures by eminent religious leaders, setting forth the desirability of Christian unity, but frankly recognizing and discussing the practical obstacles, and suggesting possible next steps toward the realization of the ideal.

CADOUX, CECIL JOHN. *The Guidance of Jesus for To-Day*. London: Allen & Unwin, 1920. 178 pages. 7s. 6d.

A study of the teachings of Jesus, organized so as to define and illuminate the problems of modern life. The outline is almost exclusively devoted to personal attitudes.

COMSTOCK, WILLIAM C. *A Word for Help from the Wider World*. Boston: Richard G. Badger, 1920. 153 pages. \$1.50.

Messages from the "other world" recorded by the writer as an "amanuensis," accompanied by the author's own enthusiastic exposition of his philosophy of the "freed life."

DAVIS, OZORA S. *Evangelistic Preaching*. New York: Revell, 1921. 240 pages.

In two sections, a survey of the principles of evangelistic preaching and the suggestion of a series of sermons designed to present the Christian message to the modern mind. A manual for the working preacher.

DEISSNER, KURT. *Die Einzigartigkeit der Person Jesu*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 19 pages.

An analysis of the content of Jesus' religious consciousness, with the purpose of showing that the belief in the uniqueness of Jesus can appeal confidently to historical facts.

FEINE, PAUL. *Die Gegenwart und das Ende der Dinge*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 40 pages. M. 1.

The writer recognizes that the first Christians looked for the end of the world in their own day, yet he holds that the Parousia is still to be expected.

FEINE, PAUL. *Das Leben nach dem Tode*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1918. 68 pages. M. 2.

A summary of biblical teaching in support of belief in immortality.

FOX, G. GEORGE. *Judaism, Christianity and the Modern Social Ideals*. Fort Worth, Texas: Monitor Publishing Co., 1919. 284 pages.

A sketch of biblical teachings as to social morality, with the express purpose of stressing the debt of Christianity to Judaism in this sphere and of indicating the essentially Jewish stamp upon most of our modern social ideals.

FRANK, FR. H. R. v. *Vademecum für Angehende Theologen*. Zweite Auflage bearbeitet und gekürzt von R. H. Grützmacher. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1918. xi+254 pages. M. 5.

A revision and abridgement of a book published in 1892 by the Erlangen theologian Frank. It contains excellent suggestions to students both during their general university career and in connection with the specific study of theology.

FULLERTON, W. Y. *C. H. Spurgeon, A Biography*. London: Williams & Norgate, 1920. xv+358 pages. 15s.

An intimate biography in the form of sketches rather than annals. Patently eulogistic but not blind to personal or professional values. Leaves a clear picture of Spurgeon as preacher and human comrade.

GARVIE, ALFRED ERNEST. *The Christian Preacher*. New York: Scribner, 1921. xxvii+490 pages. \$3.50.

A volume in the *International Theological Library*, long expected and not disappointing. Divided into two sections, "History of Preaching" and "The Sermon." Former section best concise survey to be had; second section filled with discerning, practical counsel for preachers.

GRÜTZMACHER, R. H. *Alt- und Neuprotestantismus*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. xii+119 pages.

An attempt to indicate and to criticize the factors which have modified Protestant orthodoxy so as to create a "new" type of Protestantism. The author regards this new type as a superficial syncretism without abiding spiritual power.

GRÜTZMACHER, R. H. *Konfuzius, Buddha, Zarathustra, Muhammed*. Zweite vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1921. 92 pages.

A brief study of typical ideals of life based upon four great personalities as representative of China, India, Persia, Arabia.

GRÜTZMACHER, R. H. *Nietzsche*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 152 pages. M. 3.

An exposition of the leading ideas of Nietzsche with the purpose of showing his criticism of various aspects of German culture.

GRÜTZMACHER, R. H. *Textbuch zur systematischen Theologie und ihrer Geschichte*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. viii+208 pages.

A remarkably full and well-organized survey of the main theological movements and leading theologians in Germany during the nineteenth century.

HARNACK, ADOLF VON. *Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott*. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1921. xv+358 pages. M. 80.

A thoroughgoing exposition of Marcion's life and work in relation to the contemporary history of Christianity.

HEIM, KARL. *Die Weltanschauung der Bibel*. Zweite auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1921. 87 pages.

A popular and homiletical exposition of the biblical thought about creation, the fall, inherited sin, the function of the Cross, and the hope of a messianic age.

HILBERT, GERHARD. *Ecclesiola in ecclesia*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. 96 pages.

A brief study of Luther's ideas concerning the church, election, free will, and the value of these ideas for the present age.

HILBERT, GERHARD. *Ersatz für das Christentum!* Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 80 pages.

Popular discussions, indicating reasons why neither art, nor science, nor morality, nor "religiosity" can take the place of Christianity.

HILBERT, GERHARD. *Moderne Willensziele*. Zweite Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 64 pages. M. 2. 25.

Popular essays describing Schopenhauer's "Will to Annihilation"; Nietzsche's "Will to Power"; and Hamlet's "Will to Faith."

HOYT, ARTHUR S. *The Pulpit and American Life*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. xii+286 pages.

Chiefly biographical studies, showing the influence of the pulpit in determining the ideals of America. An encouraging verdict for both pulpit and pew, rendered in a judicious and pleasing manner.

IHMELS, LUDWIG. *Centralfragen der Dogmatik in der Gegenwart*. Vierte durchgesehene Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1921. viii+193 pages.

A new edition of a work first published in 1910, and dealing with crucial questions of current theology. Ihmels advocates a conservative point of view.

JAIN, CHAMPAT RAI. *The Key of Knowledge*. Arrah, India: Central Jaina Publishing House, 1919. 1096+cxxiv.

A survey of the answers given by the great religions and philosophies to the problems of human destiny and a presentation of Jainism as the key to the knowledge of the way of life by a true understanding of man's own soul. The book sets a good example by providing a glossary of non-English words.

KIRN, OTTO. *Grundriss der Evangelischen Dogmatik*. Sechste Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. x+140 pages.

Kirn's outline of Christian theology is an exceptionally clear and sympathetic presentation from the Ritschlian point of view. This new edition, appearing eight years after the author's death, is evidence of its usefulness.

KIRN, OTTO. *Grundriss der Theologischen Ethik*. Vierte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. vii+76 pages.

Another edition of a well-arranged, brief outline of Christian ethics.

LEIPOLDT, JOHANNES. *Die männliche Art Jesu*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. 38 pages.

A popular monograph stressing the virility of Jesus' character and conduct.

LUGAN, A. *L'Enseignement social de Jésus*. VI: "La Loi sociale du travail." Paris: Procure Générale, 1920. 116 pages.

An elementary exposition, from a Roman Catholic point of view, of Jesus' attitude toward labor.

MELLONE, SYDNEY H. *The New Testament and Modern Life*. London: Lindsey Press, 1921. vi+280 pages. 6s.

A modest attempt to apply the ethical principles of the New Testament to present-day problems.

MERGNER, FRIEDRICH. *Paulus Gerhardts geistliche Lieder*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1918. x+136 pages. M. 6.

A second edition, beautifully printed, of remarkably dignified and sympathetic musical settings for Gerhardt's hymns. The composer was a pastor in French Switzerland.

OMIKRON. *Letters from Paulos, A Leader in Wisdom, to His Pupils in Korinthos*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1920. xii+276 pages. \$3.00.

A fanciful attempt to interpret Paul's epistles to Corinth as documents of esoteric wisdom.

OTTLEY, RICHARD R. *A Handbook to the Septuagint*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1920. xv+296 pages. \$3.00.

A valuable introduction to the study of the Greek Bible. It is less technical than Swete's standard work, but contains much material not treated by Swete.

PECHMANN, WILH. FREIHERRN V. *Zur neuen Kirchenverfassung*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. 62 pages.

A discussion of present-day problems of the church in Germany—revolution, land endowments, government, and relation to church.

PLITT, GUSTAV, and SCHULTZE, VICTOR. *Grundriss der Symbolik*. Sechste vermehrte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. vi+192 pages.

Plitt's convenient and well-documented little compendium has long enjoyed wide usage. Schultze has added a carefully prepared section on the Old Catholic Church, besides making slight additions elsewhere.

PREUSS, HANS. *Dürer, Michelangelo, Rembrandt*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1918. 82 pages.

Bach, Mozart, Wagner. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 104 pages.

Popular sketches of the ideals of life which found expression in these great artists and musicians.

PREUSS, HANS. *Luthers Frömmigkeit*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1917. iv+91 pages. M. 2. 50.

A short study of Luther's home-life, friendships, and disposition, with their historical significance.

RUDWIN, MAXIMILIAN J. *The Origin of the German Carnival Comedy*. New York: G. E. Stechert, 1920. xii+85 pages. \$1.75.

An interesting attempt to trace the rise of the *Fastnachtsspiel* from primitive seasonal fertility rites. The book has a noteworthy bibliography.

SEEBERG, REINHOLD. *Ewiges Leben*. Vierte u. fünfte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. viii+112 pages.

A discussion of the grounds for belief in life after death originally written to comfort the sorrowing in the Great War. It undertakes to face squarely the problems arising out of our modern world-view.

SEEBERG, REINHOLD. *Grundriss der Dogmengeschichte*. Vierte, vielverbesserte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. viii+162 pages. M. 6.

A revised edition of a very useful outline of the history of dogma.

SEEBERG, REINHOLD. *Die Grundwahrheiten der christlichen Religion*. Siebente Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1921. viii+182 pages. M. 6.

Another edition of the well-known series of lectures delivered in 1901-2, designed to set forth the nature of Christianity in more "positive" form than Harnack had presented it the previous year.

SEEBERG, REINHOLD. *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*. Band IV, 2 Hälfte. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. xvi+395-986 pages. M. 54.

The concluding portion of Seeberg's extensive and detailed history of dogma, four volumes having already appeared in 1908, 1910, 1913, and 1917. The present volume deals with the development of Lutheran and Calvinistic doctrine, and with the development of Roman Catholic dogma since the Reformation.

SEEBERG, REINHOLD. *Die Lehre Luthers*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1917. xii+393 pages. M. 10. 50.

The first portion of the fourth volume of Seeberg's *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*, devoted mainly to Luther's theology, with a brief treatment of the controversy between Zwingli and Luther.

SEEBERG, REINHOLD. *System der Ethik*. Zweite neubearbeitete Auflage, Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. xi+295 pages.

A well-organized textbook on Christian ethics, containing a brief history of the conceptions of ethics in Christendom, an analysis and definition of important concepts, and a discussion of practical problems.

SIMON, THEODOR. *Grundriss der Geschichte der neueren Philosophie in ihren Beziehungen zur Religion*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. x+196 pages.

Beginning with Descartes and coming down to the end of the nineteenth century, over seventy-five men are discussed. The interpretations are objectively given, and the book serves as a useful elementary outline.

SOMMERLATH, ERNST. *Kants Lehre vom intelligiblen Charakter*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1917. vi+110 pages. M. 3. 60.

An intensive study of the relation between certain aspects of Kant's metaphysics and his conception of freedom.

STANTON, VINCENT HENRY. *The Gospels as Historical Documents*. Part III. *The Fourth Gospel*. Cambridge: University Press, 1920. x+293 pages. A critical discussion of the form and character of the Gospel of John.

STEVENSON, MRS. SINCLAIR. *The Rites of the Twice-Born*. ("The Religious Quest of India.") New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. xxiv+474 pages.

A study of the rites and ceremonies connected with the daily life, life-history, and worship of the Brāhman. A remarkably interesting treatment of the infinite detail of Hindu ceremonial custom. Careful, sympathetic, and painstaking, it is a model of exact scholarship in the field of history of religions.

STOCKDALE, F. B. *The Future Life: Fact and Fancies*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1921. 111 pages. \$1.00.

Popular, picturesque expositions to show that the implications of sane living here and now are the best security against the future.

SWAIN, RICHARD LARUE. *What and Where Is God?* New York: Macmillan, 1920. xii+255 pages. \$1.50.

A popular and picturesque discussion of typical modern religious problems, with a warm mystical sense of the divine immanence as the background.

TIXERONT, J. *Mélanges de patrologie et d'histoire des dogmes*. Paris: Gabalda, 1921. 278 pages. Fr. 7.

A collection of lectures and essays by a Roman Catholic scholar already favorably known for his studies in the history of Christian doctrine.

WEBB, CLEMENT C. J. *Philosophy and the Christian Religion*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920. 23 pages.

An inaugural lecture delivered at the University of Oxford, in which appreciative reference is made to Butler, John Henry Newman, and Matthew Arnold as religious philosophers, and certain relations between Christian faith and philosophy are pointed out.

WHITE, HUGH G. EVELYN. *The Sayings of Jesus from Oxyrhynchus*. Cambridge: University Press, 1920. lxxvi+48 pages.

A new critical edition, including an elaborate introduction, translation, and commentary, of these well-known papyrus fragments.

ZWEMER, SAMUEL M. *A Moslem Seeker after God*. New York: Revell, 1920. 302 pages. \$2.25.

Nine lectures delivered before the Theological Seminary, New Brunswick, N.J., and the College of Missions, Indianapolis, showing Islam at its best in the life and teaching of Al-Ghazali, mystic and theologian of the eleventh century.

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REVIVALISM AS A PHASE OF FRONTIER LIFE

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Revivalism has been one of the outstanding features of American Protestantism. Through it probably more than through any other channel our evangelical Christianity has brought the impact of the gospel to bear upon the problems of American society. In congested centers no less than in isolated farming communities the normal procedure has been periodically to stage an elaborate evangelistic city campaign or the more unconventional "special meetings" in village or countryside. Hence the confusion that in many minds completely identifies evangelism with revivalism; hence also the difficulty that some good folk experience in conceiving of an evangelism that dispenses with a professional revivalist, and their conclusion that to question the merits of the revivalistic method is to betray an ominous lack of evangelical fervor. In all fairness it may as well be frankly admitted that the religious history of America in some measure at least justifies this way of thinking. For almost two hundred years it is revivalism more than any other phenomenon that has supplied the landmarks in our religious history—the undulations, upheavals, points of departure, and lines of continuity. It would not be difficult and by no means unsatisfactory to write the history of American Protestantism from the standpoint of its periodic awakenings. Such a treatment, of course, would

pass lightly over the fine distinctions between Pilgrim and Puritan, the rigor of the Massachusetts Bay theocracy, the "Rhode Island experiment" of Roger Williams, the church affiliations of Calvert's first colonists, and the peculiarities of the "sectaries" of Pennsylvania. These and many related topics which have received from historians consideration entirely out of proportion to their real significance would be pushed into the background, while serious effort would center in tracing the moral and spiritual decline that befell the several colonial settlements as the inevitable result of their economic struggle, exclusiveness, and deeply rooted prejudice.

But in one spot at least it would be shown that the spiritual fervor failed to abate. Through the long pastorate of Solomon Stoddard the church at Northampton had the joy of reaping five revival harvests, so that it was into an atmosphere of revivalistic expectancy that Jonathan Edwards entered when he assumed the pastoral charge of this church. And soon the Great Awakening was in progress, reaching out from the little Northampton village until the entire colonial area from north to south and from the sea to the utmost fringe of settlement had felt its power. For the first time in American religious history large accessions were made to Christian forces, church organizations and edifices were vastly multiplied, materialism suffered a decided setback, and coarse immoralities were checked. Of greater importance was the establishment of contacts between religious groups that hitherto had greatly misunderstood each other. A common bond of sympathy and interest contributed toward the creation of a colonial religious consciousness and concerted lines of religious effort. In short the Great Awakening marks the beginning of an aggressive American Christianity.

So slow was the subsidence of this quickening that at most only a few years of "normalcy" intervened before the awakening of the Revolutionary era, in which the Presbyterians and Baptists, finding spiritual inspiration in their advocacy of

democracy and free-church ideals, acquired such prestige and numerical strength as to give them a recognized place among the religious forces of the country. The denominational foundations of the Baptists and Presbyterians were laid in a period of revival accession. From this same awakening the Methodists reaped almost as largely. Emerging from the ostracism and persecution due to the British affiliations of its pioneer traveling preachers, Methodism entered upon an era of large ingathering, strategically significant as forming a base from which it was able so courageously to push its outposts into the newly settled districts of the enlarging interior.

Soon followed the Second Awakening, the stirrings of which were felt not only along the seaboard and particularly in the colleges, but in the remote settlements of the Carolinas, Kentucky, Tennessee, and the Western Reserve, where immense congregations assembled for sacramental communion, social fellowship, and curiosity. At the critical moment when immigration into the Middle West was beginning to assume large proportions, this revival served as a timely deterrent to the laxity of morals naturally associated with the shifting of population from one area to another, while it also quickened a sense of responsibility of the old and strong communities to the new and weak. Like its precursor the Great Awakening, this revival died away slowly. After five years of vigorous manifestation as the century closed, it gradually spent itself in the course of the next decade.

The War of 1812, accompanied by the spiritual and moral deterioration usually attending militaristic strain, interrupted the progress of widespread revival, until with the opening of the third decade of the nineteenth century local quickenings again began to break out in several sections of New York State, and probably over a wider area. With the organization of the American and Baptist Home Mission societies, and the consequent sending forth of a large corps of missionaries into the newly settled districts, revivals became general throughout

the trans-Allegheny region, continuing with unabated force right through to the depression of 1837, when their momentum was slightly moderated. It is noteworthy that in the contemporary literature of the first forty years of this century no subject so engrossed the interest of the Christian public as did these revivals. During this period great issues emerged, such as America's responsibility to foreign missions, the most effective means of organizing for work on the home field, the adjustment of Methodist polity to the demands of American democracy, and the attitude of the churches to negro enslavement. And yet, judged from contemporary records, the dominating, unifying influence of the period was the fluctuation of revival quickening throughout the widening territories of settlement.

Following this long period of revivals, a season of controversy elapsed. The Presbyterians had their theological troubles, and the Methodists and Baptists were inflamed over the slavery issue. Evangelism necessarily was thrown into the background. Yet for only a surprisingly brief period. The Finney campaign, notable for the wide distribution of its influences from coast to coast, as if by providential intervention united the religious forces of the North for the trying days of the Civil War. Reconstruction had not progressed far until Dwight L. Moody emerged in the memorable campaigns of the early seventies. Moody in turn has been succeeded by Torrey, Chapman, and less distinguished lights. In spite of the growing emphasis upon the socialized expression of Christianity, to be realized in part through the principles of religious education, the annual season of protracted meetings, special services, and such like has retained its place among the red-letter periods of many a church calendar. Each autumn witnesses the going forth of hundreds of professional evangelists to reclaim moral derelicts and to secure the definite commitment to Christian discipleship of young folk who have been under the less emotional ministry of the regular pastors.

In hundreds of our churches revivalism survives as the normal outreaching of the Christian group for the non-Christian. Among these there is no more expectation of securing conversions at other than revival seasons than there is among farmers of harvesting their crops in the winter months. Long accustomed to this revivalistic program, and themselves victims of a revivalistic psychology, it is not surprising that many of the most faithful members of these churches unceasingly keep vigil for times of refreshing while plaintively harking back to "old-time religion."

But it is next to be observed that revivalism has proved to be as distinctive of American Protestantism as it has been characteristic. "The idea of revivals," says one, "is the gift of American to foreign Calvinism."¹ In the lengthy career of European Christianity, nothing appears corresponding to the revivalistic emphasis of America. During the early centuries of Christian history, accessions to the church were made through a catechumenate conducted with considerable thoroughness. In protecting itself against the infiltration of paganism, the calmly reasoned individual appeal seems to have been the prevailing instrument of Christian propaganda. Later, of course, when Christianity became so closely identified with the state, and so thoroughly sacerdotalized, there was no urge whatever to an evangelical appeal. The requirements of citizenship and the dread of otherworldly punishment constrained all to submit to the sacraments and other priestly impositions. Why should priests plead the claims of Christ when the populace could be scared into a reasonable conformity to the moral standards of Christianity by the threat of withholding the sacraments? With a materialistic, otherworldly conception of Christianity, what more was needed than participation in the sacraments? And so everyone was gathered into the church and there were no lost sheep to reclaim, since all were in the fold. To evangelism,

¹ Allen, *Jonathan Edwards*, p. 136.

therefore, the medieval clergy had no motif whatever. To preaching indeed of any character the incentive was not powerful. Priests naturally became little more than altar officials. The wonder is that preaching survived as much as it did; the greater marvel that occasionally a really powerful messenger of repentance and righteousness appeared.

Monasticism, to be sure, has been characterized by some writers as a type of revivalism. And on the surface there is an admitted resemblance between the periodic rise of orders and the successive waves of revival quickening. Close observation, however, discovers that the similarity does not penetrate beneath the surface. Monasticism was never motivated by a yearning of the "saved" for the "unsaved." Monks did not question the magic efficacy of the priest and his sacraments. The noblest in their ranks sought in the retreat of the cloister the better way toward saintliness. Except in so far as monasticism produced some of the great medieval missionaries who carried the Christian evangel to outlying barbarians, it was a movement within the church to realize higher standards of spiritual-mindedness rather than to reach out to the unevangelized. Its concern was to provide a retreat for saints much more than a refuge for prodigals.

With their clearer appreciation of the spiritual character of religion and their deep aversion to sacerdotalism, the Waldenses and Anabaptists might have been expected to anticipate in some respects the methods of modern evangelism. But such was not the case. The unsleeping vigilance of the persecuting church compelled these groups to conduct their propaganda under cleverly devised disguise, and to increase their following through the contacts of individual with individual. A similar policy of repression accounts in large measure for the lack of organized evangelical effort among the English Dissenters of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It was reserved for the following century, more tolerant because more commercial in its spirit, under the finely balanced leader-

ship of the Wesleys and Whitefield, to give to Britain an evangelical quickening that stirred its life religiously and socially to the profoundest depths. Unlike the contemporary movement in New England, by which in some degree it was impelled and shaped, the evangelical revival of Britain tarried long but never returned. For Britain the nineteenth century has not proved to be an era of revivals. Neither the Established nor the Free churches have produced successors to the Wesleys and Whitefield. The Free churches, the natural stronghold of evangelical ideals and methods, have shown no disposition to identify their aggressive campaign among the masses with periodic revivalism. The professional evangelist has found in Britain no opportunity corresponding to that of America. "Gypsy" Smith almost alone has been able to continue an effective evangelistic ministry among the British people. It is true that Moody conducted successful campaigns and that the reception accorded to Torrey and Chapman was cordial. Yet one conversant with the religious activities of the British churches knows full well that the splendid work of "Gypsy" Smith and less widely known British "missioners," with the occasional visits of American evangelists, has been at most only an incident in their program of evangelism. There has been no tendency to look to evangelists as the main instrument in establishing contact between the church and the masses. Although many churches have their "missions," these are not to be hastily interpreted as the counterpart of American special revival meetings. In their conduct and objective these are widely removed from each other.

As for Continental Christianity during post-Reformation times, revivalism has played a rôle even less conspicuous than in Britain. French Protestantism, originally cast in the mold of Humanism, subjected to the long ordeal of fighting on battlefields to purchase privileges of which on galling illegal grounds it was later deprived, and at last sharing in the general misfortune that befell religion after the Revolution, has

possessed neither the disposition nor the incentive to resort to revivalism. French prophets early in the eighteenth century rehabilitated a type of enthusiasm, but in the course of fifty years its spell had entirely disappeared. Lutheranism early in its career fell back into dogmatic inertia. Pietism by and by interposed its protest but, though highly evangelical in its missionary interest, has been averse to mechanically imposed awakenings. Moravianism has followed the same course. Waldensianism, gallantly surviving the persecution of centuries, has shown some disposition in Italy to resort to revivalistic methods. So also have the Baptists in carrying their message to Central Europe. In Scandinavia slight awakenings have appeared, and a few evangelists have emerged into prominence. But the Continent as a whole was visited by no general awakening corresponding to the evangelical revival in Britain. At most its quickenings have been confined to small areas and have failed to operate upon society as a whole. Hence there has developed in Continental churches no disposition to resort to seasonal programs, nor anything approximating the revivalistic attitude of mind.

As characteristic and distinctive of American religious life, revivalism must be traceable to certain features peculiar to the environment in which the American church has been called upon to function. In endeavoring to ascertain just what these features were, one is immediately disposed to look into the history of the Northampton church, the historic fountainhead of periodic awakenings. Elsewhere in New England there seem to have been movements marked by special religious fervor, as in East Windsor under the ministry of Jonathan Edwards' father. But in Northampton, during the long pastorate of Stoddard, seasons of refreshing were a recurrent feature. Edwards cites five as having occurred between 1689 and 1718, with a sixth shortly after his accession to the full pastorate. A reading of the *Surprising Narrative* gives the impression that in respect of periodic ingathering the history

of the Northampton church was unique. Two factors may serve as a possible explanation. The first was the personality of Stoddard, of whom Edwards speaks as "a very great man of strong powers of mind, of great grace and a great authority, of a masterly countenance, speech, and behavior," looked up to by many "almost as a sort of deity," and regarded by the Indians of the neighborhood as the "Englishman's God." If the exceptional qualities of Edwards' mother may be taken as any index of her father's endowments, Stoddard was a man of commanding personality, the content and delivery of whose sermons goes far in accounting for the extraordinary features in the history of his congregation. In the second place the ministry of this remarkable father in Israel was in a community where to profound religious imagination and deep emotion prevailing among New England Puritans of the seventeenth century there was added a tinge of melancholy due to the hardships and anxieties of living in a comparatively remote pioneer settlement under the constant fear of attack from the Indians. Among folk so constituted and environed, vivid emotional preaching may well have been productive of results quite out of the ordinary.¹

Be the explanation what it may, in entering upon his ministry at Northampton, Edwards found himself in a revivalistic atmosphere. Grandfather Stoddard, then in ripe old age, was probably much given to talking to his promising grandson about the days of refreshing in years gone by, and Edwards recalls the comfort that a small ingathering gave this pastor emeritus as he was standing on the borders of the grave. Many of the congregation, moreover, must have retained vivid memories of the stirring times of former blessing. The fact that the newly installed minister soon married a woman who to unusual endowments of grace, culture, and

¹ On these characteristics of New England life see Davenport, *Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals*, chap. viii, and Hayes, "Study of the Edwardean Revivals," *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. XIII.

personality added a mystical tendency toward transports "into a kind of heavenly Elysium" should not escape attention, nor that his conversance with history had brought to his attention a Scotch revival a century before in which highly emotional phenomena had appeared. That his powerful intellect had forged out an irresistible logic of Calvinistic sovereignty, election, and reprobation, and that his imagination proved so capable of depicting the bliss of the redeemed and the horrors of the damned, is the crowning consideration. In any church, indeed, no matter what its history or the composition of its membership, Edwards, in the exuberance of his freshly elaborated Calvinistic message, would have created a profound impression. To characterize the awakening that convulsed the Northampton and surrounding churches during the winter 1734-35 as the Edwardean revival is certainly no misnomer. No other single factor is so largely explanatory of the distinctive characteristics of the movement as the personality and Calvinistic message of Edwards. But this does not imply that other factors may be entirely eliminated. However powerful Edwards' preaching, it was addressed to people who for almost a century had been in periodic dread of exhausted food supplies or Indian attack. Though fearless through their constant contact with frontier dangers, they were the victims of a latent fear that, played upon by descriptions of hell and divine wrath, made them peculiarly susceptible to prostrations and hysterical extravagances.¹

The Great Awakening of the following decade was the natural overflow of the Edwardean revival. The *Narrative of the Surprising Work of Grace*, falling under the observation of many in Boston and elsewhere, aroused the religious mind to a high state of expectancy, while the preaching of Pomeroy, Tucker, the Tennent brothers, and others seems to have been almost as lurid as that of Edwards. Whitefield alone, among the preachers of this movement, dwelt more fully upon the

¹ For the relation of fearlessness and fear, see Davenport, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

kindlier aspects of the gospel's message. In contrast, however, with the Edwardean revival, it was carried over a wider area, including not only older centers, such as Boston and Philadelphia where long settlement had produced a tranquility of mind, but into backward districts where solicitude even more pronounced than in the longer established village of Northampton made the inhabitants more susceptible to emotional appeals.

In several particulars the revival of the Revolutionary era differed from the Edwardean and the Great Awakening. There was a notable absence of outstanding leaders, such as Edwards, Whitefield, and the Tennent brothers. Without the stimulus of special meetings congregations suddenly awakened to a deepened sense of spiritual values. Pastorless churches not infrequently shared in this spiritual quickening. The preaching does not seem to have been as strongly emotional and imaginative as in the earlier revivals. The large accessions to Baptist and Presbyterian membership were due to the prestige and popularity derived from their staunch advocacy of republican ideals and their vigorous resistance in New England and Virginia to everything that savored of state-church favoritism. Their demand that all churches should enjoy equal rights, gallantly maintained as it was to the point of distraint of property and imprisonment, enriched the spiritual tone of the membership of these two bodies. To the Methodists, however, the Revolution proved an embarrassment rather than an opportunity. Their large numerical gains of the early seventies shriveled almost to the vanishing-point in the tense years during which suspicion and prejudice visited their preachers with such popular disfavor as to make their preaching almost ineffective and to necessitate in some cases their retreat to places of hiding. But with the close of the war the pent-up enthusiasm of these apostles of Wesley, who felt the urgency and honor of planting Methodism in this new hemisphere, broke through all bounds, reaping an

especially rich harvest in Virginia, where Anglicanism had become inert and indifferent to the needs of the people.

The opening of the national period is almost coincident with the outbreak of the Second Awakening, which in important respects was sharply differentiated from the revivals of the colonial period. Settlement by this time had begun to extend beyond the mountains, and each year was witnessing the bending back toward the west of the frontier line. With a real apostolic urge the Methodist circuit riders had felt the challenge to follow the trail of the backwoodsman with the gospel, and Baptist and Presbyterian missionaries had been aroused by the same imperative. Frontiersmen with limited, or no resources were unable to proceed immediately to erect a meetinghouse or even a school. In those strenuous days the erection indeed of a log cottage was no mean achievement. It was to this at length that the adventurous preacher came. Wearied, wet, and harried with trail anxieties, he was glad to receive its hospitality, and to bring his message of religious inspiration to parents and children who read and prayed with him around the fireplace, lingering long into the night as they listened so eagerly to the traveler's story of doings "back home." By and by neighbors were invited to meet the preacher, whose time was thus economized by an exhortation given to all people assembled together rather than by visitation in each separate cottage. The next stage was when a date was fixed for the minister to conduct a religious service for all the members of a community. Appointments were thus made for meetings sometimes months in the future. After the fashion of a modern Chautauqua lecturer, the circuit rider often found himself booked up for a year ahead. Asbury's *Journal* abounds in references to appointments dated thus far in advance. Unless the preacher of some other denomination happened along in the interim, months and perhaps a year might elapse between appointments. More adequate provision for worship was inevitable to meet

the needs of folks whose settlement on the frontier, far from lessening, often intensified their thirst for religious fellowship. Hence the camp meeting. Just when and where it originated remains obscure. Since preachers traveled over such wide areas, it was felt that time could be economized by their conducting at convenient points a series of meetings rather than by filling a succession of single appointments. People widely scattered, who might find it impossible to be present for a single meeting, could attend some of a series of protracted services. Folks indifferent to a small religious service in some neighbor's cottage might be attracted by the more imposing protracted meeting, which drew the countryside somewhat after the fashion of the later country fair. Additional impressiveness was imparted through the observance of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. The fact that the exhortations were made by several rather than by one preacher gave variety to the exercises. The scene was decidedly animated when several preachers might be heard within sound of each other's voices, especially in the evening session when the flare of torches dispelled the heavy shadows of pendant branches.

From its earliest appearance the camp meeting drew immense crowds. One is disposed at first to regard the estimate of audiences as vastly exaggerated, but the consentient testimony of contemporary writers, of whom some must be classed as keenly critical, seems to leave no doubt that thousands of people often resorted to these camp grounds. From a radius of scores of miles settlers flocked to the festive event of the year. For long months many of them had not so much as seen the face of a preacher, and a tedious wagon trek over uncomfortable roads was a small price for the spiritual tonic of four whole days of preaching, praying, and singing. Others less religiously disposed found in the social fellowship of the camp assembly a welcome break from the depressing monotony of the isolated settler's cabin. Some, of course,

were drawn by vulgar curiosity, where all sorts of improprieties were reported as of common occurrence. It is not surprising that emotional disorders were prevalent. Many folks were in a state of high spiritual expectancy when they reached the camp ground. For weeks and months they had been looking forward to this great annual event, and as a consequence their nerves were keyed to the limit. Moreover, frontier life offered an extremely limited range of interests. With few social contacts and extremely limited facilities for coming in touch with the thinking and happenings of the world at large, the settler's mind was liable to be completely dominated by whatever ideas he chanced to meet. The routine of a life consumed in chopping trees, breaking land, and doing chores, made the settler an easy mark for whatever new interest crossed the threshold of his thinking. And on the camp ground, no matter by what motive he had been drawn, the listener was brought face to face with a compelling interest—that of personal religion. However unversed in the technique of psychology, the camp preachers were sound psychologists. One subject and one only was kept before the vast assembly. The preacher was hortatory and rarely expository. Much of the time he thundered forth the terrors of hell. And fear lurked in the background for people who were in ceaseless conflict with the wily savage—much more so than in the Northampton audiences of Edwards' day. Hence the prostrations, jerks, and barkings even of crestfallen critics who came to make a laughingstock of the occasion.

However defective the camp meeting may appear to the scientific religious thinking of the twentieth century, it probably offered the most practical solution of the urgent religious needs of the undeveloped frontier. It fitted readily into the itinerant system of Methodism. It protected earnest but untrained preachers, drafted by the urgency of the times, from the strain of constant ministry to a single congregation. A mere handful of preachers were able to distribute their services

over a vast area that otherwise would have had no spiritual ministrations whatever.

In the half-century or more during which frontier communities, springing up first in the Ohio and later in the Mississippi Valley, kept calling for pastoral reinforcements out of all proportion to the resources of the long-established churches of the East, the camp meeting had ample time to establish itself as an instrument for keeping alive the religious interests of newly occupied areas. Nor did it survive only while new areas were passing through the first stages of social development. Endeared in the memories of people to whom in the days of their first struggles it had brought such religious and social comfort, the camp meeting continued long after the community had reached such a stage of development as justified and demanded a more intensive, cultural type of religious ministry. Its sentimental hold was too strong to give way before cultural advance. A greater misfortune lay in the fact that an institution springing from the necessities of border settlements was soon imported into the highly socialized regions of the East. Surprising to relate, the camp meeting was cordially welcomed in New England. To Methodism this innovation was due. Finding the camp meeting so effective in the West, it concluded that the same institution might be equally successful in planting the banners of Methodism even in the northern strongholds of Congregationalism. Other denominations, hesitant at first, soon fell into line. And so it came to pass that a seasonal view of visitation began to prevail not only in the pioneer districts, where an inadequate force of preachers had to content itself by giving to each district only occasional attention, but also in the older established churches that enjoyed the full-time services of their ministers. Without pausing to inquire into the distinctive environment in which the camp meeting had arisen and functioned so normally, churches in every section of the country seemed to discern in this institution the means

of propaganda suited to their several constituencies. In this way the habit of special meetings was incurred, and the spontaneous awakenings of the colonial period found their counterpart in the strained, conventional, periodic revivals of the first half of the nineteenth century. As long as the evangelically minded throughout the East were disposed to enthusiastically indorse the camp meeting in original or modified form as the novel means of arousing the conventionally disposed, local revivals were bound to be a prominent feature of the times. A like prominence was certain to characterize revivalism, while frontier settlement, proceeding rapidly and in large proportions, impelled circuit riders and other missionaries to use the camp meeting as the most effective means of rapidly establishing church influence in new areas and of capturing ground for their rival denominational interests. The first four decades of the nineteenth century was an era of almost continual turmoil of local revivals, because it was dominated by the institution of the camp meeting.

But a distinct change appears about the middle of the century. Local revivals no longer abound as in the preceding fifty years. The Finney campaign stirred the larger centers, but much more after the fashion of the colonial awakenings, and the Moody campaign was largely confined to the cities. It is true, of course, that since Moody's day thousands of churches still persist in the seasonal special efforts; nevertheless, the aggregate revivalistic effort of the last fifty years does not begin to compare proportionally with that of the earlier half of the century. Its persistence, moreover, is especially in areas whose emergence from frontier conditions is comparatively recent. Urban communities have been showing increasing disposition to resort to methods more educational in character. The explanation of this change is not far to seek. Ministerial forces have become more adequate to the demands of religious leadership. The cultural cravings of the ministry have made itineracy increasingly distasteful. More elaborate academic training has given preachers

an inclination and aptitude for the reasoned discourse rather than the emotional appeal. The wider range of human interests and the contacts among folks, even the most isolated, with community and national currents of thinking, have given a weirdness and unreality to appeals that once were compelling. The latent fear of the frontiersman so easily played upon by the "hell-fire damnation" preacher has given way before the complacency of the comfortable materialist.

Frontier revivalism has therefore been gradually passing. It is true that much of it yet remains. In some districts it is still solidly intrenched, and its dislodgment gives no promise of early realization. Not unnaturally it vigorously contests its ground. Legitimately it points to its splendid service in the past. Its advocates may be pardoned for endeavoring to establish its permanent indispensability from its readily conceded value in the days that lie behind. Prophets of this character have repeatedly arisen during the history of the church. But nothing is more axiomatic with the church historian than that the successful use of an instrument in one set of circumstances is no protection against its obsolescence under different conditions. It therefore seems necessary for one acquainted with the course of the church through twenty centuries to conclude that present-day American revivalism is a tenacious carry-over from a phase of social development now almost past.

This does not mean, of course, that America may witness no further spiritual awakenings. Far from it. It has been shown that the quickenings of the colonial period were produced in only a small measure by frontier conditions. They were rather spontaneous developments of evangelical Christianity, in one case stamping down the inertia of materialism induced by the strain of immigration, and in the other quickened by a stalwart opposition to the perpetuation in America of a state-endowed church. Be it noted that an awakening is the weapon that evangelicism always retains for dealing

with critical, abnormal moral and social conditions that threaten its existence. It is the meed, moreover, for faith and steadfastness and heroism in days of obscured vision and complacency. There is therefore the ever-present possibility of spontaneous seasons of refreshing long after civilization, having sloughed off its frontier primitivity, has relegated to limbo its dependence upon conventional revivalism and the professional evangelist.

SOME SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF THE THEOLOGY OF BUDDHISM

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It is as difficult to generalize about Buddhism as it is about Christianity. Both are very complex, and both are in transition from a medieval, conservative, and dogmatic to a modern, liberal, and scientific expression. Comparison between these two great Faiths, both claiming to be universal, is therefore extremely precarious and, indeed, is only possible in any detailed sense to the very ignorant or the very learned. The latter tend to be much less clear-cut than the former, and I am not sure that the only true statement of the case is not this: It is impossible to make any generalization about either religion to which there does not immediately appear a striking contradiction; to compare the two is almost impossible.

We may select as a fundamental difference this: that the Christian religion, springing in the first instance from Jewish soil, was monotheistic and emphasized most the transcendence of God, while Buddhism, springing up on Indian soil, had a pantheistic tendency, emphasizing his immanence. Yet the moment we have said this it becomes evident that almost immediately into Christianity there came the Logos doctrine, and that before long there came into Buddhism monotheistic tendencies in the worship of the historic and other Buddhas. So much has this been the case that Dr. Anesaki can say, "If we call the Buddhist faith in Buddha's person the Christianity in Buddhism, we may with the same right see in the Christian doctrine of the Logos the Buddhism in Christianity." It is fairer and more scientific to do neither! Probably the Buddhist and the Christian theologian could agree that, different

as were the circumstances and the environment of the two religions, they very soon, in answer to human needs and to a widening environment, began to emphasize doctrines not originally articulate in them. And the amazing thing is that Buddhism, beginning so differently, had, by the time Christianity came into the world, developed a theology which is closer to the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine of the Christian church than that of the Unitarians. The first formal expression of this doctrine is found in *The Awakening of Faith* by Aśvaghosa, of the first century A.D. Starting with the historic Gautama, who taught the doctrines of the orderliness of the universe, and of moral living as the way to happiness in it, the Buddhist world very soon conceived of these things in terms of a theism, as, indeed (in spite of Buddhist scholasticism), it seems more than likely that Gautama intended it should. Men came to look upon him as the embodiment of his teaching, or *Dhamma*, as the *Bodhi*, or truth, which he had discovered, just as the Christian church came to look upon Jesus not as one who showed the way but as himself the Way and the Truth. This Buddhology we can trace in its earliest development within the Pāli books of the orthodox. From being a man, supernormal but not supernatural, Gautama becomes a god among gods, and even in the *Logia* of Buddhism known as the *Iti-Vuttaka* he is made to speak the proud words, "I have mounted the empty throne of Brahmā." But just as it was necessary to relate the historic Jesus to the Eternal Order, so the Buddhist theologians sought to relate this master-teacher, whose magnetic personality has laid a mighty spell upon the Orient for 2,500 years, to the Absolute and Eternal. This Absolute they termed *dharma-kāya*, or "the body of truth," and in the historic Buddha or Buddhas they found a *nirmāṇa-kāya*, or "adapted body," in whom the Absolute revealed himself by a process of self-emptying. And as the historic Jesus was conceived, having embodied the Godhead by a process of self-emptying, to return to glory as the risen Christ,

so the Buddhist world conceived of a *sambhoga-kāya*, or glorified "body of bliss," in which, after a sacrificial life, the Blessed One was reinstated in glory. Here, as it seems to me, is at once a unique foundation for Christian teaching in Buddhist lands and an amazing vindication of Christian theology. It is surely remarkable that the two halves of the human race working independently should have solved the problem of the great Teacher in almost identical terms.

From this theological conception the two religions have, moreover, developed a mysticism and a ritual strikingly similar; union with the Eternal through unity with the historic manifestation is the essence both of the Christian and of the Buddhist life. And if the Christian has much to contribute to the Buddhist world by insisting that the divine transcendence must not be forgotten in the divine immanence, the Buddhist has much to contribute to the Christian world by his insistence upon the unity of all life, and by the linking of the universe with the individual in his meditation. This is perhaps the central ethical note of Mahāyāna Buddhism and the underlying motive of Buddhist art—that all life is one, and that all beings suffer and rejoice together. To give a very familiar example, we may cite the great pictures of the glorified Buddha on the Vulture Peak, with animals and heavenly beings, as well as men, listening in rapture to his gospel of the One Way of salvation for all; and even earlier than this in the great sculptures of Gandhāra we find the animals mourning at his funeral pyre and rejoicing with him beneath the Bo tree. The whole practice, too, of contemplation in beautiful and lonely places has wrought into the Buddhist consciousness a sympathy with nature in all her changing moods which is a rare thing in our Western lands and even in our choicer spirits is of recent growth. There is a fascinating field of study, for example, in the poetic sentences or mottoes painted upon Chinese and Japanese Buddhist temples which breathe this spirit. One I remember in the hills above Peking:

"The old gray temple needs no lamp but the moon; it needs no lock but the mists that hem it in." The influence of this meditative school upon Chinese and Japanese civilization has been incalculable, and today may be traced even in the orderliness and charm of Japanese homes and the quiet dignity of Japanese hosts.

When we turn to the devotional expression of these underlying ideas, as we find them for instance in the hymnology of the Buddhists, we shall find many a parallel to the evangelical fervor of Christian saints. Hōnen, for example, the Japanese contemporary of St. Francis of Assisi, was never tired of expressing his devotion to Amida, looked upon as the *dharma-kāya* or eternal being, whom he had seen in vision as he gazed from his quiet hermitage on Mt. Hiei at the setting sun, and of the wideness of his mercy:

His beams of love the universe pervade,
His grace forsakes not one who calls for aid.

As I have talked with Buddhist monks I have been often reminded of Wordsworth and his "Ode on Tintern Abbey," with its sense of a Presence, "whose dwelling is the light of setting suns." This idea of the divine light as present everywhere is a very familiar one in Buddhist devotion.

The haze of morning veils the light of day,
Or grudging filters some faint golden ray:
But lo! behind the shrouding veil of mist
The whole world by the sun himself is kissed.

And another image which reminds us no less of Christian teaching is that of the impartial rain which waters all alike. It is, however, in Shinran, the Buddhist Wesley, that we find the finest expression of this devotion; for Shinran developed Hōnen's teaching that man is saved by some merit and much grace, and taught a radical doctrine of salvation by grace alone, and of gratitude for this salvation as the one and only motive for the moral life. In one hymn this doctrine is exquisitely summed up:

Eternal Father, on whose breast
 We sinful children seek our rest!
 Thy mind in us is perfected
 When on all men thy love we shed.¹

Other phrases used in these hymns, such as "gladdening light," "eternal life," and "boundless love," may be all traced back to such early Buddhist books as the *Lotus of the Good Law* (*Saddharma-pundarika*), a book written about the same time as the Fourth Gospel and like it in its theology. I have many times given this Gospel to Buddhist monks and always found that they were entirely friendly to its teachings. "Why, this is just what we believe," more than one has said to me, and others have said to my friend Mrs. Gordon, who attracts to herself priests of every school in Japan by her sympathy and understanding.

The Johannine writings are indeed more and more destined to be the presentation of Christian truth to the entire Orient, and the more they are studied by Eastern thinkers the more clearly will it be seen that Christianity is not essentially the legalistic and Hebraic religion which it has too often appeared to be.

Now if the East does us this great service of re-emphasizing the Logos doctrine, which only our theologians at present make use of, this will be in itself an ample justification of the entire missionary enterprise, and it is a fascinating theme to speculate upon an Oriental Christianity into which the rich contributions of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese devotion, artistic, mystical, and philosophical, have been poured. There are signs that such a Christianity is being produced, but at present the chief result of missionary activity is that the whole Orient has come to a profound respect for the social gospel and for the teachings of Jesus about the Kingdom of

¹ A volume of these hymns will soon be translated by my friend, the Rev. S. Yamabe of the Shinshu Sect.

God. Here Christianity has an obvious and immense contribution to make to the Buddhist world. For Buddhism, in spite of the valiant attempts of an Asoka or a Shotoku to secularize it and to found an empire upon it, has been an essentially monastic religion. It too often regards the world as hopelessly out of gear, and has produced a spirit of calm resignation with compassion at the heart of it, but with a reasoned conviction that the best thing to do with the world is to leave it. Across this comes the challenge of Jesus with his doctrine of loving human service and of a Kingdom of God to be set up here and now.

Yet, different as its *Weltanschauung* is from that of Christianity, Buddhism has related its ethic in a very striking way with a kingdom, not of this world, yet slowly transforming it by the contagion of good will. Its founder is a spiritual *Cakravarti*, or emperor; refusing material conceptions of his high calling, he sets up the standard of enlightened love over against that of force and ignorance, establishes a democratic brotherhood in which old terms are redefined, insists that right living must be founded upon right thinking, and gives to those who cannot leave the world sane and practical rules for conduct in it. "The world needs most of all," he seems to say, "reservoirs of moral living of an austere but not ascetic type and fountains of good will; specialists must specialize; but it needs also ordinary folk who, when they have been infected with the spirit of compassion, will also specialize for the benefit of all." Meantime they too can die to self and as good sons, good fathers, good citizens can attain to happiness. That is the essence of the matter.

Here then, in practice as in theology, the two great religions are in substantial agreement. And today they agree also in this, that they find themselves in a world so amazingly different from that which saw their birth that its challenge will tax them to the limit. Can they meet it? That is the most important question of the day. Can they establish peace in

the earth? Can they build a bridge between capital and labor? Can they face the insistent questions of the intellect and satisfy the longings of the heart?

These are vital questions and concern the entire world; they are being answered now. And the answer would be more reassuring if their followers would get together in the sane, tolerant, and loving spirit of their Masters. Only so can the spirit of love and truth pass freely between them. Many Buddhists are ready to say with Dr. Anesaki, "We see Christ because we have seen Buddha." Cannot Christians reply, "Let us unite in the great tasks laid upon us, and learn from both"?

Lastly, as it seems to me, we who call ourselves by the great name of Christ will be wise as well as fair if we approach our Buddhist friends in a spirit of real humility. As we face the facts of our Western exploitation of Asia, and of the ultimatum offered to our civilization by our failure alike to Christianize the social order and to establish peace, it is only in a spirit of deep penitence and shame that we can offer our religion to the more spiritual peoples of the Orient. We shall say to them:

Brothers, we believe that in Jesus we have a manifestation of God more arresting and majestic with a Gospel at once simpler and more profound, and with a motive more constraining than is to be found even in the superb religion which has made your Asia great. He is our one asset; but he is a great asset! And in no spirit of superiority, but with a keen sense of our failure to give him his rightful place, we ask your help. We and he need your spiritual genius, that the world may be enriched. And because you have done great things with the religion of Gotama we believe that you have a wonderful contribution to make to the religion of Jesus. Help us to set up his Kingdom of Peace and Love, of Faith and Hope for whose coming the world is hungry.

I have often used such words as these in speaking to my Buddhist friends, and have never failed to meet with a courteous and even affectionate response. They are attuned to such an offer of a great joint-venture of faith. Are *we* big enough to make it?

THE MORE-THAN-HUMAN VALUES OF RELIGION

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Today civilization itself is in the melting-pot; nothing escapes, religion least of all. Yet underneath the current discontent with the forms, the beliefs, and the institutions of traditional religion, there is substantially universal agreement that there is something in religion that must survive. Human life needs religion, or an adequate moral equivalent for it. On another point, too, there is agreement: namely, that the historical religions, whether true or false, have contributed elements of profound value to the faithful. Religions which every modern man would regard as almost wholly made up of false beliefs have inspired and strengthened life, have made men happy, and have given them something to live for. Christian Science and Roman Catholicism cannot be true; but both heal the sick. A religion does not need to be true in order to be valuable; it needs only to be believed.

But at this point there arises a question. Can religion survive unless it is believed to be true? This question answers itself in the negative. Faith and unfaith can ne'er be equal powers. Now the faith of religion has in the past usually expressed itself as a belief in a relation of man's life to superhuman reality, generally conceived of as personal. That is to say, the human values of religion (as it has existed) depend on faith in a more-than-human value, a God or gods above and beyond me and us. Now as soon as one begins to talk about the reality of God, or mentions more-than-human objects of religious faith, one has launched on the sea of meta-physical theology. Religion is a blessing to life, it appears;

but theology and metaphysics are abstract, difficult, never ending, and sometimes in their outcome destructive of religious belief: they seem to be a curse. Is it possible to retain the blessing and escape the curse? If we hold that religion is merely human, we have been bravely freed of the puzzles of metaphysics and the dogmas of theology. But have we thrown the child out with the bath? Would it be better for religion to keep her faith in the objective and real values which she has prized, and accept her ancient task of negotiating peace with the intriguing diplomats of science and philosophy?

Stating the problem in the terms of current thought, it would read: Is the objective reference of religious faith important and fundamental to religion, or is it a makeshift which biological and social forces have devised in order to protect the sensitive life of the merely human values? The aim of the present discussion is to call attention to the importance of this problem and to discuss certain of its aspects.

The issue raised by this problem is not that between the friends and the foes of religion, but represents a radical division among its friends. On the one hand a positivistic,¹ and on the other a metaphysical, theory of religious values; accompanying this division, radically different conceptions of religious life. The positivistic attitude regards God and all objects of religious faith as wholly immanent in human life here and now, and as having no other existence than as guiding principles of human life; the metaphysical attitude regards the religious objects and values as pointing to a reality that has cosmic, transcendent, and eternal existence. For positivism, the God idea is only a symbol for certain facts of human experience; for religious metaphysics, God is the real power controlling the universe and conserving its values. The opposition between these two points of view is the central problem of philosophy of religion at the present time.

¹ The term positivism is used in this paper to describe a general tendency in current thought. It refers to no one "school."

The positivistic tradition, founded by Comte, has exerted far-reaching influence. In the form given to it by Durkheim, it has acquired great prestige and influence not only in France, but also in England and America. By this school, religion is regarded as a phenomenon of group life. God is a name for tribal or racial or world-wide human consciousness; immortality means that the group and its values survive when the individual perishes. Worship, ritual, prayer, mysticism, all that religion means, is but the symbol of the authority of the group over the individual, or of the devotion of the individual to the group. Similar ideas come to expression in Professor Roy Wood Sellars' book, *The Next Step in Religion*, which advocates restricting religion to "loyalty to the values of life," and the elimination of all supernaturalism, such as is involved in belief in God and personal immortality. Professor G. Stanley Hall in his recent *Morale, the Supreme Standard of Life and Conduct*, takes a like position. Professor John Dewey's lectures on *Reconstruction in Philosophy* bring out most clearly the essentially positivistic character of his instrumentalism, which treats religion as a means of social control, not a relation to superhuman values. Many voices today join in the positivistic chorus, "Glory to man in the highest," and religion is regarded as a purely human undertaking, humanly initiated and humanly consummated. Thus religion avoids scholastic theology; joins hands with empirical science; and also (not the least of blessings) becomes quite democratic. For God the King is overthrown; and positivism does not dally long with the fancy of God as president. Presidents and candidates are so numerous and so incalculable in their behavior that a presidential deity might be even more arbitrary and embarrassing than a regal one. The truly democratic residuum is the apotheosis of society, the deification of the general will.

Positivism, however, is not the only vocal tendency of the present. The belief that religion is essentially metaphysical,

and its values more than human, is held by many of its philosophical interpreters. Windelband found the very essence of religion in its reference to a transcendent reality; so that he regards Comte's "religion of humanity" as a mere caricature of religion. W. E. Hocking holds that "religion would vanish if the whole tale of its value were shifted to the sphere of human affairs." G. P. Adams pleads for a Platonism which makes the values of our human world depend on our apprehension of superhuman values. Pratt in his *Religious Consciousness* points out that it is bad psychology to confine ourselves to the merely pragmatic factors in the God idea, because "it neglects altogether certain real elements in the religious consciousness whether found in philosopher, priest, or humble worshipper—men who through all the ages have truly meant by 'God' something more than the idea of God, something genuinely 'transcendent.'" Fitch's recent Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale on "Preaching and Paganism" argue, as against naturalism and humanism, for supernatural and superhuman sources of religious life. The objectivity of religious values is also in the forefront of the important contributions made by Pringle-Pattison and Sorley.

It is not our purpose to discuss the views held by these opposing groups, but rather to examine religion itself with reference to some of the issues involved in the problem under consideration. Now, on the face of it, religious life is objective. It holds, as James has said, to the reality of the unseen; "it is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call something there more deep and more general than any of the special and particular senses." The positivist, however, would argue that this objectivity is but a symbol for certain social needs and interests. The critic of positivism would have to show, then, that religion has a meaning and performs a function that cannot be exhaustively described in merely human terms, whether individual or social. Accordingly, we

shall try to show that objective reference in religion is only one manifestation of a deep-lying and universal need for objectivity; we shall then consider the relation of the more-than-human values to the human desire for certainty; we shall then seek to show how a few specific religious experiences find satisfaction in a more-than-human; and finally we shall consider objections that a positivist might urge against the metaphysical interpretation of religion.

The need for objectivity is one of the most universal needs of man's rational nature. Solipsism cannot be refuted without surreptitiously assuming that there are other persons and an objective order. All proof, we find, presupposes and implies something real other than ourselves. Solipsism is refuted, not by argument, but by life's demand for rationality, otherness, reality, objectivity. This need for objectivity is at the basis of science, philosophy, and religion. "Some passion for objectivity," says W. E. Hocking, "quite prior to other passions, there is at the bottom of all idea; a passion not wholly of an unreligious nature, not wholly unakin to the love of God." Man always finds himself by finding something else. The most normal life is the life that is forgetting itself in noble causes. Now it appears that the center of gravity of the positivistic account of religion is subjective, even though social; and a social solipsism leaves humanity in the same abhorrent and satisfied state as individualistic solipsism leaves the human unit. The center of gravity of the metaphysical account lies beyond the self; one who conceives religion thus will reach out through social relationships toward God.

Another profound need of our life is that for certainty. To mention this need appears at first like a mockery. Of what element in human life, save perhaps the empty forms of logical thinking, can we say, it is beyond all need of revision, incapable of being altered by time and circumstance? There are indeed many beliefs of which we are, as we say, morally certain, to which we have committed our lives. But can we

attribute an absolute logical certainty to the beliefs we live by? To assert that religion meets the need for certainty does not mean that it is logically proved. It means rather that religion intends to be a committing of the life to the absolutely real, to a cause that cannot fail, to the eternal God. The legitimate certainty which religion affords to the believer is the consciousness that though my creed may not perfectly apprehend infinity, yet that which my faith is seeking, and in relation to which my religious life is lived, is the actual Rock of Ages. It is the real God, and not flawless formularies or even social programs that men need as the firm foundation of their assurance in life. The formularies and programs are an essential part of the human task; but faith in them is no substitute religiously for faith in God.

So much for the more general considerations. We turn now to inquire how specific aspects of religious experience actually seek to attain these more-than-human values. Take, for example, the case of communion with the divine, the sense of intimate personal relationship between the soul and God. In this experience, the essential meaning is that the whole human enterprise, be it regarded as individual or as social, is subordinate to, and derives its meaning from, the Eternal Source of Existence and Value. It is not merely that man needs a Great Socius; his companion must also be good and almighty if man's needs are to be met. The positivistic account is not an interpretation but a denial of the significance of communion with God.

In our day religious experience very commonly takes the form of social service. Men find God by serving their neighbors. Positivists find God nowhere else than in human relations; humanity or human aspiration is God. And yet it is precisely in social experiences that the significance of the more-than-human values is most clear. Religion in its genuine historical forms has always regarded the social problem as in part a metaphysical one. The dependence of all men on God makes

human relations not less but more intimate. The faith that the ideals of the moral and religious order are more real and objective than the rocks and the lightnings imparts a sanction to morality that a purely empirical ethics can never claim. In discussing the need of such religious sanctions it is often forgotten that the mores of civilization have developed under the influence of such sanctions; and that the attempts to build up a morality without them overlooks "man's need of metaphysics." Religion has manifestly abused her metaphysical prerogative, and has driven many to choose a non-religious wholesome regard for the affairs of this world rather than ascetic otherworldliness. But religion at her best has always prayed, "Thy will be done, as in heaven, so on earth." The religious attitude toward service thus contains every factor that enters into the humanitarian, and adds to it the vision of a supernatural goal. The cup of cold water "in my name" is different from a mere cup of cold water; if the meaning of "in my name" be appreciated, the act of generosity is more likely to happen again, gives a more permanent benefit to the recipient, and unites the two persons concerned more closely by an invisible and holy tie. In a human relationship the spiritual life that is expressed is the most significant fact in it. True it is that economic and social conditions are such for the majority of mankind that this spiritually significant part of life is utterly unable to come to expression. All the more reason that the higher spiritual values should be cherished as a sacred trust by those that can appreciate them against the day when all can. Otherwise, with all improvement of environmental conditions, there is no small danger that the emancipated worker in the industrial democracy of the future may be really no better off than the wage-slave of the present order. Where there is no vision the people perish as certainly as when they must make bricks without straw.

Religion also seeks to assert its contact with the more-than-human through its faith in human immortality. Now

this belief is a peculiarly rich field for the positivist. To him it means that the social influence of the individual is endless (immortality of influence), or that the group or the group mind is thought of as never dying (immortality of the social mind), or that social values are permanent. Religion does, in some sense, affirm all this. Immortality is religion's reply to the apparent destruction of all value by death; for religion cannot admit that what is truly worthful can perish. But the positivistic account of immortality can refer only to the preservation of values by succeeding generations of men on this earth. As astronomical time goes, there appears little reason for regarding such permanence as more than a few cosmic seconds in the day's work. The positivist may reply that the average man's watch is in the bondage of relativity, and that cosmic time does not enter into his calculations. But is not the answer of Koheleth truer to the depths of man's nature, that "he hath set eternity in his heart"? If so, the true religious function of the idea of immortality is metaphysical. Religion needs an objective conservation of objective values; values (it is generally agreed) are dependent on personality; and personality will certainly not be conserved forever in the world of space and time that positivism knows. Hence only actual personal immortality will satisfy unsophisticated religion. If it be argued that values might perchance be somehow conserved, we know not how, even after all human life is forever dumb, religion would indeed in her heart of hearts murmur, "Thy will be done." But to accept such a position makes more demands on faith than does the belief that persons, our highest values, will survive—by surviving!

Everywhere, then, religion asserts itself to be more than a useful set of beliefs that will help the individual and society to function more efficiently in the world of space and time. All creeds and faiths that have taken root in history point to some revelation of truth, of eternal values, of a more-than-human by which the human is saved and glorified. If the

benefits of religion are to accrue to a human soul, that soul must have its face set toward the heavenly Jerusalem.

The assertion of the metaphysical position does not mean to imply that positivism is wholly wrong. There remains the truth that even false religious beliefs have been of great value to believers; and that there is doubtless more error than truth in every human credo. It is also true that all religious beliefs have a social function, and that many positivists are veritable prophets of the higher social values. Furthermore an examination of almost any positivistic argument will show that it is concerned with some genuine item of religious life.

A familiar attack on the objectivity of value will illustrate this statement. Values must be subjective (so positivists contend) because to be of value means to be desired; the value of anything consists in its relation to our consciousness. Nothing in the universe is of value except as it is an object of interest to human beings. If this means all that positivism interprets it to mean, it is fatal to the metaphysical pretensions of religious values. But at the same time positivism is here emphasizing one of the dearest truths of religion—namely, that all value is personal, and apart from personality there is no value. Yet there remains the opposition; positivism says: no value apart from human consciousness; religion says: no value, in my domain, that is not more than human. Now, theistic personalism may be regarded as a synthetic view. All values, it would say to positivism, are indeed satisfactions of consciousness, but they are more than satisfactions, they are laws, standards, ideals, norms which prescribe to consciousness how it ought to experience, what ought to satisfy it; when I seek truth, I do not merely seek satisfaction, I seek logical coherence; when I seek goodness or beauty I am trying to obey their laws. To religion theism would say, Yes, it is true that your values point to and presuppose an order of reality other than mere subjective states of satisfaction. But what is that other? Theism answers, It, too, is a person: only for per-

sons can obligations, ideals, values be real: in the conscious life of God is the objective reality of those values which truly ought to satisfy human life. Those values are subjective, because they would not be experienced as values unless they did satisfy human life; but they are also objective because they are experienced in relation to a reality that has supreme value in itself, namely, a personal God. Thus the positivistic argument for the subjectivity of value may be seen to play into the hands of a metaphysical personalism that does fuller justice to the facts of religious life.

The positivist might temporarily admit for the sake of argument that there may perhaps be a divine order of value, divine purposes for life to attain, divine standards for men to obey. But he might go on to insist that it profits little to grant the existence of such an order if we are incapable of knowing its nature and laws. Dogmas collide, revelations contradict, and philosophy is a "strife of systems." Religion stands looking into heaven; but it sees such an amazing array of conflicting data in the skies that the positivist almost appears to be justified when he asserts that the metaphysical reference of religion is a mere gesture, an empty form; and that all metaphysical content is patently self-refuting. But is the positivist's case here conclusive against the objectivity of religious values? If so, it is equally conclusive against all objective truth whatever; and we fall back into solipsism. In what realm is there not difference of opinion, more or less contradictory apprehension of truth, development and change in our grasp of it? In what realm is it not true that our rational ideals rescue us from chaos? Only by an ideal of a cosmos, a world of law and order, are we able to distinguish our fancies and imaginations from the perceptions of real objects. Yet this ideal of a perfectly orderly world in which all relations and causes are perfectly clear and rational has not yet been realized by science; it remains precisely an ideal by which we test our fragmentary knowledge, recognize

unsolved problems, and gradually build up an increasingly clear grasp on the real world of nature. So (as Sorley has pointed out) may it also be with our knowledge of moral values, and of the values revealed in religious experience. The ideal of a coherent system of objective religious values is the principle by which the mind tests, seeks to interpret and organize its religious experiences. It may be that it is better, both religiously and logically, for the human race to believe metaphysical errors regarding God than for it to commit the more serious error of denying the metaphysical interest which is essential to real religion and logic. At any rate, we may reply to the positivist that, so far as imperfection, contradiction, and change are concerned, knowledge of religious values is in the same sort of logical situation as our knowledge of nature. No human knowledge is perfect; but our imperfect knowledge presupposes and is judged by an ideal perfection.

Still another objection may be urged by positivists. It may be argued that the belief in the objectivity of value is plainly inconsistent with the fact that some values, at least, are products of the creative imagination. Mr. C. C. J. Webb has recently pointed out that the artist is apt to regard an objective order of values in a Divine Personality "as suggestive of a tyrannical Power, cruelly or fiendishly denying its rights to that impulse of self-expression which is his very life and holier to him than any repressive law can possibly be" (*Divine Personality and Human Life*, p. 91). Thus, if art is a value, then value experience is no mere reading off of given objective order, but the creation of a realm of beauty in human life. Indeed, the whole life of value may be regarded as a work of art; and it is hard to conceive of any values from which this element of creativity would be entirely absent. Where this creative task of intelligence is not fully recognized, the objectivity of values is in danger of being practically the same as a belief that the given standards and beliefs of one's group are to be identified with the eternal will of God and the

structure of the universe; Dewey's call for reconstruction makes us acutely aware of this peril. Hypostatization of the *status quo* inevitably results in spiritual stagnation. If one already has the eternal values, what more is there to learn? It is psychologically explicable if this sort of thing calls forth the socialistic battle-cry, Drive the gods from heaven and capitalism from the earth!

Thus the metaphysical theory appears to have the twofold disadvantage of excluding creativity and of dooming life to stagnation. The illiberal dogmatism that sometimes accompanies religious life is an illustration of the concrete outcome. Yet when this is said, it is by no means admitted that the main charge is true. If the theistic account of values be correct, the objectivity of a value does not reside in some static impersonal entity which our evaluations are merely trying to know, but rather in a set of obligations which the Eternal Person imposes on himself, and which ought to be the law and the satisfaction of every finite person. If the more-than-human values are of such a sort, may it not be that the principle of free creativity belongs to the eternally valid realm, as one of the really worthwhile aspects of the world? Only a static or impersonal conception would exclude such creativity from being part of the order of what is truly worthwhile. Indeed, if the universe is morally constructed (as religion supposes), freedom in some sense must be a supremely precious fact, but precious because it points to an objective law of the structure of the universe—the law that persons ought to create. If the real laws of being are imperatives challenging the infinite person to a perpetual exploration of the infinite, based on imperishable faith in its goodness, it is clear that stagnation or petrification of any cross-section of the temporal order can occur only when the real nature of things is misunderstood. Thus may a metaphysical account of religious life do justice to the facts of experience and reply to positivistic attacks.

The most ancient and most pressing objection to objective religious faith remains to be considered—namely, the fact of evil in life. It is all well enough to dream of a real world of eternal good as an explanation of our experiences of value; but our experiences of value are not the whole of life. Among great masses of the human race, instead of eternal values there is struggle for bare existence; trivial desires and petty interests; torturing agonies of flesh and spirit; sins of the evil will. If anything is objective, the instruction of experience would drive us to say that evil is. Demons, spirits of ill omen, satans, and devils—these are nearly as universal objects of religious belief as is God himself. Whether we confront life as a whole, or its distinctly religious part, we seem to find reasons for regarding the bad as just as universal, real, and objective as the good.

Such dualism is intolerable to religion. But is it not based on a fatal oversight? Does it not neglect that fact that, after all, good is the basic and normative, while evil is a deviation from the good? The nature of good or value may be defined without any reference to evil; witness all definitions of the *summum bonum*. On the other hand, it is impossible to define what you mean by evil without reference to the good. Evil is in-consistency, dis-harmony with the good. Evil implies good as a prior concept; good does not presuppose evil. Thus there is not the same reason for asserting the objectivity of evil as of good.

The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound;

What was good shall be good, with for evil so much good more;
On the earth the broken arcs; in the heaven, a perfect round.

This consideration does not go far toward solving the problem of evil. Indeed, whatever has been said on that subject has always left irreducible mysteries. Is this a fatal barrier against religious faith in the objectivity of values? It does not seem to religion itself like such a barrier. Nor

does logic require that it be so regarded. What theory about ultimate questions completely solves every problem? The presence of a surd does not invalidate the objectivity of a system. Evil is a problem not satisfactorily solved: so is the relation between mind and body, so is freedom, so is error, so is the value of π . But is it not more reasonable to regard the existence of evil as an incompletely solved problem in a universe in which the deepest reality is good and wholly worthwhile than either to adopt a dualism, or to abandon, with the positivists, the objectivity of good and thus evade the whole problem of evil as a cosmic problem? It behooves us to remember that the last word of religion is faith and hope in God; and that it points to a reality that is infinite and therefore must transcend our powers of interpretation.

Religion, we have found, meets a wide range of the deepest needs of life by its faith that the values which it experiences have an origin and meaning which are more-than-human. The positivistic account denies or abridges some of the most characteristic features of religion. Religion, then, is metaphysical; it is a relation to the supernatural. It is supernaturalism, not as belief in arbitrariness, lawlessness and capricious interventions, but in the more sober sense which holds, negatively, that the realm of nature visible to the senses is not all that is real or all that needs to be explained, and, positively, that the realm of values, especially of those values revealed in religious experience, is objectively and eternally real. Religious thought finds most adequate expression when this realm is interpreted as the life of one Supreme Person.

The foregoing discussion has been an artificial simplification of the problem, with the purpose of centering attention on some implications of religious experience. It is, however, not intended to convey the impression that the whole problem of religious values is solved by pronouncing the shibboleth "objective and metaphysical." On the contrary, it is clear

that objectivity is the problem, not its solution. Positivists and metaphysicians have alike been concerned to interpret objectivity. Positivists have dwelt on the truth that the only world we have is the experienced world; that all objectivity must be found in the interpretation of that world; that the unexperienceable belongs in the outer darkness with all *Dinge an sich*. The transcendent is unthinkable; and if the objectivity of religious values means this, away with it! Thus current pragmatism and new realism, with all their differences, join in a common empiricism. The metaphysicians, while willing to admit that our only business as thinkers is to make the world of experience intelligible, have frequently replied that there is an ineradicable dualism in the cognitive relation. The object to which perception or thought refers is never identical with my act of perceiving or thinking. Even in a world wholly made up of experience stuff there would be a transcendent reference in every cognitive act. When now I refer to my own past or future, I transcend my present psychical state by what Professor Lovejoy calls intertemporal cognition. When I assert that another person is suffering the pangs of despised love, I mean that there is a fact in the universe that transcends my psychical state, and that can never be as it is in itself (namely, for the forlorn one) a fact in my experience.

The metaphysician (if he be an ontological personalist, and a theist) might therefore say to the positivist: I grant that everything to which my thought refers is of the nature of experience (provided the term be allowed to mean all that personal consciousness includes), but at the same time I assert that my object is other than my experience. I assert that knowledge implies transcendence, and also that life forces on us the assumption that my thought can successfully describe that to which it refers. But it does not merely refer to its own past or future or to other persons; it also refers to the world of nature and to God. If other persons have an existence (however psychical) that is not identical with my

"experience of" them, and if nature is not my or our experience of it, may not the Supreme Object of religious valuation likewise have an existence that is other than "our" experiences, however noble, social, and morally useful our experiences may be?

If philosophy of religion is to advance, there must be a clearer definition of such terms as experience, verifiability (and what crimes have been committed in thy name!), objective reference, objectivity, and the like. The present writer desires to call attention to the recent co-operative volume of *Essays on Critical Realism*, edited by Professor Durant Drake. In this volume current epistemological doctrines, pragmatic and neo-realistic alike, are challenged, and the problems stated in a fashion that may turn out to be of significance for philosophy of religion, and in particular for the problem presented in the present paper.

THE AMERICAN JEW: HIS PROBLEMS AND HIS PSYCHOLOGY

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There have been three waves of Jewish immigration into America. The first immigrants, in the early days of settlement, were Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch Jews with all their splendid background of breeding and culture. Their numbers were small. They intermarried with Christians and with the second wave of German-Jewish immigration which reached our shores in the forties and fifties. For these reasons they have almost disappeared, despite their pride of family and the wish to keep themselves distinct. The German immigration settled here and prospered, contributing much to that fine body of stable, hard-working, clear-thinking citizens who make up our great middle class. The flood tide of immigration was reached after the May Laws of Russia in the eighties, which created the Pale. This amounted to a flight of a whole people. These last comers found their homes in the crowded centers of the great cities. They sought employment in the vocations to which they were trained, more particularly in the needle trades and clothing industry; this was their work in the old country; to this they set themselves on arrival here. They have achieved remarkable success and are pushing the German-Jewish group from places of influence and power by their overwhelming numbers.

The older resident groups, those who have been here for several generations, are as different from these, their brethren, as men of different races. They cannot understand the adherence to the old marks that characterize the ghettos of Europe. The inhabitants of the ghettos in the American

cities seem all out of harmony with American life as we understand it. And so the two largest groups remain divided, having little in common, eyeing each other with more of suspicion than sympathy, yet suffering together the burden of Jewry.

Grave problems which arise out of this situation face the American Jew; problems we should be frank to realize, and to the solution of which American Israel must set itself. We must not be swept from our moorings because we are in the minority. The influence of the immigrant Jew is cast definitely in the scale of exclusiveness, clannishness. Such institutions as the Jewish parochial schools or the tendency to inject into our American political system European conceptions of group rights and minority privileges must be combated with all our influence and all our power.

The greatest task which confronts American Jewry is the problem of the younger people among our immigrant population. The attitude of the older generation is easily understood. They seek refuge in the authority of the past; they dig back to origins and attempt to assert themselves by a futile clinging to the old, in the endeavor to stay the flood that is sweeping away their offspring. This uncompromising attitude, as much as the disintegrating influence of the struggles to readjust themselves, is the cause of the greatest number of the unsynagogued, the indifferent, the criminal, and the anti-social among our immigrant brethren. Despairing of any real observance of the faith as they have learned it and practiced it, gripped in the tyranny of the economic machine, knowing no other interpretation of Judaism—for from the beginning the liberal interpretation of Judaism was pictured to them as shameful heresy—they break completely with the past. Rejoicing in the untrammelled freedom of the new land, they cast aside, with the shackles of their old political tyranny, the restraining tenets and practices of the only Judaism they know. They cut the roots and would start anew. And this

is the tragedy of the immigrant Jew—and, let us not mistake, the tragedy of all American Israel too, for the position of American Jewry can never be stronger than the regard in which the least of our brethren is held. The people to whom traditions were sacred and the spirit of law and obedience to discipline were the highest imperatives in life shows a tragic disregard for law, fills the courts of our crowded centers with transgressors and the papers with Jewish names associated with crime.

It is evident that something should be done. The non-Jew will not distinguish between Jew and Jew, between up-town and down-town Jew, between reform and orthodox Jew, between immigrant and older resident. We cannot stand aloof in complacent superiority announcing that we, the older residents, are different, and expect to escape the contumely. The consequences are equally dangerous for us as for our immigrant brethren. We should and must come to realize that this problem of the immigrant Jew is the problem of the whole household of American Israel.

I do not believe we have given the immigrant in our midst the sort of welcome which he needed. This applies not only to the immigrant Jew but to all our immigrant population. We have organized our great philanthropies, and generous has been the response of the older residents. But for the most part we have thrown the immigrant into the stream of American life and left him to swim for himself. The Jewish immigrant needed by his nature, craved from his soul, something more than a full stomach. The terrible pressure of economic life, together with his natural desire to be with his fellow-countrymen, and also his wish to live near a synagogue and so observe his religious customs, forced him into the crowded sections of our cities, there to live or to die. We expected the natural laws of adjustment to Americanize him. And America, great and vibrant being that she is, engulfed him in the maelstrom. In a very short time he learned the superficialities

of American life, the ways of politics, the veneers of the American spirit, and when he had fulfilled the allotted time he became a citizen—but without ever knowing spiritually the land of his adoption. We became annoyed when he did not dress and talk and think like us. We became alarmed when he cut loose from his past entirely. At the same time we took no care to maintain within him the spiritual values of his old life nor to appropriate those values to strengthen, beautify, and stabilize our American and our Jewish life. And we are paying the price in vast numbers of indifferentists, in economic discontent, in broken family morale, in disloyalty, disintegration, and crime.

You see then the great difficulties which are confronting us. The great mass of American Jews, including the immigrant, is law-abiding. The heritage of reverence and respect for the law is deeply ingrained in the Jewish character and expresses itself in obedience to constituted authority. This lawlessness is the reflex of previous restrictions, the growing-pains of adaptation to the new environment. Even in Russia, though names of Jews are prominent in the Bolshevik movement, the great mass of Jews is known to be opposed to the Bolshevik program of appropriation, confiscation, and terror.

One of the most interesting phases of the situation is the attempt which certain Christian bodies are making to take advantage of the drifting, unmoored Jewish mass and convert it to Christianity. Large sums of money are being appropriated for this work. Such a policy should be a challenge to American Jewry which we should hail, not in anger, but as an opportunity. Pride should stimulate American Jews that others should not do the work which is inherently our own: of arousing an active interest in religion.

The situation is by no means a desperate one. My experience with the children of the immigrant fills me with a great hopefulness. I have found a latent idealism among most of the immigrants and children of the immigrants which expresses

itself in other than Jewish ways simply because it has never been given an opportunity to realize itself Jewishly. Through these many weary centuries of oppression the Jew, thrown back upon himself, sought and found solace and inspiration in the vast store of Jewish literature, rich in idealism. Herein he read and studied day and night. The darkness of the ghetto was lighted by the faith and spirituality of his poets, philosophers, and teachers. All this idealism has been choked down, repressed, but it has accumulated in the Jewish heart and soul; and all this restrained but stored-up energy and spiritual passion are ready to break through into the present and flow into the stream of American Jewish life, enriching and glorifying America and Jewish life in America. This idealism rooted in the genius of the Jew can best express itself after its own kind—in a Jewish way. These our brethren can best serve the country as citizens if they serve it as Jews. It is our duty as Jews to capture this *Élan*, to organize and direct it; to give it the means for conscious realization; it is our duty as American Jews to see to it that our household is well ordered, that our children contribute their full share to the stabilization of American life.

This, then, is the situation in American Israel. It is the story of a great people attempting to adapt itself to a new and different atmosphere. It is the heartbreaking effort to remain loyal to its heritage in the maelstrom of an environment that it does not yet completely understand, and which as yet does not understand it. If American Israel is blameworthy, it is in this, that it is not striving mightily enough to unite all the discordant factions into a single race-conscious, God-conscious people. Upon the Jewish population of the United States rests the first responsibility to redeem the delinquent in its ranks by a revival of loyalty to the best traditions of the Jewish faith and the Jewish people. A clear understanding of the situation by Jews themselves, the will to work together in harmony as Jews and Americans, must inevitably precede

any intelligent effort to counteract anti-Semitism in the United States.

Several other charges demand refutation. They are based upon a misunderstanding of the psychology of the Jew. I would have you see this Jewish soul as it grapples with itself, as it seeks to express itself in our world. I would have you know how the Jew regards himself in relation to other peoples, to America, to his God.

It is said that the Jew is a distinct nationality; that he will never completely identify himself with the American Republic because he is intensely nation-conscious!

The war brought into recognition new definitions of the terms *nation* and *nationality*. A *nation* is a political organization. It is the mechanism and institution of government which a people creates to secure its stability and ordered progress. *Nationality* is the spiritual background or backgrounds of a nation. For instance, the United States of America is but one nation; in the American nation there are as many nationalities as there are peoples who have come here from other lands.

The Jews are not a *nation*. Many Jews of the world are opposed to the creation of a Jewish nation. The question of Zionism nearly caused a schism a few years since in the ranks of American Israel. Even today great bodies of liberal and orthodox Jews refuse to support the movement for Palestinian restoration, because they fear it may lead to the creation of a nation. There are those who believe in a Jewish homeland, who believe there should be one place in the world where the Jewish soul shall have the unhindered opportunity to express itself in a culture of its own. As a matter of fact, the Zionist policy itself has undergone radical changes since the Balfour Declaration. The most that is hoped for, and that at the end of a long period of time, perhaps many decades, is the establishment of autonomy under the continued suzerainty of Great Britain. The immediate emphasis is on the

philanthropic, practical, cultural, and spiritual aspects of the movement.

That the Jews of the United States do not constitute a nation, a people with divided loyalty, is not debatable for a moment. I need hold no brief for the patriotism of the American Jew. He came with Columbus; he fought with Washington; he made possible the continued struggle for American independence. Jewish blood consecrates every American battlefield in every war from the earliest days. American Jews, conscious of the freedom they enjoy here, realizing the concordance of American ideals with Jewish ideals, will ever be ready to take their places, shoulder to shoulder with their fellow-Americans, as they have in the past, in defense of the institutions of this blessed land. They want no other country. They spurn any other allegiance. Their love of America is writ in a story of Jewish blood and Jewish sacrifice! The native-born Jew and the immigrant Jew with broken English unite at least in eloquent testimony to their devotion to these United States. No—the Jews are not and do not desire a nation!

The Jews are a *nationality*.

If a common past, a common history, common sacrifice and suffering, the same language and literature, if a common hope and ideal and a common faith, constitute the spiritual background of a people, then are we a nationality. But this is a spiritual allegiance and not a political loyalty. And our Christian brethren with their splendid background of Christian historic tradition will be able to understand it. Of course, with us there is this difference: in addition to the bond of union as believers in the same religion, Judaism, there is the consciousness of peoplehood—the realization that we belong to a people, the Jewish people. This consciousness is frequently lost wilfully by renegade Jews or lessened in the process of adaptation; but the outside world, through prejudice or discrimination, or barriers in business and social life, forces upon us Jews—even upon those who would forget—the

knowledge that we belong to a distinct people. The best type of American Jew is eager to proclaim his fealty to Judaism; is willing to accept the discomforts of being a Jew.

If we are to be convicted because we are true to ourselves, true to the best in our past; if we are to be convicted because of our willingness to bend our necks to the slaughterer in refusal to relinquish truth as we conceive it; then upon the nations of the earth who make the unholy claim be the blame—not upon us! It is our duty to be ourselves. The tragedy is the greater in that many among us are not loyal. On the other hand, we do not feel the narrow chauvinism which sees only good in Jews, which recognizes no evil in the household of Israel. But we must be what we are, Jews, by the blood that flows in our veins, by the faith and sacrifice of unnumbered of our fathers.

Again, it is said: The Jews are against society, against the gentile scheme of things. Someone has remarked of the Jew that he is a democrat against monarchy; a socialist against democracy, and a Bolshevik against the socialist state. We are iconoclasts, lawbreakers, revolutionists.

The Jewish people is not obliged to defend the opinion of individual Jews. Without doubt the foregoing describes most aptly many of my coreligionists. Just as truly it describes many who profess Christianity. But to say that the Jew and Judaism are against society and Christian civilization is to exhibit either ignorance or hate or both.

Many years ago one man's heart was gripped by the wrong, injustice, inhumanity, and illiberality of the world. This man's soul was enthralled by a vision of brotherhood, of a time of justice and of peace. He taught his children thus to dream, and they their children's children, till a whole people felt the divine call to so live that these ideals should be realized in the institutions and relations of men.

The Jewish soul has always kindled to a flame when injustice rose in the land. It is no accident that the prophets

were Jews. It is no accident that Jesus was a Jew. It is no accident that Jews throughout the world today are striving to better conditions among men.

When an instinctive longing of the soul is met by cruel repression it will burst its bonds and make itself manifest—usually to an extravagant degree. The Jew is essentially a personalist. God is a reality to him. He identifies God's interests with his own. God demands that he cry out against unrighteousness and wrong wherever they may be. He feels called to do the work of God in cleaning the dirty places of the world, in binding up the wounds of society, in creating such an order as shall make men free. Therefore, wherever there is injustice, there Jewish arms are lifted as instruments of God for the right; wherever there is hate, there Jewish hearts are found as ministers of love.

If we are accused of anarchy, revolution, and destruction, I would answer that *some Jews* are leaders in these movements, because their innate sense of justice, long rebelling against oppression, yet unable to express itself, swings now to the extreme of radicalism. The wonder is that every Jew in Russia and Poland and Roumania is not an anarchist. But the discipline exacted by the faith makes law-abiding citizens of the vast majority. According to the Jew, law, a fundamental attribute of the universe, must likewise determine the freedom of the individual. The passion of his soul for liberty and justice, for himself and others, is tempered by the discipline of his Torah, is humanized by his concept of God, the universal Father, whose children are his brothers.

If we are accused of being protestants, disturbers of the peace, I answer that we would protest against the wrongs and inequities of modern society; we would disturb the smug content of them that eat of the fleshpots of Egypt; we would destroy the peace of them who sit at ease in Zion! Where there are sin and misery, superstition and error, prejudice and hate, wrong and injustice in the world, when there is God's

work to do, we cannot abide in our tents at peace. We summon to this hallowed crusade, not only the loyal among our own, but those from the folds of our Christian brethren, that together in the blessed fellowship of a common cause we may wage the battle against the forces of tyranny to capture for the poor and the weak the inalienable rights of freemen. Jewish discontent is constructive!

I have purposely emphasized the religious conditions in American Israel and described the psychology of the Jew, because an understanding of these things will show the baselessness of the charges against us and will dispel the anxiety of those who fear us. When the Jew breaks from the spiritual heritage of his people and his faith, then he becomes a menace; he breeds Jewish criminals and Jewish radicals and gives just cause for Christian condemnation.

I confess we must sweep before our own doors! Before we cry out by reason of the prejudice of the world against us we must tear out of our hearts the prejudices we have against our own brethren. An awful responsibility rests upon the Jew in America to realize in his personal life as husband, parent, child, friend, and citizen those noble ideals which his faith enjoins upon him. Jewish capitalists and employers should conceive it to be their highest duty as Jews, out of the rich storehouse of our prophets' inspiration for social justice, to apply in their relations with their employees such high standards of justice and benevolence that they will lead the way to a peace of industrial democracy here in America. Jewish manufacturers and leaders of industry must show that their capital is ready to become the stepping-stone for the new economic organization of society, which shall be based upon the right. Jewish laborers must not ally themselves with the hinderers, radicals, and destructionists, who delay the ordered progress of society, sow the seed of hate among us, divide the body politic into angry groups, and bring misfortune to thousands. To the Jewish employer and the

Jewish worker I would say: According to our religion, God and man are partners in the work of the world. The work we do is His work. Beyond the obligation we owe our fellow-men and sanctifying that obligation is the figure of God! "Unless the Lord build the house, they labor in vain who build it." The eyes of the non-Jewish world are upon us. They expect more from the Jew. They demand more from the Jew. And rightly! For the Jew considers himself a mission people. If we presume to call ourselves leaders of righteousness, in God's name we should so live that our example shall be worthy of emulation. If we "would be priests ministering to a world, we must first sanctify ourselves!"

Would that the Jews of America would see these things! Too many of my people shut God out of their lives. They would not be Jews. They would be something else. An aching discontent gnaws at their hearts. They are hungry and thirsty. They crowd the shrines of lesser cults without the law. They believe they find healing and salvation at other waters than the rivers of Jordan. They know not why this anguish, this hectic neurosis, this tragic madness. I know: It is because they would not be themselves. It is because they have forgotten God.

Would that my people should understand these things! The physical characteristics of the Jew may be lost as he reacts to the environment of freedom. The back may be straightened, the form heightened, the face lose its rugged, crude, and elemental strength. But the Jewish heart throbs within him. The Jewish soul is unchanged!

Would God my people would heed these things! Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ha-Levi, Maimonides, Mendelssohn—all his people's seers and prophets and poets—live in the Jew of today. Their inspiration forms the fabric of his being. Their redeeming revelations are graven on his heart. He is born with them. They live again in him. The Jew's past

is in his soul. He cannot forget it, no matter how much he would. He cannot blot it out. It is the heritage of his birth. It haunts him. It gives him no peace. God has chosen the Jew! God will not let him alone! The Jew abandons his God? Turns his back upon him? Ah, he cannot! "Whither shall I go from Thy spirit? Or whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend into heaven, Thou art there; If I make my bed in the nether-world, behold Thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; Even there would Thy hand lead me and Thy right hand would hold me." It was written. It is so. All the mighty imperatives of his tragic past, all the martyrdom of his people, rise up to agonize his heart with a thousand discontents. He becomes restless, unhappy, a cynic, a debaucher, an anarchist—a lonely, lonely seeker who gropes blindly in the dark! But—God comes into his soul and he is transfigured! The prophets live again. The poets sing. The Jew serves! He has answered the call of his God. He has fulfilled the divine purpose for which he was created: He is a blessing!

Prejudice will die out only when there is no fuel to call it forth. When all is said and done, prejudice cannot be fought with prejudice; but it can be met by courage; it can be conquered by love; it can be overcome by service! When the world hates us, let us love; when the world reviles us, let us serve! The only justification for our separateness is that which our history, our literature, and our tradition teach us: to exemplify the reality of God in our daily lives and in our relations with our fellows.

America charges the Jew to be himself. America expects the Jew to give himself to his faith and his people. America is rightly alarmed at the lack of Jewish loyalty to Jewish ideals. America charges every Jew that the responsibility for the unsynagogued, the delinquent, the criminal, the anarchic Jew, is upon him. America demands not that he forsake his

faith; America proclaims: I do not want you, renegade Jew. I do not respect you, disloyal Jew. You do me no good. You do me harm. America declares: You serve me best when you serve me as a Jew!

Let the Jews of America accept the challenge! Let them lay upon their souls the burden of a new consecration. Let my people strip from their hearts the narrow and petty prejudices which divide them, which make their efforts futile, which hold them up to scorn! Let them cling fast to the spiritual imperatives of our great tradition. Let them eschew the fleshpots of Egypt and the worship of the golden calf. Let them throw themselves upon the God of their fathers as their forebears have done in days gone by. Let them serve the Lord God with all their hearts and all their souls and all their might with the old cry: I shall not die but I shall live and declare the deeds of the Lord! We shall have naught to fear. Our fellow-citizens shall have naught to blame.

RELIGIOUS AND OTHER ECSTASIES

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In the psychology of religion adequate conclusions cannot be reached unless, making full use of the comparative method, phenomena that are alike, whether they appear within or outside of religion, are studied together.

We propose in this paper to establish whatever relation can legitimately be established between religious and non-religious ecstasy. Beginning with instances generally regarded as purely physiological in their origin, i.e., independent of any belief or other conscious factor, we shall end with a religious ecstasy.

The main manifestation of that dread disease, epilepsy, is often preceded by curious signs, varying greatly from person to person, but fairly constant in the same person. In some instances, the "aura," as these premonitory symptoms are called, is in the nature of an ecstasy. In *Modern Medicine* Dr. Spratling reports the case of a priest under his care whose epileptic attacks were preceded by a rapturous moment. Walking, for instance, along the streets he would suddenly feel, as it were, "transported to heaven." This state of marvelous enjoyment would soon pass, and a little later on he would find himself seated on the curb of the sidewalk aware that he had suffered an epileptic attack.¹ The same author mentions elsewhere two other epileptic patients, "teachers of noted ability," who speak of their aura as "the most overwhelming ecstatic state it is possible for the human to conceive of."²

¹ W. P. Spratling, art. "Epilepsy" in Osler's *Modern Medicine*, Vol. VII.

² *Epilepsy and Its Treatment*, p. 466.

Similarly, the Russian novelist Dostoevsky enjoyed, before his epileptic attacks, a moment of supreme elation:

There are seconds—they come five or six at a time—when you suddenly feel the presence of the eternal harmony. It is something not earthly—I do not mean in the sense that it is heavenly—but in the sense that man cannot endure it in his earthly aspect. This feeling is clear and unmistakable. It is as though you apprehend all nature and suddenly say, "Yes! it's right, it's good." It is not that you love—oh, there is something in it higher than love—what's most awful is that it is terribly clear, and such joy!¹

There is in *The Idiot* a similar description:

I remember among other things a phenomenon which used to precede his epileptic attacks, when they came in the waking state. In the midst of the dejection, the mental marasmus, the anxiety, which the madman experienced, there were moments in which all of a sudden the brain became inflamed and all his vital forces suddenly rose to a prodigious degree of intensity. The sensation of life, of conscious existence, was multiplied tenfold in these swiftly passing moments. A strange light illumined his heart and mind. All agitation was calmed, all doubt and perplexity resolved themselves into a superior harmony, but these radiant moments were only a prelude to the last instant—that immediately preceding the attack. That instant, in truth, was ineffable.²

The epileptic aura is a phenomenon well known to medical students. The following information, taken from Spratling's works, is valuable for our purpose:

The most common psychic aura is a sudden acceleration of the imagination, a quick overflowing of the process of thought in which "the train of imagery is urged ahead with trembling, excited haste until the thread is snapped and unconsciousness occurs."

Sudden blindness may constitute the most substantial part of the aura.

Auditory auras usually partake of the character of roaring and voices, the sound of the waves, etc. Such aura occurs in from two to three per cent of all cases.³

¹ *The Possessed* (Besi), tr. by C. Garnett (New York: Macmillan).

² *The Idiot*, I, 296.

³ The last quotation is from *Three Lectures on Epilepsy* by W. A. Turner (Edinburgh, 1910), p. 6.

Hallucinations of taste and smell occur also. The reappearance of normal consciousness is frequently marked by temporary mental confusion, during which phase automatisms or semipurposive actions may take place.

The preceding instances of epileptic auras show the following features: (1) the total absence of a causal conscious factor: a purely physiological cause is assigned; (2) the aura comes suddenly and unexpectedly; the subject's rôle is therefore an entirely passive one; it is as if an external power had taken possession of him; (3) it brings with it a "sense" of illumination, of revelation; (4) the experience is at times so wonderful that the most extravagant descriptive terms and comparisons seem to the subjects to fall short of the reality; it is an ineffable experience.

These traits might naturally enough suggest superhuman causation. Yet, no metaphysical significance is ascribed to them. The priest did not think himself actually transported to heaven; neither did he believe that he had communed with God. Both the priest and Dostoevsky accept the scientific view: these raptures are the expression of a particular organic disease; and so, the latter says, "it is not a higher life, but, on the contrary, one of lower order."¹

In *Les Obsessions et la Psychasthénie* by Janet are found instances very similar to the preceding and yet not apparently connected with epilepsy. In them some conscious activity, sometimes regarded as the sufficient cause, precedes the ecstasy. In fact, however, the conscious activity (perception, idea, etc.) plays rather the rôle of an occasion, as, for instance, of a spark that explodes a train of powder.

Fy, while walking in the country, is intoxicated by the open air, "everything seems delightful"; it seems to her that she is going "to burst from happiness." She declares:

I have never before experienced that; the day passes like a dream; time passes five times more swiftly than in Paris. I feel a better person,

¹ *The Idiot*.

and it seems to me that there are no bad people, every face is sympathetic and it seems to me that I live in the Golden Age.¹

Gs., contemplating Paris from the top of the Trocadero, is roused to intense admiration, and for a moment he forgets his suffering. He says:

It seems to me that it is too beautiful, too grand, that I am lifted up above myself. At the time, it gives me an enormous pleasure; but it exhausts me, my legs shake, and it seems to me that, unable to stand that happiness, I am going to swoon.²

But, however vivifying and inspiring a beautiful day in the country or Paris from the Trocadero may be, these sights do not usually liberate storms of feeling such as are described by these two persons. The country and Paris acted upon them like a last drop that starts an overflow. Quite similar are the two following instances, taken from my own documents.

A young woman passed, on divers occasions, through moments of sudden and extreme happiness. In one instance it was when recovering from illness; in another, she was "in a beautiful place in the Catskill Mountains, walking or sitting alone." Suddenly, she found herself "uplifted" by an "overwhelming sensation of the bigness of things." She felt a desire to pray. But these words are, in her opinion, quite inadequate to describe her experience.³

Another woman writes:

Once when walking in the wild woods and in the country, in the morning under the blue sky, the sun before me, the breeze blowing from the sea, and the birds and flowers around me, an exhilaration came to me that was heavenly—a raising of the spirit and nature within me through perfect joy. Only once in my life have I had such an experience of heaven.⁴

The case of Nadia is not essentially different, for, although two powerful emotional stimuli, love and music, provide rational causes, common sense will not in this instance regard

¹ Pierre Janet, *Les Obsessions et la Psychasthénie* (Paris, 1903), I, 380-81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 380.

³ No. 125.

⁴ No. 40.

them as causes commensurate with the intensity of the storm they let loose. The love itself has hardly any rational basis, for Nadia has never spoken to the man and has seen him but a few times. She wrote to Pierre Janet, her physician:

The concerts given by X have been for me a revelation; they have awakened such an enthusiasm in me that I have never recovered from it. I cannot explain its effect. When I left the hall after the first concert, my legs and whole body shook so that I could not walk, and I spent the night in tears. . . . But it was not painful, far otherwise; it was as if I was coming out of a dream which filled my past life. I understood things more as they really are. I was in a veritable heaven of happiness. My only hope during many years has been to hear him again and to experience the same feelings. I believe that, as people said, I had a passion for him, but it was not an ordinary passion; of that I am sure. He seemed to possess a supernatural influence over me.¹

Nadia reminds one of love at first sight. Is not the *coup de foudre de l'amour*, as the French say, a phenomenon in several respects similar to the one we are discussing? The passive rôle of the subject, the suddenness of the emotional onslaught, the ineffable happiness establish a resemblance more than superficial. But space does not permit of a more detailed comparison.

Jean occasionally experiences what he calls *sensations sublimes et solennelles*. This happens, for instance, when he thinks of himself as a representative in the Chamber of Deputies, and when, before well-filled galleries, he pronounces a great political speech. A slight shudder runs through his body—not an unpleasant shudder—: his heart is calm and beats slowly . . . ; instead of his habitual humble tread, with head down, he straightens up, and strides along with an important air. His intelligence is exalted and keen, and he thirsts for knowledge; above all, he enjoys a sense of happiness never otherwise felt. "They are," he says, "divine impressions that prove to me the existence of a soul in the body."²

The appellation "divine" applied by Jean to his emotion and the illogical sequence of ideas by which he comes to the belief in the existence of a soul in the body are well worth

¹ P. Janet, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

² *Ibid.*, p. 381.

noticing; the same sort of reasoning is common enough among persons cherishing high intellectual pretensions.

Few, if any, persons will fail to recognize in their own experiences moments of exaltation comparable to the foregoing, both in their quality and in their occasion. We are in the habit of regarding these moments as determined by some mental content, but the noteworthy thing is that they are, in principle, no more rationally caused than Jean's ecstasy or the raptures of No. 125. Did Jean actually pronounce mentally a noble discourse? Did he develop a succession of great thoughts supported by vast erudition, set forth with powerful logic? Certainly not. He simply pictured himself speaking in the impressive setting of the Chamber of Deputies. He did not actually say anything, or the things which he said mentally were mere shadowy fragments of commonplace stump-speech oratory. But he heard the applause from the galleries, and he straightened up, and he felt a shiver course down his spine, and he thought himself convincing and witty.¹

These last cases are, then, instances of the presence of an internal, organic store of energy ready to be set off at a slight provocation. Paris from the top of the Trocadero, a sun-lit landscape, a strain of music, an imaginary speech in the Chamber, were, in each particular case, equally efficient fuses. Every normal emotional experience (but not only those) is dependent upon these two factors: a stimulus in the form of a perception or other mental process and an organic disposition set into activity by the stimulus. Each particular instance differs from every other in respect to the share of these two determining factors. In abnormal instances there may be no conscious stimulus. That is the case in the epileptic aura; the emotional explosion is, as it were, self-started.

The trait of religious mystical ecstasy which has been most insisted upon in the literature of the subject—a trait

¹ This is a delusion due to causes similar to those that determine the illusory sense of power in a partly intoxicated person.

without which, according to the Roman Catholic church, no ecstasy is a true religious ecstasy—is its “noetic quality,” as the philosophers call it; the mystics themselves speak of “revelation” or of “illumination.” A careful examination places beyond doubt the revelatory character of every one of the preceding instances. Nadia alone uses the term “revelation,” but all of them convey in no mistakable terms the unique, wonderful quality of their experiences. They seem to them not only different from, but another sort of thing than, anything they have so far known. Both Nadia and Jean speak of a new understanding of things; and Dostoevsky, struggling to describe the undescribable, notes two aspects of revelation upon which the Christian mystics usually lay stress, its clearness and its certitude.

It might be said, by way of objection, that what we refer to in these instances as “revelation” is too lacking in conceptual clearness to deserve that name. But is it not well known that lack of conceptual definiteness has never been regarded by the mystics, or their apologists, as a sufficient reason for disbelieving in the revelatory quality of the mystical experience? It is sufficient for the present purpose to remark that objection on the ground of vagueness applies equally to a great many other instances of ecstatic “revelation,” both religious and otherwise.

Why is it that although our instances possess all the essential traits of religious mystical ecstasy, namely, suddenness, ineffability, noetic quality (impression of illumination), and passivity, they are not regarded by the experiencers as due to God and are not classed as religious experiences? A sufficient reason has already been offered with reference to the ecstasies known to the experiencer to be part of an epileptic attack. As to the others, they did not take place under conditions favoring a religious interpretation. The more common of these conditions is an antecedent belief in the divine origin of ecstasy; or, at least, in a God who can manifest himself in man. When

to that belief is added a desire or an expectation of entering into blessed relation with God, the probability of a divine interpretation being put upon ecstasy is very greatly increased. This general and inadequate statement must not be interpreted as implying the impossibility of an ecstatic experience becoming itself the ground of belief in a God-Providence.

We pass now to an instance of ecstasy regarded both by the experiencer and the world in general as religious.

M. E. is a man of superior education and of great moral earnestness. Throughout his life he has wrestled with philosophico-religious problems. He is wont to see in life, at least in its more dramatic events, the hand of Providence. It will be observed in the account which follows that the ecstasy fell upon him with startling unexpectedness; as far as he knew, nothing whatsoever, whether in his physical or in his psychical condition, could have foreshadowed its appearance. In this respect his ecstasy did not differentiate itself from certain epileptic *aurae*. Did it differentiate itself from them in any way other than the interpretation placed upon it and the natural consequence of that interpretation? It is for him a divinely caused experience. The effect of that belief was to lift up the ecstasy to the rank of an event of the highest spiritual importance.

As to ecstasies, I experienced one, among others, which I remember perfectly. I will try to tell you when and how it happened and what it was like. I was thirty-six years old. I was climbing with some young fellows from Forclaz to the Croix de Bovine in order to reach Champex. We were following a road bordered by blooming oleanders, and looking down over a stretch of country dotted here and there with clumps of firs. The wind scattered the clouds above and below us, sending them down or driving them up in whirling eddies. Now and then one escaped and floated over the valley of the Rhône. I was in perfect health; we were on our sixth day of tramping, and in good training. We had come the day before from Sixt to Trient by Buet. I felt neither fatigue, hunger, nor thirst, and my state of mind was equally healthy. I had had at Forclaz good news from home; I was subject to no anxiety,

either near or remote, for we had a good guide, and there was not a shadow of uncertainty about the road we should follow. I can best describe the condition in which I was by calling it a state of equilibrium. When all at once I experienced a feeling of being raised above myself, I felt the presence of God—I tell of the thing just as I was conscious of it—as if his goodness and power were penetrating me altogether. The throb of emotion was so violent that I could barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait for me. I then sat down on a stone, unable to stand any longer, and my eyes overflowed with tears. I thanked God that in the course of my life he had taught me to know him, that he sustained my life and took pity both on the insignificant creature and on the sinner that I was. I begged him ardently that my life might be consecrated to the doing of his will. I felt his reply, which was that I should do his will from day to day, in humility and poverty, leaving him, the Almighty God, to be judge of whether I should some time be called to bear witness more conspicuously. Then, slowly, the ecstasy left my heart; that is, I felt that God had withdrawn the communion which he had granted, and I was able to walk on, but very slowly, so strongly was I still possessed by the interior emotion. Besides, I had wept uninterruptedly for several minutes, my eyes were swollen, and I did not wish my companions to see me. The state of ecstasy may have lasted four or five minutes, although it seemed at the time to last much longer. My comrades waited for me ten minutes at the cross of Bovine, but I took about twenty-five or thirty minutes to join them, for, as well as I can remember, they said that I had kept them back for about half an hour. The impression had been so profound that in climbing slowly the slope I asked myself if it were possible that Moses on Sinai could have had a more intimate communication with God. I think it well to add that in this ecstasy of mine God had neither form, color, odor, nor taste; moreover, that the feeling of his presence was accompanied with no determinate localization. It was rather as if my personality had been transformed by the presence of a *spiritual being*. But the more I seek words to express this intimate intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility of describing the thing by any of our usual images. At bottom the expression most apt to render what I felt is this: God was present, though invisible; he fell under no one of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived him.¹

¹ Th. Flournoy, *Observations de psychologie religieuse*, Obs. V, pp. 351-57 (abbreviated). The translation is by W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 67-68.

No wonder that this exquisite experience aroused in M. E. thankfulness toward the Giver of it and a wish to know what could be done in order to deserve this and other blessings. He "felt His reply." It was that he "should do His will from day to day." This thought, so obvious that it might have appeared in any mind with similar religious ideas, is taken as God's reply. This is the only revelation conveyed in a conceptual form. No one would insist upon its evidential value. But in the opinion of M. E. the power, the goodness, and probably other qualities of God, as well as ineffable aspects of the meaning of life, were also revealed: he "felt" them. One can readily understand how, as soon as God was regarded as the author of this brain storm, the mind of M. E. filled with the glorious meaning of "God"; whereupon the "miracle" glowed for him with the light that has gathered during centuries of worship around the Christian idea of God. It seems almost as if M. E. himself realized that he was interpreting his feelings and emotions; for he repeats "as if" several times: "It was rather *as if* my personality had been transformed by the power of a spirit."

The reader familiar with the writings of St. Paul has probably compared in his mind the great apostle's ecstatic experience with the preceding accounts. It possesses every essential characteristic belonging to the instances we have discussed, and no other: suddenness, surpassing delight, illumination, ineffability, passivity. In his second letter to the Corinthians, when he comes to the subject of "visions and revelations of the Lord," he relates how "fourteen years ago"—whether in the body or out of the body, he does not know—he was "caught up to the third heaven," and "heard unspeakable words which it is not possible for man to utter."¹

Whether or not we regard this experience as of an epileptic nature (as some do), this question demands an answer: Was there any way for St. Paul, ignorant as he was of modern

¹ II Cor. 12:1-4.

science, sharer in the belief common about him in divine and diabolical possession, and passionate disciple of the Lord Jesus risen from the dead and seen once already on the way to Damascus, to interpret the storm of feelings and emotions that suddenly assailed him otherwise than as a divine occurrence? This question must be answered, we think, in the negative.

The ecstatic quality of an epileptic aura may puzzle the lay mind. Why should a morbid physical process appear in consciousness as an "exalted" delight? As a matter of fact, it need not be so; the epileptic aura possesses at times a very different character. In theory—and the actual facts fulfil sufficiently the theoretical expectation—the aura may have any affective quality whatsoever. There are instances on record in which the face of the subject wears "a terrified expression." It may be added that a sense of well-being and joy is characteristic of morbid conditions other than the epileptic aura. In certain phases of progressive general paralysis the wretched patient beams his enjoyment of life as he tries to say how well he feels.

If the pathology of the epileptic auras were known, probable conjectures might be made regarding the similar, non-epileptic brain storms that need the stimulus of some psychical factor in the form of perception or ideation. Ignorant though we are, this at least is clear: in epilepsy a discharge of nervous energy takes place unexpectedly and without the instigation of a psychical stimulus. The almost endlessly varied forms of epilepsy owe their peculiarities to a special distribution of that discharge. In *grand mal* it is intense and general. The grave motor commotion and the loss of consciousness indicate that the discharge has invaded the motor area of the brain as well as other regions. In psychical epilepsy, on the contrary, only those parts of the nervous system correlated not with motor but with sensory and ideational functions are affected. There is therefore no conspicuous motor effect, but instead

production of conscious phenomena such as hallucinations. The type of hallucination will be visual or auditory according as the discharge affects the visual or the auditory region of the brain. When intense and exquisite emotions are produced, we must think of the nervous disturbance as affecting those parts of the nervous system that are involved in the production of ecstatic states of mind.

The sudden discharge of nervous energy may be understood in two ways. It may be due to an abnormal production of energy in certain parts of the organism which, when it has gained a sufficient tension, breaks the anatomical bounds within which it was confined. Or, the available nervous energy remaining normal, a pathological inciter to discharge may be present which causes at certain times the epileptic or the epileptiform seizure.

It should not be imagined that all the non-epileptic brain storms are rapturous; they are no more frequently so than the epileptic auras. If our instances are all of the ecstatic sort, it is because ecstasy is the subject of this paper. Among nerve storms of another affective quality may be mentioned the pathological fits of anxiety, of fear, and of rage that break out without any, or, at best, with the most insufficient, psychical causes. And, to speak of more ordinary occurrences, there are persons constitutionally disposed to irrational anger, just as there are people constitutionally prone to raptures. There are numerous instances on record of unmotivated attacks of anxiety; this one, for instance: A woman forty-six years old suffered at times from

a feeling of extreme nervousness and agitation, great restless anxiety, with a sense of uncontrollable dread of some unknown impending terror. Physically, the attack was characterized by violent trembling of the whole body, hurried breathing, irregular heart's action, and profuse cold sweating.¹

¹ Ernest Jones, "The Pathology of Morbid Anxiety," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, VI (1911-12), 102.

In his "Study of Anger" Stanley Hall reports the following instance of abnormal rage:

A girl in good health up to 17, had fits of anger with great regularity; about once a month she was violent and lost all self-control. No small vengeance was her desire, no less than a passionate desire to kill the offender. Hatred shown by looks and gestures was intense.¹

That ecstasies entirely or mainly due to the internal, organic factor should, under the conditions sketched above, be taken as divinely caused, is, in the general state of popular knowledge, just what the psychologist would expect.

To the religious moralist the most important information conveyed in the present objective study will probably be found in the consequences following from the type of explanation accepted by the experiencer. Let us take up again for comparison the case of the priest and that of M. E. In both, as a consequence of a nervous discharge due to physiological causes, inexpressibly delightful and "elevating" emotions are produced. But, although the priest uses the expression "transported to heaven," the experience has for him no moral significance; or, to speak more exactly, in so far as he regards it as the prodromal stage of a loathsome disease, the experience, though "heavenly" in sensory quality, is nevertheless repulsive and depressing. M. E., on the contrary, by the divine interpretation he puts upon his ecstasy, is raised to a high level of energy and is inspired to the achievement of noble moral purposes. The value of God, as conveyed to him in the Christian tradition and enriched by his own meditations, becomes actualized: he *feels* the divine love, and he *hears* the call to righteousness. Every prompting and every purpose, regarded as sanctioned by the Christian God, is stimulated to a strangely intense degree by the assumed divine Presence. At the same time a sense of utter safety and of happiness too deep and lofty for words suffuses his being.

¹ *American Journal of Psychology*, X (1898-99), 541. In "A Study of Fears," by the same author, are to be found striking instances of sudden abnormal fears; see *ibid.*, Vol. VIII.

WHAT ALTERNATIVES CAN RELIGION PRESENT TO THE WILL OF MODERN MAN?

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"Choose you this day whom ye will serve." Religion has owed its influence over men's lives largely to its power of forcing upon the human will a choice, and that concerning the gravest issues of human life. Christian preachers and evangelists have not hesitated to use this power. They could command attention because the issues they presented were those of life and death; they could challenge indifference with the judgment of God. The alternatives held up were those of spiritual growth, divine fellowship, and eternal life on the one hand, as against sinful indulgence, moral degradation, and spiritual destruction on the other. Over against the solicitations of natural desire could be set the abiding joys of the supernatural life. Because it could arouse men to a realizing sense of the finality of these alternatives and the dreadful urgency of the choice between them, Christian evangelism has played a decisive part in the upbuilding of western civilization. What it has accomplished in the way of moral reformation and social cleansing is beyond easy reckoning. It has brought men to sincere repentance, has given them power to resist temptation and overcome sin, and has set them upon a new path of upright and kindly living.

This power which religion has possessed, of bringing home to the souls of men with dramatic force the ultimate issues of human life, has meant so much to the cause of social progress that it is profoundly disquieting to see signs of its failure in our day. This is because, I believe, the alternatives as they have been traditionally presented from pulpit

and rostrum, in tract and periodical, have largely lost their reality for the modern mind. No one who is at all acquainted with the workings of modern intelligence can doubt that considerations of future-life reward and punishment have lost their interest and reality; they touch no vital springs of action. Much the same can be said of the conditions of salvation in so far as they concern the introduction of the individual into a supernatural order and relationship. One who appreciates the value of the work which religion has done for individual and social righteousness and understands how necessary it is to the continued moral and social progress of humanity cannot permit this situation to go unexplained. In proportion to the strength of our religious convictions we should be anxious, first, to see why modern knowledge has obscured the issues of religion and, second, to prove that as practical alternatives the "way of the flesh" and the "way of the spirit" confront the will of modern man in as commanding and crucial a way today as they did in bygone centuries.

To account for the present indifference to claims of religion and to its value as a guide of life I shall be content to mention one factor which, while it is only one, has in my opinion noteworthy influence. Current evolutionary science, either consciously accepted or unconsciously absorbed from the intellectual atmosphere of the day, has profoundly altered men's conception of their own nature and their own relation to the common physical and social world. It has not, I think, made materialists in the strict sense, of many. But intelligent people have come to regard themselves as part and parcel of the natural world, products of a process governed by natural forces and having no destiny apart from it. The most, those at least who give the matter any further thought, recognize that human beings possess reason as a dominating capacity and they admit it to be a duty of man to use his reason in so controlling the external conditions of his existence as to insure himself of a comfortable and satisfying life. The

thoughtful ones may indeed go still farther and acknowledge that since man is a social being he is under obligations to consider the interests of his fellows and, as far as possible, to act in a manner consistent with the largest human welfare. But when we go this far we find that we have covered the entire ground of the present-day philosophy of life. Such a formula as "adjustment to the environment" completely fills the bill. It is conveniently elastic: environment may be given as wide a meaning as you please. If one objects that this is applying a biological principle to life distinctively human, he is reminded that in this case the environment meant is the human environment with its network of social relations. Now I am far from denying that this formula has a certain validity, even when extended to man and his conduct. But the point to be emphasized in the present connection is that it blurs, if it does not obliterate, the very distinctions upon which the issues of religion depend. These distinctions are the ones between animal sentience and human personality, between human individuality and divine inclusiveness. Thus religion finds the ground cut from beneath its feet; it loses its basis of appeal to the mind of the time.

If in order to restore religion to its former commanding position we were compelled to revive the old antithesis between the natural and the supernatural and to find a new basis for it in modern thought, the prospect would not, we should have to confess, be particularly hopeful. But it is possible, without reintroducing into human experience any such dualism as religious philosophy formerly postulated, to discover in the present human outlook two practical alternatives sharply opposed, between which the human agent is compelled to choose with a necessity as rigorous as that which in former days forced a choice between God and mammon. In order to see this, we have first to note that with man as a living species his natural instincts are in truth fundamental. These inherited tendencies determine his primary reactions to natural

objects and to other human individuals. Some of these instincts operate, as we know, to preserve self-existence, others to perpetuate the species, still others to maintain those social relations that are necessary to group life. Now under ordinary conditions the balanced satisfaction of all these instincts is accompanied by pleasant consciousness. Indeed, there is no more certain way for man to insure himself of a comfortable and pleasant existence (if that is his aim) than to provide through the ingenuity of his intelligence for the due satisfaction of all or the majority of his instincts.

We have next to note that man's higher faculties of reason and purpose develop in connection with the heritage of culture which each human generation receives from the past. Now this factor has assumed a position of determining importance in our day due to the rapid advance in knowledge, mechanical invention, and social and political organization during the modern period. It would be an old story to dilate upon the increase in all branches of knowledge since the time of Bacon and Galileo and Descartes. Certain it is that knowledge, scientific and historical, has in our day been made generally accessible and practically available to an extent without parallel or remote approach in any previous age. Modern methods of record and communication, the multiplication of books and libraries, the popular vogue of higher education, have all contributed to this result. In the economic sphere, our industrial system, based upon numberless inventions and adjustments and, by virtue of its complexity and efficiency, assuming the mien of a monster whose pleasure is the ruthless destruction of individuality, nevertheless offers to individuals capable of mastering its instrumentalities and processes an opportunity for amassing wealth in amounts undreamed of by the avarice of previous times. We frequently think of the political organization of the modern democratic state as so overgrown in some respects and so unco-ordinated in others that it interposes a positive barrier between the will of the individual

citizen and the larger community. Yet we must admit that to individuals capable of mastering its processes, legal and psychological, it opens a way to fame and influence unprecedented in human history. We recognize that ours is not an age of great creative achievement in art. Yet, mechanical methods of reproduction in the fields of graphic, musical, and dramatic art, place in the hands of gifted individuals today a means of stirring the deeper emotions of men on a scale unthought of before. And this opportunity is none the less existent because few if any of those interested in providing public entertainment in the large realize its possibilities of human influence and appeal.

To this social inheritance, overmastering as it appears in its sum-total, the rational will of modern man responds as to something akin to itself. This response is natural and inevitable; for what are civilized institutions but the developed expression of the human mind? But what does the present social inheritance mean to the human individual who in addition to reason possesses strong natural instincts? Its meaning may be expressed in the one word *power*. And when we ask what use shall be made of this power we come in sight of the alternatives which we have been seeking to discover, the alternatives which force themselves upon the mind and will of modern man with all the urgency which in former times attended upon the choice between God and the world. The alternatives in answer to this, the crucial question of human life today, are two. A man may choose to use the power which social progress has placed in his hands to assure himself of those instinctive satisfactions which are productive of an enjoyable existence. To do this he need not be a monster of selfishness or a sensualist or a criminal. Any person of intelligent outlook upon life quickly learns what are the conditions of comfortable and pleasant living in the way of material possessions, family ties, and community standing. He may deliberately decide to use that extension of his own

powers, which civilized economic, social, and political institutions furnish to him, for the purpose of establishing these conditions in his own case. If he so decides, as many do, he will acquire knowledge, to be used as a tool in advancing his individual ambition. He will avail himself of modern business methods and industrial processes, as a means of increasing his private wealth. He will engage in political activity and assume civic responsibilities solely with a view to creating out of the influence and prestige he may gain, an asset upon which he and those few, whose interests he identifies with his own, may realize in terms of enhanced enjoyment. Or, in the second place, the human individual of our day may choose to treat his own natural existence merely as the occasion for employing this power, which social progress has created ready for his use, in promoting and developing the social life of mankind. Thus instead of taking his own natural existence as the end to which social institutions are made subservient, he will regard his natural existence as the means of identifying himself with the universal life of humanity.

Unquestionably, modern civilization means to the human agent primarily increased power; unquestionably, the most important practical alternatives that confront the will of modern man concern the use he is to make of this power. But it may not be equally evident that these alternatives represent in terms of modern life the ancient, the fundamental, question of religion. Two considerations will suffice to make this clear. The individual who undertakes to make civilized institutions a means to his own enrichment and satisfaction is not merely pursuing a shortsighted and narrow-minded policy. He is playing false to humanity; he is betraying the cause of human progress. For, so far as the effects of his own actions are concerned, he is bringing to naught the efforts of countless generations of his fellows who have toiled faithfully and heroically to improve the conditions under which men live and work together here on earth. He is violating a sacred

trust; he is prostituting to base uses social achievements to which inventors and reformers have dedicated their lives in the hope of an elevated humanity and a bettered world. He is a traitor to his fellow-men and his own social nature; it is no mere error of judgment of which he is guilty, it is the cardinal sin of ruthless self-will. Turning now to the alternative possibility, we can say with confidence that no human individual can be expected to make his own existence a means and occasion for contributing to social progress who does not believe in the enduring reality of a life that is super-individual and socially inclusive. To this extent, I believe, God must enter into the calculation. I do not say that this is all that the idea of God may mean or that belief in God need imply, but I do hold that it must signify at least this—that the social life is grounded in a universal personal or super-personal power which is working for the realization of social values. Pragmatic sanctions may be sufficient to justify further extensions of theistic belief, but this far it must be a conviction of fact.

The choice required of modern man is thus the old choice between the "flesh" and the "spirit," the lower and the higher life. But two new factors have entered the present situation which profoundly alter the form in which this choice presents itself to the human will. One is the presence of a highly developed system of social interchange depending upon modern methods of production, distribution, communication, and control, which completely dominates civilized life and forces itself upon the attention of those individuals, whom it does not overwhelm, as an agency of unlimited power. And if on the one hand it offers opportunities for social service which are quite unprecedented, it furnishes on the other an incentive to individual ambition and social exploitation quite unparalleled in human history. The other factor is the new understanding of the "higher" life in social terms, which has arisen in result of scientific discoveries as to the origin and development of man and the course of human progress. No longer

is it necessary to find a place for the unfolding of man's spiritual capacities in another and a higher world removed from the confusion and futility of earthly existence. The long and painful process of human evolution shows how, by dint of hard struggle and flashes of insight, self-conscious intelligence and rational purpose have freed themselves from physical entanglement, have mastered instinct, and subjugated nature. No longer is it necessary to imagine God as a celestial monarch destined to preside in love over millions of elect souls in his Heavenly City. We may now conceive him as the rational will which is directing social progress and incorporating in its comprehensive and enduring life the human wills which identify themselves with the social good.

An analysis of the present social situation shows us therefore that modern civilization so far from having outgrown religion stands in crying need of its inspiring and fortifying influence. The civilized world of today offers to Christian evangelism an unparalleled opportunity for service. Now, if ever, in its history humanity needs to be brought face to face with the alternatives of the Christian gospel. They are, moreover, the ancient, the enduring, alternatives of a life surrendered to the pursuit of selfish enjoyment which destroys the higher faculties of mind and soul, against a life devoted to the upbuilding of that personal community through which the spirit of God reveals itself in the associations of men. But these alternatives in order to hold the attention of men today must be interpreted in the light of the new social problems which are distinctive of our time, and of which previous ages knew nothing. We behold civilization now enacting the tragedy of unlimited resources for social improvement, paralyzed by confusion of counsel and infirmity of purpose. Now, if ever, the influence of religion is needed to clear the vision of mankind so they may see the larger good, and to strengthen and unify the motives which impel them to disinterested service. Else what remains of the prospects of progress which but a few years ago

dazzled us by their brilliance will disappear and civilization will lose ground which it can only recover by centuries of wearisome effort.

Now, no less than in the past, the course of the higher life and the larger good requires of the human individual renunciation and self-sacrifice. The factor of sacrifice cannot be eliminated from religion or morality: the pain and disappointment inevitable upon the surrender of cherished ambition and assured enjoyment must be suffered by the individual who resolves to seek the more comprehensive and lasting good. But, in my opinion, it is not the note of renunciation that needs especial emphasis in the religious appeal of today. Rather it is the positive social content of the religious life in the way of enlarged understanding and fellowship and sympathy that needs to be enforced upon the minds of men at present. The religious life has suffered and still suffers from the remote and otherworldly character which it has been given by its authoritative exponents. If it is objected that the Christian religion, at least, has always urged the claims of moral idealism and social obligation this fact may be readily admitted. But, as an objection to the recommendation just made it lacks force because historic Christianity has tended to invest these moral and social ideals with an abstract and formal character which removed them from the world of practical human concern: goodness and truth and beauty were exalted as ideals belonging to the higher, super-sensible realm; they evoked respect and admiration, produced an elevated sentimentalism and little else besides. In contrast to all this, religion can in our day avail itself of the modern insight into social relations and social values and give to the higher life for which it stands a rich and many-sided human interest.

Is this, then, a proposal to replace religion by social ethics? Or to substitute for the worship of God, the pursuit of the Good, the True, and the Beautiful? Not so—but it is a proposal to found religion upon the spiritual unity of mankind

as revealed in human association and progress, and to interpret the religious life as the induction of the individual into the life of humanity as organized by the divine purpose working in its social history. Religion as thus conceived will be vitally interested in the realization of intellectual and moral and aesthetic ideals, in knowledge and goodness and beauty. But always as expressions of the unitary spirit working in human evolution and never as formal standards or specialized interests. Even as noble and disinterested an aim as the discovery of truth is capable of being professionalized and of becoming, in the minds of those who seek it, a matter primarily of method and technique, with its deeper significance obscured by exclusiveness and pedantry. It is the duty of religion to remind men of this deeper significance. Science and history, what are they but the experiences of humanity exhibited in a system of determinate relationships that makes them objective and communicable? It is the duty, the privilege, of religion to widen the vision of the individual by introducing him into this larger life. The Old Testament Scriptures have rendered a service of decided value in making Christian peoples acquainted with other and simpler stages of culture than their own, and in showing them the way in which fundamental religious and moral beliefs have developed from crude and dark beginnings. But surely the time has come for Christian communions to broaden the scope of their study and to learn lessons from the experience of other peoples and the evolution of the race! In the field of practice, morality has frequently fallen short as "mere" morality—adherence to this or that formal standard of conduct. The church has itself been guilty of at once upholding an ideal elevated out of all contact with the actual, and at the same time consenting to an easy compromise with existing conditions. Thus in connection with the present economic and industrial system we find the church oscillating between a wholesale condemnation of the existing system in favor of some theoretical communism, and a ready willingness

that its members should profit by it, provided they devote some of their gains to conventionally approved objects. But just here lies one of the greatest of its present opportunities. It is the duty of religion to remind men that these economic institutions and processes represent so many achievements of the social mind in subjecting the forces of nature to the support and development of human life, and then to show them that, if they can be carried on in the spirit of co-operation and comradeship, they will yield to the individuals actively engaged the experience of actually participating in the world-work of social advancement. Certainly this is to practice religion, to introduce the spirit of social unity into the everyday work of the world. It is true that economic processes will have as a whole to be considerably modified and in part to be radically transformed before they can be expected to realize in any marked degree their possibilities of human fellowship. But since, in the large, they do serve a common end by rationally devised instrumentalities and scientifically standardized methods, this possibility exists. Ought the church of God not to promote its realization by urging men to find out through practical experiments in co-operative industry the positive content of social satisfaction to be derived from such far-reaching human team-play? The aesthetic experience offers itself to religion as another means whereby mankind can realize its spiritual unity. To discuss even slightly the function of aesthetic appreciation in fostering emotional concord among men would require reference to psychological details that have no place in the present discussion. The church has, to be sure, always made liberal use of art in the adornment of sanctuaries and the embellishment of its services. But the principal use it has made of aesthetic imagery in the past has been to symbolize the objects of religious belief in the narrow sense. Surely the time has come for religion to avail itself of the universal appeal which beauty in nature and in art makes to human emotion in bringing home to the feelings of men the

common features of our human lot, the triumph and the tragedy of infinite aspirations contradicted by the limitations of mortality.

That religious belief has developed in close connection with the sense of social unity, and has promised the realization of social values, is a generally recognized fact. But, as expressions of the essence of religion, neither the spirit of self-sacrifice on the one hand, nor the practice of altruism on the other, is adequate. The spirit of sacrificial service is doubtless an indispensable element in the developed religious consciousness. But, taken alone, it suffers from its negative and ascetic note; it is liable to degeneration into mysticism and sentimentality. Altruism works out in deeds of practical helpfulness and kindly service. So intimately are such acts connected with the spirit of true religion that it is impossible to conceive of their separation. Yet, charitable conduct is not the whole of religion, not the vital part indeed, for religion is essentially a new and higher life. The present opportunity of modern Christianity is to present it as such a life, with a basis in reality and a rich content of fresh interest and positive significance. Its basis is the comprehensive and directing spirit of world-progress of which man's rational will is, in form and potency, an expression. The reality of God in this sense religion must unequivocally maintain, for out of his relation to God springs man's opportunity of integrating his individual nature within the more comprehensive and enduring whole. Having secured this necessary basis, religion is in a position to urge men to avail themselves of the unparalleled advantages which civilized institutions give to the man of today, of entering upon the larger experiences of humanity through the medium of books and contemporary records, of engaging with his fellows in the co-operative pursuit of those common ends sought by our economic and social processes, and of participating sympathetically in the deeper human emotions through the appreciation of beauty in nature and in art.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

THE MORAL VALUATION OF OUR ECONOMIC ORDER

In the field of Christian ethics the broad problem for investigation is the nature of the present social order and the possibility of its transformation in relation to the Christian ideal of society. The urgent need for adequately facing this problem, if Christianity is to continue to influence the developing life of humanity, needs no emphasis in these days of revolutionary change.

Within this broad field, the most immediate matter for investigation seems to me to be the character of our present economic relationships and their relation in turn to the other functions of the social order—our sex life, our government, our religion. It is self-evident that these economic relationships are basic, that the so-called higher life of civilization rests upon them. It is equally self-evident that they are the cause of continual disturbances in modern society and are a major factor in all its ills. Just here is one of the points of inquiry. What is the exact relation of the economic to the other aspects of life? The question of economic determinism cannot be settled by abstract argument but only by inquiry into the facts. We need to establish just how much, and at what points, our economic system is controlling our conduct in the state, our education and our religion. In that very process we shall learn much as to how the economic function may be made the servant and not the master of the other aspects of life.

It is a significant fact that organized Christianity has expressed no clear moral judgment concerning the nature of the present economic order. Concerning its worst conditions and relations, the churches have uttered themselves. Concerning the essential features of a capitalistic economic order, no general conviction is evident. Before such conviction can be formed and such judgment be uttered, we need to establish by investigation how much of the conduct and relationships of our economic life is Christian and how much is un-Christian and in what respect. We need to determine whether it is an un-Christian system with some Christian modifications, or a Christian system with some relapses.

The pre-suppositions of the present economic order need also to be examined on grounds both of fact and of Christian ideals and standards. Until we know whether it is the accidental or the intentional features

of our economic life that are un-Christian, our attempts to Christianize industry are liable to be worse than futile. For instance, of what avail and of what effect will it be to counsel co-operation between employers and employed, between capital and labor, if it should turn out that a wage and profit system inevitably leaves the profit-takers and the wage-earners in a position of economic antagonism, so that the best that is possible is an armed truce? How can we hope to reconcile persons and classes in sentiment if they cannot be reconciled in economic reality. Therefore we need to determine by comprehensive inquiry whether our ethical standards and ideals require the transformation of the present economic order or simply its modification.

In this main matter, we have too long accepted the formulae of the orthodox economists concerning competition and self-interest as economic motives. They have told us that the present economic order is the best that is possible and that if it seems to us unethical, we must for the sake of economic efficiency be reconciled to it. We need now to inquire whether in this field we have been the victims of pure dogmatism. There is a new body of data to be examined. It is the testimony of the production engineers, which may provide a new body of Christian evidence. There also needs to be correlated to Christian teaching the work of those younger economists who are approaching their subject from the standpoint of psychology. What they have to say concerning instincts in economic life needs to be examined to see if we can learn how these instincts may be controlled and directed for the realization of Christian ends.

At this point the investigation will begin to cross the line between religion and ethics. For the final point of inquiry concerns the possibility of realizing and expressing religious values in economic activity. As soon as the work of the psychologists in religion and the psychologists in economics has proceeded far enough, it will need to be correlated. They ought soon to tell us enough about the nature of religious consciousness and the nature of economic association, to enable us to discover how economic life may be organized so that it becomes a means for the development and expression of religious values. If Christian ethics can undertake and carry through the inquiries here indicated, it will furnish some guide for mankind in the fundamental economic changes now proceeding. Failing this, its field will be to interpret and sanction, after the event, the moral and religious values developed by the experience of the economic revolution into which the industrial nations are now entering.

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WHAT DID THE IDEA OF MESSIAH MEAN TO THE
EARLY CHRISTIANS?

The problems of the New Testament appear to multiply as modern scholarship clears away the mists which have obscured the facts, and it is difficult to decide which of these many problems—literary, historical, and theological—one would most like to see investigated. The interests of a New Testament student keep changing from time to time, and each new line of research on which he happens at the moment to be engaged seems to be of capital importance. He feels that if he could obtain the wished-for light on some baffling aspect of it a hundred matters would become plainer. He cannot easily detach himself from the immediate interest and make a choice among the manifold problems, all calling for elucidation, which he has encountered in the course of years. Moreover he is painfully conscious that the questions which he knows to be most vital are incapable of any real answer. To select the most important problems of the New Testament is not difficult; we are thrown up against them, as against a stone wall, at the end of every process of inquiry. Men have always been trying to solve them, and will never, in the absence of further data, arrive at anything but conjecture. I assume that when the editor proposed the present discussion he was thinking of such problems as may in some measure be solved by a more careful analysis. The materials for investigating them lie to our hand, and would probably yield their secret to patient study on the part of some fully competent scholar. I would venture to suggest one problem which seems to my mind to answer these conditions, and which certainly lies very near the heart of all New Testament inquiry. Some answer to it has become more urgent than ever in view of recent controversy. What were the implications of the Jewish messianic idea when it was taken up by Christianity? The importance of this question for the understanding of the gospel history does not need to be insisted on. Until we know more of the messianic beliefs which were current in the time of Jesus all efforts to define his conception of his mission are necessarily futile. Did he claim to be the Messiah? Did he think of his messiahship as present or future? Did he associate the messianic office with national or apocalyptic or purely ethical and religious ideas? Even to hazard a guess on these crucial questions we require a far larger acquaintance with the messianic thought of his time than we yet possess. The messianic idea, we can hardly doubt, was susceptible of a great variety of meanings, only a few of which are reflected to us in the familiar passages of apocalyptic

and other writers; and we have no means of sifting the gospel record until we know more of this unexplored region of Jewish thought. For the subsequent history a larger knowledge of the nature and scope of messianic speculation is even more necessary. One cannot but feel that the whole discussion as to the Hellenizing of Christianity from the time of Paul onward is baseless so long as we know almost nothing of the Jewish conceptions from which Paul started. That he was influenced, directly or indirectly, by the contemporary Pagan religions cannot now be reasonably doubted; but where did the foreign ideas find their point of attachment? Much of the more recent literature assumes a transition which is historically and psychologically impossible. We are asked to believe that all of a sudden, and without any consciousness on the part of its members, the Jewish messianic sect was transformed into a Hellenistic mystery-society. Though Jesus was still recognized as the Messiah he was clothed with the attributes of an oriental divinity, and was worshiped under the significant title of "Lord." But can such a profound change in all the habits of Christian thought have come about so abruptly? Are we not justified in supposing that it must have been mediated by elements that were present from the first in the messianic idea itself? It can be gathered from various allusions in Paul's Epistles that he was acquainted with a number of messianic speculations which lay outside of the ordinary tradition. May they not have included some in which the figure of the Messiah was related to mystical beliefs, analogous to those which found expression in the pagan religions? Jewish thought may itself have provided the suggestions which were only elaborated and carried out to new issues by the contact with Hellenistic theory. It was from the proclamation of Jesus as Messiah that the primitive theology developed itself. We need to know more of what was involved in that proclamation before we have a right to explain everything from alien influences.

It may be granted that the Jewish messianic doctrine of the first century cannot now be recovered with any completeness. Indeed there can be little doubt that there never was a formal and coherent doctrine, but only a number of diverse speculations, entertained by one and another of the Jewish schools. But the materials exist for obtaining at least a much more adequate conception of these messianic theories than we have hitherto been content to work with. The references scattered through the Rabbinical writings have never been properly collected and sifted. The apocalyptic passages are capable of a more thoroughgoing study. Much would probably be learned from a closer

analysis of the Jewish influences which are traceable in certain phases of early Gnosticism. It is more than likely that many of the speculations which grew up around the messianic hope were never committed to writing. The books which would have been most illuminating for our purpose would circulate among a very limited public, and have been irrecoverably lost. But we still have data for a fuller investigation of the Jewish messianic idea than has yet been attempted, and the study of Christian origins cannot advance much farther until this work is carried through. In no other way can we hope to bridge the gulf which now lies open between the primitive Christian gospel and that of the later church.

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CURRENT EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Mystical Aspect of Religion.—Under the caption “The Meaning of ‘Religion’ and the Place of Mysticism in Religious Life” (*Journal of Philosophy*, XVIII, Feb. 3, 1921) James H. Leuba protests against recent tendencies to enlarge the conception of religion so much as to make it practically synonymous with all endeavors which aim at social welfare. There are “devoted agnostic or atheistic social workers” whose psychological attitude is quite different from that found among adherents to organized religion. To be sure, social practices and ceremonies have frequently been the beginnings of religious practices and ceremonies, and paved the way for belief in superhuman agents; but religion has stepped in at “the birth of some conception, however vague, of superhuman personal power or powers, whose existence is felt to be a matter of moment.” This is the historical connotation of the word “religion,” and we still need it, or some word, to denote “those forms of behavior that involve belief in and relation with superhuman, anthropopathic beings.”

This historical belief in the invisible superhuman gives the author a bridge over which he passes into a consideration of mysticism. In a “mystical” experience the self senses an immediate touch or union “with a larger-than-self, be it called the spirit world, God, or the Absolute.” This “union of will and feeling with other selves” is encouraged by (1) the feeling of weariness of the self in its strife with other selves or objects, as it desires union and peace with these instead of contention and conquest; (2) the natural tendency of thought to rest itself in generalization, inducing the construction of an all-inclusive principle which may guarantee a unified and coherent world.

To locate the real place and value of mysticism in religion the following steps are taken:

1. The classification into two kinds of religious worship—the worship for defensive purposes, where God and men are kept apart, like buyer and seller; the objective kind of religion, “the worship prompted by the tendencies to association, co-operation, union”; this latter characterizes the mystical worship.

2. The discovery of the danger of mystical tendencies, if these become dominant, as it leads to an overemphasis on an individualism which regards its center as the holder of ultimate truth.

3. The recognition of the church as hospitable toward the rudimentary forms of mysticism. "Intercourse between sympathetic people constantly tends to pass from externality to the intimacy of united will and feeling." With a loving God as religious object the individual easily glides into the attitude of trust, self-surrender, repose which constitutes the first step toward complete mystical union. Thus, organized Christianity is both objective and mystical, with the objective dominant. "Held in subjection though it is, the mystical impulse performs in Christianity a vivifying function, the value of which can hardly be overestimated; for it represents the action of tendencies in which humanity sees its salvation, the tendencies to universal co-operation and love-union." "The non-mystical and mystical tendencies *together* make a complete man and a complete religion."

The Religion of a First-Century Jew.—In an article on "The Religion of Flavius Josephus" (*Jewish Quarterly Review*, XI [Jan., 1921], 277-306), James A. Montgomery speaks of Josephus as the only representative personality left to us from first-century Judaism. A trimmer in politics, he was loyal to his religion; a Pharisee by choice, with a leaning toward the Essenes, and a willingness to criticize his own party. He dwelt on divine providence, while recognizing chance as an important factor in experience. Making much of omens and miracles, he recognized fully such spiritual elements in religion as faith and prayer. He stood for one God, one law, one temple, one people, and one history.

Was the Worship of Ashur Monotheistic?—Writing on "Monotheïsme in Assyrië" (*Nieuw Theologisch Tijdschrift*, X, No. 1, 36-45) A. H. Edelkoort denies that there was any monotheism in Assyria, such as a recently published tablet seems to indicate. As in the case of Marduk, so with Ashur, the characteristic qualities of various gods are ascribed to him, but without denying their existence. A systematized polytheism was as far as even the theologians went.

Propagandists for Yahweh.—According to T. J. Meek in his article, "Some Religious Origins of the Hebrews" (*American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, XXXVII [Jan., 1921], 101-31), Yahweh was originally the tribal god of Judah, his power increasing with the political supremacy of Judah. The Levites were a tribe who had worshiped a serpent god, and later attached themselves to Judah, becoming priests and propagandists of Yahweh so as to share in Judah's glory. The prophets developed among the priests as a protest against their professionalism, just as the new prophecy of the eighth century was a

reaction from a similar tendency within prophetism. Bull-worship was prevalent in the north, having been introduced probably by the tribe of Ephraim, and revived after the kingdom was divided. Only under Jehu did Yahweh become god of the northern tribes, so that there were two nations serving the same god.

The Samaritan Pentateuch.—In the *Bibliotheca Sacra* (LXXVIII [Jan., 1921], 1-22), Dr. W. E. Barton tells of "The War and the Samaritan Colony," commenting on the diminishing population and the unsettled priesthood. The chief interest of the article is in its account of the photographing of the Samaritan Pentateuch; arrangements have been made for purchasing the photographs from the American Colony at Jerusalem, without restrictions as to purchase or publication.

When Did Old Testament Religion Begin?—In the *Expositor* for February, 1921 (pp. 81-106), Ed. König contributes the first of a series of articles dealing with the origins of the Hebrew religion. "The Burning Problem of the Hour in Old Testament Religious History" is whether that history began with Abraham. He contends that those who deny it on the basis of late and untrustworthy records are really biased in favor of evolutionary explanations, laying chief emphasis upon environmental influences.

Shall Industrial Needs Justify Slavery?—This question is raised by G. H. Wilson in an article, "The Labour Problem in Nyasaland" (*The East and The West*, XIX [1921], pp. 27-38). In these days of turmoil and strife in every land, the missionary is forced to have an interest as broad as life itself. Africa, like other countries, has her labor problems. During the critical shortage of plantation help in British East Africa, a system of enforced labor is being imposed upon the African people, not for public improvements, but for private British enterprises. Some of the missionaries have given assent to this as a temporary expedient. A similar crisis exists in Nyasaland, a British Protectorate, and the author fears that a like solution will be offered. This he vigorously opposes as autocratic, unworthy of true Englishmen, un-Christian, and detrimental to mission progress. The problem is a vital and pressing one, and its results upon missionary work may be far-reaching.

Where Western Traditions Thwart Oriental Ideals.—Many missionaries today are becoming restless under the old restraints imposed upon them by the strict denominational lines of the home churches. They see tragic social and moral results follow this strict adherence to sectarian

practices. Its unbrotherly exclusiveness is fatal to Christian progress. Indian Christians find a Western church forcing upon them a system that divides, demoralizes, and tends to denationalize them. Garfield Williams in an article, "Liberty to Experiment" (*The East and The West*, XIX, pp. 65-72.), revolts against an ancient theory that so flagrantly disregards the religious needs of living Christians. He pleads for a greater liberty for the missionary that will enable him to face facts as he finds them, and launch out on a practical plan of co-operation with other Christian bodies. His suggestions are timely and wholesome, and represent the attitude of many missionaries. Undoubtedly, tangible results will follow such demands when the church comes to appreciate the actual situation.

Is Islam Better Adapted to Africa than Christianity?—The old problem of the relation of a Christian government toward Christian missions in a Moslem country is now acute in parts of Africa. In some sections the government excludes Christian workers from territories occupied by Moslems, and in other ways shows a decided favoritism toward the followers of the Prophet. It is alleged that in such areas Christian missions are a menace to peace and quiet, that Islam is better adapted to the African than is Christianity, and that Christian schools and other agencies "generally exercise a denationalizing influence on the native and 'destroy racial identity.'" These charges are stoutly denied by the missionaries, as represented in Du Plessis' article, "Government and Islam in Africa," *The Moslem World*, XI, pp. 2-23. The problem is one on which a careful study should reveal many important but hitherto unknown facts. It would be of great value in determining the type of work that would prove most effective in dealing with Moslem territories.

Is the Church Condoning Ignorance?—A stirring challenge is raised by President McGiffert in an article, "The Teaching Church," in *Religious Education*, February, 1921. Is present-day Protestantism unconsciously obscuring religious issues and leaving the great mass of men ignorant of and detached from a Christianity with a real meaning for today? The British and American reports of the religious life of the men who took part in the Great War answer yes in a decided manner. Four-fifths of the young manhood of Great Britain had little or no vital connection with the churches, and the small fraction who did have an interest in religion misunderstood it atrociously. This detached and confused attitude toward Christianity was also widely manifest in the young men of America. The great lack today is a teaching church. The warring sects of Protestantism were interested in doctrinal peculiarities,

and, in the zealous pursuit of these, human faith and duty got scant attention. From the wreck of this old sectarianism there has come no adequate appreciation of what Christianity is, if not Anglicanism, Presbyterianism, or Methodism. The great evangelical revival, like the old novels which ended with the marriage of the hero and the heroine, stopped with conversion. The absorption in winning men left small strength and time for the guidance of those already won. The simple theology and code of ethics was narrowed to a belief in the atonement and deity of Christ, and Christian character was denoted by the refusal to participate in a few definite and widely popular pleasures. Following this program the church has largely lost its teaching function. What is urgently needed is a church that will be in a real sense a life-long school in which teacher and taught thresh it out in democratic fashion. This does not mean the repetition of lessons learned long ago. The young men of the army have accused the church of reiterating ancient formulas that have little or no place in the life of today. This is no day for the acceptance of ready-made opinions. We respect those who refuse to be docile spoon-feds. We believe that the church needs teachers with a fitting modesty—those who attempt to convince by a message that gets to the heart of things and who invite the students to test this message, improve it, or reject it. This is the only kind of teaching that can enlist a permanent interest. The burning problems thrust on the minds of men by the war must be adequately related to present-day religious thinking. Men want to be taught their moral and religious obligations that they may play a man's part in Christianizing the world rather than skim through life on the surface of glassy and meaningless platitudes. If we can get the kind of teaching that will challenge intelligent students, we shall not want for leaders in the church.

Toward a More Scientific Theology.—In the article, "Santayana and Modern Liberal Protestantism" (*The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, Jan. 6, 1921), George P. Conger makes the following appropriate suggestions. Modern theologians will be stronger when they more thoroughly consider the problem afforded by the material universe. Although it is adopted into their system, they have yet failed to examine it closely and to try out the constructive possibilities of materialism. The thought that the structure of the universe of our sciences is like the structure of our bodies, or our brains, or our societies, may prove fruitful in greatly unifying the world-process.

To these timely suggestions the remark may be made that the more advanced religious thinkers of our day are endeavoring to do just this.

But no reproach should fall upon the theologian because he does not "head off" the philosopher in the solution of a problem more characteristically native to the domain of the latter.

The "Soul" and Immanence, from an Evolutionistic Viewpoint.—In an article on "Immanence, Stoic and Christian" (*Harvard Theological Review*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, Jan., 1921) Gerald H. Rendall, finding the "soul" beset with difficulties from all speculative standpoints, feels more helpfulness and attractiveness in the following interpretation. The soul is not an entity, nor created, nor transmitted. It is a "center or nucleus of potential capacities," itself a part of the great current of cosmic life, like the swirling vortex of the river. Though a part of the cosmic stream, this nucleus enjoys a certain independence. This independence consists of its peculiar behavior of reaction and response. And the behavior constitutes its very existence, depending on its ability to unify with itself the elements within its scope of behavior. Thus the soul is a self-determined whole, as it forms itself on the strength of existent capacities and exists as long as it can master the environing factors by its will-to-live and its will-to-love. But on the other hand it is only a part of the vast cosmic sweep of life, its potentialities are those of the cosmic order, its principle of life is that of the universe. The achievements of the individual soul are not lost when the soul disappears; the sensitiveness to stimuli and the feel of responses accumulate in the existence of each soul and are carried along in the ever-widening evolutionary life-process.

In this cosmic situation Immanence is not an intrusion from without, "an interference with individuality and an invasion of the soul's prerogative," but is that sensitiveness and capacity which belong to the life of the universe and in the case of the soul are attracted into its nucleus. The life, the power, the response of the soul is all in and a part of the universe, of the evolutionary process, and represents but the nucleating center of which this process is capable and which it has a tendency to invite and stimulate. Every aspect of the soul is the universe particularized, and every soul as a whole is the sensitivity, capacity, and principle of the cosmic life in epitome. The soul and the universe are one.

On these views it may be remarked that since the native soil of the "soul" is "entity philosophy" and "faculty psychology," modern evolutionary thinkers have substituted the "self" which connotes more faithfully the above-suggested interpretation.

Implications of an Open Moral Order.—The modern world is increasingly suspicious of any and every assertion of a fixed system,

closed order, static world, or "block universe." Flux, movement, development, relativity supplant the older conceptions. In recognition of this fact, William James Mutch discusses "An Open Moral Order" (*Homiletic Review*, LXXXI, 2, Feb., 1921), pointing out the following implications:

1. The open moral order is one of growth. Successive stages grow out of their preceding ones. Each situation has its own growth.
2. The "whole moral aspect of life is completely rooted in nature, and cannot be separated . . . into a category of the supernatural."
3. This order is progressive, not perfect from its beginning. Herein lies the hope for future betterment.
4. The moral standard is inner, not external, yet open to influences of experience, judgment, culture, etc. "For any person there can be no such thing as goodness, until it takes the form of an ideal of the inner life."

No universal goal or single motive has long held sway before new definitions, emphases, theories, have won recognition. Each new prescription or definition has been an additional contribution to the ever broadening and deepening stream of complex ethical consideration. Such new attempt only urges a more real analysis of the moral order and results in a fuller realization of the diversity of factors involved. "The inner attitude toward the community as a whole, the habitual control of one's natural tendencies in the interest of that whole, and the openness of mind toward new considerations, better habitual adjustments, and truer judgments, are the fundamentals of the moral order, and they are all open. They are all in danger of deterioration, and they are all in need of progressive improvement."

A New Journal of Religion.—This year witnesses the beginning of the *Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie religieuse*, published bimonthly by the Protestant theological faculty of Strasbourg, including P. Lobstein, E. Ehrhardt, G. Baldensperger, F. Ménégoz, A. Causse, and C. Hauter, with the assistance of M. Goguel and other professors from outside. In the first issue (pp. 45-60), A. Causse has an article on the "Wisdom Literature of the Old Testament," which he exhibits as the product of an age extraordinarily rich in religious development, with its legalistic, pietistic, and apocalyptic movements, and as having a popular appeal like that of pietism, with which it is otherwise in marked contrast.

P. Humbert contributes to the second issue (pp. 97-118) a study of the prophet Hosea, whom he characterizes as a Bedouin, explaining his religious and political enthusiasms and antipathies alike on that basis.

Messianic Expectations in the Sixth Century, B.C.—This subject is discussed by W. R. Aytoun in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, IX (Nos. 1 and 2, 1920), 24-43. The hope was a product of the Exile, but rested also on a prediction, current before that time, of the perpetuity of the Davidic dynasty, a faith akin to that in the inviolability of Jerusalem, both of them vigorously opposed by the great prophets. Accordingly there are numerous insertions in Jeremiah and Ezekiel in which Ezekiel's "prince" is a deliverer, of Hebrew stock and blood royal, a new David, Yahweh's representative, and an ideal king. After such an expectation centering in Zerubbabel was disappointed, the hope was spiritualized and transcendentalized, as, much later, in the prophecies of Isaiah, chapters 9 and 11. Strictly speaking, there is no messianic hope prior to the Exile, or even during the Exile.

The Holiness Code and Josiah's Reforms.—Critical scholarship has been practically unanimous in identifying the code of laws found during Josiah's reign with the code of Deuteronomy, but G. R. Berry, in the *Journal of Biblical Literature*, XXXIX (Nos. 1 and 2, 1920), 44-51, holds that the Laws of Holiness, contained in Leviticus, chapters 17-26, meet the requirements even better, agreeing in general with the Deuteronomic provisions, and corresponding more closely in details with the measures of reform described as introduced under Josiah; while Deuteronomy contains much that belongs to a later time and, in fact, agrees with the laws promulgated in Nehemiah, chapters 8-10, better than does the Priest Code. In the Laws of Holiness, all slaughter is still sacrificial, and the threats are more specific.

An Assyrian Parallel to the Code of Hammurabi.—In the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, XLI (Feb., 1921) 1-59, M. Jastrow, Jr., tells of an important discovery at the site of Assur, consisting of two large tablets and seven fragments which contain Assyrian laws dating perhaps from 1500 B.C., so far as may be judged from the character of the writing and the language. These laws are in some respects cruder than those of the Babylonian code: there are no class distinctions, other than those of master and slave; the authority of husband, father, and master is more absolute; there are more "cruel and unusual" punishments, without logical relation to the offense; and there is less indication of judicial procedure. More space is given to sexual immorality. Among the penalties found here and not in the southern code is that of forced labor. As the remains are so fragmentary, little stress can be placed on certain general differences, and on the whole there is fairly close agreement.

A New Non-Christian Bible for China.—It is significant that when the Western world is considering the question of a "modern Bible," a similar suggestion is made with regard to the non-Christian literature of China. Professor Harlan P. Beach shows the value of such a collection, in an article entitled "Christian Missionaries and China's Canonical Writings" (*International Review of Missions*, X [1921], 236-48). He tells of the prevailing ignorance of the Chinese with regard to their religious and ethical literature as the reason for the new book. The proposal is that a select committee of Chinese scholars—Christian, Buddhist, and Taoist—make a careful compilation of the best of the ethical teachings of the Confucian, Buddhist, and Taoist faiths, to be used as a textbook on Chinese ethics in the schools. Additional selections could be used for advanced training in colleges and seminaries. The execution of some such plan would aid greatly in the education of Christian workers by giving them a fuller appreciation of the religious mind of China and a more comprehensive point of view in facing religious problems.

Presenting the Gospel in Indian Lyrical Form.—One of the great objections offered to the work of Christian missions in India is that they are a denationalizing influence. Even the Indian Christians often feel that they are but abridged editions of American or English Christians. Hence a vital problem is that of making Christianity indigenous to India. A solution of one phase of this problem is suggested by H. A. Popley in the *International Review of Missions* for April, 1921 (pp. 223-35). He declares that the appeal to the Indian by means of doctrine and argument is fundamentally wrong. It is the story, and particularly the story in lyrical form with musical accompaniment, that appeals to the Indian mind. For centuries the Hindu-Bāgavatars have used this method. Accompanied by an orchestra of drum, violin, and cymbals the singer presents the sacred Hindu truths in lyrical form. He holds his audience in eager appreciation for three or four hours by the old familiar tales of the heroes of the great epics.

The same method is now being used with great success by Christians. The Bible story in lyrical form provides the basis of the presentation. With this are interwoven quotations from the great devotional literature of India and illustrations from the lives of her revered heroes, sages, and prophets. The amount of such contributory materials is very extensive, while both its poetical and ethical qualities are high. By a careful selection and use of this material and a presentation of the Christian message in these terms, India can receive the gospel in its

most welcome form, and, on the other hand, the meaning of Christianity will be greatly enriched by this use of India's national literary and musical heritage.

Democracy in Religion on the Mission Field.—One of the problems that is demanding much attention in mission circles in India is that of compulsory Bible teaching in mission schools. In most of the schools a certain amount of instruction in biblical lines is required. But there are many who are revolting against methods which savor of autocracy in religion. The attitude of this group is presented by R. C. Das in *Young Men of India* for April, 1921 (pp. 170-73). Mr. Das objects to this compulsory religious instruction on three grounds: (1) It is fundamentally in contradiction to the spirit of Christianity, as well as opposed to the genius of Hinduism. By compelling all to submit to such instruction, Christianity "appears not as a gospel freely proclaimed and freely responded to, but as an aggressive propaganda of dogma and European culture." (2) Much of this instruction in the past has actually resulted in evil rather than good; for many of the teachers have been altogether inadequately prepared for their task, and the children have formed wholly wrong ideas with regard to Christianity. (3) Because of the present situation in which educated Indians are particularly sensitive with regard to anything approaching domination by the ruling race, special care should be exercised to avoid antagonism. A rash attitude now on the part of missionary organizations may compromise the whole position of Christianity and mean the loss of much that it has taken a century to win.

A New Missionary Qualification.—A fundamental qualification for missionaries, and one that is receiving increasing recognition by missionary leaders, is the attitude of mind and will with which one undertakes his work. This is clearly set forth by Edward Shillito (*International Review of Missions*, X [1921], 174-82) in a plea for a quickened imagination in our whole approach to another people. He shows how a missionary may easily mortgage his whole future by a failure to enter into a sympathetic understanding of the ideas, ideals, and social attitudes of the people in his field. He may erect an almost impassable barrier between himself and them, unless he goes in a spirit of open-mindedness, humility, and courtesy, and with a willingness to receive as well as to give—with a genuine eagerness to appreciate the fine racial loyalties which dominate their civilization. Without such a sympathetic imagination in these critical times, failure is almost certain; with it, a man's possibilities for usefulness may be multiplied tenfold.

Gains to Faith from Criticism.—In the *Methodist Review* (March-April, 1921, pp. 280 f.), the following interesting consequences of critical scholarship are noted: (1) A better comprehension of truth, which always increases the power of the message, has been secured. (2) Since criticism has made the Bible more human—it has thus succeeded in making it more vivid. The Bible has become a new book, a book of life; and there is great power in the appeal to life. (3) The fresh moral orientation brought about by criticism has rendered unnecessary a defense of obsolete morality, like slavery, polygamy, despotism, etc. There is no need of explaining away ethical perversities and intellectual contradictions. The preacher need waste no energy on apologetic sophistry, insincere harmonizing, and conscience-deadening casuistry.

A discussion entitled "Authority and Inspiration" (*Methodist Review*, May-June, 1921, pp. 450 f.) has the following timely suggestions. If Christian preaching as a living force is to survive the present social and intellectual upheaval, it will be because of the new life given it by the free atmosphere of critical thought, whereby all dogmatism is abandoned and the confessions and institutions of the past are made mobile and fluid. In this atmosphere authority assumes the form of persuasive spiritual influence.

New Values in a New World.—In a recent address Professor Gilbert Murray gave a suggestive interpretation of the basic reasons for the spiritual perplexity of modern men. According to a report in the *Century* for May ("At Home in the Modern World"), Professor Murray, after describing the comfortable and comprehensible view which regarded this earth and man as the center of things, called attention to the bewildering consequences of the conclusions of modern natural science. In a universe where this earth is an insignificant speck, it seems preposterous to construct a philosophy in which man shall be the chief item. But applied science has so transformed conditions of life on this earth, and has so completely brought the peoples of the earth into a consciousness of interdependence, that we begin to dream of a world once more organized to promote human welfare.

While Professor Murray does not explicitly discuss the development of religious ideas in connection with these changes, it is significant that Christianity today is thrusting ideals of social righteousness and missionary effort into the foreground. It was difficult to integrate religious values in the non-human world of mechanistic science. But the smaller, more intimate world of social and international relationships is a fruitful field for religious zeal.

BOOK REVIEWS

A NEW HARMONY OF THE GOSPELS¹

Any study of the gospels, no matter how superficial, any inquiry into the words or teaching of Jesus, whatever its object, requires a comparison of parallel passages in the synoptic gospels. This comparison is very significant when made in the English; it is much more instructive when made in Greek. A harmony of these gospels presenting similar passages on the same page is therefore almost the first tool a student should acquire. After providing such tools in English, professors of the University of Chicago are again to be thanked for publishing a similar one in the original tongue. The text used is that of Westcott and Hort, which, though it has generally received the preference of English and American scholars in the forty years since its publication, apparently has not before been issued in the form of a harmony. Here it has been carefully reproduced *literatim*, arranged conveniently for parallel study, and provided with an outline, index, and other suitable equipment. The editors have done well to substitute quotation marks for the unfamiliar capitals used by the former editors to indicate quotations from the Old Testament. They might have further improved on their predecessors if they had supplied a textual apparatus for the variant readings which are noticed marginally by Hort, as they have done for the variants, many of them much less important, which they have added in another margin of their own. In this respect (as well as in the matter of expense) the latest edition of Huck's *Synopse* has still an advantage over this product of American home industry.

There is not much opportunity for novel or individual theory in preparing a harmony of the gospels, and the editors have wisely refrained from obtruding into the Greek text any of the special theories of the "Chicago School" of synoptic criticism, contenting themselves with a brief allusion in the Preface. There are sometimes opportunities also for differences of opinion in delimiting each individual pericope. In this matter they seem to have followed generally Westcott and Hort. As has been said,

¹ *A Harmony of the Synoptic Gospels in Greek*. Ernest D. Burton and Edgar J. Goodspeed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1920. xxx+186 pages. \$3.00 net.

a harmony is a tool, and the making of a tool gives little scope for creative work. None the less, the tool is indispensable and these accurate craftsmen deserve much credit for their pains.

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A NEW COMMENTARY ON REVELATION¹

The long-awaited commentary on Revelation in the "International Critical" series has at last appeared in two substantial volumes.¹ Approximately the first two hundred pages are devoted to topics usually treated as introductory. The problem of authorship is the first to claim attention. The writer of the Apocalypse is thought to have been a Jewish Christian of Galilee who late in life emigrated to Asia Minor and settled in Ephesus. He is not to be confused with John the Elder, who is assumed to have been the author of the Fourth Gospel and of the Johanne Epistles, nor is he to be identified with the Apostle John, who is thought to have suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Jews in Palestine some time before 70 A.D. Thus the Apocalypse was composed by a third John, an otherwise unknown Christian prophet, about the year 95 A.D. Questions regarding sources, interpolations, redactions, diction, and text are duly considered. Next follows the commentary proper, embracing I, 1—II, 226. In content it is mainly a phrase-by-phrase study of John's diction, made with a view to discovering the literary origins and meaning of the document. The third section of the work presents a reconstructed Greek text with an elaborate *apparatus criticus*. The fourth and last section contains a new English translation accompanied by an analytical outline of contents and numerous interpretative notes.

Users of this monumental work will do well to follow the author's advice and first read the English translation, then the introduction, and lastly the detailed commentary. Possibly such procedure will reduce to a minimum the inconvenience and confusion that inevitably result from the author's method of treating his subject. His arrangement of materials is such as to involve considerable repetition, for the same topic comes up for discussion on various occasions in different contexts. To add to the reader's embarrassment, he sometimes finds that in the meantime the author has undergone a radical change of opinion. For example, one who is curious to ascertain the author's views on the much-discussed

¹ *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of St. John*. R. H. Charles. 2 vols. New York: Scribner, 1920. cxcii+373, and viii+497 pages. \$9.00.

chapter 12 of Revelation will find in the commentary on the passage a minute examination of idiom and diction leading to the italicized conclusion that "*the evidence is distinctly against the hypothesis that we have here a recast of existing Greek sources from another hand or hands*" (I, 303). But it turns out that, after all, this is not the final opinion of our author, although the text of the commentary furnishes no indication of his change of view. But on page lxiii of the Introduction we are told that John did not have Greek sources for chapter 12, and that "the conclusion recorded in I, 303, is here withdrawn." But on what grounds? We have no means of knowing—as yet we have not been given even a cross-reference—unless we are sufficiently curious to read on to page xci and page clviii, note 1, where the reasons for the retraction may be discovered. This is by no means the only instance in which the reader will have difficulty in ascertaining the full mind of the author. Even when the latter's views have undergone no essential change in the course of writing, it not infrequently happens that he recurs to a subject in separate contexts adding statements that one might easily miss, especially in using his volumes for purposes of reference. The plan of the work also entails frequent repetitions. The discussion in the commentary includes a topical analysis of the text, an occasional printing *en bloc* of the proposed reconstruction of the Greek, and also portions of the new English translation. Subsequently these passages all have to be reprinted as parts respectively of the complete Greek and English texts. The English version also reproduces a topical analysis and offers further commentative notes. It is greatly to be regretted that these extensive and valuable studies of the author could not have received a more thoroughgoing revision and unification previous to publication, so that his final opinion regarding the revised text of any particular passage, his complete views on its interpretation, and his rendering of the Greek, could have been brought into one context and made more easily accessible.

An especially distinguishing feature of this work is the attention which it gives to questions of literary criticism and philological research. Perhaps the most significant feature of the whole discussion is the light which it sheds upon the interpretation of Revelation through a more extensive recognition of the Hebraic character of John's Greek. This Semitic coloring is ascribed in some measure to the influence of Hebrew sources, but more particularly to John himself. It is assumed that he was a Jew so familiar with Hebrew that he thought in this idiom and wrote Greek only artificially and very imperfectly. Thinking to find the key to a new understanding of Revelation in the study of John's linguistic

peculiarities, Charles has made a particularly careful examination of the grammar and diction of the Apocalypse. As a consequence of this intensive philological inquiry, he believes he is able to distinguish, often mainly on the ground of John's solecisms, lines of division between the original work of the author, the literary sources he employed, and the editorial emendations or supplements of a later hand. One almost feels that John has been credited with a sort of divine inerrancy, as it were, in the employment of solecisms. Even though Revelation is assumed to contain products of John's pen covering a period of about fifteen years, during which time presumably he was living in Asia and writing Greek, his linguistic peculiarities are supposed to have remained exactly the same throughout this period.

On the basis of linguistic traits and differences in thought content, Charles attempts with great confidence some very detailed literary analyses. As a whole Revelation is found to be a unity in thought and dramatic development, yet its author is said to have used many sources in the composition of his work. Some of these were earlier fragments of his own composition, while others were appropriated from current traditional materials. To the latter class belong in the main 7:1-8; 11:1-13; 12; 13; 17 f. With the exception of chapters 17 f., which are assigned to the reign of Vespasian, all of these sources are dated before the year 70 A.D. The hypothesis is further complicated by assuming that these traditional units were themselves composite. Thus chapters 17 f. are supposed to have come to John in a Greek form, but to have consisted originally of two Hebrew documents to be recovered by separating 17:1c, 2, 3b-6, 18, 8-10 (greater part); 18:2-23 from 17:11 (greater part), 12 f., 17, 16. In chapter 13 three original Hebrew sources are detected: (1) 13:1abd, 2, 4-7a, 10; (2) 13:3c, 8; (3) 13:11, 12ab, 13-14ab, 16ad-17a. These attempts at literary analysis are interesting but often far from convincing. In the first place, the philological clues are so hypothetical in character that their evidential value is easily overestimated by a zealous protagonist, and one of Charles's distinctive charms is the zeal with which he works. Nor is differentiation of sources on the basis of variation in thought content always conclusive. Not only is one unprepared to assume that the mind of an ecstatic apocalyptic seer will always operate with logical exactness, but some of the ideas assumed to be distinctive and mutually contradictory in different parts of the book are of doubtful argumentative worth. For instance, the thesis that the letters to the seven churches were originally written in the time of Vespasian, and some fifteen or twenty years later incorporated

by the same writer in his apocalypse, rests principally upon the contention that the letters betray no anticipation of a universal martyrdom of Christians, while the remainder of the book is thought to be dominated by this notion. But is the contrast so striking as our author assumes, even if we allow the arbitrary excision of 3:10, which he has to make on behalf of his hypothesis?

By a similar process of reasoning, numerous evidences of editorial revision are detected in the present text of Revelation. An early editor is held responsible for certain alleged interpolations and dislocations in the text of 1:1—20:3, but in 20:4—22:21 his hand is most apparent. Here the demand for logical consistency in the progress of an apocalyptic's thinking is worked to the limit. Since this required consistency is felt to be conspicuously lacking in these closing chapters, Charles concludes that John died before his book was completed, and that "the materials for its completion which were for the most part ready in a series of independent documents were put together by a faithful but unintelligent disciple in the order which he thought right" (II, 147). This editor straightway becomes a convenient scapegoat upon whom to place the responsibility for all ideas and illogical features in the text that otherwise might, in the opinion of our author, mar the fair name of John. Notwithstanding the fact that he is an alleged disciple of the seer, he is called an "unintelligent editor," "a monkish interpolator," "a shallow-brained fanatic and celibate," who reaches the "climax of his stupidity" by inserting 14:15-17. He is not only stupid, he is positively "dishonest," for he is charged with having deliberately substituted for some such lost word as "treasuries" or "chambers," in 20:18, the word "sea," in order thereby to teach the doctrine of a physical resurrection. But one wonders whether John would have been as ardent a champion of "spiritual" *vs.* "physical" resurrection as Charles himself is, and whether, in fact, it is not he rather than the original editor who has sinned against the apocalyptic seer in this matter. Similarly he will not allow John to utter the anathema recorded in 22:18 f. Such anathemas are admitted to have been quite common among "writers of an inferior stamp," hence the hypothetical editor must come to the rescue and by this final impropriety "set the crown on his misdemeanors." But deliverance from such "obscurantism" is at hand we are told; "the reverent and patient research of the present age is steadily discovering and bringing to light the teaching of the great Christian prophet" (p. lv).

We would not want this research to be any less reverent or patient, but we could wish that it were much more objective, unbiased, and

historically scientific. This is not to say that these two valuable volumes do not contain a large amount of wheat, but they also contain not a little chaff. Possibly they give us the last word—or the last word worth uttering—upon hypothetical analyses and speculative source criticism, and they mark a distinct advance in the field of philological inquiry. But as an attempt to read objectively the mind of the author and to set forth the content of his book in the light of its immediate purpose and historical environment, they fall far short of the final goal. One doubts whether such a goal could ever be reached by an interpreter who can write that the outcome of the recent world-war is “the greatest fulfillment of the prophecy of the Apocalypse” (p. xv), and that this document “lays down the only true basis for national ethics and international law” (p. xxii).

SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF PENANCE IN CHRISTIANITY¹

A field of ecclesiastical history unfamiliar to most students is investigated in these volumes. No extended treatment of the history of penance has hitherto been attempted in English, and the Latin and German treatises we have are defective and out of date. Occasional interest only has been taken in the subject since 1651 when John Morinus published his *Commentarius historicus de disciplina in administratione sacramenti poenitentiae tredecim primis seculis*. Just two centuries later appeared the law-historian Wasserschleben's valuable edition of the *libri poenitentiales*.² Since then the most prominent investigator has been the Catholic Bishop Hermann Joseph Schmitz, whose two volumes constitute a full but fatally biased and unreliable account of the practice of penance in the West.³ The less erudite books of F. Frank (1867) and of J. Tixeront (1914) virtually complete the list of general studies before that of Mr. Watkins. At the same time, a considerable amount of editorial and research work of a fragmentary kind has been done.

Mr. Watkins has had a distinguished career in the Anglican church, is vicar of an Oxford charge, and has previously written on holy matrimony. The present work is the product of the author's “available time

¹ *A History of Penance*. Oscar D. Watkins. New York: Longmans, Green, 1920. 2 vols. xxix+xix+775 pages. \$16.00.

² *Bussordnungen der abendländischen Kirche nebst einer rechtsgeschichtlichen Einleitung*, Halle, 1851.

³ *Die Bussbücher und die Bussdisciplin der Kirche*, Mainz, 1883, and *Die Bussbücher und das kanonische Bussverfahren*, Düsseldorf, 1898.

for a good many years." It surveys the story of Christian penance from the beginnings of the church to the Lateran Council, A.D. 1215. The first volume, dealing with the early period to A.D. 450, comprises nearly two-thirds of the work. The order of treatment is admirably planned for the reader's convenience. Each chapter (with the exception of the review chapters at the end of each volume) deals with a specific period of years, and consists of a selection of documents of the period followed by an interpretation of these sources. Within its limitations this method is very successful.

The work gives evidence of much study and careful reflection, and the author deserves our thanks for a real contribution to a very difficult subject.

As a history of penance, however, the inquiring student will find it not without grave defects. He may not be prepared to concede the point that the whole penance system sprang out of "a commission formally and authoritatively given by our Lord" by which the Apostles were authorized to remit or to retain sins (Vol. I, p. 8). This conception of apostolic authority is fundamental to the whole work. While diversity of practice is recognized, it is all referred to the original authoritative deliverance. From this viewpoint it is unnecessary to think of penance as a part of human history. It is only a part of a closed system. The student may ask: What is penance in the light of the larger history of religion? He finds it in the laws of Manu and the aphorisms of Apastamba, in the records of Babylonish kings and in early tales of the Mabinogion. If he compares the penitential books (which Mr. Watkins rightly regards as determinative of the history of Western penance) with the ancient laws of Ireland, he will discover strange correspondences. The excerpts from the *libri poenitentiales* given by Mr. Watkins seem to be selected for their propriety. The reader would not suspect that the books themselves contain many features that have no recognizable connection with an apostolic commission. They reflect, on the other hand, the customs of the ancient Celtic peoples, and derive some of their materials from the time when Caesar found the druids excommunicating and exiling the enemies of the social order (*de Bell. Gall.* vi. 13), or from the dimmer stages of Aryan primitivity in which taboos and penalties for defilement were the recognized laws of life. (See e.g., the *Canones Adamnani* and parts of the *Poenitentiale Cummeani* in Wasserschleben.) Why, to take a pointed instance of primitive survival, do canons in the *Excerpta* from the Book of St. David and in the *Prefatio Gildae*, for an offence related to primitive sex taboo

command the singing of Psalms, while the *Dharmasastra* of Gautama, for the same offence, order the recitation of verses? Or, to cite a more familiar example, what is the historic relationship between the practice of composition in money for assigned penance, and the same practice in Irish, Welsh, and Anglo-Saxon law for crimes of violence? The *Canones Hibernenses* and later Celtic documents might have helped to explain this. But along with the *genuine* Canons of St. Patrick and the important *Collectio Canonum Hibernensis* (c. 700 A.D.) they are not represented in the selection of documents. How, again, is this Composition System in Celtic penance related to the Indulgence System of the late Middle Ages? To all such carnal questionings Mr. Watkins offers no answer. In fact, his book arouses no curiosity in the direction of broad, historical relationships. Once only does he allow himself the pleasure of a suggestive footnote. In discussing from Columban's penitential the custom of giving a meal to the confessor, he remarks "a curious parallel to Hindu practice"; but curiosity is led no farther.

Probably no two investigators would have agreed as to the documents that should be selected to illustrate the many-sided subject of penances, and on the whole, granted the presuppositions of the author, there is little that should provoke objection on this score. Still, the use of the legend of St. John and the Robber from Clem. Alex. as a document of the Apostolic Age (Vol. I, p. 7), and the insertion of canons of the so-called Second Synod of St. Patrick with the date "c. 475" (Vol. II, p. 587)—a document which Bury has shown to be compiled from the acts of seventh-century Irish synods²—are palpable, if minor, blunders. It is certain, too, that many of the judgments of the book will be doubted or challenged. An extraordinary weight is given to the slender evidence for private confession in the West before the penitential books came from the Celtic churches. The treatment of the dismissal of the penitentiary priest at Constantinople is interesting but hardly convincing. On the question of the candor of Haltigar in stating that he had obtained his penitential *ex scrinio Roman(a)e ecclesi(a)e*—from a book-repository of the Roman Church—Mr. Watkins exhibits a beautiful charity. He often takes a doubtful position without the least reference to recent discussions. But in doing this he is keeping strictly in view the designed scope of the book, which is stated in the Preface as "a succession of studies in the primary authorities on the penance of the Christian Church." This enables him to avoid *excursus*

¹ Borrowed from Haddan and Stubbs.

² *Life of St. Patrick*, pp. 238f.

into questions of authenticity, readings, and dates of documents. But it also leaves him rather too independent of recent periodical literature, in which he might have found help and guidance. He has consulted the opinions of Hauck, but he has not utilized the investigations of O. Selbass, A. Lagarde, or H. C. Lea, to say nothing of a large group of Celtic scholars headed by H. d'Arbois de Jubainville.

It would, however, be unfair, by these criticisms, to give an impression that the work is inferior in scholarship. While not truly a history of penance it is the most useful contribution to the subject since Wasserschleben. It is a safe prophecy that, both as a treasury of valuable sources and for the thoughtfulness of its discussions, it will be consulted by generations of students.

There is a good table of contents, a poor index, and no bibliography.

JOHN T. McNEILL

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BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.]

ABBOTT, LYMAN. *What Christianity Means to Me*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. xi+194 pages.

A confession of faith by one who has for many decades been a leader of religious thought in this country. The discovery made in Dr. Abbott's early years that God's love rather than his wrath is primary in the gospel gives warmth and vitality to what he writes.

ALBACH, ROBERT HENRY. *The Application of the Teachings of Jesus to "The Responsibility of the Capitalist to the Public."* Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1921. 34 pages.

A prize essay, written in conformity with the requirements of the foundation, which requires a discussion of the application of the teachings of Jesus to practical affairs. Guidance for our modern, complex, enormous capitalistic industry from Jesus' comments on a very primitive economic situation can scarcely be very explicit. The essay is necessarily restricted to general statements.

ALLO, E. B. *Saint Jean: l'apocalypse*. Paris: J. Gabalda, 1921. cclxviii+375 pages. Fr. 45.

An elaborate commentary representing the best type of Roman Catholic scholarship.

BACON, BENJAMIN W. *Jesus and Paul*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. ix+251 pages. \$2.50.

The author seeks to trace the most significant changes undergone by Christianity as it made the transition from the gospel as preached by Jesus to the gospel about Jesus as preached by Paul and the writer of the Fourth Gospel.

BAKER, EDNA DEAN. *The Beginner's Book in Religion*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1921. 271 pages. \$1.75.

This book presents one of the sanest approaches to the task of developing children religiously that we have seen. It is up to date in psychology. The program is developed out of the child's own life. A valuable contribution to the beginner's field.

BENETT, WILLIAM. *Freedom and Liberty*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. vii+367 pages.

An examination of ethical ideals in relation to various practical realms. Legal control and liberty are both equally essential and lead to conflicting interests. A solution is found by the author in a religious dualism—the Kingdom of Heaven as the absolute end, human development as our immediate task.

BORNHAUSEN, KARL. *Pascal*. Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt, 1920. xi+286 pages. Fr. 7.50.

A clear, concise presentation of the periods of Pascal's career, with the text of several of the Provincial Letters and an estimate of Pascal's mission.

BRIGGS, GEORGE W. *The Chamārs*. ("The Religious Life of India Series.") New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. 270 pages.

The third of the volumes in the "Religious Life of India Series," interpreting with sympathetic scholarship the social and religious life of the Chamārs, the ancient leather-worker caste of India.

BROWNLIE, JOHN. *Hymns of the Russian Church*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. xviii+123 pages.

A charming translation of hymns from the Greek Office Books bearing upon church seasons and devotional themes. An introduction discusses the technique of Greek church hymnody.

BURNEY, C. F. *The Old Testament Conception of Atonement Fulfilled by Christ*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. 20 pages. 1s.

Professor Burney rallies to his support in this thesis a sane interpretation of the Old Testament and the words and life of Christ as presented in the Gospels, though he incidentally but intentionally combats the subjective view of the atonement set forth by Dr. Rashdall in the *Bampton Lectures*.

CAVALLERA, FERDINANDUS. *Thesaurus Doctrinae Catholicae ex Documentis Magisterii Ecclesiastici*. Paris: G. Beauchesne, 1920. xviii+794 pages. Fr. 35.

A carefully arranged and well-documented compendium of Roman Catholic theology published with the imprimatur of the proper official.

CHARLES, R. H. *The Teaching of the New Testament on Divorce*. London: Williams and Norgate, 1921. xiii+127 pages. 6s.

An interpretation of New Testament teaching which, by some forcing of its meaning and an occasional resort to the hypothesis of textual interpolations, is made to agree with the theory and practice of present-day Anglicanism.

CHESTERTON, G. K. *The New Jerusalem*. New York: Doran, 1921. 307 pages. \$3.00.

This is neither a description of old Jerusalem nor of new Jerusalem, neither a contribution to travel literature nor to serious thinking; it reminds one of the attempted balancings of a literary tight-rope walker—wholly Chestertonian in character.

CLEMEN, CARL. *Religionsgeschichtliche Bibliographie im Anschluss an das Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1920. 40 pages.

A bibliography of the literature on the history of religions, covering the years 1918-19. All students of religion must be grateful for this very valuable compilation.

CRAFER, T. W. *The Second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians*. ("Texts for Students.") New York: Macmillan, 1921. 22 pages. 6d.

The Greek text with a brief explanatory introduction.

DAVIES, DAVID J. *The Church and the Plain Man*. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson (New York: Oxford University Press), 1919. xvii+324 pages. 5s.

A consideration of the problem of the church in current world and industrial crises, with a discussion of organized selfishness, the progress of labor, and the strength of the church for its task.

DOUGLAS, LLOYD C. *Wanted—A Congregation*. Chicago: Christian Century Press, 1920. 213 pages. \$1.75.

A gripping story showing the application of business methods and scientific advertising to building a congregation. It sets forth how analysis of the actual situation and supplying the real needs of the people win.

DOWD, QUINCY L. *Funeral Management and Costs*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921. xiv+295 pages. \$3.00.

A world-survey of burial costs, showing the great need for protection of the poor. This is a very valuable work laying bare great moral issues at the point in human life where people are caught off guard.

DRAKE, DURANT, and OTHERS. *Essays in Critical Realism*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. ix+244 pages.

A militant statement by a group of modern philosophers who find themselves standing in essential agreement on the battle-scarred field of epistemology.

EARP, EDWIN L. *Rural Social Organization*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1921. 144 pages. \$1.00.

A concrete presentation of the task for the country church in the light of the actual needs of the country community. The author belongs to the organic social psychology school of thinkers. The book gives a splendid survey of rural social organization.

FOSTER, GEORGE BURMAN (Douglas Clyde Macintosh, editor). *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. xiii+294 pages. \$3.75.

An outline compendium of Professor Foster's conception of Christianity as it was expressed in the notes for his classroom lectures about the year 1905. It represents a definitely Ritschlian conception of Christianity.

FWLER, J. T. *Adamnani Vita S. Columbae*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920. 280 pages.

A revision of the older edition of 1894 enriched by the subsequent contributions of Bury, Plummer, and Gwynn. The text is considerably improved. Copious notes are added.

GALLOWAY, T. W. *The Sex Factor in Human Life*. New York: American Social Hygiene Association, 1921. 142 pages.

A sane presentation of a most perplexing problem. The book sets forth the biological and psychological processes involved in the sex functions, the meaning of these in individual and social control, and practical suggestions for developing control. A strong book.

GRANT, FREDERICK C. *The Life and Times of Jesus*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1921. 222 pages. \$1.25.

A compilation in modern language of the gospel stories setting forth the life and times of Jesus, paragraphed and arranged according to topics.

GREENE, JOSEPH NELSON. *The Portrait of the Prodigal*. New York: Methodist Book Concern, 1921. 215 pages. \$1.50.

The story of the prodigal son presented in ten sermons setting forth the prodigal's experience as a type of universal experience.

GRUPPE, OTTO. *Geschichte der klassischen Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte*. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1921. viii+248 pages.

A historical survey of the study of Greek and Roman mythology from the time that Christianity supplanted paganism in the ancient world down to the present day.

HASTINGS, JAMES (editor). *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. Vol. XI, Sacrifice-Sudra. New York: Scribner, 1921. xx+916 pages. \$8.00.

Another volume of this remarkable compendium of information on religious and ethical subjects.

HEADLAM, ARTHUR C. *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion* (Bampton Lectures, 1920). New York: Longmans, Green, 1920. xii+326 pages. \$4.00.

A rather conservative Anglican interpretation of the conception of the church as disclosed in the history of Christian thinking. At the same time the author seeks to shed light upon such practical problems as the validity of orders and sacraments and the possibility of denominational reunion.

Heroes and Kings. ("Bible Readings for Schools.") New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. 168 pages.

The first volume of a series presenting selected portions of Scripture, arranged in such a form as to display the essential features of the story. The following stories are included in this volume: Gideon, Jephthah, Samson, Samuel, Saul, Saul and David, David.

HILBERT, GERHARD. *Kirchliche Volksmission*. 2te verbesserte Auflage. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 52 pages.

A stirring appeal for a more popular program of evangelization to bring religious vitality into the somewhat conventional church life of Germany.

HILBERT, GERHARD. *Volksmission und Innere Mission*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1917. 24 pages. M. o. 60.

Recognizing the alienation of many people from the church, the author pleads for the completion of the ideal of the Inner Mission by a larger emphasis on popular evangelism.

HILL, OWEN A. *Psychology and Natural Theology*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. xiii+351 pages.

A volume, published with the imprimatur of archbishop Hayes, designed to ground Roman Catholic students in the principles of scholastic philosophy as a sound foundation for theology.

JAMES, J. COURTENAY. *The Language of Palestine and Adjacent Regions*. New York: Scribner, 1920. xxii+278 pages. \$7.00.

A sort of Baedeker to the various languages spoken in and around Palestine during the biblical period. The chief languages surveyed are Sumerian, Babylonian and Assyrian, Aramaic, Hebrew, Egyptian, Persian, and Greek.

JOHNSON, GIFFORD H. *The Church of Waltham Holy Cross—Waltham Abbey*. A Guide. London: Oxford University Press, 1919. vi+58 pages. 1s.

A revised guide to this historic abbey, with illustrations. An appendix discusses Harold's burial place and contains important registers with lists of deans, abbots, and incumbents.

JOHNSTON, JOSEPH S. *Christ Victorious over All*. Chicago: Johnston, 1921. 234 pages.

A detailed study of biblical texts and miscellaneous quotations from men of many ages designed to set forth what the author conceives to be a correct view of the divinely appointed program of things.

JORDAN, LOUIS HENRY. *Comparative Religion—A Survey of Its Recent Literature*. Vol. I, 1900-1909. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. viii+160 pages. 10s.

The first of a projected series surveying the modern literature of comparative religion. The present volume is a revised edition of that published in 1910, and deals with a selected few of the works issued during the period 1900-1909.

Journal of the Manchester Egyptian and Oriental Society, No. IX. New York: Longmans, Green, 1921. 56 pages. 5s.

The Manchester Museum and its *Journal* are making attractive contributions to the science of archaeology through the presentation of brief reports of results of excavations in the Near East, especially in this period of reconstruction in governmental authority.

KEAY, F. E. *Hindi Literature*. ("Heritage of India Series.") New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. x+116 pages.

The seventh of the volumes in the foregoing series. It presents a concise survey of the modern vernacular literature of Hindustan.

KOENIG, EDUARD. *Moderne Vergewaltigung des Allen Testaments*. Bonn: A. Marcus and E. Webers, 1921. 40 pages.

This is an aftermath of Professor Koenig's first counter-stroke at Professor Delitzsch's *Die grosse Täuschung*—an adverse criticism of the religio-historical conception of the Old Testament in modern thought.

LEGGE, F. *Philosophumena, or the Refutation of All Heresies, Vol. I*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. vi+180 pages.

An introduction and a new English translation with brief but valuable notes.

MANN, JACOB. *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. 280 pages.

Contributions to specific periods of history such as Volume I of Dr. Mann's work, based on original documents, are doubly welcome in this age of so much hackwork. The exact time covered stretches from 969 A.D. to 1204, the date of the death of Maimonides—a most fascinating period, probably because so little known.

MOULTON, JAMES HOPE (Wilbert Francis Howard, editor). *A Grammar of New Testament Greek*. Vol. II, Part 2—Accidence. New York: Scribner, 1920. viii+117+266 pages. \$4.00.

A continuation of important studies in New Testament grammar interpreted in the light of the *koine* Greek of the papyri.

MULERT, HERMANN. *Gebetserhöhung; Freiheitsglaube; Gottesglaube*. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1921. 62 pages. M.8.50.

Three studies of the fundamental problems of prayer, freedom, and faith in God. The studies are dedicated to Professor Wilhelm Herrmann.

PAGE, KIRBY. *The Sword or the Cross*. Chicago: Christian Century Press, 1921. 107 pages. \$1.20.

A vigorous defense of Jesus' ideal of service and sacrifice in opposition to the doctrine that war is the ultimate arbiter.

PAGET, STEPHEN (editor). *Henry Scott Holland—Memoir and Letters*. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1921. xii+336 pages. \$5.00.

A fascinating and suggestive picture of a broad-minded and sympathetic Christian leader in the midst of English life during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

POOLE, REGINALD LANE. *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought and Learning*. New York: Macmillan, 1920. xiii+327 pages.

A revision of the issue of 1884 with extensive alterations relating to Bernard of Clairvaux and Abelard. Notes are inserted dealing with pertinent literature between 1884 and 1920.

RICHTER, JULIUS. *Evangelische Missionskunde*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. 463 pages.

A comprehensive and invaluable survey of the missionary enterprise from the pen of perhaps the greatest living authority in this field.

ROBERTS, RICHARD. *The Untried Door*. New York: Woman's Press, 1921. xiv+174 pages. \$1.50.

A popular textbook intended to acquaint students with "the mind of Jesus" so as to discover what is really involved in "following Jesus" today.

ROEDER, GÜNTHER (Samuel A. B. Mercer, translator). *Short Egyptian Grammar*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1920. xiv+88+56 pages. \$2.50.

Professor Mercer's indefatigable industry has here put into English form a creditable little introduction to the language of the ancient Egyptians. Its grammar, vocabulary, and practical exercises contribute much to the facilities of the beginner in that tongue.

ROGERS, CLEMENT F. *Pastoral Theology and the Modern World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. vii+176 pages.

A presentation of the new emphasis essential in a world deranged by war and growing industrialism. The book is not clearly outlined nor the message tersely stated.

RUDWIN, MAXMILIAN J. (editor). *Devil Stories—An Anthology*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1921. xix+332 pages. \$2.50.

An interesting collection of stories in which the Devil plays a leading rôle.

SANDAY, W., and EMMET, C. W. *The New Testament Background*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. 63 pages.

A very brief and elementary introduction to the books of the New Testament.

SMITH, ROBINSON. *The Solution of the Synoptic Problem*. London: Watts and Co., 1920. viii+286 pages. 10s.

The author sets forth an unusual hypothesis involving the assumption that the New Testament gospels were written in the period 105-150 A.D.

SNEATH, E. HERSHEY (editor). *At One with the Invisible*. New York: Macmillan, 1921. 293 pages. \$3.00.

Eleven studies of mysticism by various well-known professors in American seminaries and colleges. The Hebrew Prophets, Indian Mystics, Jesus, Paul, Augustine, Mohammedan Mystics, Dante, Eckhart, Saint Theresa, George Fox, and Wordsworth are treated.

SOPER, EDMUND DAVISON. *The Religions of Mankind*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1921. 344 pages. \$3.00.

An outline history of the great religions of the world, written from the standpoint of one devoted to Christianity. The author's understanding of the origin and nature of religion, and his own method of approach, are treated in an introductory chapter.

TAYLOR, VINCENT. *The Historical Evidence for the Virgin Birth*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. xii+136 pages.

A scholarly and cautious exposition of New Testament data leading to the conclusion that belief in the virgin birth does not emerge in the public teaching of Christians before the year 60 or perhaps 80 A.D. Hence the dogma is hardly capable of valid *historical* proof. The problem is thus seen to be ultimately one of *theological* speculation depending upon the question as to whether belief in the virgin birth is necessary to account adequately for the spiritual greatness of Jesus. On this point the author "has not yet been able to satisfy his mind." No serious account has been taken of the views of the *religionsgeschichtliche* school in the treatment of this subject.

TURNER, CUTHBERT H. *The Study of the New Testament—1883 and 1920*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1920. 66 pages.

This inaugural lecture of the successor to the late Professor Sanday of Oxford is a survey of selected aspects of New Testament study as carried on by German and British students during the period under consideration. French and American works are almost completely ignored.

WATKINS, OSCAR D. *A History of Penance*. 2 vols. New York: Longmans, Green, 1920. xxix+xix+775 pages. \$16.00.

Documents illustrating penance in the Christian church to A.D. 1215. An explanatory chapter follows each group of documents.

WAXMAN, MEYER. *The Philosophy of Don Hasdai Crescas*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1920. xii+162 pages.

An introduction to the thought of a Jewish philosopher of the fourteen century, A.D., with an exposition and criticism of his ideas about God and God's relation to the world.

WILSON, PHILIP WHITWELL. *The Vision We Forget*. New York: Revell, 1921. 288 pages. \$2.00.

A homiletical allegorization made with no regard for the original historical setting of the Book of Revelation.

WOHLENBERG, G. *Der erste und zweite Petrusbrief und der Judasbrief*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1915. lv+334 pages.

A new volume in Zahn's well-known series of New Testament commentaries representing the best conservative Protestant scholarship of Germany.

WOODCOX, BENJAMIN F. *Spiritual Evolution*. Battle Creek, Mich.: Woodcox and Fanner, 1921. 80 pages. \$1.00.

A numbered collection of 526 aphorisms dealing with phases of religious life and aspiration.

ZAHN, THEODOR. *Staatsumwälzung und Treueid in biblischer Beleuchtung*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1919. 55 pages.

The author seeks to show that loyalty to the state and its rulers is in accord with New Testament teaching.

ZÄNKER, O. *Die Gottesoffenbarung der Bibel*. Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1920. 82 pages.

A series of popular lectures sketching the history of revelation in the Old and New Testaments until its climax is reached in the work and personality of Jesus.

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PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

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Twenty years ago in *A Dynamic Faith*, after reviewing the new questions which the great sciences had raised for religion, I said: "There are still harder problems than any of these. Psychology has opened a series of questions which make the boldest tremble for his faith in an endless life or in any spiritual reality." The twenty years that have intervened have made my point much more clear. It is now pretty generally recognized that the deepest issues of the faith are to be settled in this field. The problem of the real nature of the human soul is at the present moment probably the most important religious question before us, for upon the answer to it all our vital spiritual interests depend. If man has no unique interior domain, if he is only a tiny bit of that vast system of naturalism in which every curve of process and development is rigidly determined by antecedent causes, then "spiritual" is only a high-sounding word with a metaphorical significance, but with no basis of reality in the nature of things. There is certainly no "place" in the external world of space where we can expect to find spiritual realities. They are not to be found by going "somewhere." Olympus has been climbed, and it was as naturalistic as any other mountain peak. Eden is only a defined area of Mesopotamia, and that blessed word can work no miracles for us now. The dome of the sky is only an

optical illusion. It is no supersensuous realm on which we can build our hopes. The beyond as a spiritual reality is within, or it is nowhere. Psychology, however, has not been very encouraging in promises of hope. It has gone the way of the other sciences and has taken an ever increasing slant toward naturalism. The result is that most so-called "psychologies of religion" reduce religion either to a naturalistic or to a subjective basis, which means in either case that religion as a way to some objective spiritual reality has eluded us and has disappeared as a constructive power. Many a modern psychologist can say with Browning's Cleon:

And I have written three books on the soul,
Proving absurd all written hitherto
And putting us to ignorance again.

Two of the main tendencies in what is usually called scientific psychology are (1) the "behaviorist" tendency and (2) the tendency to reduce the inner life to a series of "mind states." Let us consider behaviorism first. This turns psychology into "a purely objective experimental branch of natural science."¹ It aims at "the prediction and control of behavior." "Introspection forms no essential part of its method." One is not concerned with "interpretation in terms of consciousness," one is interested only in reactions, responses—in short, in *behavior* in the presence of stimuli which produce movements. The body is a complicated organ and "mind" is merely a convenient term to express its "activities."² The behaviorist "recognizes no dividing line between man and brute." Psychology becomes "the science of behavior,"³ the study of "the activity of man or animal as it can be observed from the outside, either with or without

¹ Watson, *Behavior*, p. 1.

² See Ralph Barton Perry's article "A Behavioristic View of Purpose" in the *Journal of Philosophy*, February 17, 1921.

³ Pillsbury, *Fundamentals of Psychology*, p. 4.

attempting to determine the mental states by inference from these acts." Emotions become reduced forthwith to "the bodily resonance" set up in the muscular and visceral systems by instinctive movements in the presence of objects, these curious movements being due entirely to the inheritance of physiological structure adapted at least in the early stages to aid survival. There is no way by which behaviorist psychology can give any standing to religion or to any type of spiritual values. "Aesthetics is the study of the useless," as William James baldly states the case. Conscience disappears or becomes another name for the inheritance or acquisition of certain types of social behavior. Everything which we call ethics or morality changes into well-defined and rigidly determined behavior. There is nothing more "spiritual" about it than there is in the fall of a raindrop or in the luminous trail of a meteor, or in any form of what has happily been called "cosmic weather."

This reduction of personality to a center of activity is a reaction from the dualistic sundering of mind and body inherited from Descartes. The theory of psychophysical parallelism is utterly bankrupt. Idealism, which is an attempt to get round the *impasse* of dualism by treating mind as the only reality, is abhorrent to scientists and unpopular with young philosophers especially in America. Some other solution is therefore urgent. The easiest one at hand, though it is obviously temporary and superficial, is to cut across the mind loop, ignore its unique, originative, creative capacity and its interior depth, to deal only with body plus body's activities, and to call that "psychology."

The "mind-state" psychology takes us little farther on. It also is a form of naturalism. "Mind-state" psychology makes more of introspection than behaviorist psychology does, and it works more than the latter does in terms of consciousness, which for the behaviorist can be almost ignored or questioned as an existing reality. According to this view,

mind or consciousness is composed of a vast number of "elemental units," and the business of psychology is to analyze and describe these units or states and to discover the laws of their arrangement or succession. Mind, on this theory, is an aggregate or sum total of "states." Professor James, who gives great place to "mind states," will, however, not admit that they are permanent and repeatable "units," passing and returning unaltered. In his usual vivid way he says that "a permanently existing 'idea' [i.e., mental unit] which makes its appearance before the footlights of consciousness at periodical intervals is as mythological an entity as the Jack of Spades."¹ And yet he continues to deal with mind as a vast series of more or less describable states. Some states are "substantive," such as our "perceptions," our "memories," or our definite "images," when the mind perches and rests upon some clear and describable thought, and on the other hand there are "transitive states" which are vague, hard to catch or hold or express, and which reveal the mind in flight, in passage, on the way from one substantive state to another.

When we ask the "mind-state" psychologist to tell us about the soul or to supply us with a working substitute for it, he relegates it to the scrap heap where lie the collected rubbish and the antiquated mental furniture of the medieval centuries. We have no need of it. It is only a *word* anyhow. It has always been an expensive luxury and a continual bother. We are better off with it gone. When we look about for a "self as knower," or for a guardian of our identity, we find all that we need in these same "passing states of consciousness." They not only know things and facts, but they also know themselves, and successively inherit and adapt all the preceding "states" have gained and acquired. The state of the present moment owns the thoughts and experiences which preceded it, for "what possesses the possessor possesses the possessed." "In our waking hours," Professor James says, "though each

¹ *Psychology* (Briefer Course), p. 197.

pulse of consciousness dies away and is replaced by another, yet that other, among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor and finding it 'warm,' greets it saying, 'Thou art *mine* and part of the same self with me.'"¹ It seems, then, this famous writer concludes, that "states of consciousness are all that psychology needs to do her work with. Metaphysics or theology may prove the soul to exist; but for psychology the hypothesis of such a substantial principle of unity is superfluous."¹ We are certainly hard up if we must depend on proofs which theology can give us!

We are thus once more reduced to a condition of sheer naturalism. Our stream of consciousness is only a rapid succession of passing states, each "state" causally attached to a molecular process in the brain. "Every *psychosis* is the result of a *neurosis*." There is no soul, there is no creative spiritual pilot of the stream, there is no freedom, there are no moral values, there is nothing but passing "cosmic weather," sometimes peeps of sunshine, sometimes moonshine, sometimes drizzle or blizzard, and sometimes cyclone or waterspout! To meet the appalling thinness of this "cinema" of mind states, we are given the comfort of believing that there is an under-threshold world within, possibly more real and surely more important than this little rivulet of states which make up our conscious life. There is a "fringe" to consciousness more wonderful than that which adorned the robe of the high priest. This "fringe" defies description and baffles all analysis. It is a halo or penumbra which surrounds every "state" and holds all the states vitally together, so that "states" turn out to be unsundered in some deeper mysterious currents of being. Others would call this same underlying, mysterious part of us the subliminal "self," i.e., under-threshold "self." It is a kind of semispiritual matrix where the states of consciousness are formed and gestated. It is the source to which we may trace everything that cannot be

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

explained by the avenues of the senses. Demons and divinities knock at its doors and visitants from superterrestrial shores peep in at its windows. It is often treated, especially of course by Frederic Myers, as a deeper "self," more or less discontinuous with our conscious upper self, the self of mind states. All work of genius is due to "subliminal uprushes," "an emergence into the current of ideas which the man is consciously manipulating of other ideas which he has not consciously originated, but which have shaped themselves beyond his will in profounder regions of his being." As is well known, Professor James resorts to these "subliminal uprushes" for his explanation of all the deeper religious experiences and he has done much to give credit to these "profounder regions of our being" and to make the subliminal theory popular. He does not, however, as Myers does, treat it as another "self," an intermediary between earth and heaven, a messenger and a mediator of all those higher and diviner aspects of life which transcend the sphere of sense and of the empirical world.

No theory certainly is sound which begins by cutting the subconscious and the conscious life apart into two more or less dissociated selves. There is every indication and evidence of continuity and correlation between what is above and what is below the threshold which in any case is as relative and artificial a line as is the horizon. The so-called "uprushes" of the genius are finely correlated with his normal experience into which they "uprush." The "uprushes" which convey truth to Socrates beautifully fit, first, the character of the man and, secondly, the demands of the temporal environment. Dante's "uprushes" correspond to the psychological climate of the medieval world, and Shakespeare's "uprushes" are well suited to the later period of the Renaissance. All subliminal communications are congruent and consonant with the experience of the person who receives them. The visions of apocalyptic seers are all couched in the imagery

of the apocalyptic schools, and so, too, the reports of mediums are all in terms of spiritualistic beliefs. We shall never find the solution of our religious problems by dividing the inner life of man into two unrelated selves, by whatever name we call them, for any religion that is to be real must go all the way through us, must unify all our powers, and must furnish a spring and power by which we live here and now in the sphere of our consciousness, our character, and our will.

It proves to be just as impossible to cut consciousness up into the fragmentary bits or units called mind states, or to sunder it into a so-called "self as knower" and "self as known." Consciousness is never a shower of shot—a series of discontinuous units. It is the most completely integral unity known to us anywhere in the universe. There are no "parts" to it; it is without breaks or gaps. It is one undivided whole. The only unit we can properly talk about is our unique persisting personal self in conscious relation to an environment. We can, of course, treat consciousness in the abstract as an aggregate of states and we can formulate a scientific account of this constructed entity as we can of any other abstracted section of reality. But this abstracted entity is forever totally different from the warm and intimate inner life within us, as we actually live it and feel its flow. Any state or process which we may talk about is only an artificial fragment of a larger, deeper reality which gives the "fragment" its peculiar being and makes it what it is. Underneath all that appears and happens in the conscious flow is the personal self for whom the appearances occur. Any psychologist who explicitly leaves this out of his account always implicitly smuggles it in again.

The most striking fact of experience is *knowing that we know*. The same consciousness which knows any given object in the same pulse of consciousness knows itself as knowing it. Self-consciousness is present in all consciousness of objects. The thinker that thinks is involved in and is bound up with all knowledge, even of the simplest sort. Every idea, every

feeling, and every act of will is what it is because it is in living unity with our entire personal self. If any such "state" got dissociated, slipped away and undertook to do business on its own hook, it would be as unknown to us as our guardian angel is. The mind that knows can never be separated from the world that is known. One can think in abstraction of a mind apart by itself and of a world equally isolated—but no such mind and no such world actually exist. To be a real mind, a real self, is to be in active commerce with a real world given in experience. One thinks his object in the same unified pulse of consciousness in which he thinks himself and vice versa. There is no self-consciousness without object-consciousness, and there is no object-consciousness without self-consciousness. Outer and inner, knower and known, and not two but forever one. The "soul," therefore, is not something hidden away in behind or above and beyond our ideas and feelings and will activities. It is the active living unity of personal consciousness—the one psychic integer and unit for a true psychology. It binds all the items of experience into one indivisible unity, one organic whole through which our personal type of life is made possible. At every moment of waking, intelligent life we look out upon each fact, each event, each experience from a wider self which organizes the new fact in with its former experiences, weaves it into the web of its memories and emotions and purposes, makes the new fact a part of itself, and yet at the same time knows itself as transcending and outliving the momentary fact.

When we study the personal self deeply enough, not as cut up into artificial units, but as the living, undivided whole, which is implied in all coherent experience, we find at once a basis for those ideal values that are rightly called spiritual and for "those mighty hopes that make us men." The first step toward a genuine basis of spiritual life is to be found in the restoration of the personal self to its true place as the ultimate fact, or datum, of self-conscious experience. As soon

as we come back to this central reality, our unified, unique, self-active personality, we find ourselves in possession of material enough; as Browning would say,

. . . . For fifty hopes and fears,
As old and new at once as nature's self,
To rap and knock and enter in our soul
Take hands and dance there, a fantastic ring,
Round the ancient idol, on his base again,—
The grand Perhaps!

What we find at once, even without a resort to a subliminal self, or to "uprushes," is that our normal, personal self-consciousness is a unique, living, self-active, creative center of energies, dealing not only with space and time and tangible things, but dealing as well with realities which are space and which are space- and time-transcending. "The things that are not" prove to be immense factors in our lives and constantly "bring to naught the things that are." The greatest events of history have not been due to physical forces; they have been due to plans and ideals which were real only in the viewless minds of men. What *was not yet* brought about what was to be. Alexander the Great with his physical forces, sweeping across the ancient world like a cataclysm of nature, was certainly no more truly a world-builder than was Jesus, who had no armies, who used no tangible forces, but merely put into operation those "things that were not," i.e., his ideas of what ought to be and his conviction that love is stronger than Roman legions. The simplest and humblest of us, like the Psalmist, find the Meshech where we sojourn too straightened and narrow for us. We have all cried, "Woe is me that I sojourn in Meshech!" The reason that we discover the limits and bounds of our poor Meshech is that we are all the time going beyond the hampering Meshech that tries to contain and imprison us.

The thing which spoils all our finite camping places is our unstilled consciousness that we are made for something more

than we have yet realized or attained. Our ideals are an unmistakable intimation of our time-transcending nature. We can no more stop with *that which is* than Niagara can stop at the fringe of the fall. All consciousness of the higher rational type is continually carried forward toward the larger whole that would complete and fulfil its present experience. We are aware of the limit only because we are already beyond it. The present is a pledge of more; the little arc which we have gives us a ground of faith in the full circle which we seek. A study of man's life which does not deal with this inherent idealizing tendency is like *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out. Martineau declared:

Amid all the sickly talk about "ideals" which has become the commonplace of our age, it is well to remember that so long as they are dreams of future possibility and not faiths in present realities, so long as they are a mere self-painting of the yearning spirit and not its personal surrender to immediate communion with an infinite Perfection, they have no more solidity or steadiness than floating air-bubbles, gay in the sunshine and broken by the passing wind. . . . The very gate of entrance to religion, the moment of its new birth, is the discovery that your ideal is the everlasting Real, no transient brush of a fancied angel wing, but the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul of souls.¹

In the same vein Pringle-Pattison, one of the wisest of our living teachers, has said:

Consciousness of imperfection, the capacity for progress, and the pursuit of perfection, are alike possible to man only through the universal life of thought and goodness in which he shares and which, at once an indwelling presence and an unattainable ideal, draws him "on and always on."²

It is here in these experiences of ours which spring out of our real nature, but which always carry us beyond *what is* and which make it impossible for us to *live* in a world composed of "things," no matter how golden they are, that we have the source of our spiritual values. When we talk about values

¹ Martineau, *A Study of Religion* (2d ed.), I, 12.

² *The Philos, Radicals, and Other Essays*, pp. 97-98.

we may use the word in two senses. In the ordinary sense we mean something extrinsic, utilitarian. We mean that we possess something which can be exchanged for something else. It is precious because we can sell it or swap it or use it to keep life going. In the other sense we see value in reference to something which *ought to be*, whether it now is or not. It is *fit* to be, it would justify its being in relation to the whole reality. When we speak of ethical or spiritual values we are thinking of something that will minister to the highest good of persons or of a society of persons. Value in this loftier meaning always has to do with ideals. A being without any conscious end or goal, i.e., without an ideal, would have no sense of worth, no spiritual values. It does not appear on the level of instinct. It arises as an appreciation of what ought to be realized in order to complete and fulfil any life which is to be called good. Obviously a person with rich and complex interests will have many scales of value, but lower and lesser ones will fall into place under wider and higher ones, so that one forms a kind of hierarchical system of values with some overtopping end of supreme worth dominating the will.

It becomes one of the deepest questions in the world what connection there is between man's spiritual values or ideals and the eternal nature of things in the universe. Are these ideals of ours, these values which seem to raise us from the naturalistic to the spiritual level, just our subjective creations, or are they expressions of a co-operating and rational power beyond us and yet in us giving us intimations of what is true and best in a world more real than that of matter and motion? These ideal values, such as our appreciation of beauty, our confidence in truth, our dedication to moral causes, our love for worthy persons, our loyalty to the Kingdom of God, are not born of selfish preference or individual desire. They are not capricious like dreams and visions. They attach to something deeper than our personal wishes, in fact our faith in them and our devotion to them often cause us to take lines of action straight

against our personal wishes and our individual desires. They stand the test of stress and strain, they weather the storms of time which submerge most things, they survive all shock and mutations and only increase in worth with the wastage of secondary goods. They rest on no mere temporary impulse or sporadic whim. They have their roots deep in the life of the race. They have lasted better than Andes or Ararat, and they are based upon common, universal aspects of rational life. They are at least as sure and prophetic as are laws of triangles and relations of space. If we can count on the permanence of the multiplication table and on the continuity of nature, no less can we count on the conversation of values and the continued significance of life.

They seem thus to belong to the system of the universe and to have the guardianship of some invisible Pilot of the cosmic ship. The streams of moral power and the spiritual energies that have their rise in good persons are as much to be respected facts of the universe as are the rivers that carry ships of commerce. Moral goodness is a factor in the constitution of the world, and the eternal nature of the universe backs it as surely as it backs the laws of hydrogen. It does not back every ideal, for some ideals are unfit and do not minister to a coherent and rationally ordered scheme of life. Those ideals only have the august sanction and right of way which are born out of the age-long spiritual travail of the race and which tend to organize men for better team efforts, i.e., which promote the social community life, the organism of the Spirit. Through these spiritual forces, revealed in normal ethical persons, we are, I believe, nearer to the life of God and closer to the revealing centers of the universe than we are when we turn to the subliminal selves of hysterics. The normal interior life of man is boundless and bottomless. It is not a physical reality, to be measured by foot rules or yardsticks. It is a reality of a wholly different order. It is essentially spiritual, i.e., of spirit. In its organized and differentiated life

this personal self of ours is often weak and erratic. We feel the *urge* which belongs to the very nature of *spirit*, but we blunder in our direction, we bungle our aims and purposes, we fail to discover what it is that we really want. But we are never insulated from the wider spiritual environment which constitutes the true inner world from which we have come and to which we belong. There are many ways of correspondence with this environment. No way, however, is more vital, more life-giving than this way of dedication to the advancement of the moral ideals of the world.

THE VALIDITY OF THE IDEA OF GOD

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This paper approaches the problem of the validity of the idea of God from the social and genetic points of view. Validity is conceived in terms of value and experience rather than in terms of the metaphysical concept of existence. This approach, of course, implies the conviction that the history of an idea is an important means of ascertaining its nature. Such a study suggests that the reality of God may be found to be social in nature. This reality may be of the same order as the reality of the family or state which consists in the character of the organization of the individuals included in it. "Existence" in the case of the family or state includes the relations which the members have to one another.

Studies of the development of religion among various races have shown a striking relation between organized social life and the gods. The gods are identified with those objects of the environment which are the centers of interest and attention. Hunting and nomadic peoples have animal gods, fishers have fish gods, agriculturists have grain and rain gods, and where cultures blend as among the later Hebrews the sacred objects are syncretized. This statement is not made merely with reference to totemism, though the totem deities are obviously related in this way to the activities and interests of the people. When the social organization is sufficiently advanced to center attention upon human leaders, the gods become more human and are invested with the character and powers of the sheik and king. It is significant that monotheism did not arise in religion before monarchy in government. In the present time with the falling of monarchs

and the increasing tendency toward democracy the conception of a Kingdom of God is losing ground. Professor Coe has not hesitated to insist that we must now do our religious thinking in terms of the "democracy of God."

The intimate identification of God with the Spirit of the Group is further revealed in the fact that these wax and wane together in the shifting fortunes of peoples. Robertson Smith was one of the first to note this. If a god's followers were conquered and enslaved their god became a vassal of the conqueror's god. If the tribe were scattered and its identity lost the god became a jinni, shorn of power and tending to disappear completely. Just as the personality and power of an earthly ruler increase with the extension of his domain and the growth of his armies, so the god grew with the enlarging circle of his worshipers and their access of power.

Irving King has emphasized the fact that the personality of Yahweh was gradually built up through the experiences and conflicts of Israel particularly as these were mediated and interpreted by the prophets. He has attempted to indicate something of the process by which the ethical idealism of the nation evolved and the manner by which it was progressively reflected in the character of God. That he was conceived as set off above and beyond the people and regarded not as the reflection of their aspirations but the source of them, is explained as a common tendency of the evaluating consciousness to put our highest values into a different sphere, separate and unique. ✓

We have this same phenomenon in our modern group life. We do not designate the lesser social unities as gods, but we do personify them. The psychological process is apparently of the same nature as in primitive groups. The Alma Mater of college life is an example. The whole meaning and spirit of the college is registered in our feeling for the Alma Mater. The validity of this idea is not to be found in any specific individual,

though any person prominently associated with the institution may be representative of the whole. The idea of the Fostering Mother is more adequate for symbolizing the entire life of the school just because it is not bound down to the definite form and features of any one person. The reality answering to it is not without tangible, vital qualities. The buildings and grounds, the libraries and laboratories, the long procession of founders, teachers, students, friends, and benefactors belong to this reality. Moreover, there is a peculiar flavor and spirit which we call the genius of the institution. Anyone who has participated intimately in the life of Yale or Harvard, for example, is sensitive to certain customs, attitudes, manners, methods of work, and habits of mind which are so characteristic as to be keenly appreciated by their supporters and antagonists.

A similar case is that of Uncle Sam. He is not an actual person in the ordinary sense of a man of certain height and weight, but he is a person in the legal sense. That is, the United States is a person before the law who can own property, sell and trade, collect revenues, excite loyalty and antagonism. During the war at least, it was not safe to speak lightly of Uncle Sam. The idea of such a person cannot be said to be valid in the sense of the existence of a particular being in human form answering to it, but has the idea therefore no validity at all? During the war it was noticeable that the cartoonists used this idea to fire the imagination, to awaken patriotism, and to portray the fortunes and the attitudes of America. As the United States entered the war Uncle Sam's countenance became stern and impassioned. As wealth rolled into our coffers he appeared stouter and more prosperous. He gave evidence of greater cosmopolitan interests. Surely this face and figure had meaning and referred to a reality, that is, to the American people in their national organization. The use of the symbol had two functions at least. It furnished a means of conceiving the people of the

United States as a whole, and it provided a familiar, vivid, and manageable representation in reference to which national attitudes and purposes could be expressed and cultivated. It may even be insisted that there is some necessity and urgency about this Uncle Sam. The mind requires some means of grasping the main characteristics of the nation, since its relations are essentially social, especially in dealing with other social units. Personification is one of the most natural means of accomplishing this.

The analogy of these cases with the idea of God is suggestive. The reality which the idea of God expresses may be thought of, not as an independent person or individual in the very form and shape of man, but as the Common Will idealized and magnified and presented in personal symbolism. The whole of life, taken in a certain way, is then the reality. The whole of life includes physical objects, earth and sun and stars, motion and ether and light, and also the sentient orders culminating in mankind. When the idea of God is employed it implies a particular organization of reality in terms of the felt values of experience. God is felt to be the source and guardian of life and of good fortune. In earlier society each god had a special sphere over which he presided—Poseidon over the sea, Ares over war, and Zeus over all. As society becomes more highly organized and unified, these various interests become functions of the one deity. God is occupied more and more explicitly with the human social order and its needs. The concerns which are felt most acutely by the whole community are those with which God is associated. Thus drought, famine, pestilence, and war which affect all individuals stir a universal impulse to seek relief and to turn to the embodiment of all power and protection. As arts and specialized forms of culture arise, God becomes their patron. With gradual modification of customs and the emergence of new standards those members of the group who favor them refer them to the will of God. And those who oppose such modifica-

tion are equally sure that they are works of the Devil. It is the party whose policy succeeds which establishes assurance with reference to what the will of God is. We have striking illustrations of this fact in our own society. Slavery was for a long time thought to have the approval of God, but now the judgment or will of God is wholly identified with opposition to slavery. During the struggle to establish prohibition there were many Christians who quoted Paul's advice to Timothy about the value of wine for his frequent infirmities and cited the use of wine in the communion service, the most sacred ordinance of the church. Now the will of the majority has been registered against intoxicating liquor and religious people in America have become certain that its use is contrary to the will of God. Only a few generations ago the doctrine of the divine right of kings was commonly accepted and it is clearly written in our Scriptures, but it is no longer the correct doctrine in these democratic days. The will of the people does not now support that conception and therefore it is not the will of God.

The voice of the people as the voice of God is a statement which may claim assent if by the voice of the people is meant the expression, not of the impulsive cries of the mob or rabble, but that of the matured, deliberate judgment of the whole people. There is much to be said for the divine authority of tradition if we may include in the conception of tradition the growing body of criticized opinion, scientific reflection, and social aspiration. When this is registered in codes of conduct, in laws and customs, it gains majestic proportions and becomes profoundly impressive. The individuals of society do not think of such tradition being made out of hand or as weak and transient. They have the sense of its vast importance. It is superindividual and in a very true sense objective.

On the psychological side the key to the importance of the group in reference to God may be found in the experience one has in any intimate, significant organization to which one

belongs. Certain features of this experience emerge in any small face-to-face group where large interests are involved. A board of trustees administering a benevolent cause such as an educational institution may illustrate the matter. Here the individuals constitute an entity, whose being and will is more than the aggregate of their personalities. The board is a reality in which the minds and wills of the trustees have a certain organization and direction. It may be older than the living members. It may represent interests, financial, social, and political, quite beyond the combined power of all the individuals. The method of deliberation of this institutional mind is more or less prescribed by custom and precedent. When a member expresses himself in conference concerning a vital measure, he is uttering not merely his own mind, but his mind as influenced—stimulated and directed—by the group and its interests. He is a different “self” there from the “selves” which he is in other associations. When he sits with the members of that body there is a “sense of presence” peculiar to that relation. Various characteristic inhibitions and impulsions arise beyond the conscious, purposeful volitions of a voluntary attitude. The mind which he addresses is the group mind or the mind of certain members in reference to the group mind. When the company tries to “make up its mind” on any issue, a process occurs not unlike that of the deliberation of an individual, but the mind thus made up is not the mind of any one individual. All individuals stand in a unique relation to it, manifest consideration for it, and feel a kind of deference toward it.

Something of this kind may be felt in the humblest committee meeting, but the force of it is likely to be in proportion to the felt importance of the work in hand. When the deliberations concern ideal causes, such as the determination of national political policies or the world-wide interests of some humanitarian or religious enterprise, there is an elevation of mind and heart of the highest degree. Sitting in a convention of

delegates from all parts of the world deliberating upon the problems of world-wide missions the speakers are listened to as exponents of movements and issues of immeasurable significance. The emotional tension is often great, not so much through differing judgments as through the feeling of responsibility and the desire to hear and utter solving words. Emerson's reflections upon the Oversoul express this mood. There is a Spirit of the Group which exercises the function of control and inspiration for all the members. When the group is extended to embrace humanity and the participants share the noblest aspirations and plans for the uplift and welfare of all men, in the present and in the future, the fullest possible sense of a supermind or superspirit is attained. The social, psychological basis for the sense of God may therefore consist in this interaction of the individual and the group. The attempt at any analysis or description of this relation is necessarily inadequate and disappointing, but the experience of it is among the profoundest events of human life.

If God is the idealizing Social Will, or Spirit of the Group, what is his relation to Nature? It is sometimes assumed that if religion is regarded as primarily a concern of the social group it can take no sufficient account of the natural world. This view may rest upon the accepted picture of the order of events in the genealogy of our earth. Life appears after long geological ages, and human life still later. Society arises therefore as the latest development in a vast cosmic process. Human beings seem like puny insects in a great material order. Such a conception of man makes all of his thoughts and works appear insignificant. How, then, can a development within society, such as the social mind, or common will, condition or be superior to the forces of nature? Such a view of man's place in nature has seemed to demand the conception of a God preceding the material universe and ordering all its minutest elements. A God of that kind rules as the master-creator. He is the conscious ordering Will sustaining every

law and every event. But in the nature of the case, such a conception is a postulate, a dogma incapable of proof or verification. It may even be called a poetic fancy, and a similar notion is indeed found in the myths and legends of all peoples. With the coming of science and a critical examination of man's ideas of himself and his world it becomes apparent that no scientific or logical procedure of thought can establish the existence of such a Being. Kant's criticisms of the arguments for the existence of that kind of God are conclusive. As Kant showed, the argument from design is recognized as establishing at most the "carpenter" relation of God to the materials given. It does not account for the origin of stuff and substance. The ontological argument, which Kant saw to be the most important and ultimately the foundation of all the other arguments, comes back to human life for its starting-point. It is the nature of man's idea, that is, its inclusion, by necessity, of perfection and existence, which is the guaranty of the truth of the idea and therefore of the existence of God. Probably the great majority of theologians and philosophers accept essentially such a starting-point for the doctrine of God. That is, they start with human experience. They have then the problem before them as to how an idea in the minds of these little animals we call men, revolving on a mere speck in space which we call the earth, can validate the existence and creative work revealed in all the stars and suns and planets whirling in the void.

The view of the social psychologists emphasizes a different procedure. This view also starts with actual experiences and studies them, not by metaphysics and logic primarily, but in terms of their nature and functions. Thus Durkheim finds that the social group comes to have a sense of unity and relationship. This unity is symbolized and magnified, and is identified with a totem or a power of nature or an anthropomorphic being. The social group is a kind of protoplasm in which the individual is nourished and imbedded like a

cell. The relation of the infant to his world is typical of his experience through life. He is surrounded and protected by the members of his group. His mother hovers over him. Her breasts and face and eyes and voice are among the first "objects" he encounters. Constantly persons are about him. By their movements they arrest attention. All his waking life they are watching, caressing, feeding, calling, commanding him. They come between him and all other things. They are ceaselessly pointing, explaining, advising, and putting him in his place. The commonest objects are already labeled. It is very important to call fire, fire, and not water or wood. A kind of veil of thoughts and attitudes is woven about everything, about people and dogs and trees and stars. This veil is the social medium, the atmosphere created by customs and speech and ways of human kind. This veil is never lifted, for the vast majority of human beings. They live and die within the mores and folkways of their inherited groups.

Here and there an individual becomes aware of his own racial characteristics, manner of speech, and eccentricities. Few ever catch a glimpse of the profounder qualities of human nature or realize anything of the extent to which social inheritance and personal habit enter into perception and emotional attitudes. William James thought the study of the subconscious promised to open very remarkable chapters in the understanding of human nature. Much has been done in that direction, particularly by the French studies of hypnotism and other abnormal phenomena. The Freudians have made real contributions through their investigations of dreams, suppressed complexes, and related phenomena. The French school of Durkheim has opened new vistas by its study of the social or group mind. The reaction from the former intellectualistic conception of human life began in the last century with Arthur Schopenhauer. His voluntaristic psychology placed the intellect in subordination to the will and gave new importance to instinct and to the emotional life.

From many sources the impression has been deepened that men have a collective organization of experience not unlike that of the insects and lower animals—for example, the ants and bees. The ants and bees have developed a remarkable system of subdivision of labor, interdependence, and discipline. Durkheim has shown that human society has grown up by these unconscious processes and is still to a remarkable extent controlled by them. The social organization quite unintentionally and without any purpose to do so furnishes the patterns and models of the august categories of space, time, number, and the rest. Language furnishes a striking illustration. Not only does the child learn his mother-tongue literally before he knows it, but the race itself developed sign language and highly inflected speech before anyone really was aware of it. It is common experience to write a word as automatically as possible to ascertain how it should be spelled. In the same way we fall back upon our usage and feeling to ascertain the proper form of a phrase. The conscious analysis of such habits is more or less difficult and irksome, as may usually be seen in a boy's struggles with grammar. It is also appalling to see how little immediate influence such conscious analysis has upon incorrect established usage.

The sense of the group as a whole is one of the deepest and most tenacious facts of human experience. It is more than a feeling for particular individuals. It is the sense of the complex relations which several persons, including one's self, sustain to one another and to other groups. It enters into the masterpieces of art. The translators of works of literature are constantly baffled by shades of meaning which elude them. Persons who have lived long among people of a different race, as Lafcadio Hearn did, have confessed that they could not establish the full sense of kinship. He remained a foreigner in his own home and the sense of complete unity was impossible to achieve. From such depths of social habituation do our profoundest attitudes arise that we cannot fathom them. And

we are constantly projecting this inner order and structure of thought and feeling into our consciousness of the world about us and the God over us. It was natural that when men lifted their eyes to the stars and began to notice them they saw them grouped in the shapes of animals with which they were familiar—the bear, the scorpion, the fish, and the bull. For the same reason there is a man in the moon. Equally significant is the fact that there is a woman in the moon, though she is of course less conspicuous than her liege lord.

There is certainly a very real truth in the contention that the cosmos as we conceive it is a social affair, dependent upon society. Even if it has now passed beyond the myths of childish fancy it is a construct of the scientific imagination. Kant believed he had achieved an epoch-making truth when it occurred to him that we should regard nature as conforming to the laws of our thought—not our conscious, individual thought, but our pure, *a priori*, synthetic judgment. And the studies of early society have emphasized the fact that man naïvely spread the pattern of his clan and tribal arrangement over all animate and inanimate things. The Zuni Indians named the points of the compass, that is, they described all space, in terms of the seven divisions of their camp. The Australians likewise attributed to all space their own social arrangement of it. It is of interest that since Kant what has probably been the most dominant school of philosophy, idealism, has insisted that we conceive the physical world of space and time, not in terms of things as they are in themselves, but according to the law and temper of our own intelligence. From this standpoint the representation of God as the Spirit of the Group, that is, as the Common Will, with its idealizing tendency, is not unrelated to nature, but is supreme over it. The conception of God in social terms is not inconsistent with the thought of him as also the God of nature when nature is thought of as socially conditioned.

A further feature which should be considered before deciding that a social conception of religion does not deal adequately with nature is the very practical, vital fact that society does much in the actual control and development of the natural order. With the coming of scientific medicine contagious diseases, such as malaria, measles, smallpox, and diphtheria, are no longer the dreaded enemies of civilization. The use of vaccine, quarantine, and other preventives have all but eliminated these perils. Pests of the soil, of grain and fruits have been destroyed. Irrigation projects have made deserts bloom. By aviation man has attained mastery over space and time which for practical purposes has marvelously diminished them. By working with nature man has helped her to produce new species of grain and flowers and has wrought transformations in animals and men. By processes of selection and training the men and women of a few centuries hence may be supermen and women as compared with ourselves. It requires no strain of the imagination to realize that we might go far toward the elimination of disease, poverty, and crime simply by spreading and intensifying present-day education, limited as such education is. In many countries 90 per cent of the population are illiterate, and in the United States even with our free public-school system 7.7 per cent are illiterate. Rapid improvement in this respect is shown in the United States by the fact that in 1900 there were 10.7 per cent, in 1890, 13.3 per cent, in 1880, 17 per cent who were illiterate.

The study of the various modifications which society has made in nature and especially in man himself and in his relation to his environment strengthens the impression which is abroad that the process of creation is still going on and that it is the Spirit of the Social Group which is directing this activity. We have learned from the Great War how devastating and remorseless the power of society may be when turned upon itself. If the war had lasted a little longer, the wreck and

ruin by bomb and poisoned gas would have been incalculably greater. Perhaps it is not over optimistic to believe that more slowly, but just as surely, man's inventiveness and social organization may accomplish correspondingly great constructive results.

It is a suggestive fact that the sense of God is closely bound up with social solidarity, and that when society is disintegrating or full of conflict God becomes unreal and remote. Professor Cooley remarks that it is hard for our transition age to believe in God because we behold his face reflected in troubled waters. There are signs, however, of a new social spirit. The war gave us a vision of a new humanitarianism. The dream of a League of Nations cannot be entirely forgotten. A new sense of kinship stirred in the hearts of all peoples, and it will never again be quieted into the old selfishness. The Hope of the Blessed Community, to use the phrase of Professor Royce, will continue to be cherished. It may be expected that the spirit of invention will turn to social enterprises in the future as it has to mechanical devices in the past. Some writers think that our civilization is still medieval in social affairs as compared with the natural sciences. They say the social sciences are a thousand years behind the physical sciences. If we are to expect developments in human associations such as this comparison suggests, then we may believe that these new measures of justice and mutual aid, of discipline and concentrated effort will afford us a more vital companionship with our fellows and therefore a greater sense of God.

It is a fair question to ask of such a view as the one here presented, How would its acceptance affect the practice of religion? If God were thought to be the Spirit of the Group, would he still be of value in religious experience? What validity would God, thus conceived, have for the religious needs of man?

Here the recent studies of psychology furnish a valuable point of view with reference to the relation which man's ideational life sustains to his volitional and emotional nature. In this view we are primarily active and emotional. Someone has said that "at best human beings just barely think even under the utmost provocation." Anyway, the religious life does not arise from thought or rest upon logic. Like love and patriotism it wells up from deeper sources. Religion is an expression of man's quest for life and life more abundant. It is more than the demand for self-preservation. It asks for expansion, for growth. Through the process of development now widely achieved under social pressure and pacemaking, human beings become partially conscious of the process. They generate ideas, theories, and hypotheses. In religion they produce creeds and symbols. When it is once realized that life creates systems of thought for its aid and satisfaction and is not created by them, then the problem of this discussion appears in a new light. The idea of God arising as a kind of "collective representation" may not persist in the same relation of externality and supernaturalism as it has seemed to hold in the past, but may be variously conceived and still have validity because formulating and symbolizing important attitudes and ideals. This seems to be suggested in part at least by Professor Coe's

prediction that human nature will go on building its ideal personal-social worlds, finding in them its life and its home. This process will continue to be carried out toward ideal completeness as faith in a divine order in which our life shares. The thought of God may, indeed, undergo yet many transformations, but in one form or another it will be continually renewed as an expression of the depth and height of social experience and social aspiration [*Psychology of Religion*, p. 326].

Evidence that God may still have meaning, and therefore validity, under most diverse conceptions is seen in the writings of the mystics and other men of conflicting creeds. Jacob

Boehme held God to be beyond all of our thoughts of him, even so far above our world that he is beyond good and evil. We cannot properly call him good. From quite another approach Herbert Spencer came to essentially the same conclusion. He was agnostic only with reference to what God is, not that he is. Poles apart from these positions is that of William James and H. G. Wells who find it easier to believe in a finite than in an infinite God, and do enthusiastically confess their faith in a God who is so finite and limited as possibly to "draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity." That is, our will to believe helps to create the fact. Some primitive peoples punish their Gods if their prayers are not answered. We may wonder how it is possible for them to believe in gods which they occasionally knock from their pedestals and roll in the mud, but at least it is some evidence that attachment to the gods does not depend upon maintaining an idea of the gods' perfection.

The problem of the validity of the idea of God may lead through the observation of such facts to a discrimination between the analytical, critical, reflective attitude and the synthetic, active, religious attitude. This is the difference between the spectator and the participant. As spectator in any situation one may be detached, intellectually alert, and cold. As participant one is interested, appreciative, and warm. Both attitudes appear in varying degrees. When the participation in a practical situation is most complete, the critical attitude is intolerable. Thus during the war there was a tendency to silence every questioning tongue without argument or investigation. The mind untrained in critical analysis is generally impatient of the attempt to describe objectively, in the spirit of science, any personal experience. A student I once advised to study botany feelingly objected on the ground that it would spoil her love of flowers. The same reaction often meets the student of religious experience. There seems at first something irreligious and disloyal about the descrip-

tion of one's deeper emotions. This is the objection which is constantly brought against introspection. How is it possible to analyze an active, practical, or emotional state of mind without destroying it? The answer is that we make such an analysis by means of the experience of what we may call different selves. We are accustomed to the notion that every person is a kind of community of selves. Each self is a rôle which the person takes in a sort of imaginative dramatization. Self-criticism is a process of setting up one of these rôles as a "me" to be analyzed in contrast to another possible "me." By practice this objectification may reach a point where the person becomes a fair and just critic of himself, but it is not often achieved. Where it is accomplished the individual moves back and forth from the rôle of an active agent to that of an impartial spectator. This is much more easily accomplished, however, by the aid of another individual whose eyes we borrow for the purpose of seeing ourselves. If a person remained in the attitude of self-criticism he would be permanently inhibited from the active mood. It does sometimes happen that a person who has endeavored to master a technique, such as playing an instrument or manipulating golf sticks, establishes such a definite and inescapable impression of himself as a failure in that rôle that he gives up further effort. But the normal process of growth is by embodying in action the suggestions derived from criticism.

The application of this transition from participant to observer and from observer to participant in religion bears directly upon the validity of the idea of God. The records of religious experience in the Bible and in Christian literature are largely from the standpoint of the participant. An excellent illustration is afforded by the prophets of Israel. They announced their message by saying, "The word of the Lord came unto me." Modern psychology affords a convincing account of this psychosis by identifying it with certain phenomena of the subconscious. The sense of objectivity

pertains not only to hallucinations and illusions, but also to insistent ideas and deep convictions. They do not seem to be the work of the individual thinker. Many literary men, scientists, and artists have testified that their minds seem to be controlled by outside agencies. Their own accounts show that their understanding of this feeling does not lessen the sense of objectivity when actively absorbed in work.

It may be that the sense of God is just as little affected by the discovery of its identity with the feeling for the group. If as observer and analyst a man reached the conclusion that God is one with the Spirit of the Group, it would not necessarily follow that as participant that man would have any lessened feeling for God as the supreme ruler of men and nature. The practical, emotional life may be said to guarantee the absoluteness of its objects, while it is the nature of reflective thought to qualify and limit them. It is difficult for the mother to see defects in her child. Love is blind, blind at least to blemishes. Religion has been slow to reconstruct its program of action under criticism, especially where God has been conceived statically. It has been necessary to make it appear that the growth of knowledge was only the achievement of more adequate insight into the eternal will and unchanging purpose of God. Often changes have come about by an unconscious development in the spirit of the age and in the mores, or the changes have been thought of as occurring in the nonessentials. This has generally meant that progress has been welcomed only where it was not felt to be important. So long as one did not criticize or attempt to reconstruct the fundamentals of the faith it was well enough. In all matters of mere expediency there could be full liberty of opinion. It seems seldom to occur to the defendants of this view that it means that God contented himself with only a partial arrangement of the world. Looking over the history of Christianity, one easily gets the impression that the making of our human world was left with only a

rough structure and without clear plans for its completion. What some regard as important or essential, others place in the category of opinion. Perhaps the radically different conception of a growing God, finite but marvelously great and still advancing through the enlightenment of society and the organization of its will, might elicit, not only loyalty and affection, but a far greater sense of responsibility in the individuals of society. Other institutions have made this change in attitude with that result. Political democracy surrendered the conception of the divinity of kings and the divine right of kings and now accepts more or less frankly the authority of society itself in all matters, great and small. That change has not destroyed patriotism. Men still die for their country, and as it seems to us in America they die more gloriously when believing that their cause is an experiment and an adventure and that their deeds decide the issues. Religion might conceivably gain in the same way. Loyalty and devotion seem to increase rather than diminish where responsibility is most fully shared. Possibly the idea of a powerful, finite, struggling, and growing God identified with the common will of society would make a profounder appeal and therefore have greater validity than any notion of a perfect and ineffable Being could have. Just as we may regard the state critically in one mood and be willing to serve and die for her too, so we may be capable of holding our conception of God subject to revisions and also maintain the utmost devotion to him. In other words, it may be possible to regard God from the analytical, critical standpoint as limited and developing and also maintain in action and sentiment the sense of the absolute.

The question of the possibility of prayer and of worship naturally arises here. Both belong to the active, emotional attitude and are natural to it. Prayer is a form of communion. Ideal companionship is involved in it. It affords comfort and restfulness by inducing relaxation, a sense of security and

strength. As in all conversation we are alert and sensitive to the other person's point of view, so in talking things over with God we tend to think of ourselves and our problem as such an ideal Being does. Prayer is therefore a valuable means of illumination and direction. Problems are solved through it and the course of events modified and transformed. If in the midst of one's prayers the critical spectator mood should set in, the prayer would be at an end for the time being, and if the critical mood in reference to this act became chronic it would undoubtedly abolish the practice of prayer. But it is equally true that if in conversation with a friend I allow the critical, scientific mood of the psychologist to possess me, then the conversation is at an end. Besides, my friend is likely to be irritated and estranged and may think me quite out of my mind, especially if he himself is not a psychologist, and not a very considerate person. It makes no difference what one's conception of God is, the emergence in thought of its critical, logical formulation interferes with prayer just as much as does the emergence of the view which identifies God with the Social Will. Any theory critically attended to inhibits for the time being the attitude of appreciation and acquiescence.

The term worship has come to have a connotation which almost identifies it with obeisance and adoration. The subservience and deference of a slave or vassal is implied. With the passing of arbitrary dictators this attitude of subjection has become obnoxious. The endless chanting of hymns of adoration palls upon the modern mind. In a more democratic society there is a greater sense of kinship and of likeness of nature. Religion therefore tends to become more of a mutual enterprise. The church may be thought of as performing two functions, one that of a "deliberative assembly" with educational facilities such as classrooms and libraries and clinics to make the deliberations intelligent and fruitful; the other function that of dramatizing the

religious life with all the aids of scenery, music, and action to give the most vivid representation of the struggles, tragedies, and victories of man's spiritual progress. The ceremonial drama has been employed with the greatest possible wealth of expression bodying forth what have been felt to be the important crises and values of life and affording a means of contemplating with hope and vision the achievements of the future. In such comprehensive pictures of life different occupations and professions and the various social relations common to men may be seen in their total setting and in their ideal meaning and value. Worship thus conceived belongs to religion which is integral with life and concerned with concrete, natural relationships. The sense of God is found in that sense of presence which comes with comradeship in a genial company of earnest, idealistic souls who are interested in no petty selfish ends, but in the common good. This sense of God is not unlike other precious experiences of life which are not to be achieved so much by direct effort as by a kind of self-effacing devotion to objective, practical ends. Just as happiness and virtue elude too bold a search and yield themselves only where men live disinterestedly, so God becomes most real to those who in association with their fellows labor for the advancement of a social order in which there may be greater sympathy, wisdom, justice, and progress.

IS THE GROUP SPIRIT EQUIVALENT TO GOD FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES?

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I. A FAIR CHALLENGE

Religious ideas show something like an instinct of self-preservation. Having combated scientific advances long enough to discover the futility of that enterprise, they have sought to maintain livelihood in regions which science does not enter, regions above but not contrary to reason, regions beyond proof or disproof. God has long been silent, intangible, invisible: to many minds he has ceased to be the doer of the particular things that are done in the world. As our religious ideas thus withdraw beyond proof and disproof, and beyond reproach, have they not also withdrawn beyond all value and meaning?

It would not be difficult to define God in such a way that we should have to say: God does nothing. And if that is said, it is not far to the next step: God does not exist—for us. No one has any interest in the existence of an inert metaphysical possibility, not even metaphysicians.

But it would also be possible to set up the postulate: God is what God does. And if a particular definition of God proved to be the definition of a Do-nothing, we should infer not that God does not exist, but that we have the wrong definition. It is at least one of the possible beginnings of a religious philosophy to inquire: What has God been supposed to do for men? What has the idea meant to them? To identify these functions, and then to identify the agent which performs these functions, is to identify God.

This I understand to be Professor Ames's method of approach; and I understand his conclusion to be that as we become clear as to what God means to human experience it approaches coincidence with what the spirit of the social group means to human experience, so that the presumption of identity between God and the group spirit is very strong.

The method is a legitimate method; and the challenge which lies in this conclusion is at once powerful and fair.

II. THERE IS A STRONG ANALOGY BETWEEN WHAT GOD IS SUPPOSED TO DO, AND WHAT THE GROUP SPIRIT DOES

The evidence as one looks into it is massive—the evidence of correspondence between what the Group Spirit actually means to men, and what God is supposed to mean. One who begins by tracing analogies may well end by asserting identity.

Or if one sees a certain truth—as I do—in polytheism, he may be inclined to say that wherever there is analogy there is identity. "Here, you say, something acts like God": then, there is a god at work. Something of God does preside, as Professor Ames points out, over one's occupation and one's luck, leads the social quest of culture and the arts, calls there for devotion and sacrifice, saves us there from self-absorption and moral decay, connects our labor with an immortal object, and even, in its more personal context, forgives our sins and atones by its own sufferings for our disloyalties.

And surely no one can be unconvinced, or unmoved, by that striking picture of our individual immersion in the social body: it is the vine and we are the branches; in it we not only live and move—in it we think and will; through the language and the goods and the goals it sets before us we first find who and what we are. The purposes we frame are in no exclusive sense *our* purposes: as we learn by degrees what it is we want and aim toward, we become consciously what we always are subconsciously, the organ of a living organism, the general human will.

Salvation is the central practical concept of religion; and salvation can henceforth be no solitary individual transaction with a supermundane God: no man can be saved except as he is reborn into the body and blood of a divine humanity.

Thus far, I follow the analogy. If even so literal a thinker as the hard-headed Hobbes was stirred by the meaning of his Leviathan-State to name it "that mortal god," with how much more reason are we impelled toward identifying the social spirit with the Deity.

III. BUT THERE ARE DIFFERENCES WHICH PREVENT THE IDENTIFICATION

As Bacon reminded us, we need a "table of absence" to set beside our "table of presence." If we are to apply thoroughly the method which Professor Ames proposes, we must be as intent to discover differences as resemblances: i.e., we must ask whether there is anything which the God of instinctive and practical religion does, which the social god does *not* do, and is not in a position to do.

When the social god undertakes to preside over the fortunes and the moral welfare of men (as through the agencies of law, education, family counsel), is this god in a position to promote these fortunes with adaptation to individual need and with justice? Is it in a position, more especially, to appreciate the moral needs of individual men with an adequate understanding of the human frame and an inward discernment, so that one might turn to it with the petition, "O Lord, Thou hast searched me and known me. . . . Thou understandest my thought afar off. . . . Try me and know my thoughts: And see if there be any wicked way in me. . . . Cleanse Thou from secret faults. . . ."?

Or is it true that the social order, as it bears upon the individual, is inevitably somewhat crude, wholesale, and external, even at its best? The social order has its ideals, and in pursuit of them it approximates sensitiveness in justice:

but still it seems to sacrifice many lives, many finer possibilities, even many demands for the most elementary moral satisfaction, in the stern necessities of historic movement, manned as that movement must be by persons limited in time, in knowledge, in power, and in good will.

If we identify God with the forces that play in human history, including the ideal forces that play there, we can take great satisfaction in the outcome for which we hope. But when we remember that the whole course of history lies *prior to that goal*, and is strewn with the wreck of honest causes and honest lives torn from the vine without the vine's knowledge or remembrance or power to help, the picture loses something of its divine aspect. If the god or gods of our social world function as leaders in party conflicts and national struggles—and this is said to be one of their merits—they also accept the fate of party struggle and of national subordination. The forces which decide such contests incline, it is true, more and more to the region of *morale*, and less and less bear out the old rule that "*Dieu, est toujours pour les plus gros bataillons*": but what we discern here is a tendency, not an accomplishment; and after every campaign, even such as has reached a decision we call "right," there seems to remain in the hearts of individual man a need to appeal from that victor to another spirit. "Thou, O God, who didst *not* go out with our armies, give us help from trouble; for vain is the help of man."

The truth is that society is not an organism, but is in a perpetual process of becoming one. And only an actual organism, in which, not only the bodies and services and expressible thoughts of men, but their subconscious impulses as well were included, could play the part of God. That is the social ideal; but one need not call it a "mere ideal" to indicate that what it still lacks of complete reality is of terrible moment for the lives of individuals. For if *this* spirit becomes our god, its judgments become absolute; its knowledge rightly turns itself into power; and if and when it says to this or that one, "Thou

be damned," then is that person effectively and finally damned; the keys of heaven and hell are indeed in the hands of men—at the best, of the court and the historian, at the worst, of the gossip and the mob. Until society becomes its own ideal, the soul will be one thing and social good another: and there will be besides all the sacrifices that promote the ideal a constant stream of brute, unnoted sacrifice, not of the worst, but of the best.

The advocate of the social god may admit the crudity of human adjustments, and yet believe that they are the best we have: "Show me a God who does better," he may say, "and I will serve him." The demand is justified, and religion—and metaphysics—must hold themselves responsible for meeting it. But our sole present contention is that God has been believed to do better. It is his function to do better. The social spirit is not identical with what God practically means.

IV. THERE ARE OTHER VITAL DIFFERENCES, WHICH AFFECT THE SPECIFICALLY RELIGIOUS ATTITUDE OF WORSHIP

We have been speaking of the God who works in history, contends with evil, and is interested in justice. But the religious consciousness has other concerns beside these, and may regard justice, to itself at least, as wholly unimportant, because it has a greater good, the good of the worshiper or mystic.

Religion has always taken upon itself to aid men in the historic struggle, but it has also taken upon itself to give them a conscious poise in the midst of that struggle which, while rendering them mentally immune to its contingencies, has been an element in their fullest efficiency. This consciousness has been given the name of "peace": it implies an ultimate confidence in the religious object; it corresponds to the attitude of "absolute dependence," which is certainly not the whole of religion, but an essential part of what we call worship.

Now in our relations to society, we remain responsible and effortful. We depend on society; but we know that society

also depends upon us: it will fail to be (in large measure) what we fail to make it. If in the instinctive basis of religion there is any support for that quest of peace, or rest, which implies "absolute dependence," that instinct cannot find satisfaction in the social god. ✓

In the entity we call society there is nothing that can think if we men fail to think, nor will if we fail to will; it is we that must work; it is we that must supply "society" with ideas; it is we that must aspire; it is we that must grasp the goals of action and interpret society to itself. When society gives to the individual, it gives through other individuals, whose wills take part in the giving. The social god is not more self-conscious than the most self-conscious of its members: can we inquire of *it* why the world exists, or why individuals exists or why itself exists? Too palpably the social spirit keeps fraternal pace with the spirits of its members, shares our limitations, and being altogether such as we are, can hardly claim to be without sin. Society will always stand to men for an object of gratitude, and simultaneously as an object for correction and improvement. If there be in the universe an object upon which there can be reliance without criticism, a valid object of worship, and a source of peace, that object must be other than the social god.

We have already said that worship, while it means "peace," is not an idle attitude: this sort of peace is a release from the self-anxiety that hampers our best effect. But in another sense also worship is the focus of religious action: it fixes the *degree* of the will. There can be no religion that is not a religion of individual aspiration; there can be no aspiration unless the world is worth aspiring in; and the world is not worth aspiring in as a world of mere chance to be faced by the cosmic bravado of unreflecting minds. If the world is worth aspiring in it is because the successes of the spirit are already made possible by its total constitution, and not merely made conceivable by the structure of a fragment of the whole. Perhaps

the most practical of all religious functions has been its function of assuring individual minds that they may and should aspire without limit; that in the real world the will is concretely free. But if religion is to do this, it must involve the whole sweep of the objects of the mind that worships, and not any finite part of them. But the social spirit is a very finite portion of the cosmos.

Finally, in religion, the worshiper seeks *response*. We cannot too often remind ourselves that, whatever the object of religious regard, whether society or something beyond society, religion itself is always the religion of individual minds; and it seeks a response which shall be an *individual response*.

Now my judgment must be that the response of the spirit of society to the individual is never quite an individual response. It is a response to a class of which an individual happens to be a member. Society, for example, confers upon me my "rights"—that is one of its most marked attentions, but in doing so it never thought of me. What it does for me it does for all such as I am: the law, the customs, the industrial order in which we survive or perish, are provided for the average man, but not for John Brown in particular.

And while through our lovers and friends the social spirit may be said to mean us, as individuals, and to respond to us as such, these precious gifts are after all but a fragment of the reality with which we have to do. They are symbols of what we could wish the whole to be.

On its specifically religious side, then, the social god fails to meet the need for peace, for freedom of aspiration, and for individual response. And such must be the case with any deity who, like the social god, is fallible, mortal, and something less than completely real. The finite god, sought by many a brave spirit of our own time and of other times, we have no thought of denying, neither of disputing his religious value. We have already said that polytheism has its measure of truth, as a protest against an abstract monism which becomes empty.

But the value of any finite god depends on his being an aspect of the God who is not finite.

V. THE HISTORY OF RELIGION BEARS OUT THIS VIEW

As we are deliberately confining our study to the functions which God has been supposed to fulfil, the history of religion should supply us with some evidence that the social gods have not been sufficient to fill the religious horizon of mankind, and that they appear less sufficient as religion develops.

It seems right, then, to ask whether it has ever been true, in any stage of culture, that the social and functional deities to which Professor Ames refers constitute the *whole* of the religious pantheon; or whether the supreme being among the gods has ever been conceived in terms of the spirit of the human society?

In a region where our ignorance is large one cannot rightfully speak in universal negatives; but one may surely say that even in primitive religions and from that point onward the typical situation is one in which some god of Nature stands above and behind the gods directly concerned with human life. Totemistic, ancestral, tribal gods have each their own hierarchy, and at the top of the series melt into the powers of the wider cosmos. The gods which are vivid and companionable, because they are near and concrete, are felt in just that proportion to lack something of finality. As Brinton puts it, speaking of our own aborigines:

God, the ungrasped, remains behind. It is never the object of veneration or sacrifice; no myth brings it down to apprehension; it is not installed in his temples. Man cannot escape a belief that behind all forms there is one essence; but the moment he would seize and define it, it eludes his grasp, and by a sorcery more sadly ludicrous than that which blinded Titania, he worships not the Infinite he thinks, but an idol of his own making¹

In fact, the multiplication of deities in various of the greater pantheons can be traced, in successive steps, to efforts to name

¹ *Myths of the New World*, p. 54.

that ultimate being which the religious consciousness knows to be uncontained in all its plastic and associable shapes.

If we press somewhat closer to the precise practical relation which the gods in these early stages of religion bear to the social interests, we shall discover, I think, that this relation has two sharply contrasted aspects.

The gods do, in fact, embody and idealize the spirit of the group. But they also serve to keep the individual mind from being absorbed in the group; they help to save men from the oppressive insistence of group claims and group psychology. This seems to be true not alone in societies in which individual initiative has become conspicuous, but also in very early stages in which the group life seems to be almost the whole life of all its members. For if we interpret rightly the ideas at the basis of fetishism, or of the rites of initiation, they mean that when the individual reaches adolescence, the time has come for him to shake off for a moment this childish identification with the group spirit; he must win maturity by facing the great fact of solitude, symbolic of the ultimate relation of man to his social order, a solitude in which he finds his own original relation to those powers which, for the moment, are not tribal functionaries in any sense, but simply the powers of the great world. It is their function now to enable him to look upon his whole social situation from the outside, so that when he adopts it, he shall do so as a free spirit, and not as one who has been smothered along into a relation which he has never been able to assess because he has never had the mental picture of anything else.

The prevalence of this sort of ceremony seems to me one of the most remarkable exhibitions of the rightness of human instinct under the spell of religious consciousness. It amounts to an act of self-suppression on the part of the social group; but it is an act from which the group knows it will derive new strength, because the member which it will now receive will be a member bearing with him the trace of that wakening of personality from which all novelty and initiative must proceed.

The group profits by the process, which is in very summary form, the equivalent of our process of "higher education"; but that fact does not alter the meaning of the process to the individual. Its meaning is that he has first found God as God is apart from society; and it is this greater God which enables him to receive and appropriate the meaning of the tribal gods and traditions. He receives these latter gods as *depending upon* the God of the wider world.

Thus even primitive religion has its antisocial aspects; because primitive religion is engaged in creating individuals who have to bring about the later stages of religion. It does this both directly, as we have seen, and indirectly, as by developing the institution of property, which makes its portentous connections with individual greed, brings an alienation of neighbor from neighbor even while it enlarges the wit, the foresight, and the force of the human mind. This religiously developed institution will react by shaking the entire social structure, breaking up in time the old modes of coherence; and with the aid of war, which is in part its offspring, bringing into being new unions, territorial and municipal, which modify their social gods to suit the altered spiritual bond. Meanwhile the active divinities in this process are certainly not those passive divinities which so serenely accept the mutations of historic fortune.

But come at once to the highest stage of religion, where whatever principles we find true should hold true in the highest measure, and see if there God has not settled nearer toward identification with the social spirit. What do we find? We find, perhaps to our astonishment, that religion seems to have turned its back upon the whole social undertaking; not merely by sustaining a momentary retreat, as in the initiation program, but by expressly calling its followers to renounce this world and seek their treasure in quite another.

It does not appear to me that the religion of the social spirit has taken the full measure of this phenomenon of religious

history. Social religion is inclined to say that "the sense of God is closely bound up with social solidarity, and that when society is disintegrating or full of conflict God becomes unreal and remote"; that in our own age, for example, as an age of transition "it is hard to believe in God because we behold his face in troubled waters." This, I think, should be the case if the thesis of social religion were true. But the history of religion seems to show that at its culminating point the exact opposite is true.

Not when the human society is solidary and prosperous, but when it is threatened, or overwhelmed, or morally bankrupt does the religious spirit reach its highest development. I will not quote here in explanation the remark of Hegel to the effect that it was first in the Roman world that the soul was thoroughly lost. But I will remind you of the judgment of one who would probably reject any technical designation as either philosopher or Christian. Let me quote a passage from Gilbert Murray's *Four Stages of Greek Religion*:

Any one who turns from the great writers of classical Athens, say Sophocles or Aristotle, to those of the Christian era must be conscious of a great difference of tone. There is a change in the whole relation of the writer to the world about him. The quality is not specifically Christian: it is just as marked in the Gnostics and Mithras-worshippers as in the Gospels. . . . It is hard to describe. It is a rise of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope in this life and of faith in normal human effort; a despair of patient enquiry, a cry for infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the state, a conversion of the soul to God.

It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so much to live justly, to help the society to which he belongs and enjoy the esteem of his fellow creatures; but rather by means of a burning faith, by contempt for the world and its standards, by ecstasy, suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sins. There is an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase of sensitiveness, a failure of nerve. . . .

I do not depreciate the religions that followed on this movement by describing the movement itself as a "failure of nerve." Mankind has

not yet decided which of two opposite methods leads to the fuller and deeper knowledge of the world: the patient and sympathetic study of the good citizen who lives in it, or the ecstatic vision of the saint who rejects it.

In the days of this movement of which Gilbert Murray speaks Rome itself was a political success; but the movement did not spring from that success; it sprang from Asia Minor, from Thrace, from Greece, from Persia, from Egypt, from Palestine, the regions of political and social failure. And what we preserve today as the most precious fruit of that movement is a religion that most clearly demands the subordination of all social interests and ties, even the tie of the family, to the love of a divine object which transcends every human object. This divine object manifests itself in a kingdom which is to have a career in this world; it is not hostile to association nor to earthliness as principles; it intends to confirm them, not to abolish them; but as a condition of confirming them, it demands that the passion of man shall find its primary object outside of them. It must love first that which is not of this world and never can be. It is not alone the individual, it is society also, that must lose its life in order to save it.

And if we can penetrate into the secrets of subsequent social history, we may perhaps be justified in saying with a great historian of Europe, that had the religious consciousness not reached this point of fixing its attention upon that which was so far outside all definite social aims as to be non-tribal, non-national, non-familial, non-political, in brief, universal, Europe could, in all probability, never have succeeded in reaching a coherent political order. An antisocial religion made modern Europe possible.

VI. THE METAPHYSICS OF THE CASE

We have proceeded so far empirically, by the aid of the psychology of religion and the history of religion. Not wholly empirically, because our reading both of psychology and of

history has been an interpretation of the facts, and not a mere rehearsal of them. But we must live by interpretation; we cannot live by facts alone.

It would be possible to leave our case at this point. But it would be incomplete without an indication of the source of the interpretation we have adopted. The source of every interpretation lies in one's metaphysics, that is, in one's belief about the ultimate nature of the world he lives in. Let me then sketch very briefly, and therefore somewhat dogmatically, a few propositions from which our view logically depends.

1. *Every finite being is a dependent being; and in particular every empirical knower is a dependent being.*—Thus, when we sum up reality in convenient dichotomies, as "man and his world," we consider man as one thing and his environment as another thing, each limited by the other. Each of these partial beings is dependent; in this case, each is dependent to some extent on the other: but the presumption is that dependence upon dependencies points to an independent which is not the mere sum of the two parts.

But in this case, too, the man is an empirical knower of his world; that is, he has to accept what is given him as fact. As a mental being, then, he is dependent on what is presented to him. He is not self-sufficient.

2. *Society, or community, is a dependent being.*—Society is dependent in each of the two ways in which individual men are dependent. For society is a member of a pair—society and its environment. Society is also, as a mental being, an empirical knower.

But society is dependent in a third respect: it depends on the prior being of its members.

Every society is an organization of persons; and "organization" is a relation between terms. The terms in this case are not the same in and out of the relationship; but they are not wholly constituted by this relationship. For they are identical terms in *other* relationships, such as the relation of the indi-

vidual mind to its empirical objects, which are more fundamental to its being.

We say that the other relationships are more fundamental for the following reason:

3. *Society or community is a matter of degree, not merely a matter of fact; the degree of association depends on a mental rapprochement of the terms associated; and this, in turn, depends on the relation of those members to a being not identical with any of them.*—Community, it will be admitted, is never a finished fact. We are always more or less intimate with one another; always more or less involved in our social environment. We do not always feel it our present ideal to be more intimate or involved than we actually are. And if we in any case wish to be more intimate we do not always find that we can be so. We cannot become so by direct effort of will. In the one case, we make conditions of intimacy; in the other we find that conditions are imposed upon us.

The essence of these conditions may be stated thus. We can approach one another, and can bear to approach one another, only in so far as we at the same time maintain our "selves," or as we maintain "reality" and "truth." Thus one who sacrifices truth for the sake of a friendship finds that the friendship is so far sacrificed and cannot be kept by main force of will. The same holds of all human relations.

Society, then, depends on a prior relation of individual minds to that which is true; and that which is true is, in its most obvious aspect, the world of nature.

4. *But nature also is a dependent being.*—Hence society depends ultimately on the relation of individual minds to that upon which nature itself depends. We need not here inquire what this independent being is. We shall so far beg the religious question as to say that God is the independent being, or that God controls the universe; merely because whatever controls the universe is God. *That* is the deed, of all deeds, of Deity, in which religion is primarily interested.

Worship is the effort to approach *this* reality. It aims to go behind whatever is dependent, and whatever is merely ideal or not yet actualized. *Society will not do for an object of worship, for society is itself dependent on worship.* It is dependent on worship because it is dependent on truth. In its dependence on truth it is manifestly dependent on science, which gives the truth of Nature—and no religion dare leave Nature out; but worship penetrates to the truth behind Nature, and there establishes the ultimate social bond.

Hence the common religious instinct of mankind has been right. It reveres society, because it is in fact dependent on society for the fulness of its life; but its deeper concern, its essentially religious concern, is for what the Universe apart from society is going to do with us—what it will do with us, for instance, when society is through with us.

I was speaking not long ago with a Japanese friend about the rites of the Shinto religion, asking him whether there was anything corresponding to the sacraments of baptism or matrimony. He said that marriage was usually the occasion for a social feast, but not for a religious ceremony; further, that, an infant is commonly taken by its mother, during the first few months of its life, to a local shrine, and there consecrated to the service of the community spirit (I alter his language to show its connection with our argument). But, he said, the main religious ceremony is that called out by death; so much so that the Japanese are often unpleasantly affected by the comparative casualness of the Christian burial. The great deed of the God of Shinto piety begins, it would seem, when society has taken leave of the soul, having, for better or for worse, done what destiny has given it to do for that soul. And in this respect, the divine power of Shinto piety is the divine Power of the piety of all mankind.

PRESENT TENDENCIES IN CHINESE BUDDHISM

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In the rapid transformation of thought and life which is sweeping over Eastern Asia as a result of the impact of Western civilization upon oriental culture, there is one phase that is being watched with special interest by students of the history of religions on account of what it portends for the spiritual future of the oriental peoples in particular and of the world in general, namely, the reaction of the old native religions to modern influences. The disruptive effect of modern science upon ancient faiths is well known, but it is not to be supposed that the latter are so valueless and discredited as to succumb readily to the onslaught of new ideas and pass out of existence quietly without an effort at self-defense. On the contrary, the danger that faces them serves often as a powerful stimulus to rouse the old religions to renewed activity and reformation in an attempt to adapt themselves to changed conditions and so retain their hold upon the loyalty of their followers. A classic instance of this kind in European religious history is the so-called Counter-Reformation within the Roman church and the accelerated development of its missionary zeal immediately following the Protestant Reformation. We find today in India reform movements within Hinduism, as indicated by the organization of the Brahma Samaj and similar bodies; in Japan, the nationalization of Shinto and the active revival of Buddhism; and in China the frustrated attempt to make Confucianism the state religion of the republic and lately signs of awakening in Chinese Buddhism, after centuries of quiescent existence.

It will be recalled that in the history of Buddhism, China occupies a very important place. It was here that reformed or Mahayana Buddhism received its greatest development and from here spread into Korea and Japan. In the sixth century when Buddhism was threatened with extinction in the land of its birth, Bodhidharma, the twenty-eighth Indian Patriarch, removed his seat from India to China and became the first Chinese Patriarch, thus making China the center of the Buddhist church of that time. Modern students of Buddhism know that for much of our knowledge of the life and teachings of Sakyamuni and of the history of India and its condition in the time of the founder, we are indebted to the records of the Chinese pilgrims, Fah-hsien, Hiuen-tsang, and I-ching, who visited India in the fourth and seventh centuries and spent years of research there. Only through the French translation of Rensusault in 1837 did any of these records become first available for Western scholars, and it is interesting to note in passing that the exact birthplace of Buddha was not located until toward the end of the nineteenth century with the help of data found in those records. While it is correct to say, as Fenollosa and others have done, that China owes much of its finest in literature and art to Buddhism, it is equally correct to say that Buddhism in its historic development and expansion owes much to China. China is still the largest Buddhist country in the world, and in its language the most complete and extensive canon of Mahayana Buddhism is to be found. What will become of Buddhism in China will largely determine the fate of that religion in Asia, and on this account the present manifestation of new life-currents running through this old faith in China is of unusual interest and significance.

The reform movement in Chinese Buddhism began a little over ten years ago in the closing decade of the now defunct Manchu Dynasty. Those were thrilling days for the nation, astir in its every part with new life. Within the compass of

those ten short years were crowded together events of tremendous moment, such as had never occurred at any other time in the history of Eastern Asia. The year 1898 saw the abortive launching of the educational and political reforms by Emperor Kuang-hsu in collaboration with K'ang Yu-wei, which brought down upon them the fury of the then reactionary Empress Dowager and resulted in the virtual imprisonment of the Emperor and the flight of K'ang from the country. Two years later, in 1900, came the cataclysm of the Boxer Uprising, the humiliation of the Imperial Court and its ignominious flight to far-away Si-an-fu. When the Empress Dowager returned to Peking she was a wiser woman, and espoused the cause of reform. In 1904-5 the war between Japan and Russia was fought and the spectacular victory of Japan over the forces of the northern Octopus stirred the hearts of all Asiatic peoples with new hopes and ambitious dreams of the future. In 1908 the Imperial Court, after having sent special commissions to Japan and Europe for the study of constitutional government, and having received their favorable report, announced a program for the gradual transformation of the government into a constitutional monarchy and authorized self-government for the provinces and districts. Had the program been worked out to its culmination, China would have been a constitutional monarchy in 1913. But something happened which deflected the course of events. In 1908 occurred the mysterious death of Emperor Kuang-hsu, still in his thirties, simultaneously with the Empress Dowager, and with the strong hand of the old lady withdrawn from the helm the ship of state drifted into a condition which set the stage for the Revolution of 1911.

It was in those days of national self-consciousness and social and political upheaval, which wrought havoc to conventional attitudes and antiquated traditions, that the Buddhist church first felt the shock of changed times and the challenge of the new day. For better self-preservation and

expression the Chung Hua Fu Chiao Tsung Hui (Chinese National Buddhist Society) was organized under the leadership of Chi Ch'an Ho Shang, abbot of Tien T'ung Ssu Monastery, Ningpo. The inauguration meeting was held at Liu Yun Ssu Monastery, Shanghai, in April, 1910, and an ambitious program was adopted, of which the following were its chief provisions (free translation):

1. This society is formed by the union of all Buddhist monks.
2. With branches all over the country, it exercises supervision over all the monasteries and monks.
3. All monks, formally admitted into the Order, are given certificates attesting to their membership in the society.
4. No monk is permitted to receive any pupil [candidate for the Order] unless the candidate is a bona fide applicant and of good family.
5. No monastery is permitted to alienate any of its property without authorization from the society.
6. Observance of monastic rules should be strictly enforced; for violation of the same rules, monks are to be punished.
7. Seminaries for the training of candidates for the Order are to be established, and in it Buddhist scriptures and Chinese classics are to be taught.
8. Persons under twenty years of age are not to be admitted into the Order; also those who have not had three years' theological training.
9. For monks to hire themselves out for the performance of funeral services, especially appearing in funeral processions, is considered derogatory to the dignity of the monastic order, and so the practice is to be strictly prohibited.

We note that the society aimed to purify the monastic order of its existing evils. Of them, the two most prominent are the ignorance of the monks in the elements of their own religion and the mercenary spirit of the monks in rendering their religious services to the people, hence the emphasis placed upon better theological preparation of the candidates and the prohibition of the monks taking part in the funeral services.

Other societies that appeared at that time in different parts of the country were: Fo Chiao Kung Hui (the Buddhist

Church Club), Chung Hua Wang Man Tsu Hui (the Yellow Swastika Society, corresponding to the Red Cross Society in its objects), Fo Chiao Chin Te Hui (Buddhist Moral Endeavor Society), Fo Hsueh Yen Kyeu She (Buddhist Research Society), etc. Two magazines were published as organs of the new movement: *Fo Chiao Ts'ung Pao* (Buddhist Miscellany) and *Fo Chiao Yueh Pao* (Buddhist Monthly).

This was the first wave of Buddhist revival. In its nature it was political rather than spiritual, and it resulted in better organization rather than moral reformation. As a reaction to external circumstances enthusiasm surged high at first, but there was nothing within the Order to uphold it, and so, when the first impetus had spent itself, the movement fell to pieces. One by one the activities such as educational and charitable institutions, lectures and magazines were given up, and the various societies, which had sprung up like mushrooms, disappeared as quickly.

In justice to the movement it must be said that the Revolution of 1911, which resulted in the formation of the Republic, was at least in part responsible for the breakdown of the revival. The spirit of the Revolution was iconoclastic, especially toward monastic Buddhism, and the Republican government has not dealt kindly with it. Although the constitution has promised religious liberty and equality of treatment to all religions, yet the government has seen fit to exercise stringent supervision over Buddhism. In doing this it is merely keeping up the tradition of the past dynasties which had always looked upon Buddhism as a ward of the state, owing to the fact that historically Buddhism was introduced into China through royal patronage and had been more or less dependent for its support upon the munificence of the imperial court. Perhaps the other reason for government supervision is that official China, being Confucianist in its political and social philosophy, is always apprehensive of a religion which values monastic life as superior to the life of

the household and so thinks that it should be carefully guarded against too successful a propagation lest it weaken the state which is built, according to Confucian tenets, upon the family as its cornerstone.

Whatever the motive behind the governmental policy, soon after the political reorganization of the country was fairly well in hand, President Yuan Shi-kai, first president of the Republic, ordered to be promulgated through Parliament in 1915, "Regulations for Government Supervision of Temples and Monasteries." While these regulations were supposed to apply to Buddhist and Taoist institutions without discrimination, it was clear that owing to the fact that Buddhist institutions far outnumber those of the Taoist faith and that Taoism has no monks anyway, the regulations would fall more heavily upon the Buddhists—in fact, that was the intention of the government. The government justified itself by arguing that temples and monasteries are public institutions and many of them are of historic and artistic importance, and so supervision was necessary to prevent their falling into private hands. The chief features of the regulations are: (1) registration of temples and monasteries, monks and nuns; (2) taxation of temple property; (3) non-alienation of temple property; (4) subjection of religious activities and preaching services to police regulation.

This action brought forth vehement protest from the Buddhists, and because of this protest and also of the fall of the Yuan régime in 1916, the regulations were not enforced. But in retaliation for the protest, the government closed down the National Buddhist Society, on the pretext that its existence was inimical to public safety. The society was reorganized after Yuan's fall, but in 1917 it was again closed by the government, at the time when the regulations were put into effect.

As an illustration of the way the government has dealt with Buddhist establishments, when pressed by circumstances,

we recall the fate of Lung Hua Ssu, an ancient and famous monastery in the western suburb of the city of Shanghai. In prerepublican days, it enjoyed wide popularity, not only on account of its architecture but also of its beautiful rural surroundings. In the springtime its courtyards were thronged with pilgrims and children who came to worship and to enjoy the many-colored peach blossoms for which the countryside around the temple is famous. Then came the Revolution of 1911 and with it the battalions of new soldiers in khaki uniforms. Some of them were despatched to Shanghai for its protection. But there were no barracks and the government had no money to build them. Someone with a business mind, but little capacity for spiritual values, suggested that the commodious equipment of Lung Hua Ssu was available and the army could have it for less than a song, for the monks were powerless to resist. And so one morning soldiers came, turned out the monks, and established themselves there. That was eight years ago and the khaki-uniformed soldiers are still there. The droning voices of the bonzes in their chanting, the temple bells, and the footsteps of pilgrims in springtime have all disappeared, and in their place one hears the mingled notes of the bugle and the drum, and the measured thud of the soldiers' boots resounding in the yards as they practice the goose step to the rhythm of the "Left-Right" of the leader. A sight which one can hardly forget on entering the main hall is to see in place of the beautiful tapestries, candlesticks, kneeling stools, and burning lamps—the paraphernalia of worship and adoration—the entire floor space crowded with stacks of rifles with shining bayonets, soldiers' kits and camp-beds—the paraphernalia of warfare and destruction. But in the center there remains the majestic image of Buddha, seated on a raised platform, with the serene and unperturbed face, looking down upon this strange sight with infinite pity in his eyes for poor humanity thus gone astray, yet patiently waiting for its return to the path of peace and brotherly love. To see

this is truly to see the abomination of desolation standing in the holy place, but military necessity knows no sanctity.

The failure of the first wave of Buddhist revival to achieve spiritual results was in large measure due to the lack of a truly great spiritual leader. Now such a leader seems to have appeared in the person of T'ai Shu Fa Sz, a monk of great learning and saintly character, and with his appearance has commenced the second wave of Buddhist revival. As the first was political in nature, the second is essentially spiritual. A genuine desire to reform monasticism, to reconstruct Buddhist theology according to modern philosophy, and to promote human welfare on the basis of the teachings of Buddha is the dominant note. Instead of attempting to organize a nation-wide society to include all Buddhists, spiritually minded monks and laymen have united to form a society for the working out of the new ideas and aims and adopted for it the significant name of Bodhi (Enlightenment) Society. The objects of the new organization are set forth in the following words:

1. To propound the essence of Mahayana Buddhism so that opposition may be dissolved, doubts removed, faith strengthened, religion energized, and mankind transformed into saintly and heavenly beings.

2. To propagate the essence of Mahayana Buddhism, so that the wicked may be led into lovingkindness, the selfish persons to righteousness, the wise to thirst for the doctrine, the strong to love of virtue, and the struggling misery-filled world transformed into a place of peace and happiness.

Membership requirements are high. To be a member one must express sympathy for the objects of the society and faith in the Three Treasures (Buddha, Law, and Order); he must also declare the Four Great Vows (to save all beings, to destroy all passions, to know and teach others to know the law, and to lead others to understand the teachings of Buddha) and observe the Ten Commandments (not to kill, not to steal, not to commit adultery, not to lie, not to exaggerate, not to

slander, not to be double-tongued, not to covet, not to be angry, not to be heretical). Besides these he has to be diligent in the study of the sutras and observance of rules of fasting, meditation, and charity. The society was first formed in 1915.

For effective propaganda the society publishes a monthly magazine, called *Hai Chao Yin* (the Voice of the Sea Waves). It aims to lift the voice of Mahayana Buddhism for the guidance of mankind tossed as it is by the waves of modern thought. The magazine contains (1) exposition of Buddhist doctrines, as, for instance, a new commentary of "Mahayana Craddhotpada-castra" (Awakening of Faith); (2) apologetics or defense of the faith in face of modern criticism; (3) advocacy of reformation, as reorganization of the monastic order; (4) testimonials: stories of conversion experience, lives of saintly devotees, etc.; (5) critical review of works on religion and philosophy, especially on Buddhism. It is of high literary quality and is edited by T'ai Shu Fa Sz himself.

About the early life of the new leader little is known. He is much sought after for spiritual advice and for conducting lecture and devotional meetings. His writings are read extensively and through them he exercises great influence upon thinking men and women of the day. He has travelled in Japan and there met some of the leaders of Japanese Buddhism. From his autobiographical sketch which appeared in the first issue of the *Hai Chao Yin*, the following is extracted, as showing the spirit of the man:

T'ai Shu, in youth, did not know Buddhism. Later I was attracted to it and I studied deeply into Buddhist books. After some time knowledge of the Buddha came to me like a pearl, lost and found again, and with it, as with a mirror, I was enabled to see clearly through the changes of this life and the world.

Toward the last days of the Tsing (Manchu) Dynasty, the wish gradually formed within me of applying the law of Buddha for the harmonizing of the philosophies of ancient and modern times and of the east and the west, and of leading the nations of the whole world to

follow the teachings of Sakyamuni. Since then, during the past decade, through circumstances favorable and unfavorable, whether travelling abroad or staying at home, whether engaged in mundane affairs or retired in lonely hermitage, this wish has not for one moment been permitted to leave my mind.

Then the European War broke out. Added to the rottenness of the inward life of man, was the brutal struggle of the outward world. I was convinced of the magnitude of the human calamity, which like a wagon-load of hay on fire could not be extinguished with a cupful of water.

Since it was ordained that I should wait until the ripe time to carry out my wish, I decided to make use of the waiting to exercise my religion [contemplation], and so I "shut myself" on Pootoo Island for three years.

After that, I travelled in Japan and Taiwan and wherever convenient I preached the doctrine. [He published afterward an account of his travels.]

The next year, I was invited to visit the South Sea Islands [where there are colonies of prosperous Chinese emigrants]. I formed the idea of building a National Monastery. My observation leads me to feel that the monastic institutions in our country have fallen away from ancient pure ideals and are corrupt beyond reform. If I could raise the fund from people abroad, I would build the national monastery [as model of renewed and purified monasticism]. If I should fail to attain my object I would reconcile myself to the life of a wandering mendicant and, leaning upon Buddha's mercy, thus travel to my life's end.

When I was at Pootoo, some earnest devotees requested me to lecture on "Wei-shi-lun" [Shastra Vidyamatra-siddhi]. I talked to them about my wish to reform monastic institutions and my plan to go south. They also saw the works I have written. They strongly advised against the southern trip at the time as the European War was at its height, and it would be difficult to raise money there, but urged me to publish my works and to organize a society for the promotion of Buddhism in China as the first step of my larger plans. And so we organized the "Bodhi Society" in Shanghai . . .

[Mentioned plans for establishment of Buddhist University, model monasteries for training preachers, encouraging philanthropies, etc., also raising fund for trip around the world in the interest of Buddhism.]

Lately I have been living in Chin-Van Yuan Monastery, on the side of the Western Lake, Hangchow. Here I had desired to live quietly for

the practice of contemplation, but the members of the Bodhi Society have asked me to edit a new magazine, called *Hai Chao Yin* [the Voice of Sea Waves] to meet the needs of the time. I have consented to do it for one year, as the work is congenial to my original wish, and so for this year, I have decided to lay aside other work and devote myself to editing the magazine. What of the future, a year hence, none could foretell. But at the close of ten thousand years, the Tathagata will surely raise up men to establish the Law and spread it throughout the world of the living. I shall wait awhile.

[Dated 20th Day of 11th Moon of 2946th year after Buddha (1920)]
—H. C. Y., Vol. I.

T'ai Shu, being a monk himself, is fully conscious of the weakness of the Buddhist church (1) in the lack of efficient organization for propagation of the religion, and (2) in the corruption of the monastic order, and so he has addressed himself to the task of reorganization and reformation. He proposes to have a national system embracing preaching chapels and parishes in every city, a certain number of monasteries and charitable institutions in each province, and a national monastery and university in the capital city of the country. As a part of the national institution he would have a library containing an extensive collection of Buddhist literature and a museum for Buddhist art. Into the museum he would have all images moved, so that other buildings could be free of them. Belonging as he does to the Dhyana or Meditation School, founded by Bodhidharma in the sixth century, T'ai Shu is opposed to idolatry and tolerates it only as an accommodation to the weakness of the masses. As to the monks, he would encourage manual labor as an antidote to laziness and would encourage more time being spent for meditation and study for spiritual development. In his account of his travels in Japan and Taiwan he had a brief reference to his daily life to the effect that it has been his practice to spend at least three or four hours every day in meditation, and he has never allowed a day to pass without it, even the busiest day, during the past ten years. How far he will be able to carry out the

reforms he has conceived in his mind only time will show. Meanwhile he has been influential in winning many serious-minded men and women to the pursuit of the religious (monastic) life.

In the spring of 1920, three men renounced the world and entered the Order together, adopting as their religious names, Great Mercy, Great Awakening and Great Valour. They were litterati and had served the Republic in public life, but were converted through the preaching of T'ai Shu to become teachers of the Law of Buddha. On taking the step each person wrote out a statement giving his reasons for his action. On reading these statements, which appeared in the *Hai Chao Yin*, one realizes what a strong appeal the simple gospel of Buddha still makes on the minds of men and women in the East, who, dissatisfied with existing conditions in life, are seeking a way of escape whereby they could rise above the turmoil and adversities of troublesome life, be free from the shackles of circumstances, and have peace of mind. In the practice of self-discipline, of strenuously controlling and suppressing one's insatiable desires—the root of all misery in the world—that Buddha taught twenty-five centuries ago, men feel they have found the way of salvation for themselves and for others, and having found it they become, like Buddha himself, fervent messengers in bringing the truth to others. The following, taken from one of the above-mentioned statements, expresses the spirit of the present movement in Buddhism:

The Law of Buddha is the most true, most excellent, most profound, and most universal way for all phenomenal and supra-phenomenal worlds—unexcelled and the only one—because it meets the sore need of the world, which is spiritual, of the heart. Let us consider the recent world-war as a case to the point. Did it not arise on account of the greed, ignorance, and madness of human egotism? The greater the desire, the greater the seeking; blind movement leading to blind steps; eager for struggle, eager for victory; false grappling, false possession;—from such activity [deeds] on the part of many there has resulted the world calamity. To go forward with such a heart, unchanged, then,

the more one tries to restore order, the greater will be the chaos. And so to seek for true, universal and permanent peace and happiness, the only way efficacious is for everyone to be willing in his heart to reduce desire, to be contented, to cease struggling, and relinquish one's hold. Hence my conviction that world-salvation requires the Law of Buddha. But this cannot be accomplished without my earnestly and speedily proclaiming the Law among men. To do this, the best way is for me to strengthen my will, study the doctrine and thus prepare myself to give my personal testimony of faith. Hence the primary step of entering the Order. My now doing this, namely, leaving family and society and learning the Law of Buddha is to prepare myself for the task of saving the world with the Law. It is not dissimilar to my previous action of leaving home and studying Military Art to prepare myself for the task of saving my own country. The difference is that previously my aim was the salvation of my country and people, while now my aim is the salvation of all living creatures.—*H. C. Y.*, Vol. I.

Not only are men renouncing the world and entering the monastic order, but educated women are doing it also. In *Hai Chao Yin* was published a remarkable letter written by a young woman to T'ai Shu for spiritual advice. Documents of this kind, recording as this does the inner spiritual life in non-Christian religions, are not common or easily accessible, and so we have given below the letter as a whole.

At present, Buddhism has deteriorated and reached the lowest ebb. The main reason is the corruption of monastic orders, male and female. The monks and nuns do not know how to save themselves, not to think of their saving others. Not one out of a hundred can keep the discipline and read the sutras. This is indeed most sad. So I think we cannot hope for improvement of the condition unless there come forward monks and nuns, of genuine motive for saving the world, with deep knowledge of the Law and respect for the Order, (1) to purify the monastic life and (2) to propagate the religion. But how few are such choice spirits, like your reverend self, and others [mentioned by name]. If only more would take up the monastic vow! But some say that one may serve Buddha without laying aside family and social life. In my opinion, at the present time, to purify monastic life and propagate the religion, it is absolutely necessary to shave off the hair and enter the Order. I am therefore greatly surprised to read in one of the numbers of the Magazine

that you, reverend Sir, wrote, "The best way is to practice bodhi without forsaking the world [becoming a monk]." Now, you, reverend Sir, are yourself a monk; why then advise others against becoming monks? There must be a reason. Will you instruct me?

Formerly I was a student at a school, and was not inclined to believe in Buddhism. Later unconsciously my faith sprang up and then I became convinced that the Law of Buddha is the absolute and only true religion, unbounded and most lovable. So at the age of 19, I made a vow before Buddha, that in this life I would never marry but give my life to Him as a nun. I have kept this vow for four years, and many times I wanted to shave off my hair, but was prevented by my parents. I am sorry that I cannot be a nun early in life. I have three friends with the same mind. One is married, but she daily thinks of shaving off her hair and "forsaking the world"; only she is prevented from doing so by her husband. But she is persuading him to become a monk, and I won't be surprised if they two should "forsake the world" together before the end of the year. [For a girl to be able to shave off her hair and be a nun it is the most happy thing. Now-a-days some nuns complain that their lives are unhappy, while the lives of lay-folk are happy. I really cannot understand their way of thinking.] The other two friends were both my school-mates. One is called "Pure root"; she has no parents, but a brother,—none to prevent her—and so she became a nun in the spring of last year. The other is only 18 and yet her determination to "forsake the world" is unusually strong. This year her mother wanted to betroth her to someone, and so she decided to leave home secretly. I recommended her to a certain nunnery. Of us four, two have already realized their wish, leaving my cousin and myself outside of the fold. I feel grieved and also envious of their good fortune.

At first we thought that by becoming nuns we would escape from the world's misery and sorrow, enjoy peace, and work off by penance some of our sinfulness. Furthermore, by becoming nuns we sisters could live together and never be separated, which is supreme joy.

But now after reading *Hai Chao Yin*, we know that "to forsake the world" is to benefit others, not ourselves. Having known this my will to be a nun has become stronger than ever. I wish that I could now and here shave off my hair. I have a few questions which I hope my Master in the Law will answer fully. I shall be most grateful: (1) How could one secure parents' and elders' consent? (2) Failing to secure the consent, could one be justified in secretly leaving home and

entering the Order? (3) How could one get rid of the emotion of love? (4) Could one abandon one's husband and be a nun? (5) Is it right to persuade one's wife, husband, or others to "forsake the world"? (6) Is it right to abandon one's children and become a nun? (7) If I were a man I would have chosen you, Sir, as my Teacher, but being a woman that is not proper. Could you recommend to me a nunnery where I can go?

In my study of the sutras, I have unfortunately none to teach me. I can only try my best to recite them, with or without true understanding. In case I come across passages I cannot understand, would you permit me to write you for help?

. . . . Kindly reply through the magazine. . . .

[Signed: Purified Heart]

P.S. I am determined, whatever happens, to shave off the hair this year. After becoming a nun, I propose to reform and change the life of the nunnery with all my might. I hope to ask your advice in the future.—*H. C. Y.*, Vol. V.

As yet this spiritual revival in Buddhism is confined to a small group of educated monks and lay brothers, and the vast mass of Buddhist monks and nuns (estimated at 400,000 monks and 10,000 nuns) are untouched by it. The latter still continue their religious life in the conventional way, bow before the image of Buddha, repeat the sutras without understanding, and trust to the magic password *Namo Omite Fo* (*Namu Amida Butsu*)—"Praise to Amida Buddha"—for entry into "western paradise" after death. The reformers have a great task before them in purifying and energizing the faith of this multitude. Will the revival succeed in transforming Buddhism to meet the changed conditions and demands of modern life, so that it will stand out in Asia as a rival to Christianity or Mohammedanism for centuries to come, or will the revival fail in its object and leave this ancient religion to the fate of ultimate extinction from internal corruption and external disruption? The question is not easy to answer, but one feels that the essentially pessimistic spirit of Buddhism and its

conception of the worthlessness of life are fundamentally opposed to and incompatible with the buoyancy of the modern spirit and the modern conception of the worthfulness of life, and unless Buddhism is transformed to fit in with the new age, as a religion it has no vital message, although as a philosophy of life its influence will persist in men's thinking. But Buddhism with its pessimistic spirit and outlook amputated will no longer be itself, but become something else, although the name may remain. Buddhist reformers are trying hard to find a way out of the dilemma, and the probable course they will take, as indeed they have already done, is to return to Sakyamuni's Ethics of the Middle Path and make it their creed and message. But in doing this the Buddhist reformers will meet with a serious difficulty in the question: What is the goal of the ethical life in a system that denies human personality and social reality? And so when one reviews the work of the reformers, so heroic and devoted in their effort to stem the tide of disintegration and to build up the glory of their religion in a new age, one senses in them a feeling of loneliness, want of self-confidence, and the absence of genuine zest for lack of an adequate goal. We recall the pathos of what T'ai Shu, the leading reformer, said: "If I should fail to attain my object, I would reconcile myself to the life of a wandering mendicant, and, leaning upon Buddha's mercy, travel thus to my life's end."

THE ECONOMIC STRUGGLE WITHIN THE MINISTERIAL PROFESSION

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It may be taken for granted that few men enter the Christian ministry from selfish motives. Were it merely a question of making money, the Christian ministry, as a vocation, would receive no consideration. For the young man who enters the ranks of the clergy is under no delusion in this particular, at least. Big financial returns are not expected. On the contrary, a certain amount of self-denial is anticipated. It is this devotion to Christian idealism that sustains him through those long years of preparation for his life's task. While his friends are establishing themselves in the business world, he abandons himself to four more years of grind and poverty in the hope of adequately equipping himself for the work that lies before him.

Once in the actual ministry, however, the young minister's purposes often suffer in an unexpected way. So subtle is the transformation that comes over him that the change takes place before he is aware of it. He leaves the seminary for a position that pays a mere pittance, and soon discovers that it will take years of self-denial to free himself from the debts accumulated in school. True, he had not anticipated that the profession would be a bed of roses. But he had failed to realize the amount of strength and courage it takes to sacrifice in the midst of abundance. Were his lot cast among those less fortunate than himself, he would endure his privations without complaint. But he finds himself among a people who are comfortably situated, or who have, at least, some prospect of prosperity. Soon he finds himself raising the question, "Am I justified in sacrificing myself in the midst

of plenty, and for a people who can well afford to pay me a living wage?" The question becomes more acutely felt when he finds himself obligated to provide for a wife and children. Where is the parent of moderate means who does not wish for his children greater advantages than he himself enjoys? And a minister is not unlike the rest of men in this respect. He feels responsible for his family's well-being, and wishes to save them from all unnecessary privations. What would happen to those he loves should permanent disability or death overtake him? From whence is coming the money to pay for his children's education? How can he provide against the monetary ills of old age?—are among the thoughts constantly uppermost in his mind. In short, the young minister's idealism is threatened by the economic factor.

There is another cause that even more seriously affects a young minister's purposes. A little distance away a minister of the same denomination is drawing a salary considerably larger than his own. The question immediately suggests itself, "Why should I be content to live on a mere pittance when larger salaries are to be had?" The Christian ministry offers as many opportunities for advancement as any other profession. There are within most denominations all varieties of churches, paying from starvation wages to competent stipends. Why should not the young minister of meager salary qualify for a better paying position? Why should he not make his present charge a stepping-stone to something more remunerative? Is he not justified in seizing any offer that may come to him (regardless of the opportunities for service that his present location may present) that promises escape from economic serfdom? In a word, his temptation is to sacrifice his Christian idealism to economic expediency. Of course, he still intends to make service his life's great purpose. But why can he not serve on a larger, just as well as on a smaller, salary? As a matter of fact, he has surrendered his ideal of disinterested service to material prosperity.

Once the young minister recognizes that he, too, is the victim of the competitive system, he will seek to discover, and to apply himself to, those methods and means that guarantee success. Experience will soon teach him that "quick returns" are of supreme value in the economic struggle in which he is engaged, and that tangible results in the form of increased money and members are generally accepted as signs of ministerial ability. For the minister who is able to show an increase in the membership of, and attendance at, every department of the church's activities under his care, and is able to raise the figures of his budget (especially for the support of his denominational machinery), is invariably pronounced successful. The quicker and greater his returns, the better chance he stands of favorable recognition.

What does this imply? It compels the young minister to enter into the keenest competition with the men, not only of his own, but of all denominations. His task is "to make good." But such is the task of every other minister. It is necessary, therefore, that he shall effectively meet the challenge of his fellow-competitors. By some means, fair or foul, he must attract people to, and interest them in, his own specific religious organization. Service becomes a secondary matter. He must learn the art of "catching" men for his own cause. To accomplish this, he must compete with every minister of the community in matters of advertising. Too much money is spent on advertisements to question its importance as a business asset. A well-established firm, organization, or profession may regard further publicity unnecessary; but to the obscure—or where competition is keen—advertisements are of vital importance. It is therefore the task of the minister to excel his brethren of the profession in the art of advertising. Nor can the young minister who is striving to further his personal interests afford to ignore the spice of novelty and variety. Novel methods, new "stunts," striking innovations, ingenious competitions, and pleasing variations are not

to be disdained if the curiosity of the crowd is to be aroused. Of course, after he has attracted the unattached (granted he is honest enough to refrain from proselyting), there still remains the sphere of personal qualities to capture for himself. He must tower above the rest of his fellow-ministers either as a speaker or in social qualities; preferably in both. Fortunate is that young minister who, in addition to the other demands made of him, finds himself both the best speaker and most popular man among the preachers of the community in which he resides.

But the young minister finds himself engaged in more than a local struggle; he must compete with the men of his own denomination. There are numerous churches scattered throughout the country whose doors remain closed. This is due to the fact that their members are unable to support a minister. When we come to the better paying churches, the supply is found to be more than equal to the demand. There are always a large number of ministers who are waiting for an opportunity to improve their financial status. And advancement for the obscure man rests almost entirely with the denominational official under whose charge he happens to be. There are denominations whose churches are privileged full autonomy in the management of their local affairs. These not infrequently select their ministers without consulting outside officials. To this class of church a young minister may be introduced and called through the recommendation of some friend. But until such time as he has won for himself a large circle of ministerial friends, or has achieved more than a local reputation, he must invariably look to his bishop or superintendent to recommend him to the consideration of other churches. It is, therefore, imperative that he should gain the approbation of those upon whom his chances for promotion depend. Ignoring all evidence of favoritism—found in church as well as all other relationships—our young friend must attract the attention of those under whose charge

he is. Here again, as in the case of the local situation, "numbers" are of primary importance. There lies on my desk as I write an official questionnaire relating to the Easter Membership Campaign now established as an annual custom in many of our Protestant churches. The information desired is, in brief, "How many members did you take into your church Easter Sunday? How many on Confession of Faith? How many by letter? And what were the methods used to secure these results?" However far removed the purpose of these questionnaires may be, the work of the young minister, as he answers or refuses to answer these questions, goes on record. "Results" are made the test of his winter's endeavors. The young minister knows that these returns are pouring into the office of his superintendent and that he must submit a glowing report if advancement is to be known. He is also fully aware that in his efforts to impress his denominational leaders with the merits of his claim to preference, he is competing with the rest of his brethren of the ministry, especially those belonging to the class receiving a stipend comparable with his own. Nor is this all. If his financial status is to be improved, the young minister must get behind all denominational programs, however unreasonable or exorbitant some of them may appear to be, and support his denominational machinery. The denominational machinery must of necessity depend upon the loyalty of the local church for its existence. Consequently, the local church is asked to share with the rest of the churches of the body politic the expenses incurred in extension work, missionary enterprises, educational activities, and in the general upkeep of the larger organization. Now the bigness of the machinery depends on the number and size of the churches within the sect in which it operates. The demand made of the local church is determined by the size of its budget. The funds at the disposal of those in office depend on the number of active churches within the denomination. The economic struggle is now more than

local. It has to do with sectarian competition in the widest sense. Sect is pitted against sect in its endeavors to capture new territory or to maintain and to expand the work already established. And the size of the denominational budget determines the number of its high-salaried official positions; for the greatness of responsibility involved in any office must be met by equally great ability, which, in turn, must be correspondingly remunerated. It is in the interests of sectarian officialdom, therefore, that the machinery shall not only be kept going, but that the denomination shall enlarge rather than diminish. Sectarian officials, too, are caught in the thrall of the competitive system. The denomination they serve must hold its own against the aggressiveness of other religious bodies, and, if possible, strengthen its position even at the expense of all other sects. And in the economic struggle in which the denomination is engaged, the sectarian official must rely on the local pastor for support. He depends on him for the execution of his programs and to raise his ever growing budgets. And the young minister knows that if ever he is to gain favor in the eyes of those above him, upon whom his welfare so largely hangs, he must meet their requirements, however exacting. "To make good" involves substantial increases in the church's contributions for the wider denominational program and activities. Insurgency may be tolerated in one who is too well established to be either hindered or destroyed; but the young minister soon learns that loyalty to the denominational machine pays better than open criticism or revolt.

Several obvious evils resulting from this economic struggle as found in organized religion may be briefly stated. In the first place, the young minister is tempted, if not compelled, to sacrifice quality in his work to quantity. Many learn from bitter experience that such a thing as a thorough training of a group of young people for Sunday-school work does not count. It is not one of those things that looms up conspicu-

ously. Nor is there any special merit attached to the task of drilling a young men's class or a congregation in the practical application of Christ's teaching—teaching that will not only stand them in good personal stead, but will make for a better quality of Christian living, especially as it affects their human relationships. The young minister discovers that such service is at a discount in the economic struggle in which he is engaged. During at least the early years of his ministry, he cannot afford to lay out extensive and carefully evolved educational plans which require a period of years for their execution. His own economic struggle, as well as the demands of the church he serves, necessitate plans and methods that, in their working, bear evidence of progress. His primary task is to enlarge his membership rolls—church, Sunday school, young people's society, etc.—to fill his church pews, and to increase his church budget. These are the things that count to his advantage. And oftentimes he so far forgets himself in his anxiety to give evidence of his worth as to violate the common ethical principles of honesty, truthfulness, and justice. He practices the shrewdest methods of the business world; never fails to take an undue advantage of a fellow-minister; succumbs to schemes of wholesale proselyting; and perverts all ethical sense in his efforts "to succeed."

The effect of the competitive system on the local church is no less pernicious and pronounced. In the first place, each church is out to procure the best possible man "in the market." It is not considered unethical for a church to hold out every inducement to persuade a minister to resign his present charge in its favor. If the church with which it is competing is able to raise its price, or the minister is unwilling to relinquish his work for the advantages offered him, then it must continue its quest in another direction. Churches not only recognize the right of a minister to further his material interests, but encourage him to do so by their own competitive methods. The young minister knows that if his work does

not show numerical gains, he will be asked to resign. He also knows that if ever he is to be invited to a better paying pastorate his record of ministerial achievements must be satisfactory. Nor is this all. His work is judged by the conditions existing in the other churches of the community. If the church which a man serves is not enjoying as great prosperity as a neighboring church (apart from the methods used in securing that prosperity), his whole work is in danger of being underestimated, depreciated, and discredited. His congregation grows restless and dissatisfied, and eventually calls for his resignation or removal, as the case might be. It is immaterial whether or not he is doing a more permanent piece of work than the minister whose prosperity they admire. Results, quick returns, are the things principally insisted upon in religious work; for these are made the standard and test of progress. Consequently, the most prevalent demand made of the modern minister is that he shall be a good business manager in the sense that the money expended on the institution in his charge must prove a profitable investment. He is called upon to compete successfully with the rest of the ministerial business men of the community. To be and to do this, he must possess all the qualifications of a good business manager. He must be neat in appearance, a good mixer, an expert organizer, an adept advertiser, qualified to run every department under his care, tactful, sociable, and jolly, especially with the young people, and an entertaining talker. An expert knowledge of the Bible, a broad outlook on life, an uncommon insight into the deep things of God, and a sane interpretation of life's varied problems are not urgent as long as these other requirements are met. The quality of a minister's work and message is, alas, too often sacrificed to pretentious statistics. And sooner or later the church suffers from the system under which it exists. We have reference now specifically to the smaller churches. They suffer from short pastorates. The same competitive method by which they secure a minister is respon-

sible for his quick departure. No time is allowed for a piece of good, educational, constructive work. Oftentimes they suffer from "watered stock." They carry a bulk of worthless material—people who are a hindrance rather than an asset to the church's life. In their anxiety for "quick returns," they lower the standard of Christian discipleship, depreciate the value of Christian fellowship, and make church membership perilously easy. All these things have a demoralizing effect on Christian living and the moral life of the community in which they are found.

Two panaceas have been offered during recent years for the ills of the competitive system as found in organized religion. A great deal has been written and said on the overchurched community. On the assumption that there are such communities, a process of elimination has been urged whereby only such churches shall be allowed to exist as are able to pay a minister a living wage. Personally, I have often questioned the moral right of religious leaders and journalists (men who, for the most part, live in large cities where they are within easy access of the church of their choice) to determine the form of creed and worship to which any person must of necessity conform. Undoubtedly, there has been too little recognition of, and attention given to, the fact of religious temperament in approaches to, and conclusions arrived at, on the question of religious organic unity. Observation has brought home to the writer the fact that when the religious temperament is not adequately provided for, efficiency results in moral and economic loss rather than gain.

There have also been, during recent years, serious efforts put forth by various denominations to secure a minimum wage for its ministers. No one questions the worthiness of such efforts. But a minimum wage does not solve the problem. As long as one minister draws a larger salary than another, the competitive system under which ministers and churches today exist, with all its concomitant ills and dangers, will

continue to menace organized religion. Neither a minimum wage nor schemes of federation can accomplish the end desired. The abolition of the system itself will provide the only corrective and cure so sorely needed.

One often wonders why the current zeal for social reform does not seek more definite expression in reform within the church. Perhaps nowhere has the social question received greater consideration during the past decade than in religious journals and conferences. One has grown quite accustomed to the ceaseless attacks made upon the flagrant inequalities and injustices of the present social order. Endless discussions have gathered round the question of industrial relationships; while, with increasing insistency, social wrongs have been denounced and the urgency of the social application of Christ's teaching passionately proclaimed. Facts and figures have been assiduously collected and widely distributed. Most congregations have been informed of the glaring, iniquitous disparities existing between the extremely rich and the extremely poor: conditions of wicked luxury and extravagances as contrasted with the grind, hardships, and privations of those existing at the opposite end of the social ladder. These things are discussed in every religious conference of today and receive no little publicity through religious journals; while there have been numerous religious commissions appointed during recent times to investigate social and industrial conditions for the purpose of advising the church what attitude it should assume toward some of the pressing questions of the hour, of disseminating facts, and of discovering possible remedies for those defects in our common life which are generally conceded to call for drastic treatment. With these discussions, publicity, and commissions most Christians are in full sympathy; in fact, they are widely felt to be long since overdue.

But the amazing thing is that it does not seem to occur to those religious leaders who are so ardently anxious to destroy the evils of the social system to deal with the flagrant inequali-

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ties and obvious injustices of their own profession. A bishop will passionately denounce the wrongs of the social order and fervently urge the application of Christ's teaching to industrial relationships, while under his supervision are men whose strength is being sapped and spirits broken in their hopeless and unintermittent fight with poverty. And these are expected, nay, almost compelled, to support their bishop that he may live in comparative comfort and maintain the dignity of his high office. It may be true that there are not in the ministerial profession those appalling contrasts provided by the self-indulgent extravagances of the idle rich and the drab struggles of the extremely poor; nevertheless, the monetary disparities are too great and unjust to be ignored. The fact must be faced that there are men (and their number is not small) who are eking out an existence (they can scarcely be said to be living) on a few hundred dollars a year when, but a little distance removed, is the minister who is drawing as many thousands in the same length of time. Not infrequently the preoccupying thought as one listens to the declamatory discussions of the social question by high-salaried ministers is, "Physician, heal thyself!" The ill-paid pastor has qualified by his identification with, and experience of, the corrosive wear of poverty to speak on the subject. But there is something incongruous about the well-paid religious leader denouncing social inequalities and industrial wrongs when similar evils remain unremedied, nay, not even considered, within his own profession. Is it right or is it wrong for a religious superintendent to receive remuneration in figures of thousands while under his care are men who must meet the demands of life by the same figures in hundreds? Is it right or is it wrong for a missionary secretary to have enough and to spare while the minister and his family on the pioneer field are enduring all manner of hardships and privations? Is it not time the church faced some of these questions before she undertakes to eliminate the evils of the industrial world? For the church

and the Christian ministry of today are perhaps suffering as much as any institution or class of people from the evils of the competitive system. Its vicious demands tempt the young to place a premium on material success; subject the old to unnecessary strain and worry in their struggles to hold their positions; cause churches to compete with each other in their anxiety to procure the best man in the market for the money they can afford to pay; and hinder, in more ways than one, the progress of Christian unity.

Of course, it may be anticipated that any proposal of a standardized salary among ministers would be met by the usual arguments put forth in favor of the competitive system. The present order would be defended on the grounds that equality in wages would rob ministers of all incentive to do their best, and would tend to encourage laziness. The underlying confession of such an argument is that every clergyman is in the ministry for what he can get out of it. It was maintained in the opening paragraph of this article that the majority of young men entering the ministry are actuated by unselfish motives; if a minister loses his Christian idealism for disinterested service, it is largely due to the competitive system under which he labors.

The world from time immemorial has paid homage to exceptional brains and ability. It has placed those possessing them in high office and felt in duty bound to reward them in accordance with the bigness of responsibility and tasks borne by, and entrusted to, them. And the church has accepted the custom of the world in this respect. But surely the standards of the church, where all men are supposed to be dedicated to the one common cause of disinterested service, should be different from those of the world. There is no New Testament evidence that God has placed a premium on brains and ability, or rewards men according to their material achievements. As co-workers with God, the New Testament presumes that each minister will do his best as opportunity and

gifts are granted to him. It teaches that privilege and talents are trusts that must be zealously safeguarded and liberally used. The only merit accorded to possession is the privilege of the larger responsibility and service it affords. As co-workers, the master is not above the servant, nor the servant above his lord. The harvest results from common effort, and its rewards are mutually enjoyed. And such teaching is not infrequently made the basis of appeal for Christian service. The humble worker is encouraged by the thought that his contribution, however small, is of equal worth in the eyes of God to the greatest contribution He receives. Then why not apply the teaching to the material rewards meted out to Christian service? It may not be through any fault of his that the missionary lacks the ability to fill a high executive office. But is it not enough that he is making his contribution to the common cause, and that upon his fidelity those in executive positions must rely for the execution of their plans and purposes? If a missionary gives his best, what more can even a bishop give? In the light of New Testament teaching, is it not, therefore, but just and honest that the work of the minister on the pioneer field be recognized as possessing a significance and worth equal to that of the missionary secretary who gives oversight to his work, and that he receive equal reward, material as well as spiritual, for a service of equal value in the eyes of Him whom they both serve?

Of course, it will be objected that those holding the more remunerative positions have greater expenses to meet; that the difference in salary is offset by the difference in their respective expenses. True; but how many ministers would be only too happy to relieve some of their brethren of the expenses incurred by clubs, banquets, committee meetings, and conferences, and to share the comforts of their higher standard of living, were they only privileged to do so. Such are some of the little inequalities of the Christian ministry, that while there are men who are glad to be excused from some of the

things to which they subscribe or for which they pay, others would most jubilantly take their place were they not debarred from doing so on financial grounds. Is it not a fact that, as a general rule, only the favored few are delegated to distant conferences, whereas the man who most needs the inspiration of these gatherings is rarely privileged to attend? Were the system different, one man would not be surfeited by intellectual and inspirational feasts while his brethren go hungry—as is now, alas, too often the case. And this apart from the difference existing between their respective standards of living. The present writer has often seriously questioned within his own mind whether it is in harmony with the spirit of Christ for a minister to enjoy a standard of living above that of the worst-paid member of the church he serves. Certain it is that were all professing Christians, laymen as well as ministers, unwilling to accept a standard of living denied to those of the same Christian fellowship, the social problem would be more than a subject for glib rhetoric, but would be faced with convincing seriousness.

Is it not high time the church faced some of the facts and evils of her own vicious competitive system? While she is emphasizing with increased insistency the need of applying Christ's teaching to social and industrial relationships, does she have courage to attack the economic wrongs of her own life? Would she not be in a better position to appeal to the conscience of the business world were she to set her own house in order first? For what success can she hope to have in taking the mote out of her brother's eye while a beam remaineth in her own?

However much men might disagree as to the practicability of any scheme of uniform salary for the Christian ministry, and however many apparently insuperable difficulties might prevent its general acceptance, this much may be said in its favor. It would eliminate much, if not all, of the inane, suicidal competition so commonly practiced today by ministers,

local churches, and even by denominations as a whole. Organized religion would exist solely for the sake of serving humanity rather than for the purpose of making humanity serve its interests, as, indeed, is only too frequently the case. The emphasis would be on quality instead of quantity; just as it should be if ministers and churches are to do permanent and worthy work. The small churches, more particularly, would be better served. Its pastorates would be longer, and the feverish restlessness now so widespread both among clergy and churches would be considerably lessened if not practically unknown. The church whose doors are now closed because of its inability to support a minister would be provided for; its pastor would be guaranteed a living wage. The particular forms of religious worship and government existing in a community would be the choice of the people themselves and would not be thrust upon them, as so often has been the case, by the aggressive policies of competing sectarian officials. The old heroic call to the Christian ministry would again be heard—the call to serve rather than to compete. Nor would men so readily leave the ministry; for there would not be that feeling so prevalent among the younger ministers of today that if they are to enter the competitive field they may as well be where the odds are greater and the struggle more worth while. And the man in the street would be more inclined to support organized religion. For he would have the assurance that the purpose of both ministers and churches is to serve rather than to get. But best of all, the church would be able to appeal more effectively to the conscience of the world to practice the spirit of unselfishness in business relationships having cleansed her own purposes of all unselfish motives. She would be in a position fearlessly to preach social and industrial righteousness as one who practices what she preaches.

DEMOCRACY AND THE CHURCH

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"We are at the cross-ways and progress is not inevitable." This arresting statement occurs in the Preface to a remarkable book on *Political Ideals* by C. Delisle Burns. He is persuaded that democracy and a League of Nations are the only alternatives to preparation for more civilized wars, the passions of the mob, and social chaos. The Christian church, too, is at the cross-ways. Whether it shall be discarded as outworn machinery or be refashioned to function creatively in the socialization and spiritualization of a new human order is no mere academic or even ecclesiastical problem. It is a social problem with vital implications for the future career of society. The purpose of this article will be to analyze the rôle of the church in our democracy with a suggested reorganization of that institution to fulfil its function.

Democracy and science are the two most significant mutations of social evolution today. They go hand in hand. We are concerned principally with democracy in this article, yet let us remember that science is the intellectual counterpart of modern democracy. Both had their small beginnings in a remote past. But their rapid expansion and development in modern life warrant the use of the mutation figure. They have come upon us so suddenly that we have been taken unawares and have scarcely had time to adjust ourselves to them.

Democracy is not yet achieved. It lies in the future. It is an ideal. "It is the ideal of those who desire a society of interdependent groups so organized that every man shall have equal opportunity to develop what is finest in him." It has

arisen from the perception that the social organization of today does not allow most men to develop what is finest in them. In this sense democracy has not arrived, but is on the way. It is one of those flying goals that seem within our reach, but which we never quite overtake. We trust it is the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night that shall lead us into a promised land of social order, harmony, and peace.

That is one aspect upon which we wish to dwell more emphatically. Democracy seems to be as much a process as an organization. It is a movement as well as a state of society. This is the dynamic rather than the static view of democracy. Stated more technically, democracy is that social process which permits and encourages both individual differentiation and social integration. It is the process which provides for the fullest, richest, freest individualization consonant with the most complete socialization. As Mr. Burns says, "Our Utopias are not now fixed and eternal situations, but continually developing organizations of life." Democracy, therefore, seeks the harmonious coadaptation and growth of both individualism and mutualism. It is that progressively changing organization of society in which the personalities of all members reach their ripest development through constant adjustment to and interaction with one another.

Thus defined, democracy is seen to mean more than the rule of "the undistinguished and ignorant 'demos'" in politics. It is not a mere counting of heads, or the sovereignty of the people. These are but the more or less imperfect methods and techniques of democracy as it is organized in society today. Democracy is the latest and most rational phase of the social process as it has developed among human beings.

It must be made clear at this point that this form of association we call democratic is not superimposed upon people from without. It cannot, by the very nature of the case, be foisted upon a group. It is rather the latest step in the evolution

of group association. It must be consciously initiated, sustained, and guided by the group. Every member of the group must voluntarily and consciously participate in the further functioning of this process. This means that a certain degree of education is necessary in the members of the group. The power to reason and moral responsibility are prerequisites. There cannot be a democracy among animal or low human groups. Only those groups capable of consciously directing the evolutionary process can be progressively democratic.

Thus education is ever the central and crucial problem for democracy. It has been said that the ideal of education in the United States is that each generation shall stand on the shoulders of the preceding generation. This is not only the ideal, but the method, of a democracy. No individual can be either a slave or a spectator here. Although he may occupy a subordinate position, each is a creative factor and force in the democratic process. Hence everyone must be capable of seeing his relation and function in the whole and must have developed a sense of obligation for the movement and success of the process.

Democracy does not repudiate all authority. It substitutes for the self-constituted authority of a minority or a vested interest, however, the freely chosen authority of the expert. And even the expert is subject to the constant criticism and recall of his constituency. More than any other organization or process, it gives recognition to real distinctions of intellect and character. "Democracy has been well said to be an hypothesis that all men are equal, which hypothesis we make in order to discover who are best; for it is only by giving equal opportunity that distinctions of intellect and character are made to appear." One of the principal functions of education, therefore, is not only to lift the level of intelligence and develop moral and social attitudes in the masses, but it is to grow experts, to provide specialists—in a word, to train leaders to guide the democratic process.

This may have seemed to be a highly attenuated and abstract treatment of democracy. But such a treatment is necessary. Democracy is too frequently identified with a specific organization of society, or confused with certain social ideals such as justice, equality, and the like. If this statement of what democracy means is valid, we see that it is the latest phase of the human social process. It is both organization and process, and if it be not paradoxical, it is an ideal. It stands for that method of development whereby the individual and the group reach their maximum of growth through mental interaction that is voluntary and rational. Its method is two-fold. The principal technique of democracy is education. Following education, its method of development is through consciously trained and selected leaders. This in brief is the democratic process.

The church, as it stands today, is an institution which democracy has inherited. Organized in a past when authority was the ruling force in society and the form of social organization was a hierarchy, the church seems to be somewhat of an anomaly in modern life. In many quarters it represents medievalism stranded in the rising tide of democracy. The Roman Catholic branch of the church is still rigidly organized on the hierarchical and autocratic basis. Protestantism has cut loose from its mother-institution, yet even here we find the constant appeal to authority and a striving to impose a more recent hierarchical form upon society. The polity of some Protestant churches is avowedly democratic. The theology of most of them is conservative, traditional, and unadapted to the expanding stream of democracy. In a process where the function of religion should be to enhance and reinforce the highest ethical values with emotion, symbolism, and idealism, to socialize human attitudes and moralize human motives, one church is content to institutionalize its members and make blind devotees of them, the other would pluck individuals here and there from a lost world, like brands from

the burning, and save them for a postmortem bliss of questionable ethical character. These may be exaggerated pictures, but for the main the trend has been, in one branch of the church, toward a mechanical ecclesiasticism and, in the other branch, toward selfish individualism. Neither fulfils its function in a democratic society.

There may be controversy over that function. Indeed, that is the stage at which the churches find themselves today. There is a growing body of religiously minded people who do not think it is the business of the church either to call us back to medievalism or to disinfect us for the hygienic post-mortem society. Christianity means more to them than ecclesiastical regularity or creedal conformity. It would seem that the church should permeate the democratic process with passionate religious fervor for the highest ethical and social ideals. It should reinforce the democratic process with the religious motive. It should cultivate social attitudes, promote social values, and observe for the future what is vital in the religious tradition of the past. It should neglect neither the individual nor the group, but should seek to coordinate them and perfect them. The otherworldly motive should be supplemented by a burning enthusiasm for the improvement and amelioration of this world. Nothing short of the redemption of the social order from all its vices, diseases, malformations, and maladjustments should be the goal of the church, and its primary function should be to incite and then enlist men to the consummation of this task. Education will be the principal method. And this education will not be a cognitive affair, a pouring in and stamping in of information. It will be more affective and conative than in the past, a building up of social attitudes, desires, and habits, a moralization of the individual.

This will require a reorganization and redirection of activities. The basis for entrance into the churches in the past has been creedal. And once within the church, the chief duties

of the member were to observe certain rites and passively enjoy in anticipation his future security. Now there is a fundamental fallacy in the creedal basis of the church. Creeds are made to exclude, not to include. It is doubtful whether a creed can be constructed so liberal that all or any considerable portion of a community will subscribe to it. Creeds are usually the majority's voice in debatable issues and as such tend to split groups rather than to integrate them. Should not the basis of church membership be an intelligent willingness to co-operate in the church's enterprise rather than a submissive acceptance of ecclesiastical dogma? Is not loyalty to the humanitarian purposes of Christianity the more excellent and more just test of fitness for church membership? Once within the church, the members should be under obligation to promote the service of the church to its community group. The highest social values in the local community should be given a religious sanction by the church as those values emerge in the democratic process. The membership of the church should be the animated nucleus in the promotion of the salutary community interests, the moral yeast in an otherwise unleavened mass.

The church in a democracy will not require one peculiar type of religious experience as the prerequisite to membership. In the past the Protestant church has sought to standardize the emotional conversion experience and make that essential. In a democratic society the church should allow free play for individuality in religious growth. It will not seek to press all persons into the same mold or stamp them with a certified experience. It will respect variation and individuality so long as fundamental loyalty to its major motives hold sway in the life. Religion, moreover, is not something to be experienced once and for all. It is itself a growing experience of fellowship and service with God and man. It may express itself in a variety of ways, but to be vital in a democracy it must assuredly issue in some form of socially useful service.

Spontaneity and individuality in religious experience and growth ought to be prized by the church functioning in a democracy.

Dogma and doctrine will not be venerated because of their antiquity or origin in the sacred literatures of the past. They will deserve the respect of people only as they are instrumental to more harmonious and richer forms of human association. The teaching of such churches will not consist of *ex cathedra* utterances upon biblical interpretations and ecclesiastical formulas. It will be a co-operative working-out of specific and immediate problems in the lives of pupils in which both teacher and pupil participate. The solutions to these problems will be reached in the light and by the aid of the moving ethical and social ideals, standards, and values of the community.

The policies and organization of the church will be determined democratically. If this change could be accomplished in this generation a great step would have been taken. At present the overhead organization tends to perpetuate itself even in the most democratic of Protestant bodies. New and original leadership is excluded too frequently. Only the indoctrinated "machine" men are promoted. This is becoming less and less true, however. The strait-jacket of orthodoxy is no longer the only style which ecclesiastical leaders may wear. More and more variation, originality, and individuality will be welcomed, as these tend to enrich the life and service of the group.

Thus we have defined democracy as a dynamic process of human social evolution brought about by the conscious and voluntary participation and interaction of all individuals of the group, in which the goal is the most complete individuation in the richest social organization. Education and expert leadership are the chief methods of furthering this process. Institutions represent, more or less, nuclei of experts who are attacking specific problems, obstructions, and maladjustments which occur in this onward process.

The church has been organized in the past on the authoritarian and hierarchical basis. Admission came through submission to a standardized creed or experience. Its function was an otherworldly salvation. It sought to redeem individuals out of the group. To function in the democracy of today the church must reorganize and redirect its activities. It must find the ideals, standards, and values as they emerge in the social process which are of highest utility to the group and enhance and reinforce these with the religious sanction, motive, and fervor. It will seek to build up social and moral attitudes in the entire community. Free play will be given for originality and individuality in religious experience and in the expression of that experience. Its great objective will be the redemption of the group rather than of the lone individual. But the redemption and social regeneration of the individual will ever be one of the methods of group regeneration. All individuals who have the social passion will be members of this church. Its immediate objectives will be in its own community. But it will also orient itself to the world-community of which, increasingly, we are an effective part. Thus we shall have the church fulfilling its function in a democracy. So long as standards, ideals, and values are the moving dynamic forces in society, so long as human aspirations reach out toward an unseen, unrealized yet constraining goal, so long as the great facts of mystery, death, and imperfection abide, man will have a religion. In a democracy the religious spirit should permeate the total process. And the church's function is to impregnate the process with the religious spirit. Only when we have reached that divine-human democracy which Jesus called the Kingdom of God, and we more affectionately call the brotherhood of man, will there cease to be a need of a church.

CURRENT EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Conception of Relativity as a Guide of Life.—With a few clean-cut, well-directed strokes Ellwood Hendrick has applied the conception of relativity to human life in general. ("Relativity and Life," *The North American Review*, CCXIII, May, 1921.) Relativity teaches the following:

1. There is no absolute freedom. Freedom is relative, always circumscribed. Each man is bound in his relation to some other. To move away is only to move into another such relationship.

2. There is need of greater precision in thinking. No single shibboleth suffices as a guide. Not only should the rights and privileges be emphasized, but also our obligations. The world would be better if the consequences of our actions were thought out more accurately.

3. Ignorance in action is an offense against the general welfare, since understanding is one phase, "dimension," of conduct. In the choice of political candidates mere numbers of uninformed voters do not promote wisdom. The vote of people is democratic. But since they may know too little about the qualifications of a given candidate to guide their vote, and since some official may be better qualified to make the appointment, such appointment may secure a more representative official, hence be more democratic. The exercise of the franchise should be considered relatively in order to spell progress.

4. Character is a phase, "dimension," of ability. In industry one may exploit and ruin another today, but himself be laid waste tomorrow. We can never know the complete and ultimate effects of our every act. But there is need of a greater consciousness of their consequences.

5. When human "rights" are considered in their genetic relationships, they are found to be conditioned by obligations; they emerge out of service rendered. The rights of a child are really the obligations of its parents.

It would be interesting to apply the foregoing in the realm of religious life. Might it not be discovered that this doctrine of relativity would work out into something like the Christian attitude of love for others?

What Did Judas Betray?—Did Jesus announce himself to his friends as Messiah? Or were the disciples, when they thought they could forsake him and flee, surprised to find they could not thus put him by?

Professor B. W. Bacon, of Yale, thinks Jesus did set himself forth as Messiah and as a contribution to the solution of the problem of Jesus' self-consciousness he seeks to show, in the *Hibbert Journal* for April, 1921, that what Judas betrayed was some event in the course of Jesus' life which was capable of messianic interpretation on the part of the Roman officials, ever watchful of usurpers. That event Professor Bacon finds in the anointing at Bethany. The narrative of the anointing is imbedded in the Markan account of Judas' betrayal. To the friends of Jesus, his anointing meant "*Vive le Roi!*" This is what Judas betrayed.

If the incident of the anointing was actually so crucial in determining the fate of Jesus, it seems strange that the account of it given by the evangelist should not furnish some direct hint of this significance.

Is Supernaturalistic Belief Essential in a Definition of Religion?—

Upon examination of such definitions as attempt to exclude the supernatural element, W. R. Wells answers in the affirmative (the *Journal of Philosophy*, May 12, 1921). Religion involves a twofold belief—in the existence of a supernatural order of reality and in the need of human adjustment to this order. These objects may or may not exist; but religion depends for its existence upon the *belief* in them. The supernatural order is the sphere transcending the natural order as we know it. It has its philosophical basis in Plato's celestial world and Kant's noumenal world. In its pre animistic form it was the unseen "power," while in its modern form, as conceived by men like William James, it is an unseen order. It is the external divine source of religious experience, as contrasted with that immanent source of which alone a naturalistic view can have knowledge. That is, a naturalistic view of the world cannot define religion.

In conclusion: "Though supernatural belief of some sort occurs in all religious experiences properly so called and in all accurate definitions of religion, it might be claimed, nevertheless, that those persons ought to be called religious whose reactions to the universe as a whole, to the cosmic drift of things, were serious and reverent, even though their philosophical view were naturalistic. The majority of scientists would probably be included in this class. The man of high moral ideals and serious purposes, especially if his life is touched with deep emotion at the thought of the total cosmic situation, ought hardly to be called irreligious, perhaps, even though he lacked all the usual religious beliefs. Such a man is certainly not irreverent; but it would be more accurate, however, to call such a man, not religious, but moral merely, with

esthetic emotions coloring his morality. Regard for correct usage of the term requires that religion be defined in such a way as to include supernaturalistic belief."

In the interest of clearness, it would be desirable to discuss the foregoing question from a different angle. It is generally agreed that religion is not primarily a matter of *belief*, but rather one of practical attitudes, of cult, of worship, of propitiation of gods. The term "supernaturalistic belief" turns the discussion to a debate over a definitely formulated dualistic philosophy embodied in Christian theology, and thus distracts attention from the real question—which is whether religion is not *essentially* a means of enriching life through relationship to a more-than-human environment.

How to Commend Christianity to Non-Christian Peoples.—An interesting narration of his recent trip to the Near East was given by Sherwood Eddy in an article entitled "The Christian Approach in the Near East" (*International Review of Missions*, April, 1921). He spent five weeks in Egypt and one month in Turkey. Though the audience was composed of Turks, Armenians, Greeks, Catholics, and Protestants, yet he found no difficulty, however, in presenting his Christian message. The significant fact was that "the large majority of Turkish students, by the very process of modern education, have lost their old faith and are almost without vital religion."

From his experience in dealing with such complex audiences, Mr. Eddy has been convinced that irenic method of approach is far more effective than polemic. The moment a Christian speaker tries to contrast Christianity and Islam, Christ and Mohammed, he will immediately arouse and call into conflict against him all their prejudice, their patriotism, and everything that they hold dear. "It was a tug of war." If the speaker won the argument, he would lose the audience. But if instead of tearing down what the people have, the speaker tries to give them something better; instead of attacking or criticizing their religion, he gives them a glimpse of richer life; instead of reflecting upon Mohammed, he presents Jesus; he is the more certain to appeal to their heart. In other words, the Christian missionary has to speak as man to man rather than as Christian to Mohammedan.

The Problem of the Christian Leader in China.—Two papers on the same subject, "The Training of the Future Leaders of the Chinese Church," were read at Peking Missionary Association not long ago. The author of one paper is Dr. C. H. Fenn who has been in China twenty-two

years while that of the other is Professor T. T. Lew, of Peking University. Dr. Fenn's paper is valuable because he speaks authoritatively from his rich experience. He feels very strongly that the church should train both clergy and laity. Besides the improvement of seminaries and Bible institutes, there is a necessity of having correspondence schools and summer schools for Christian leaders. Doubtless there are many potential leaders among the laity but they have failed simply because it is a custom of the church not to give any further religious education after they have been received into the church.

Professor Liu (*Chinese Recorder*, LII, No. 3, 158-77) looks at the problem from an entirely different angle. His viewpoint is worth careful consideration, for he is the spokesman of many a Chinese Christian leader. The missionaries have undoubtedly educated and trained many young men and women, but they have also turned away many capable leaders, because the latter, who sooner or later have found it difficult to co-operate with missionaries, are not given the necessary opportunity for practicing leadership. They have been discharged when they tried to extend their service beyond the mission compound, or have not been allowed to specialize their training according to their ability. The church cannot afford to have such a waste. This leakage must be stopped at once.

The "Religious Renaissance" in China.—The most significant development in new China is the New Thought or New Culture movement. Its influence on the religious life of the Chinese is well described by Lewis Hodous in an article, "China Revisited" (*Christian China*, Vol. VII, No. 6, 292). The new movement is at present, at least on the part of its advocates, hostile to religion. It not only opposes superstitious beliefs and customs, but also considers religion itself as superstitious.

On the other hand, some religions in China have somehow caught this new spirit. The Confucianists are working hard to revive Confucianism. An attempt has been made to adapt Confucian teachings to modern situations in China. The liberal-minded people are trying to start a "Reformed Confucianism." A campaign of \$2,000,000 to build a national Confucian headquarters has been launched. Buddhism is rebuilding its old temples, publishing books, holding lectures, and establishing schools and orphanages. A recent number of the *New Buddhism* published in Ningpo was devoted to an attack on Christianity.

Did Moses Use Cuneiform?—The theory that the Pentateuch was written in Akkadian, and later translated into Aramaic and then into

Hebrew has been zealously advocated by Naville, whose views have been defended recently by Doumergue. This theory is sharply criticized by J. A. Maynard in the *Anglican Theological Review*, III (March, 1921), 284-89, and at greater length but no less incisively by P. Humbert in the *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, IX (Jan.-Mar., 1921), 59-93.

A Valuable Review of Old Testament Studies.—The *Jewish Quarterly Review*, XI (April, 1921), 473-542, contains an extensive review of more than twenty recent books on the Old Testament, by J. Hoschander.

The Death of Morris Jastrow, Jr., 1861-1921.—Morris Jastrow, Jr., Ph.D., LL.D., professor of Semitic languages in the University of Pennsylvania, died on June 22. The *American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures*, of which he was associate editor from 1907 until the time of his death, will publish in its October issue an appreciation of the significance of Professor Jastrow's contribution to scholarship.

An alumnus of the University of Pennsylvania, he began teaching Semitics in his Alma Mater and continued in that department until his death. He was a recognized authority on Semitic religions, having contributed to Hastings' *Dictionary of the Bible*, the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, the *Jewish Encyclopedia*, the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (11th ed.), and Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*. His most significant work is *Die Religion Babyloniens und Assyriens* (1902-12). More recently he has published *A Gentle Cynic* (1919) and *The Book of Job* (1920). In 1913 Professor Jastrow delivered the Haskell Lectures at Oberlin College (*Hebrew and Babylonian Traditions*).

Two Noted German Scholars Honored.—Professor Adolf Harnack, of Berlin, and Professor Karl Budde, of Marburg, have both just passed their seventieth birthdays. Festival volumes in their honor have been published, the one dedicated to Harnack containing interesting contributions in the field of New Testament and church history, and the one dedicated to Budde furnishing articles in the Old Testament field. One wonders whether modern German scholarship is furnishing such stimulating leaders in research as these giants of a former generation.

The Death of a Noted Orientalist.—The death of Felix Peiser, founder and editor of the *Orientalische Literaturzeitung*, is announced in the issue for May-June, 1921, just after he had handed over his editorial duties to Dr. Walter Wreszinski. Dr. Peiser was known as a scholar and a trainer of scholars. His chief interest was in Assyriology

from the historical standpoint. Next to that, he concerned himself with the history of the text of the Old Testament, seeking especially to account for the transition from its original to its present form by his theory of glosses.

The Latest Phases of Dr. Sanday's Thinking.—In the last years of Dr. Sanday's life he was led to give expression to the final resolution of his theological views, especially his views on two closely related matters—miracle and the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. Both of these questions had been with him from the beginning of his career. As for miracle, he had hesitated about taking holy orders because of the difficulties he had felt in regard to this.

I began as a theologian by deliberately putting it aside. I decided that my best course was to hold it in suspense. . . . I began by taking up a neutral position on the subject of miracle. The sort of general conclusion at which I arrived might be called conservative or liberal-conservative.

To this—from his last public utterances as Lady Margaret Professor—he adds, with pathos:

Then the theological world was pleased with me and it still reminds me of those better days.

All his mature studies had been sketches preparatory to the main work of all his aim, *The Life of Christ*. Professor W. Lock, in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (January, 1921), writes:

But it was becoming clear that that aim would never be achieved. Time was slipping by very rapidly, and there was another reason: it was necessary to make up his mind more decidedly as to his attitude to the gospel miracles. This had always been an anxious problem with him: he had tried to hold the balance between the traditional view and the claims of a rather rigid theory of the uniformity of Nature, but by 1912 the balance had gone against the traditional view. He could no longer accept, though he hesitated to say that he rejected, the Virgin Birth, the literal Resurrection and Ascension of the Lord and the Nature Miracles.

In 1912 and 1913 men were saying: "Sanday has gone over to the Modernists." This left its mark on his sensitive soul: "I do not disclaim the name of Modernist," he writes at the end of his life. The occasion which brought forth the clearest expression of his attitude to miracle was the controversy which called forth his open letter to the bishop of Oxford (*Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism*, 1914). There Dr. Sanday distinguishes between miracles that are *supra naturam* and miracles that are *contra naturam*. With the former he can live; the latter class, which includes the Feeding of the Five Thousand, the

Walking on the Water, the Virgin Birth, and the bodily Resurrection—all of which “seemed to involve real violation of the order of nature”—he thought were not “strictly historical.” “I should be inclined to seek a solution under the general heading that the element of the abnormal came in, not so much in the facts as in the telling.”

As with the question of miracle, so with the problem of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel—throughout his long, active life he never got very far away from it. His first publication, in 1872, was entitled *The Authorship and Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel*. He came to be regarded quite generally as the ablest defender of the apostolic authorship, and his name more than any other gave weight to the traditional opinion. This intimate biographical note, also from Dr. Lock, is of more than passing interest:

There synchronized with this change about miracle, partly induced by it, a change in his view of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel. He was partly affected in this by Mr. E. F. Scott's book on the Gospel, which seemed to him to picture an adequate situation out of which the Gospel could have arisen, but the deciding influence came from the article in the eleventh edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* by Baron von Hügel.

At the last Dr. Sanday wrote: “I'm afraid there is one important point on which I was probably wrong—the Fourth Gospel.”

How the Versailles Treaty Injures Missionary Work.—One of the darkest pages of recent events is that which tells the story of the treatment of German missionaries by the governments and missionary societies of the Allied countries. It has been a heavy blow to missionary progress and international good will. The story of this un-Christian attitude toward our German fellow-Christians is told in the message from the German Students' Christian Alliance to the Glasgow Conference (*Young Men of India*, June, 1921). Since 1914 about 1,400 missionaries have been withdrawn from German mission fields in many parts of the world. The sections where the results have been most disastrous are parts of British India, Egypt, Togoland, and German East Africa. In many places the results of from forty to eighty years of faithful work have been practically lost through the complete withdrawal of all forces. Churches are disintegrating, mission property is falling to ruin, schools are without teachers, and the native peoples are beginning to lose faith in the value of Christianity. While the host of missionaries wait in Germany for the opportunity to return, the other countries cannot supply the workers for the needy fields. Even if they were available, they would be untrained and ignorant of the

language. Moreover, the missionary activities of the church in Germany are being paralyzed by such conditions. With the demands so urgent for every available worker in spreading the gospel of good will and brotherhood, such a procedure is surely a crime against humanity. May the church speedily rise to a higher plane of international brotherhood and co-operation.

The Church and World-Fellowship.—What is the church's responsibility to the modern task of education for world-fellowship? In his presidential address at the eighteenth annual convention of the Religious Education Association, at Rochester, New York, March 10-13, President Arthur C. McGiffert defined world-fellowship as meaning:

First—the absence of distrust and jealousy and hostility between peoples and nations. Second—universal and mutual good-will, leading men everywhere to help each other, wherever help is needed, as we here in America have been aiding the Chinese famine sufferers and the starving children of the Central Powers, though they are personally quite unknown to us.

Third—world-fellowship must mean world-wide co-operation in common tasks. Where there is international hatred and enmity, of course there cannot be world-fellowship. But the thing itself comes to reality only when there is world-wide co-operation for worthy ends.

The fitness of the Christian church to further world-co-operation rests upon its doctrine of universal brotherhood, upon its interest in spiritual rather than material values, and upon its service in providing a laboratory of experience for the practice of efficient co-operation in unselfish enterprises. It is a high calling to which the church is summoned by Dr. McGiffert. The address is printed in *Religious Education* for June, 1921.

The Milwaukee Conference.—The forty-eighth annual meeting of the National Conference of Social Work, held at Milwaukee, June 22-29, was attended by some 3,000 people. The aim of the conference was the examination of the present status of social work in America, and a study of ways and means for increasing the efficiency of the agencies for social betterment. President Allen T. Burns, director of methods of Americanization of the Carnegie Corporation, struck the note for the conference in his presidential address on the theme: "Does Social Work Promote Social Progress?" The address, in the main, was an argument for the intelligent study of values in social work, indicating the need of scientific research and attention to the organic relationships of social laws in any efficient scheme of social progress.

The program of the conference represented a wide scope of interests, including contributions from social workers of many types, psychiatrists, physicians, government workers, criminologists, sociologists, and economists. Labor conditions were discussed by Sidney Hillman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, "Prohibition—What Is Its Effect?" by J. L. Gillin, professor of sociology in the University of Wisconsin; and "Immigrant Heritages and How to Deal with Them" by R. E. Park, of the University of Chicago. The conference will meet in Providence in 1922.

As One Having Authority.—The boy in Nazareth had his schooling in a carpenter's shop, in the village street, and out on the hills of Galilee. Lincoln learned from the same books—work with his hands, elemental people, and the lonely backwoods of Kentucky. This was education for individuality, for creativity, for leadership. "But what child nowadays has such teaching?" asks Dallas Lore Sharp in "Teaching for Authority" in the *Atlantic Monthly* for July. "A child cannot be educated for authority on lesser books, with sophisticated people, with pointless play instead of work, with ordered lessons in school in place of the dear disorder of nature and her companionship and his own soul's." The task of American school education is "the mighty making of the democratic mind"—the average mind. It is education in the interests of leveling life's extremes, averaging up and averaging down, to produce a common, democratic, uniform level of life. But where is the education for poetry, for prophecy, for genius, to find its place? The challenge of the article is not to the schools, but to the parents of today. It is they who must provide for the education for authority.

Mr. Wells and Religion.—We are unanimous in our interest in the mental processes of Mr. Wells. Groping ineffectually for an understanding of his mental daring and his prolific power, as manifested by his literary output in recent years, we welcome any examination of the operation and the results of his thinking. Many who shrink slightly from the controversial examination of the *History* by Mr. Wells and Mr. Gomme in the *Fortnightly Review* and the *Yale Review* will welcome with interest the expository article by Mr. A. E. Baker in *The Living Age* for July 16 (reprinted from the *Church Quarterly Review* for April), on "The Religious Development of Mr. Wells." Between the earlier stages of Mr. Wells's religious thinking, which Mr. Baker characterizes as "reluctant agnosticism," and the later fervent apostleship of God the Invisible King, four main influences are recognized: (1) Mr. Wells's

interest in utopias, or ideal states; (2) the realization of the solidarity of the human race; (3) the belief in a supranational authority; and (4) the sense, quickened by the war, of God as an immediate helper and savior of mankind. The dominant interest of the resultant religious consciousness is suggested in the lines quoted from Mr. Wells: "Mankind will awake and the dreams of nationalities and strange loyalties will fade away, and there will be no nationality in all the world, and no king, nor emperor, nor leader but the one God of mankind." Predominantly sociological rather than theological or ethical, such a concept of religion asks of course for supplement from other fields. Mr. Baker very rightly suggests its failure to bear comparison with the ideal of Jesus, who stated the rights and duties of individuals in concretely ethical terms, and defined the nature of the God-King in the warm, vital symbols of human personality and fatherhood.

Remnants of a Jewish Sect in China.—An interesting survey of Jews in China has been given by Mr. W. C. White in the June number of the *Church Missionary Review*. The Jews came over to China as early as the third century A.D. and settled in many important cities. But at present the only Jewish community left in China is that in Kaifeng, Honan. There are about two hundred families at that locality. They have sold all their Hebrew scriptures partly because they are poor and partly because they are no longer able to read them. They have given up circumcision because they no longer understand the reason and tradition concerning it. Their synagogue buildings have been completely destroyed. As a religious entity they are quite disintegrated and their clan relationships are almost non-existent. Furthermore, many have intermarried with the Chinese. While many have followed Chinese customs and beliefs, there are others who come to Christian churches on Sunday.

Was the God of Jesus the God of the Jews?—It is infrequent indeed that scholarship, and particularly scholarship in the field of religion, is criticized for its neutrality. Perhaps Mr. Edmond Holmes, in his article "Does Contemporary Scholarship Do Justice to Jesus?" in the July issue of *The Nineteenth Century and After*, is right in his contention that complete impartiality in the sphere of religious sentiment is beyond the grasp of human thought. In any event, Mr. Holmes has presented an interesting challenge to the position of Dr. Foakes-Jackson and Dr. Lake, in their first volume of *The Beginnings of Christianity*, that the God of Jesus was the God of the Jews. Their attempt to be fair

to Judaism, and to free themselves from any taint of partisanship, has, Mr. Holmes maintains, withheld them from a just estimate of the originality of the thought of Jesus and the revolutionary character of his teaching about God. Mr. Holmes is assuredly right in his position that there is other evidence to be considered in such a question than the specific utterances upon the theme in question. The general outlook on life and attitude toward its practical problems furnish criteria, both legitimate and decisive, for scientific criticism. Out of this larger field of evidence, Mr. Holmes brings his testimony. He shows that there was implicit in Jesus' attitude toward the Jewish law a conception of God less limited and less legalistic than the conception which Jewish theology had produced, and he suggests that in Jesus' attack upon other, similar problems of the day there is abundant evidence of the originality and unorthodoxy of his thought about God.

How to Christianize the Chinese Family.—Shanghai College has a new idea of solving this difficult problem. The college has founded a "Christian Home Club" with the purpose of bringing wholesome ideals definitely before the students through addresses, exhibits, and personal contact with Christian homes of the faculty. Both Christian and non-Christian students are allowed to become members on an equal basis. The club is too young yet to ascertain the full results of this experiment, but valuable testimony from students shows how the seed has already been sown. Here are typical comments: "I owe so much to the C. H. C." "The things I learned there I am trying to work out in my home." "I am starting a C. H. C. here in the school where I am teaching." "But now I know that my home can be made sanitary and attractive, that my wife and I can be companions, and that our Christian home may be a blessing to many others."

Recognizing the Social Background for Mission Education.—Professor Paul Monroe points out in his article entitled "Mission Education and National Policy" (*International Review of Missions*, Vol. X, No. 39, pp. 321-50) that there are at least four distinct types of culture in the foreign fields: (1) that of tribal life; (2) that of people who are highly cultured, but are in the period of transition; (3) that of people who have adopted definite procedures for realizing their national aims; (4) that of people who are under foreign mandates. Each type has its own distinctive problems. Mission education should take the total environmental conditions into consideration and adapt itself in such a way as to aid the natives for whom it labors.

What's Wrong with the Catholic Missions in China?—This interesting question has been raised by George M. Stenz, a Catholic priest in the July number of the *Ecclesiastical Review*. He has keenly felt that the Catholic missions have failed to reach the upper ranks of Chinese life. This is largely due to the fact that the Catholic school situation in China is still in a most deplorable condition and the consensus of Catholic opinion has not awakened to the importance and the actual necessity of producing books treating of other subjects than those referring directly or exclusively to religion. He also hopes that the Catholic benefactors in America will furnish funds not merely for the erection of chapels, but also for the support of the Catholic schools and the Catholic press and of some capable converts to complete their education in America.

Co-education and Mission Schools in China.—The time for co-education has at last come to China. The National Educational Conference of 1919 in Shansi voted co-education for China. The same conference meeting in Shanghai the following year discussed ways and means of encouraging co-education. The Peking Government University has opened its doors to girls and has now more than ten co-eds. The Nanking Teachers' College, starting co-education during the summer session of 1920, has more than one hundred girl students.

Among missions schools, the opinions are still divergent. Some entirely ignore the problem, others have decided to start co-education, and still others stick to their traditional policy. Mr. Chang, in his article on "Students' Social Problems" (*The Chinese Recorder*, Vol. LII, No. 5, pp. 329-35), points out that mission schools should not only have definite policies toward co-education, but also be active and careful in directing the social intercourse between young men and women. This is especially important now, for the old ethical standards have been discarded, while the new ones have not yet crystallized.

History for Everybody.—Few serious books have awakened more popular interest and called forth more scholarly criticism than Mr. H. G. Wells's *The Outline of History*. In the *Yale Review* for July, Mr. Wells answers his critics at length in delightful, rollicking spirit, driving home his reply with the announcement of the preparation of a new edition.

To Mr. Wells this was a serious task, to set forth the sweep of events.

It was written to help oust such teaching of history as one still finds going on in England,—of the history of England from 1066 to the death of Queen

Anne, for example, without reference to any remoter past, or to the present, or to any exterior world,—forever from the schools.

For the work of some American historians he has warm words of commendation, e.g., for Professor Breasted, but severe words for the British universities with their exaltation of the classical studies—"a world-wide nuisance, and as a patriot, a parent and a schoolmaster I have raged against them." He talks of wishing to take some younger critic "across his knee and establishing a truer relationship in the simple way boys have." But withal the new *Outline* will benefit by the criticisms, he adds.

What Are the Real Relations between Christianity and Judaism?—

"Back to the study of Jewish sources" is the answer to the present stress on Hellenistic influences in the effort to recover the story of the rise of Christianity. To that end Professor G. F. Moore, in "Christian Writers on Judaism" (*Harvard Theological Review*, July, 1921), has this to say of Emil Schürer's *History of the Jewish People*:

Schürer's volumes are an indispensable repertory for all sorts of things about the Jews. . . . [He] did what he set out to do, and made an immeasurably useful handbook. But the reader must take it for what it is, not for what its author, notwithstanding the title, never intended it to be,—history. . . . To Schürer Judaism was synonymous with legalism and legalism was his most cherished religious antipathy. . . . The problem of the origin of Christianity historically conceived demands, however, an investigation of every other phase of Judaism at the beginning of our era, and the endeavor to define what Christianity took over from Judaism as well as what was new in it.

Wundt's Conception of Religion.—"Wilhelm Wundt's Significance for Theology" is considered by K. Thieme in the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* (May-June, 1921), pp. 213-38. Wundt regarded theology as the science of religion and religion as consisting of historical phenomena. As an exponent of collectivism, he looked upon the relation of the community to individual existence as the problem of problems. His last work, *Erlebtes und Erkanntes*, published shortly before his death, shows that he synthesized experience and knowledge into a world-view. For him, religion was the feeling that the world of sense belongs to an ideal, supersensuous world; so he counteracted the naturalism of Haeckel and Ostwald, partly on the basis of a mystic experience in his youth. He held to the unity of the religious and the philosophical treatment of the world, the rights of religion side by side with science, and experiences of worth as conditioning a world-view.

On Translating.—For the person who uses the Bible only in English it is often real service of emancipation for someone to remind him that his New Testament is a translation and that the art of translating has a history. Frederick Harrison in the *Forum* for June has gathered together some "brief notes on translation" which must impress the student of general literature with the advance our age has made in this art. "The laws of translation," he says, "are three:—one, exact rendering of the full meaning; two, some echo of the original form; three, clarity, grace, vigor in the translation." He proceeds:

All through the eighteenth century almost down to living memory in the nineteenth century, famous translations were produced in defiance of the first two canons of translation, aiming only at clarity, grace and vigor in literary English, neglecting the meaning of their author and substituting a totally different rhythm of their own. The most brilliant example of this was Pope's *Iliad*.

And he shows how something of fidelity to the original, something of the "feel" of the original which the first readers had, has come into the new versions to take the place of that elegance of style which the *littérateurs* of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries made the desideratum.

But his dictum on the English Bible provokes a word:

Take the supreme case of the Bible, of which the Authorized Version formed the master-type of the English language. To the millions the power of the Old Testament is due to the sublime effect of a unique translation from the Hebrew: and to me the New Testament in English is grander than in the Greek,—itself being largely a translation of other tongues.

The 1611 Version is one of the enduring monuments of Elizabethan English: it has left its stamp indelibly upon all our literature since and upon the language of every day as no other influence has—and that for many reasons. But Greek is the original, not the secondary language of the New Testament; and much water has flowed under London Bridge since that translation, much more than since Pope's *Iliad*. Some vigorous thinking is "embalmed" for us in the King James's English. The new renderings, e.g., Moffatt's and Weymouth's, are pointing the way to a better day. The "Authorized" Version will remain a classic, but the New Testament writers have a right to be understood today. The "translation" English of the Revised Version will yield to idiomatic, stately English with "some echo of the original form."

BOOK REVIEWS

HOW SHALL WE CONCEIVE THE PERSONALITY OF GOD?¹

The most searching inquiry of the religious mind today is concerning the possibility of a definite belief in God. The popular theology of past centuries made frank use of anthropomorphic analogies, and succeeded in bringing to clear consciousness the conception of a definite personal figure with whom men might have intimate relationships. But as the principles of modern scientific and philosophical thinking have become dominant, the older anthropomorphism becomes incredible, and the loved picture of God as a compassionate Father grows dim. If the Christian faith is to persist in its accustomed form, some way must be found in which to make real the idea of personality in God.

It is to this task that Mr. Webb devotes himself in the Gifford Lectures. His previous studies in the field of theological and philosophical thought in antiquity and during the Middle Ages admirably equip him for an exact and historically correct understanding of the precise meaning of theological terminology in the history of Christian thinking. From the point of view of literature, the lectures are a delight. The author is thoroughly at home in his subject, he possesses a charming style, and his spirit of fairness and courtesy is unailing. The wealth of allusions, the many side lights, and the attempt to do justice to all phases of a question furnish an unusually stimulating discussion. Yet there is preserved an exactness of philosophical reasoning, and an insistence on some abstruse considerations, which lead one to marvel at the intellectual capacity of the audience which listened to these discussions without the aid of the printed page.

Mr. Webb attempts first by a critical study of historical phases of thought to ascertain exactly what the concept of personality means. It cannot be said that he succeeds in giving us a very definite picture. But the fault lies in the difficulty of the concept itself. The definition

¹*God and Personality*. (Gifford Lectures, 1918 and 1919: First Course.) By Clement C. J. Webb. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1918; New York: Macmillan. 281 pages. \$3.00.

Divine Personality and Human Life. (Gifford Lectures, 1918 and 1919: Second Course.) By Clement C. J. Webb. London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan, 1920. 291 pages. \$3.00.

of Boethius, *Persona est naturae rationabilis individua substantia*, is considered, on the whole, as about the best description available. On the basis of this definition attempts are made to differentiate personality from mere individuality and from mere rationality. It is discovered that what is really important in the concept of personality is the possibility of social relationships between persons. But the Boethian definition, designed as it is to analyze metaphysical substance, is a poor starting-point for the discussion of the social implications of personality. Those who are accustomed to thinking in terms of modern social psychology will feel the discussion to be curiously medieval in spirit and method.

One of the interesting and valuable conclusions of Mr. Webb is that Christian theology, until very recent times, has never ventured to affirm the personality *of* God. It has asserted personality *in* God. God is not *a* person. This would be such an individualizing of him that he could no longer be considered the Absolute. The doctrine of a finite God is hopelessly wrecked here. But there is that in the character of the Absolute which makes possible reciprocal personal relationships between God and the worshiper. This personality *in* God, Mr. Webb finds to be well stated in the Christian doctrine of the trinity, with its three "persons" in the Godhead.

The evidence for this personal aspect of the divine nature is to be found exclusively in the religious experience of personal communion with God. While this conception may be made rationally plausible, it is yet possible to defend other conceptions of the Absolute if the testimony of the religious consciousness be left out of account. The whole case, then, rests ultimately on the testimony of a profound religious consciousness. The book thus is really a very careful and suggestive study of definitions. Granted the legitimacy of the testimony of the mystic consciousness, Mr. Webb asks how we may best think of the transcendent source of that personal relationship which we experience in religion. It is evident that those who demand a study based on the history of religions will not find it here. The argument moves entirely in the older field of definition of concepts. The author seems to be almost unaware of the interest which modern students find in tracing the psychological and social genesis of concepts.

The second course follows in the footsteps of the first. The various aspects of our human life are considered, and it is argued that the fields of economics, science, aesthetics, morals, politics, and religion are all better interpreted with the help of the conception of personality in the Absolute than by any other alternative. There are, of course, suggestive

considerations at every turn; but the general positions are, on the whole, very familiar to students of apologetics. In short, the two volumes are valuable chiefly as an apologetic for that concept of God which was developed by the Christian thinkers who employed the categories and the method of Greek metaphysics. And if the metaphysical presuppositions be granted, it is a most effective presentation. What many readers will miss is an apprehension of the problems presented by the empirical point of view embodied in modern psychology and history.

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THE SOCIAL IDEALS OF THE OLD TESTAMENT¹

This is a book on theory, not history. The author is attempting to point out what the people thought on social matters in a given period, regardless of the practice of the time or of the historical basis of their theories. Following the chronology of the modern school, he classifies the materials of the Old Testament in four large sections; viz., "The Age of the Patriarchs"; "Moses to Samuel"; "The Monarchy"; and "The Exilic and Post-Exilic Epoch." All the New Testament materials are used without discrimination in the two chapters composing the last one-third of the book, the one on the "Christian Ideal" and the other on the "Social Institutions of Early Christianity." His warrant for so doing is that this book takes as its unit the doctrine of an epoch, not of individual teachers. Again the writer is interested, not in origins, but in use.

Two important assumptions underlie the entire development of the thesis: (1) in the Bible, sociology waits upon theology, and (2) the theory of society is naturally a branch of ethics. The author's ethical creed is evolutionary, idealistic, and Christian. One is therefore impressed that the book as a whole is a fairly good biblical theology, for, as the author holds, his sociology constantly merges into theology. This is the more clearly brought out when it is noted that in the compilation of the present book from the original thesis, three important social topics—"Work," "Womanhood," and "Wealth"—have been omitted, and that "yet without them the book has perhaps a true unity." With the omission of such important materials, one scarcely hopes to find unity from the social point of view.

¹ *The Bible Doctrine of Society in Its Historical Evolution.* Charles Ryder Smith. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. xviii+400 pages. 18s.

In his treatment of "The Age of the Patriarchs," the purpose of the writer presents itself most boldly. He believes that the JE sources presenting these materials are essentially premonarchic rather than post-Davidic, even though they may have been worked over at the later date. The question of interest then is, not what was the actual political and social position of the patriarchs, but rather what was the survival value of the institutions of this epoch for the time of Samuel or thereabouts; the sources reflect what we have reason today to believe to be a very unreal history, but it was this very idyllic life of the patriarch that stood as the ideal of social life for the later age. The idealized patriarchs are in this period the ideal individuals and the ideal society for the Hebrew nation. Peace by isolation, independence, absence of law, and prosperity are the elements of this society. Home, wealth, and leisure are basal. Ideal relations to the members of the social group are secondary to ideal relations to God. To be sure, in the background of this well-nigh perfect society and in sharp contrast with it are the unideal city with its sin, kings, and war, sordid commerce with its cunning competition, and the institution of taskwork.

Against this older background of perfect men we have in the next two epochs the imperfect people, Israel, and the social process is one gradual adaptation of this earlier peace ideal to the practical needs of a more normal and a growingly complex society. Thus the premonarchic age is a "democracy of families," a nation, yet a nation with the emphasis still on the family as the unit. Law—as of inheritances—comes in, and the alien can no longer be ignored, for here is presented the clash of ideals in clear form.

The problem of such a society as Israel evolved into with the period of the monarchy is "to assign to every social unit its rights and duties in respect to every other"; in other words, to discover and frame principles of mutual rights and obligations. Of this task most ancient civilizations despaired, but not so the Hebrew prophets whom the clash of the old culture with city problems brought to the fore.

Their solution of the inequalities of the day was based on two principles: (1) righteousness, containing four elements: (a) justice, in law and in government, (b) truth, (c) mercy, and (d) peace, culminating in a league of nations for the purpose of cultivating a mind for peace; and (2) accommodation, which principle gets its substance from the fact that history is a process, not of mere change, but of organic growth. The most important applications of this principle by the prophets were to the problems of (a) the responsibility of privilege; (b) wealth; (c) war as a means to righteousness; and (d) the temporary predominance of other nations over Israel.

In the final period, monarchy fails; the theocracy is restored; the Jews accept dependence on one condition—they must be allowed to follow their own religion; this becomes the basis of nationality, and by a process of elimination of the undesirables, it makes the Jewish state a smaller, but a more compact social unit than ever before. In this period arises a new doctrine—the worth of man as man—and a new problem, the problem of the free individual. These take various forms and in one way or another are the theme of most of the literature produced in this epoch. The four fold righteousness of the former period is supplemented by a new element, that of humility, and righteousness itself becomes the *character* rather than the *will* of God. Thus were the experiences of a suffering people enriched and mellowed.

The evolution of religion was complete with Jesus, in whom the perfect relation of man to God was realized. Social evolution, however, proceeds much more slowly, and is yet far from completed realization. It will finally come about by the universal practice of that distinctively Christian social quality so perfectly exemplified by Jesus himself, the characteristic commonly termed love, but which this author prefers to call *meekness*.

The writer has amassed an immense amount of material under a very large number of subdivisions. In most cases he has illustrated his theses by the citation of a number of Scripture references. When we keep in mind the rather limited approach he has set for himself in preparing the book and when we allow for the strange and somewhat venturesome vocabulary used in a number of places, we must credit the author with a seriousness of purposes and with a certain constructive result, more in the realm of biblical theology, as it seems to the reviewer, than in that of the social sciences.

D. E. THOMAS

LINCOLN, NEBRASKA

A MASTER PREACHER ON PREACHING¹

Dr. Cadman's study of the work of preaching begins with a chapter on "The Scriptural Basis for Preaching," which is not an examination of the warrants for preaching as they are found in the Bible, but is an enlightening study of the homiletic values of various sections of Scripture. Especially valuable are the studies of the Prophets and Jesus. The second chapter, "Prophets and Preachers of the Christian Church," is far removed from an outline sketch of the history of preaching, although based on careful study in this field. Dr. Cadman presents the personality

¹ *Ambassadors of God*. S. Parkes Cadman. New York: Macmillan, 1921. 353 pages. \$2.50.

of Wesley vividly, as one would expect after reading the middle section of *The Three Religious Leaders of Oxford*. He says, "Study Wesley as you study no other modern preacher, and do this the more because a certain parochialism, tintured with condescension, is occasionally to be detected in Puritan references to him" (p. 67). He describes the manner of Whitefield thus: "Truths he could neither formulate nor cast in literary fashion were fused within him by his glow of soul and expressed with fluid energy. Even the small change of discourse was reminted by his volcanic manner." He calls Dr. W. L. Watkinson "one of our few surviving great preachers." "The Modern Attitude toward Preaching" is a careful study of the popular attitude toward the pulpit today based upon the author's wide experience in pulpit and platform work. Taking a thorough inventory of the forces at work in modern life, he finds that there is little new or disheartening in the prejudices and misapprehensions unfavorable to preaching in the modern world. He feels that "the primary cause of the present dearth of pulpit influence in many centers, learned or otherwise, can be traced to its breach with nineteenth-century science" (p. 107). Also the pulpit has been too remote from the current social unrest and yearning, although this fault is rapidly being remedied. Dr. Cadman writes with wisdom on the matter of preaching what is called the "social gospel." He says:

I venture to break a lance with those who contend that the advocacy of social righteousness should be the absorbing theme of your ministry. When everything has been said for it that can be said, the fact remains that the restitution of the entire man after the pattern of his Creator is the whole of which social righteousness is but a part. . . . At all times insist upon the New Testament doctrines as the absolute principles of a Christian sociology. . . . Many to whom you appeal exceed you in the knowledge of classes and their callings, of groups and their necessities; but you have the effective Word that covers them all as the sky over-arches the landscape. That Word should become by your dispensation the source of those lasting benefits for society which, as history demonstrates, proceed from the moral and religious changes effected by the Gospel in the heart of man (p. 122).

The two following chapters are closely related in subject-matter and are entitled, "Cross Currents Which Affect Preaching," and "Present-Day Intellectualism and Preaching." Here the fine insight and the balanced discrimination of Dr. Cadman appear attractively. No preacher can read these pages without feeling that there is every incentive awaiting him and no fears to daunt him in the way as he threads the tangled path of modern thinking. "The best preaching you will achieve," says the author, "which in the long run will prove its acceptability to mind and heart, will not be that of the pietists who deplore scientific dominancy, not that of negativists who deny religious

mysteries, but the preaching in which religion interprets and is interpreted by science; in which faith and knowledge subsist together and reënforce each other" (p. 175). A stimulating study of "The Nature and Ideals of the Christian Ministry" follows; it is filled with common-sense counsel, such as this: "Shun as you would a plague the clerical mannerism which has the appearance of downfallen amiability dashed with professional pretentiousness" (p. 214). "Preaching: Its Preparation and Practice" requires two chapters and is written in a friendly and intimate way. The man who has been doing the work here tells his comrades how he has done it. One is sensitive to the note of reality in this section; the counsels grow out of experience. At best, however, there is not much to be said in the field of technique over what has been put in form by Phelps and Broadus. It is interesting to see how another man works. It is comforting to hear him tell his brethren to study Bunyan and Lincoln for their terse and biting Saxon style, and then read his own sentences, loaded with polysyllabic Latinity. It refreshes one to find again the classic illustration of the preacher who can give counsel but cannot follow it. The next book on technique must be written from the standpoint of psychology, evaluating all methods according to the nature of the preacher and the congregation, and using the last results in psychological and pedagogical research. Until then, such chapters as these, valuable as they are, will only rehearse the masters with the added factor of fresh personal experience. The final chapter is on "Preaching and Worship," and is wisely constructive in its exaltation of worship as the paramount activity of the church and its minister. The volume as a whole is one of the most stimulating of recent homiletical studies. It does not possess the compass or solidity of Dr. Garvie's new book, but it is a thorough piece of work.

OZORA S. DAVIS

CHICAGO THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

PREACHING AND LIFE¹

Professor Hoyt brings together here thirteen papers consisting of biographical studies and essays, designed to show that the preachers of the Christian gospel have exerted a deep and potent influence in the development of American life. The first paper is on "The Puritan Preacher," a discerning study of the sources of power in the earliest American preaching. Then follow chapters on Edwards, Lyman Beecher, Channing, Bushnell, Henry Ward Beecher, and Brooks, each proportioned well and indicating the ways in which the preaching of

¹ *The Pulpit and American Life*. Arthur S. Hoyt. New York: Macmillan, 1921. xii+286 pages.

the man touched contemporary life with creative power. The attention given to Lyman Beecher is deserved. This study is by far the most interesting and profitable of the biographical chapters. Lyman Beecher is presented in the rugged and manly fashion which befits him. Professor Hoyt says, "He was about the most *live* man in the American pulpit for the first half of the nineteenth century." A chapter on "The Old and New Evangelism" sets forth the permanent worth of the methods and message of such preachers as D. L. Moody, and shows the weakness and peril in the highly organized modern "campaign." The longest and the most valuable chapter in the book is entitled "Some Distinctive Contributions to the American Pulpit." Here Professor Hoyt studies the work done by the leading preachers in the principal Protestant bodies in large outline, giving us a picturesque representation of the work of leading preachers, especially as they have molded the thought and life of their generations. The tenth chapter is devoted to a survey of "The Present American Pulpit," where the author finds points for criticism and commendation. Here are two judgments: "The present sermon has more practical thinking, if not so much high speculation, and is clothed in appropriate speech, not a peculiar dialect of religion, but the clear, pictorial and attractive speech that men put into the best conversation and the best books." "If we think of the modern American pulpit as a whole, it does not seem to have an overmastering and compelling sense of message." We commend the careful reading of this chapter to every preacher. It contains wholesome suggestions as to our American homiletic weaknesses. The concluding chapters are on "The Pulpit and Social Welfare," and "The Pulpit and the Nation." They point out the influence that preaching has exerted in making for good citizenship and social idealism. The papers bear here and there the mark of use on local occasions which ought to have been more carefully worked out: for example, "Albert Barnes of our own church" (p. 254); "in the first church" (p. 255); "we had resident preachers" (p. 228); and on page 165 there is a poor connection between the sections of the paper, so that "his" on page 166, line 4, has no antecedent. It evidently refers to Billy Sunday, but he is not introduced until later. The "Ba · Psalm Book" becomes the "Bay State Psalm Book" on page 10; the familiar "Brother" Lawrence becomes "Father" Lawrence on page 38; "ad capitandum" appears on page 99; "Oberlin University" on page 160; a period is lost on page 244, line 3 from bottom; Leonard Bacon becomes "William Leonard Bacon" on page 254. Defective footnotes appear on pages 31 and 104.

OZORA S. DAVIS

BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.]

BERKOWITZ, HENRY. *Intimate Glimpses of the Rabbi's Career*. Cincinnati: The Hebrew Union College Press, 1921. 178 pages.

An admirable statement of the spirit and method desirable in the rabbinate written by a leading rabbi who greatly enriches his lectures by citations from his own experience.

BOYER, CHARLES. *Christianisme et néo-platonisme dans la formation de Saint Augustin*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1920. 225 pages. Fr. 12.

———. *L'idée de vérité dans la philosophie de Saint Augustin*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1921. 266 pages. Fr. 16.

These two examples of Catholic scholarship seek to defend the originality of Augustine, particularly on the question of his relation to neo-Platonism, and to show that he was sound also upon the question of the authority of the church.

BRUN, L., and FRIDRICHSEN, A. *Paulus und die Urgemeinde*. Giessen: Alfred Töpelmann, 1921. 76 pages. M. 3.30.

Two essays dealing with the much discussed problem of the apostolic decrees and Paul's relations with the Christians of Jerusalem.

BRUYNE, DONATIEN DE (ed.). *Les fragments de Freising (épîtres de S. Paul et épîtres catholiques)*. (Collectanea Biblica Latina Cura et Studio Monachorum S. Benedicti, Vol. V.) Rome: Bibliothèque Vaticane, 1921. 68 pages.

A critical edition of the fragments of a Latin manuscript of portions of Paul's letters and of the Catholic epistles.

BUTLER, SIR GEOFFREY. *Studies in Statecraft*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1920. vi+138 pages.

A series of scholarly essays with fine bibliographies dealing with sixteenth-century political ideas of world-power and internationalism, based on studies of Bishop Roderick, Postell, Sully, and Crucé.

CAVERT, SAMUEL MCCREA (ed.). *The Churches Allied for Common Tasks*. New York: Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, 1921. 419 pages.

The official report of the notable Quadrennial Meeting of the Federal Council held in Boston in December, 1920.

DUDDY, FRANK E. *A New Way to Solve Old Problems*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. x+50 pages.

A write-up of a six months' experiment with a school of about 800 members by which its efficiency has been increased. It is a helpful contribution to the literature upon concrete projects.

FAULKNER, JOHN ALFRED. *Modernism and the Christian Faith*. New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1921. 306 pages.

A discussion of some of the crucial questions on which modernists diverge from the orthodox position, with a vigorous defense of the old faith on historical and theological grounds.

FRAYSER, NANNIE LEE. *Followers of the Marked Trail*. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1921. 231 pages. \$1.25.

A book of stories for week-day religious instruction, most of them from the Bible, and adapted to the eleven-year-old pupil.

Fünfundzwanzig Jahre. Berlin: Martin Warneck, 1920. 209 pages.

A survey of the publications of this firm during the past quarter-century.

GABARROW, FRANÇOIS. *Arnobé, son œuvre*. Paris: Librairie Ancienne Honoré Champion, 1921. 77 pages. Fr. 5.

A brief introduction to the life and writings of Arnobius.

HARTSHORNE, HUGH. *Stories for Worship and How to Follow Them Up*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. viii+127 pages.

Those who have used the first manual published six years ago will welcome this contribution from the same author. The material has been wrought out by experimentation. The whole scheme centers about training for the City of God.

HALPER, B. *Post-Biblical Hebrew Literature—An Anthology*. (English translation.) Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1921. 251 pages. \$2.50.

A careful selection from the writings of Hebrew authors ranging from the second century B.C. to the nineteenth century A.D.

HUME, ROBERT ERNEST. *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*. (Translated from the Sanskrit.) London: Oxford University Press, 1921.

A new translation of source materials of early Hindu philosophic thinking. The author introduces his translation with an interpretation of the development of the philosophy of the Upanishads and adds a valuable annotated bibliography.

HURLBUT, JESSE L. *The Story of Chautauqua*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921. xxv+429 pages. \$2.50.

An interesting and valuable account of this great movement for popular education. Photographs and personal reminiscences lend vividness to the narrative.

KITTEL, RUDOLF. *Die Religion des Volkes Israel*. Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 1921. 210 pages. M. 12.60.

A popular sketch of the religion of Israel, from a historical but cautiously conservative point of view.

KNIGHT, G. A. FRANK. *Nile and Jordan*. London: James Clarke & Co., 1921. xi+572 pages. 36s.

A study of the relations between Israel and Egypt from a thoroughly traditional standpoint.

KNUDSON, ALBERT C. *The Prophetic Movement in Israel*. New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1921. 174 pages. \$1.00.

A very good introduction to the study of the prophets suited to the use of adult classes and preparatory schools.

LANDRIEUX, MGR. ÉVÊQUE DE DIJON. *Le Divin Méconnu*. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne, 1921. 208 pages.

A religious exposition of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, the "forgotten" God.

MAINS, GEORGE PRESTON. *United States Citizenship*. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1921. 296 pages. \$2.00.

A popular discussion of various forms and ideals in United States social and political life by an ardent patriot. The interpretations are not especially profound, but the spirit of the book is wholesome.

OMAN, JOHN. *The Paradox of the World*. (Sermons.) New York: The Macmillan Co., 1921. viii+292 pages.

A book of sermons whose source material is mainly biblical, of general rather than of special interest.

SANDAY, W., and EMMETT, C. W. *Tracts on Common Prayer. No. 4: New Testament Background*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1920. 59 pages.

Brief and very elementary information about the early history of Christianity and the New Testament books.

Theological Study Today. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1921. xii+215 pages. \$1.50.

Nine addresses on the various fields of theological study, delivered by distinguished scholars at the celebration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Meadville Theological School, June 1-3, 1920.

WEBB, ROBERT L. *The Romance of American Life and Progress*. Philadelphia: The Judson Press, 1921. 80 pages.

A bright, brief study of America's territorial expansion, population, wealth, political ideals, religious liberty, and probable destiny.

THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION

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The Journal of Religion in 1922



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An editor's page. Here the significance of the topics treated in each issue of the *Journal* will be interpreted, and attention will be called to important problems and achievements.

The January Issue of the Journal

will contain the following articles:

"The Contribution of the Open Forum to Democracy in Religion," by GEORGE W. COLEMAN, the father of the Forum movement.

"Glimpses of the Religious Life of New Japan," by PROFESSOR KENNETH SAUNDERS, for years a resident in the Orient.

"The Mission of Reform Judaism," by SAMUEL S. COHEN, an influential rabbi.

"What Are the Fundamentals of Christianity?" by PROFESSOR C. R. MOEHLMAN, who has the chair of Church History in Rochester Theological Seminary.

"Christian Division: a Prior Claim," by DR. PAUL HUTCHINSON, formerly a missionary in China.

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Who's Who In



The November Journal of Religion

MAURICE GOGUEL ("The Religious Situation in France") is Professor of Exegesis and New Testament Criticism in the Faculty of Protestant Theology in Paris. He is the author of various books dealing with New Testament problems.

JOHN EDWARDS LE BOSQUET ("The Unconventional God") is a successful pastor in Fall River, Mass., and an occasional contributor of thought-provoking articles to theological periodicals.

C. J. CADOUX ("The Proposed Creedal Basis of Christian Reunion") is Professor of New Testament in Yorkshire United Independent College, at Bradford, England, and author of *The Early Christian Attitude to War* and *The Guidance of Jesus for Today*.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON ("Idealistic and Pragmatic Interpretations of Religion") is Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in the University of Nanking, China.

JOHN WRIGHT BUCKHAM ("Mysticism and Personality") is Professor of Christian Theology in the Pacific School of Religion, and author of *Mysticism and Modern Life*, *Progressive Religious Thought in America*, and other works.

E. ALBERT COOK ("The Kingdom of God as a Democratic Ideal") is Professor of Religious Education in Pacific University, Oregon, and author of *Christian Faith for Men of Today*.

ANGUS STEWART WOODBURN ("The Psychological Study of Conversion in India") is Professor of Philosophy in Madras Christian College, Madras, India.

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RUSSIAN DISSENTERS

By FREDERICK C. CONYBEARE

Honorary Fellow, University College, Oxford

Among the many facts in Russia which are still so little known that it is impossible to say whether they had or had not any effect in producing the Revolution, is the existence of the Russian dissenters. To most of us their history, numbers, and opinions are quite unknown and therefore it is impossible to form any reasonable opinion as to whether they helped to produce the Revolution, and still less whether, now that the Revolution is here, they will come into their own in the religious and political life of Russia.

Mr. Conybeare's "Russian Dissenters," published by the Harvard University Press, is almost the first scientific attempt to tell the story of Russian dissent. He traces it from the seventeenth century down to the eve of the Revolution by the help of Russian books which are mostly inaccessible to European and American readers. No one who is interested in the past or future of Russia can afford to neglect this book, which, though not intended to illustrate the rise of Sovietism, explains more things than are elucidated by most books written especially for that purpose.

x+370 pages. Octavo. Stiff paper. \$4.00

HARVARD THEOLOGICAL STUDIES X

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THE RELIGIOUS SITUATION IN FRANCE

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Paris

It is out of the question to present an even approximately complete picture of the religious situation in France at the present moment. Such an undertaking would require us to go far into the past and to show the origin and development of the different movements, both religious and antireligious, which either successively or simultaneously have influenced the French spirit. It would be necessary in particular to ascertain in what degree and in what fashion religious life in France has been affected by the terrible crisis which has just shaken humanity. In short, it would be necessary to delineate the distinctive characteristics of the principal religious groups if we were to attempt on the basis of the facts thus ascertained to apprehend the religious spirit of France.

We shall content ourselves in this article with the mention of certain features of the actual situation without pretending in any way to exhaust a peculiarly rich field of material.

The complexity of the situation is due in part to the fact that during the last quarter of a century or less, religious development has been influenced either successively or sometimes simultaneously by several causes any one of which alone would have been sufficient to exercise a profound influence on the religious situation. The two most important of these are the separation between church and state and the war.

It is necessary first of all to consider the influence of these two causes. We may then pass in review the principal religious groups (Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Theosophy, and Free Thought, both religious and antireligious) and point out what is most characteristic of each group in the present situation. It would obviously be impossible to do this even with approximate completeness in the space at our disposal. In order to avoid treating so delicate a question in an obviously inadequate fashion, thus running the risk of not doing justice to any, we prefer deliberately to leave out of consideration Catholicism and the other non-Protestant religious groups and to speak in the remainder of this article especially of the conditions which prevail in French Protestantism.

I. THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

The development of ideas which ultimately found expression in the passing of the law of December 9, 1905, providing for the separation of church and state, is the outgrowth of a sentiment of hostility if not against religion at least against the Roman church. The framers of the law, however, did not yield to the demands of antireligious passion, but made a sincere and loyal attempt at a liberal solution. They desired to create a régime which should assure genuine religious liberty. If their intentions at certain points were only imperfectly realized, the fault is to be laid primarily upon the uncompromising attitude of the Roman church, which showed itself eager not for liberty but for domination. The evidence that the separation of church and state in and of itself implies no hostility to religious ideals is furnished by the brilliant campaign in support of the law conducted in the periodical *Le Siècle* by M. Raoul Allier, at that time professor and now dean of the faculty of Protestant theology at Paris.

The enforcement of the law of separation compelled the different religious communities to come to a clear understanding of their needs and to seek to face them squarely. They

were obliged to adapt themselves to a new situation, and to find in themselves the indispensable means for continuing their life. The test to which their members were thus subjected, placing them, as it did, on their honor, reacted to strengthen loyalty to the church. One naturally treasures that which has cost one an effort more than that which demands no sacrifice. Many believers felt henceforth attached to their church as soon as they realized more clearly that their church needed them. It is in this loyalty that the influence of the separation on religious life is to be found, and not in the realm of a reconquered liberty; for in the course of the nineteenth century the churches, at least the Protestant churches, had come to enjoy complete liberty in France. If at times Catholicism had seemed not to enjoy such liberty, the reason is to be found usually in some anticlerical fanaticism which had provoked in return a manifestation of clerical fanaticism.

The Law of Separation at once thrust religious questions to the fore.¹ We need only recall the debates and the polemics aroused by the preparation of the law and the vote upon it, the incidents often attended with violence provoked by the application of the law, the obstinate resistance maintained in Catholic churches to the carrying out of a formal inventory of the property, the obligation under which the government found itself of providing new legal arrangements, in order to avoid the necessity of closing the churches which legally should have been put solely at the disposal of "worshiping associations," when the Catholics refused to organize themselves in such associations following instructions which came from Rome quite contradictory to the proposals of the French bishops. All this called attention to the religious problem and compelled many people who had hitherto little suspected the primary importance of the religious factor to recognize its place in the

¹ It is to be noted that religious history in France has increasingly become an object of interest. A glance at the development of the religious sciences would show this clearly. The latest manifestation of this interest is the creation of a society of the history of religions under the name of the Société Ernest Renan.

life of the people. Who can measure the direct and indirect importance of this lesson taught by undoubted facts?

II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE WAR

What has been the influence of the war on the religious life? To this question very diverse replies can be made, even contradictory conclusions, in each one of which some element of truth might be found. It depends on the angle from which one views things, and the particular sequence of events which one takes into consideration, whether one says that the war exercised a profound and lasting influence on the religious life of France, or on the other hand, that its influence was quite superficial and transitory. It may be contended that it has deepened the religious sentiment in the souls of men, or that it has alienated them from religion.

The war required a concentration of all the energies of France which would never have been complete and consequently would never have been entirely efficacious if it had not included also religious forces. It is to the credit of President Poincaré that he understood this from the very beginning of the crisis, and that in August, 1914, he published an appeal for a *union sacrée* which was universally regarded. The religious forces were not the last to put themselves at the service of the country. Whether it was a matter of giving general support, of undertaking enterprises to sustain morale either at home or at the front, of coming directly to the aid of the soldiers, or of defending either at home or abroad the just cause of France, the representatives of the churches were in the front ranks of those who were eagerly active. No appeal to their co-operation was ever made in vain; Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and Free Thinkers, co-operated under all circumstances. Like good and loyal Frenchmen, all together responded to the appeal. It is particularly to the credit of the Catholics that they proved themselves so loyal. Many times, it is true, they found themselves divided in sentiment

between the inspiration of their patriotism and the explicit directions which came to them from Rome. Under these difficult circumstances the French Catholics never once swerved from the pathway indicated by a passionate love for country. They had the good fortune to have at their head during the critical years of the war a man of well-attested patriotism, who had in him the making of a real leader, and who was at the same time a very shrewd politician, Mgr. Amette, Cardinal Archbishop of Paris. This prelate was able, without disobeying the directions which came to him from Rome, to interpret them, often to amend them, in the matter of prayers for peace, for example, in such a way as not to offend even the most sensitive patriotism, while at the same time formally maintaining a perfectly deferent and submissive attitude toward the pontifical authority.

The attitude maintained during the war by the representatives of the different churches naturally had its influence on the relations between the political power and the churches. A government which during the war had never appealed in vain to the representatives of the churches could not with the coming of peace begin again to ignore them as it had before the crisis. Although the principle of the separation between church and state was never called in question, nevertheless the plan to re-establish an ambassador at the Vatican, as well as other more or less important symptoms, show that the relations between the churches and the state are about to enter upon a new phase.¹ It would indeed be impossible to prophesy just what this new phase will be. In a large measure this depends upon the wisdom which shall be manifested on both sides. The religious peace which seems actually to be in sight might indeed be compromised if Catholicism, as it has so often done in the course of history, should undertake

¹ It is doubtless due to a similar cause that antireligious propaganda now seems to avoid certain noisy manifestations to which it willingly gave itself a few years ago. It does not appear, however, that the traditional attitude of certain forms of free thought toward religion has at bottom greatly changed.

to meddle in the affairs of the state and to exercise an influence not simply religious but definitely political.

The co-operation of the representatives of the different churches in the manifold activities made necessary by the war brought these churches into mutual relationships and led them to co-operate under conditions which had never been previously realized. The *Comité du Secours National* in which Cardinal Amette, Pastor Wagner, and the foremost rabbi of France sat side by side, is one of numerous examples. Frequent also were the public occasions when bishops, pastors, and rabbis were seen side by side. At the front instances of co-operation were common. The chaplains of the different religious organizations, sharing the same life and facing the same dangers, could not ignore one another. Bonds of attachment were thus formed which could never have been realized in peace. But interesting as these facts are, their significance should not be exaggerated, nor should they be used as a basis for hope that in the nearer or more remote future there may be a genuine *rapprochement* between 'Protestantism and Catholicism. If this hope was entertained by some idealists, the course of events will surely dissipate their illusions. The recent decision of the Holy Office forbidding Catholics to participate in any way in the moral and religious undertakings of non-Catholics is very significant in this connection. Indeed, how could the Catholic church without abjuring itself give up its claim to be the sole depository of truth and of salvation? Catholicism would cease to be Catholicism if the war had led it to modify in any particular its attitude with regard to other Christian confessions.

It is much less easy to estimate the influence of the war on religious life itself. Here one must be on his guard not to indulge in hasty generalizations, or to derive from particular observations conclusions more far-reaching than the facts would warrant. The shock produced by the war seemed at first to provoke a reawakening of religious life. Amid the

most diverse circumstances, among Protestants as well as among Catholics, attendance at the churches was very large. Perhaps this was simply a transient situation due less to fundamental religious needs than to a kind of nervous shock and to the bewilderment provoked by the unexpected appearance of a terrible situation for which no one was prepared. What we may observe, however, is that the attraction exercised by the churches in the first months of the war speedily diminished, according to the testimony even of those who were most rejoiced by it and who greeted it as the forerunner of a veritable religious renaissance. It would nevertheless be hasty to affirm that nothing remains of this movement which began with the outbreak of the war. One fact alone shows that such a conclusion would be unwarranted. We have in mind the very large audiences which for two consecutive winters have gathered every Tuesday in Paris to attend the religious conferences conducted by Professor Raoul Allier.

Another fact worthy of note is that in the Protestant churches¹ during the war and after the war certain pastoral vocations arose which would not have come into existence under other circumstances. Many a young man who was following a different career has felt the call to abandon this in order to take, in the ministry, the place of a brother who died on the field of honor. We have seen many an officer refuse brilliant opportunities in order to become a student of theology. In November, 1919, when the soldiers returned after the conclusion of peace, at a time when the whole domain of practical life and of advantageous opportunities lay open to young men, and when the preoccupations and needs of material efforts seemed to dominate everything, the Protestant school of theology in Paris received more students than had entered at any time for twenty years.

We have here, undoubtedly, symptoms of a renewal and a revival of religion. These may readily be noted, but what

¹ The same is true of the Catholic church.

may be called the negative symptoms may easily escape observation. The weakening, and even the disappearance of religious sentiment are facts of the inner life, and it is only under exceptional circumstances that these express themselves in objective form. Here we are dealing with the mystery of personal life. If under favorable circumstances the veil may be occasionally lifted which conceals this life, nevertheless as a general rule it is out of reach of direct observation.

The formidable problem of evil was not created by the war. The death of a single infant is sufficient to raise this question in its full scope, and such monstrosities as pauperism, alcoholism, and debauchery raise for every soul capable of reflection the question of divine omnipotence. At the same time it is true that the war gave to the problem a magnitude and an acuteness which many people had hitherto not perceived. The thousands upon thousands of dead, of mutilated, of widows, of orphans, of mourning parents, the material and moral ruins heaped up on the soil of France, in short, the intensity and the duration of the disaster gave a new importance and a tragic seriousness to the objections which theodicy undertakes to meet. Is it surprising that there have been many persons who, not being able to surmount these difficulties, have been incapable of enduring the heavy weight of doubt, and who have felt their inner life completely exhausted? For such persons the conception of an all-powerful providence and faith in a fatherly God have crumbled. These inner dramas of the soul have most frequently remained concealed. They have not always brought about a definite rupture with the church. In many cases, indeed, the religious practices and attitudes of former times have continued. Nevertheless, we have here certain facts which, even if they cannot be definitely enumerated ought not to be overlooked in estimating the religious consequences of the war. But it would be unjust here to speak only of the losses. Is it not in some sense evidence of progress that in place of an attitude composed

of habit, conventionality, and routine, there should be an attitude of personal concern in relation to religious problems? And is not the soul, which in response to the stimulus of grief has confronted traditional beliefs with its own intimate experiences and emotions, religiously superior to the soul which passively accepts a ready-made faith?

It has also occurred that the crisis due to the war has developed or at least has given birth in certain souls to religious forms, which although not specifically Christian have, nevertheless, a very high value. Among those attitudes which the war created in the heart are to be found numerous admirable examples of a stoicism worthy of ancient teachings and a love for country which in many choice souls has a genuinely religious character and value. However difficult it may be to speak of it, a word certainly should be said concerning it, lest we neglect a trait which might not be reckoned by those less sympathetic or less respectable among the factors which make up the religious situation of present-day France. But we cannot here pursue this matter farther.

III. PROTESTANTISM

Separation of church and state had absolutely no effect upon the religious principle of Protestantism. It simply compelled Protestantism to adjust itself to a new situation. In the first place it was necessary to find material resources to take the place of the subsidy which formerly had come from the state, and which, moreover, had never constituted more than a portion of the Protestant budget. More delicate and more serious because of the consequences which it entailed was the work of organization rendered necessary by the circumstances.

There were in France before the separation, two Protestant churches recognized by the state—the Lutheran and the Reformed. The former was the only one which possessed a unified organization. Divided into two districts (Paris and

Montbéliard), each with its definite synod, it was administered as a whole by a general synod. The Paris district was almost exclusively orthodox in tendency, with a strongly marked pietistic strain. The Montbéliard district was predominantly liberal, and the spirit of loyalty to the Lutheran confession was less developed. The two districts had always lived in perfect harmony within the framework of an organization flexible enough to permit each one of them to develop freely according to its own genius. It seemed then entirely natural to continue a system which had proved successful. It needed only to be adjusted to the new situation.

Quite different was the situation in the Reformed church. Historically this church in France has been organized on the basis of Presbyterian synods, but at bottom the division between orthodox and liberal views was so profound and had occasioned such lively polemics that after a single experiment made in 1872, which only served to bring clearly to light the irreconcilable opposition between the two parties, the government never again convoked any official synods. The Reformed church was thereby reduced, officially at least, to an administration by the consistories alone.

Taking advantage of this legal status, the orthodox party provided an organization for itself, and created officious synods which made the foundation of their discipline a strictly orthodox confession of faith voted by the majority of the general official synod in 1872. When the separation took place, the orthodox party desired to reorganize in the framework prepared by these officious synods. The declaration of 1872 was the chart of these churches. It was to be explicitly accepted by all pastors when they were ordained. All attempts to secure certain concessions¹ met with an unalterable and haughty refusal to compromise. Thus there came to be constituted through the action of only a part of the Reformed communities,

¹ For example, the provision of an introductory formula in order to modify somewhat the formula of 1872 and to harmonize it with the principles of the freedom of modern thinking.

a church rigorously orthodox, at least in principle, for experience has proved that the confession of 1872 is not in and of itself a sufficient guaranty against heresy. An important part of those who until 1905 had remained attached to the officious synods now did not feel themselves justified in approving decisions the inevitable consequence of which was to tear asunder the Reformed church of France when their most ardent desire was to reunite all the members in one and the same body. The dissenters, however, did not immediately join themselves with the liberal group, although this group had done everything possible to facilitate the union of the Reformed churches. The group which had separated from the legally organized church, even though in matters of ecclesiastical polity it was in accord with the liberals, felt itself more closely related to the orthodox groups in theological and religious matters, and hesitated to take a position in opposition to the orthodox group. The leaders of this group believed also that by remaining in a position between the two extreme parties they might some day serve as a point of union for that *rapprochement* which they continued to desire with all their hearts. Their hope was not justified by the facts, and, compelled by the logic of the situation, the middle party, the Jarnac group (as it was called from the name of the city where its constitutive assembly was held) finally united with the liberal party with which it had, moreover, up to that time maintained the most fraternal relation.

The organization of these church groups, together with the controversies and discussions which accompanied it in the press, had the result of strengthening on both sides the spirit of partisanship and of postponing, if not entirely dissipating, any hope of re-establishing a united reformed body.

Nevertheless, at the critical time when the schism was being consummated, many Reformed Protestants refused to accept as inevitable a situation in which they saw a source of weakness for all Protestantism. Recognizing clearly that time must be left to soften sensitiveness at certain points and to

modify certain antitheses, they devoted themselves to the plan of bringing the different Reformed churches together in the field of practical activity. It seemed that much could be hoped for from this plan. There existed before men's eyes the example of the traditional relations between the Lutheran churches and the Reformed churches, showing that ecclesiastical separation might very well go along with a feeling of real and profound unity. Although belonging to churches differing in their historical origins, and each having its own peculiar psychology and genius, Lutherans and Reformed Christians have always co-operated in a great variety of enterprises. A *Protestant* sentiment has always supplemented any particular ecclesiastical loyalty in France, whether Lutheran or Reformed. It seemed therefore possible to hope that above all ecclesiastical divergencies there might be developed a unified reform sentiment which might gradually grow in strength and pave the way for a better future. In various ways men have devoted themselves to this task while at the same time continuing to strengthen the Protestant sentiment.¹ Such efforts, of course, cannot be expected to achieve immediate results. For the present, however, it can be recognized that they are at least not useless. The opposition between the different church groups is at present less acute than it was a dozen or fifteen years ago. This can be verified constantly. The pastors belonging to the younger generation, in particular those who entered the ministry within the last fifteen or twenty years, show a notable indifference with regard to the ecclesiastical questions in which their elders were passionately interested. Although the war did not create this tendency, it favored it because it brought out the fact that there are tasks infinitely more urgent and more appealing than ecclesiastical discussions.

¹ The efforts which have resulted in the organization of the *Fédération protestante* have in a way aided in this result. This federation, organized to represent and defend the general interests of French Protestantism, is constituted of delegates from the different churches. Although its authority is very limited, it has grown remarkably in strength since its birth, and seems destined to play an increasingly important part.

Nevertheless we ought not to lay too much emphasis on this tendency. Even if ecclesiastical hostilities have somewhat abated within French Protestantism, it would be exaggerating the matter to say that they have disappeared. Every once in a while some significant incident reminds aspiring spirits that they must not mistake their noble aspirations for accomplished facts. It would be superfluous to cite instances of this, but we must at least mention the existence of an ultra-conservative tendency which is conducting a very active campaign in the churches, organizing revivals and biblical conventions where the doctrine of verbal inspiration is taught and critical scholarship is anathematized. In this campaign members of Reformed churches, Baptists, Lutherans, and others co-operate. In other words, the leaders of this movement are much more concerned with polemics than with their positive principles.¹ This movement indicates a weakness in theological thinking which is not without its importance and its danger.

In present-day French Protestantism Christians are generally far more preoccupied with practical activities than with theoretical considerations. This is especially true among the youth. The war still further accentuated this tendency. Men are eager for action, and through that very fact are liable to underestimate the importance of careful thinking. Even those who must deplore this spirit of disdain, in which—it is to be hoped only temporarily—the problems of religious thought are involved, and who believe the attitude to be dangerous for the future of Protestantism, cannot fail to recognize that there is much which is noble and generous in the ardor with which youth throws itself into action and enthusiastically supports theories of a social Christianity. This practical movement, although not without some noisy declamation and some failure to do justice to the past of Protestantism and the achievements

¹ There exists also, especially in the North, a very active Adventist apocalyptic movement. The impending end of the world is proclaimed on the basis of calculations derived from the Book of Daniel and from the Apocalypse, showing the date of the return of Christ.

thus far accomplished in the churches, has at least had the merit of calling attention to urgent duties which the actual social situation imposes on Christian people.

This simply means that the task confronting Protestantism in France today is immeasurably great. The churches feel that it is not enough simply to keep alive, but that they will become stagnant and faithless to their responsibility if they do not in some fashion come through as victors. Immense fields are open to evangelization everywhere, but especially in the North where flourishing churches recently established, were destroyed by the war, and where the task of restoration is imperative. In other regions the outlook is not less favorable. We may mention merely the movements among the young people—the Federation of Christian Students, Christian unions of young men and of young women, the movement of the Boy Scouts—which during recent years have undergone a development suggesting the most optimistic expectations.

Along with these favorable symptoms, we must also note others which are less favorable. Protestant loyalty has been growing weaker.¹ This has come about partly through the indifference which has arisen in many people in regard to purely ecclesiastical questions. But it must be confessed it is due also to that scorn for theological thinking which we have just mentioned, for this is the consequence of an inadequate knowledge of the history and the principles of both Protestantism and of Catholicism. At any rate, it has come to pass that some spirits, generous or possibly somewhat naïve, have dreamed of an activity which should transcend the formal organization of the churches, and which should take a form liberally Christian, permitting the co-operation of Protestants and Catholics—a dangerous illusion, which cannot fail to lead those who espouse it to cruel disillusionment.

¹ Here we may note the frequency of mixed marriages which the Catholic church consents to bless only if the husband and wife promise that the children shall be educated as Catholics.

Another dark aspect of the situation is the material question. It is necessary to say a few words concerning this, for it rests like a dead weight on the actual situation of French Protestantism, and is a very serious menace to its future. Before the war, Protestantism had with difficulty succeeded in meeting budget requirements; that is to say, it had faced not only the expenses of the churches and the faculties of theology, but in addition different undertakings such as biblical societies, works of charity, evangelization, home and foreign missions. Since the war, the expenses of these undertakings have been extraordinarily increased. It has been found necessary—and this necessity has been met only in a very inadequate fashion—to raise the income of pastors who were still dependent on a salary so very low that in many of the presbyteries in France the problem of securing one's daily bread presented itself (and too often still presents itself) as an agonizing perplexity. Expenses of every kind have been greatly increased. Take a single example. Copies of the Bible and the New Testament now cost biblical societies six or seven times as much as before the war, and they have never been so much in demand. There should be added to this the cost imposed by the restoration of the destroyed churches, assistance needed by the victims of the war, the missions in the Kamerun which French Protestantism honorably undertook to take over when this country passed under French administration. This brief and incomplete survey shows what a financial burden rests on French Protestantism. Up to the present it has been possible to face these demands in part, thanks to generous gifts which have come, particularly from America, but how far this can continue is a question. This is a problem which anxiously presents itself to those who have the future of French Protestantism at heart.

We have just referred to the generous aid which the churches in France have received from their sisters across the ocean. This fact is not simply of material importance for French Protestantism. Its import extends much farther. The war

has created bonds between French Protestantism and Anglo-American Protestantism, and has indeed revealed these one to another. Thus there has come to birth in our churches what might be called an ecumenical Protestant sentiment. The importance of this sentiment should not be underestimated, nor the influence which it may exercise on the character of French Protestantism in its further development.

It may perhaps be asked what has been the influence on religious life of the return of Alsace to France. Here there is a Protestant group, for the most part Lutheran, which is not less significant than any of the other groups of French Protestants. The influence of this group has hitherto been somewhat restricted because of the peculiar situation found in Alsatian Protestantism. Nowhere was the return of Alsace to France greeted with more enthusiasm than among the French Lutherans whose church had been cruelly mutilated by the brutal victory of 1870. But inasmuch as the principle of the separation of church and state very wisely has not been put into effect in Alsace since the Armistice, no organic union has as yet been established between the Lutherans of Paris and Montbéliard and those of Alsace. The latter, moreover, have not lost the memory of the bitter ecclesiastical struggles which took place before 1870 in the higher consistory of Strasbourg between the representatives of Parisian orthodoxy and those of Alsatian liberalism. Consequently they have no serious regret that they have not yet found it possible again to enter into organic unity with the Lutheran church of France and to be constrained to give expression to friendly sentiments.

The question of organization, however, it goes without saying, is only a secondary one, and there is certainly much to be expected for the future of French Protestantism from the relations which cannot fail to become more and more close with Alsatian Protestantism, which has always been and is today an incomparable source of religious power and of Christian thought.

Up to the present, the consequences have not been what we have a right to expect because Alsatian Protestantism is passing through a serious crisis. Some of its pastors and theological professors who had come from beyond the Rhine or had at least been educated in German schools had adopted an attitude of loyalty to Germany which during the war alienated many members from the church. The departure of these since the Armistice has left vacancies which it has not yet been possible to fill entirely, although a certain number of French pastors have come to settle in Alsace. It is French Protestantism which has furnished in part the professors of the new theological faculty created at Strasbourg. Up to the present time Protestant Alsace has received from France more than she has given, but the time will come when Alsatian Protestantism, having been able to recover and having succeeded, it is to be hoped, in triumphing over certain inner divisions, will become a leaven for the life of all French Protestantism.

As will be seen, the Protestant churches are at this time at one of the decisive hours of their history. The part which they make take in the reconstruction of France might be very large, but their resources for activity are weak and seem totally out of proportion to the most urgent tasks. There would be reason to view the future with solicitude, almost with despair, if it were not for the fact that religious life is subject to a special power where there is no inevitable relationship between material resources and real action. Many times previously in its history French Protestantism has found itself face to face with tasks which seemed utterly beyond its power, but it has not in the end been unequal to these. For that reason in spite of its weakness, it has the right to look confidently forward. For that reason, it will be able to fulfil the mission to which it is called in France if ultimately it shall have in itself something of the spirit expressed in the words of the Apostle Paul: *πάντα ἰσχύω* (Phil. 4:13).

THE UNCONVENTIONAL GOD

JOHN EDWARDS LEBOSQUET
Fall River, Mass.

Our ideas of God are suffering immeasurably from our conventionalities. The average man, whether in the pews or on the street, is failing to know God because of his crude misconceiving of what knowing God would be. The theologians, meanwhile, should help us here, but they are too busy running with the hounds (with the intellectual and critical, that is) by means of their innumerable reservations and elasticities and tolerances, and at the same time with the unthinking church public, the hares, by their apparent acceptance and support of that public's traditional conceptions.¹ Very many people have the vague idea, for example, that a real communion with God would be a talking back and forth with him, though the fact is that God as a clear-cut and conversationally approachable other-than-ourselves is simply an experience none of us, at least, has, and just to say so now and then would mightily clear the air!

But life is too short for negatives. Let us consider in wholly unconventional and empirical mood certain actual outcroppings in our living which are possibly divine because they all in some sort transfigure living for us.² Several different and

¹ Professor D. C. Mackintosh's *Theology as an Empirical Science* should have made this criticism unnecessary, but unfortunately his philosophizings keep him from that getting at close grips with the concrete presuppositions of theology which one would naturally expect from his book's title. Certain topics, such as sin, salvation, the person of Jesus, and immortality, live up to it in brief and undistinguished fashion, but in his discussions of God he is dealing with definitions and hypotheses, preliminary and otherwise, the total aim of which is rather to justify the conventions handed down than to follow the facts wherever they may lead.

² It is, to the writer's mind, the note of augustness, of illumination, of lifting everything to a higher plane (one throws various figures at the experience, not to describe it but to suggest the inward "feel" of it) which is our most dependable criterion of the divine presence.

not particularly related experiences shall be brought forward: their very variety, it is to be hoped, will serve as a succession of "elevations" adding wholeness and solidity to the idea of God, and in particular pointing the direction in which will lie a more adequate conception of what knowing God is.

Most elementary and fundamental of all there is that negative suggestion of the positive fact of God: the sense of unreality again and again flooding our drabness and monotony. It does not appear often when we are in the thick of our usual everyday occupations; our energetic concentration upon action, adaptation, effectiveness keeps us firmly fixed then in the framework of the ordinary, actual, outer world. It does descend upon us sometimes in the moments between, the moments of margin which supervene beyond that minimum which is immediately absorbed by the sheer necessity of rest. During our pauses, now and again, there has arisen for most of us a misty strangeness compacted of various constituents, partly of wonder at the mere fact of existence—that same wonder which has often been noted as the beginning of philosophical reflection—partly of awe at the complexity of things together with the resulting oppressive consciousness of our own vast ignorance, partly of terror at the dead lift of the task of living upon our shoulders, the task of toiling and pushing—strong in will to strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield—and bearing, and then approaching, and then arriving at that death with which all have a rendezvous. How pervasive, how universally experienced this sense of unreality is, may be gathered from the widespread phenomenon of pessimism in philosophy and literature; and pessimism is all the more significant in that it is not only found thus in thinkers and poets, but is keenly relished, at times at least, by the great majority of readers. A bare reference to "the weary weight of all this unintelligible world" starts an answering chord resounding in us who yield ourselves to Shakespeare's magic: even the wildly exaggerated gesture contained in his—

Life's but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is heard no more: it is a tale
Told by an idiot full of sound and fury,
Signifying nothing,

wakens our zestful interest and keen attention, not that we agree with it—at heart surely we do not, else we could not continue the effort living is, soon or late—but we have had in ourselves irruptions of blackness of the same quality as the mood which these words have permanently transfixed.

If one may leap to a contemporary, Mr. Arnold Bennett serves this generation well, not alone by his homely, exquisitely dumpy figures, instinct with common sense and vigor, and by his sure literary touch in general; but most effectively in his sinewy, realistic disclosures of the wonder of living as such, now in quietest gray tones suffused with despair (wonder with a negative sign), as in *The Old Wives' Tale*, now outlining appreciatively the never ceasing unfolding of one's life as it advances in years into things new and strange and amazingly interesting, as in *Clayhanger* and *The Roll-Call*.

Those who seldom stop for thought may regard this which I call the sense of unreality as being tainted with introspection and at bottom decidedly morbid, and so it would be morbid in and of itself as an unrelieved attitude. In most of us who are aware of it, however, it does not exist alone and unmingled, but in and among many other more commonplace ingredients: as a flavor of bitter or sweet tang it should be welcomed, not cried down.

Morbid or not, however, these aspects and moods which have been hinted at are at all events real, that is, really experienced. Their significance does not lie in the fact that they have been scientifically arrived at, by any rigorous casting up of debit and credit, weighing over against each other the pains and the pleasures, the advantages and the disadvantages, the surprises and the ennui of life. Nothing of the kind has been

ordinarily even contemplated: these experiences are made up not of reasonings but of realizings, not of reckonings but of moods; we do not arrive at them, but are immediately aware through them of a something not ourselves and are startled, disquieted; in any case we are rendered self-conscious and unsettled by this otherness looming athwart our neatly arranged garden plots of everyday jog-trot knowing and feeling and willing. The feeling of unreality, of being outside it all while yet breathing and living with it all, is an experience not impossibly of God. Or rather one might put it that there is here an *Ahnung* of God at his shadowiest: not of what he is, but of the fact *that* he is. With that we have something of him: an incipient communion is already in effect.

But to gain any satisfactory suggestions of that to which the foregoing experiences refer, one must look not to such elusiveness any longer, but to another group of positive and exceedingly vivid experiences. It is difficult to label this group in a few words unless use is made of the question-begging expression "God at the throttle," which expression will not do, surely not at this stage of our consideration. What is meant is a familiar enough experience in some form or other; to put it neutrally, there are occasions of sheer effectiveness on our part when what we do is in a sense the result of our minds' or spirits' effort, and yet in another sense—and this from the point of view of our own consciousness—there is about the achieving an inevitableness, a sureness, and hence often a gladness such that we feel rather carried on than carrying on. Even this description is manifestly far from colorless, though the anonymity of the "not ourselves" is resolutely maintained. The trouble is that one cannot be adequate, which is to say accurate, without mentioning and putting in a high light that "otherness" which every experiencer, whatever his theory, finds to be the inescapable differentia of the experience in question.

The most striking type of cases under this rubric is that found in creative geniuses in the broadest denotation of the

term. These men are characteristically humble. It must be granted that their humility is not always in evidence as regards their attitude toward those whom they are prone to call "philistines," the outsider class as such, but they are usually humble in that they will admit and even insist that it is not themselves really who bring to pass their marvelous creations. They may refer to their star or to destiny in the case of generals or empire-builders like Napoleon or Cecil Rhodes, or to a dissuading daimon as it was with the profound thinker-discoverer Socrates. They may cry aloud in desperation with the prophet Jeremiah, "It is a fire within my bones that will not let me go!" The higher "creative" kind of scientist and philosopher calls this otherness "truth" and toils for it and with it in never ending investigation, or in contemplation of the facts, now rearing cloud-capped towers of hypothesis, now razing those elaborations and starting again and again and again. The sense of being buoyed up and carried exultantly on, issues in these quarters not in any sense of aid which the truth as such imparts, but in the keen, glad livingness of the search for the truth. When the savant is well immersed in the concerns of his laboratory or study, it is a fact of his experience that his whole being is suffused with a zestfulness and all-absorbedness so intense, so sublime that it can easily be comprehended why Spinoza—one such creator—termed this and none other "eternal life"! Such a joy in work (to translate the poetic phrase into prose for the sake of clearness) is always vital and inspiring, nay more, all-significant and all-potent—a not-ourselves bearing us, not we it. It is open to the work done with the hands as well as to that done with the head, although alas its appeal seems in this snobbish age to be becoming less and less alluring to the artisans.

It is, however, the artist who is peculiarly and classically the channel of an effectiveness his own, yet not his own. One may describe him as striving and travailing in a poetic frenzy of high effort and hope, and then utterly inert and discouraged and self-loathing; the whole to-and-fro going on

apart from his volition until there appears at last that soul-tearing but joy-bringing birth which was all along the goal. Pregnancy with its restlessness and nerves and selfish irritabilities is one current and very apt figure for the exasperating oddities and yet profound significances of the artistic temperament.¹ There is an external compulsion there, both of that which is to be and of that by which it is (nature) which brings out not inappropriately the artist's experience of communion. There is another figure, however, which more fits our idea and is at the same time no less true to the consciousness of the artist: it is that of a higher authority laying hold of the musician or poet, or whatever he be, and using him as an instrument for its ends. So that the creator's effort needs to be expended not much, not at all as he views it, in the direct bringing forth of his works of art: his whole labor, assuming that he has mature command of his materials and his craftsmanship, consists in the back-breaking, heart-sickening drudgery of getting into the control and swing of that commanding power beyond him and so infinitely greater than he. At the outset of his career he gropes for it, not knowing where it may be or how he is to proffer himself to it, laboring or dreaming, sometimes for years, "to find himself" as it is called: yet this is but a way of speaking, for it is not himself but this other than he—though only to be found within himself—which he is seeking, if haply he may find it.

This striving which is the artist's life-drama has its counterpart in his every working-day. He sits down to his easel, his music score, his typewriter, with the necessity upon him of toiling forth from the average general-human to the exceptional and divine-energizing attitude. To put it in homely but apt phrase, he must crank and crank and crank until the divine fire functions, first snappingly, then smoothly—and he is off on the wings of the wind: no longer pushing at a dead weight, but borne on and on, his effort now being the

¹ See in particular May Sinclair's novel *The Creators*.

different one of directing and steadying the exuberant flight. Such an exertion sounds much easier than the preliminary striving for it, and so it is, in so far as it is stimulating and exhilarating to an extent such that no words can express adequately its infinite attractiveness; but judging by the vitality it takes out of a man and the unremittingness of its demands, it is at the same time incredibly difficult, much more so than the brute muscular (so to speak) drudgery which preceded it. One actually grasps now the true, the beautiful, the ultimate, or rather is grasped by them; and so the free, happy, yet unspeakably strenuous activity goes on, until, perhaps gradually, perhaps in a sudden insistent call, the usual, the material resumes its sway; if nothing else, the physical need of food, recuperation, sleep will drag him off the field of divine action. Loath though he be, he obeys perforce, and must strive and concentrate all over again, upon his return, to win through to the heavenly experience: so that it is hard to say which is the more irksome, to pause when one prefers to go on, or to get moving, drudgingly tugging one's self by one's bootstraps up out of the comfortable, ambling everyday.

So much for the transitional moments, the painful beginnings and breakings-off of artistic energy. The significant fact for our purpose here is that during the artistic activity as such, i.e., during its normal course irrespective of change, the picture the artist is painting, the symphony he is composing, the novel he is writing (and it is the same as regards the truth the thinker is seeking to formulate, or the cause the reformer lives and dies for—not to go into the other Protean forms taken by this divine which we call from this point of view imagination because we know not what else to call it) mounts him and drives him and in every way for the time being wields him, wearing him down and using him for its goals until at the last it allows him (though it keenly protests even then) to break away weak and spent. He will gaze later wonderingly at the work accomplished in those hours of creative experience.

His name is attached to it: he has the credit for it and will sometimes insist all but swaggeringly—human, all-too-human as he then is—upon the praise due him; yet he knows well, deep within, that it is not to him that the glory truly belongs, for the work came not so much *from* him as *through* him! If one may digress for the sake of clearer illustration into theology (though it is not really a digression, for the whole of this discussion, odd though this may sound, is nothing if not theological), what the Gospel according to John sees and states with utter absoluteness, and so far as I can see with utter truth, is this significance we are pondering, the significance of that “other” rather than of one’s self in the productions of creative genius. For example, there is this: “The words that I say unto you I speak not from myself, but the Father abiding in me doeth his works” (John 10:14). It is a strange perversion, one which would be incredible if it were not nearly universal, to regard this and other such expressions as self-exultations rather than, what they so vividly are, disclaimers and the very extreme of humility. In general, for that matter, what our doctrinal statements call the divinity of Christ signified for the writer of the Fourth Gospel—and much more, one must think, for the consciousness of Jesus—not an exaltation of Jesus, but an exaltation of God, whom Jesus was aware of in a way analogous to that of the other creators just now outlined, but with a unique pervasiveness and spiritual range. Let it be freely granted that the argument thus far is being decidedly outrun when one plumps out thus prematurely the word “God”; our excuse is that the illustration from Jesus becomes far clearer if the word is not omitted. That it is God to whom these experiences point, it will be attempted to show in due time. For the present that matter may well be postponed, the more as we are not done as yet with the phenomenology of our subject.

There must surely be mentioned, because conventional religious experience makes so much of it (and an experience is

not necessarily false, as so many seem to think, because it is commonly and conventionally met with), the fact that a striving for a right life individual, social, becomes aware similarly of a something higher, abler, other than the striver as such. "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" is the forthright description of this by one clear-seeing passionate pilgrim of this type. The reader should remark here not the name given to that other, but solely the sheer experience focused in such a description. Not otherwise, though in different connection, the Reformation theologians ascribed the forgiveness of sins (meaning by that what we should put as "the hope of a wholly satisfactory living") not to one's own works, but to the grace of God,¹ "grace abounding" in Bunyan's title.

The Roman Catholics emphasize no less this aspect of the struggle for perfection. It is for them also a "not-ourselves" which co-operates with our effort to redeem life. Among them this matter is realized, for the common man at all events, by being externalized: in that certain specific, outward relations and officially (that is, validly) performed acts—speaking by and large, the sacraments—are proclaimed essential to salvation, the word here meaning virtually satisfactoriness. The mechanical quality of this procedure is not congenial to our prejudices, but it exhibits the more clearly their corporate and age-long developing conviction that it is not in man, himself alone, that walketh to direct his steps—and here again it is important to observe the nature of the conviction rather than to quarrel with its manner of expressing itself.

It need not be said that the ecclesiastical opinions here adduced have been glanced at, not in the slightest degree as dogmatic proofs, but to illustrate the elementary religious perception which prompts them, a religious perception which is met with, with more or less consciousness of it, among most if not all of the morally and spiritually in earnest. The fact

¹ For Martin Luther upon this point see Professor McGiffert's *Protestant Thought before Kant*, pp. 23-27.

is indeed that the sectarians and dogmatists and infallibilists, who (in the Protestant as well as the Roman mode) are vastly numerous in our churches, are prone to exploit in the interest of their peculiar tenets this all but universal religious experience, the experience, that is, of added impetus, of a swing forward which the aspirant, outside as surely as inside the church fold, becomes aware of in his energetic pushing toward deeds worth doing. Undoubtedly this forging on is himself in one sense, and he will, if not theologically biased, be very likely to call it his "better self"; but however it be as to phrasings, there is in men an immediate realization, not as religious dogma but as religious fact, that there is something more august, worthier, abler, more enduring than one's own (usual) personality which must be taken into the reckoning during one's spiritual strivings.

It is, it should certainly be noted, such a spiritual striving in one's self and most of all in society which is the context and basal reason for the most recent and undoubtedly the most familiar idea just now of God: I mean "the striving God" or "the finite God" as he is commonly called. This conception originated, for us at least, in Professor William James who put it forth as a religious corollary to his root-and-branch anathema against absolutism; it was enthusiastically subscribed to by the Pluralists, including the Neo-Realists,¹ by most of the novelists who poach at all upon this region,² and by many of the thinking public, lay and liberal theological. A good case could probably be made out for the thesis that no idea of God but this one would do as theoretical framework for the religious experience here being emphasized; in particular that no all-including, diffuse God could possibly be "other" enough, which means individual enough, to be associated with. Whereupon the opposite side would counter, very likely, that a God more than we (which the upholders of a finite God also insist to be true of God) might well be more in that he *includes* us

¹ See Professor Ralph Barton Perry, *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, chap. xxii, "Pluralism and the Finite God." Neo-Realism's "Amen" to it is given on p. 379.

² Mr. H. G. Wells and younger men of his school.

and all men and all else; and the fact that God in the sort of experience in question effectively functions within the experiment or within society, immanently that is, decidedly indicates an Infinite All-Container. So the argument would wax no doubt hotter and hotter. We need not pause upon it, however, for though it would not be irrelevant, it would be lengthy; besides not being in the least necessary, for the only point intended to be made in the reference to the idea of a finite God has been gained already in the mere mention of it: the very existence of the idea bears testimony to religious experience of the sort referred to in this paper.

The hints or illustrations (it is plain that they are no more) thus far brought forward by way of not so much supporting as presenting that religious experience, are far from being exhaustive; no mention has been made, for example, of what might be termed the social increment, meaning the experience that five people working together or even meeting together in any effectual way are considerably more effective from many points of view than that five times the effectiveness of one which would naturally be expected; and so with five hundred, or fifty million,¹ an experience well described if not precisely meant by Jesus' remark, "Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. 18:20). Furthermore there has been a complete and even conspicuous ignoring of the much which the mystic of all ages and all religions has to tell; this has at all events been overmuch treated already and need not be gone over again. Despite these and other omissions, and despite also, be it said, the inevitable meagerness of outline throughout, it is to be hoped that the angle of consideration intended here is by now somewhat intelligible and that it is, whether one agrees with it or not, at any rate clear what is meant by insisting that though the "Great Companion" is dead in the older sense, he is yet living and communed with in another and equally admissible sense.

¹ Cf. G. Simmel, *American Journal of Sociology*, VIII (1902), 1 ff., 158 ff.

But it is high time to turn from phenomenology to evaluation, from the fixating and denoting of this particular type of experience to the consideration of what or whom men do under such circumstances experience. The word "God" has been used above at more than one juncture, used prematurely, and in strict logic unjustifiably, because of the difficulty and unnaturalness of paraphrases. Can it be demonstrated now that this provisional use of the term was in fact accurate? Can it be proven that that "other," as we usually called him with careful neutrality, is God? The answer to such a direct question would of course have to be "no": God is, as such, we might say, never to be proved, but always to be believed in.

It is at least possible to brush away certain objections to such a belief. It will be said by some, has probably been said often by the reader of the preceding pages, that the experiences described above point not to God but to the subconsciousness. I do not deny that the subconscious is involved in these experiences, but that fact in no sense disproves that the awareness in question is awareness of God. Nothing is more self-evident to the epistemologists of the present than that the channel through which an experience comes cannot as such make the experience an illusory one. In other words, the reality of anything of which we are conscious is not refuted by an analysis of the perceptions concerned in bringing that reality to our consciousness. Shall it be denied us to be as healthily realistic regarding our belief in God as we are, by all theories of knowledge, admonished to be regarding the outer world? Surely the "egocentric predicament" cannot bar our way here, where it is the subconscious ego which enters into the reckoning!

In any case, though much use has been made here of the word "other," otherness is by no means a sole and sufficient criterion of God; for the matter of that, the whole world of outer facts and persons, other though they are, are daily perceived and lived with, with no remotest thought of their being God—I am not including here the incorrigible theoretical

pantheist, of course. The sense of otherness is an essential element in our idea of God, as—again save for certain eccentrics—it is essential to our idea of any reality apart from ourselves; but in the case of God this “not-ourselves” factor is combined with a sense of impalpableness and general elusiveness. In addition to these characteristics, which are at bottom negative, there would have to be certain positive notes, as most obviously that of irresistibleness. I do not use the word “omnipotent” which would seem to some more natural, for I am referring to our feeling in the matter, not asserting objective might.

Even irresistibleness is too inclusive to serve us as a divine criterion, for it may be said of it, and of all the experiences alluded to above, that they might conceivably, even so, evidence an evil power, a “devil” in some form or other. This possibility, so far as anything thus far adverted to is concerned, must be admitted; yet these experiences, as we shall see, have a further precluding note. As for the possibility of a devil being really amongst us, it cannot be denied that there are certain very definite experiences pointing in that direction, not those detailed above but analogous to them: take, for example, the confidence of many a selfish adventurer in “destiny” or in his “star,” as was the case with Napoleon; or there is the gambler relying upon his “luck” or the betting man upon his “hunch”—these all and others like them being not-hoped-for, but, for those concerned, actually experienced enablings. Such a realizing sense of the Evil One is less common, usually however, among his votaries than among his persistent opponents—for the reason probably that evil and selfishness, as one of its many other injurious effects, slowly but surely clouds the vision and clogs the whole perceptive apparatus.

So much for the argument from experience as indicating a Satan as well as a God in the world. It ought to be admitted indeed, more generally than it is, that every argument for the existence of a personal God will, analogously applied, serve equally well to prove the existence of a personal evil urge. So that to object to the reasoning above because it opens the door

to an Evil One is no such *reductio ad absurdum* as at first might appear.

The note just now hinted at, which points to God and at the same time debars the inference to any evil power is the note of moral and spiritual elevation. A true sense of God will be pervaded—and, I submit, the positive experiences adduced in the body of this paper are pervaded—by unselfishness which means on the one hand an utter absence of sensuality and self-interest, and on the other hand, an outgoing and a benevolent interest in the good of all, the whole making for hope and unworried confidence and a gladness, not of an individual and selfish, but of a spiritual sort—"joy," in the religious terminology.

But whatever be the correct theoretical description of its differentia, the sense of God is surely in no danger of becoming confused, on the part of those undergoing the experience, with that of God's opposite. If consequently we take our stand, as we are here doing, upon experience, no further effort need be spent upon the describing of this particular distinction. What is vitally needful is that one should avoid being misled by the smoke screens of conventional description implicit in many words and phrases. Only actual experience ought to be accepted as significant, which means among other things that it is not necessarily those who speak most clearly of communing with God who have experienced him or know anything whatever at first hand about him. There are so many petty minds and erroneous parrot-repeated conceptions abroad among those who say "Lord, Lord!" with unction, not to say gusto. And vice versa, the profession and even the stout assertion of utter ignorance of God (very characteristic as these are of our inverted hypocrisy nowadays) should not in itself lead us to suppose that religious experience is in fact absent. Here, as everywhere else, the true procedure is that of being guided not by appearances or opinions, but solely by the realities in question.

THE PROPOSED CREEDAL BASIS OF CHRISTIAN REUNION

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From the course taken in recent controversy in regard to Christian reunion, one would anticipate that the discussion will probably center for the present around the interesting questions of valid ordination, ministry, and sacraments. It is the purpose of this paper, however, to draw attention to a no less interesting and fundamental issue involved in the problem, viz.: the proposed doctrinal basis on which it is suggested that different groups of Christians should unite.

No one who has the welfare of the Church of Christ at heart could do other than welcome warmly and gratefully the two great Anglican statements of 1920, viz.: Dr. A. C. Headlam's Bampton Lectures, *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian Reunion*, and the *Appeal to All Christian People* issued by the bishops assembled at Lambeth. It is perhaps too much to hope that every response made to these statements will exhibit that broad, sane, and constructive outlook which alone is worthy of so great and solemn an occasion; but there is every reason to be confident that the genuinely Christian spirit in which the new beginning has been made will evoke an equally wise and generous attitude in those to whom it is addressed. In the nature of the case, however, the right response must in the first place take the form of a full and candid discussion of the points that have been raised; and, if such discussion should involve a certain amount of apparently negative criticism, that need not denote any lack of cordial and brotherly regard for those who have raised these points, or any lukewarmness or despair in regard to the cause of

Christian unity. If one may borrow a proverb once used by Clement of Alexandria, *ὁς δ' ἐλέγχει μετὰ παρρησίας εἰρηνοποιεῖ*.

Both the Lambeth Appeal and the Bampton Lectures propose the adoption of the Scriptures and the so-called "Nicene Creed" as the doctrinal basis of reunion. Little difficulty need be anticipated in regard to the Scriptures, since room for the critical treatment of them is admitted on all hands to be necessary. Let us rather turn to the proposal in regard to the Creed. The bishops say, "We believe that the visible unity of the Church will be found to involve the whole-hearted acceptance of the Holy Scriptures . . . and the Creed commonly called Nicene, as the sufficient statement of the Christian faith, and either it or the Apostles' Creed as the *Baptismal confession of belief* . . ." (*italics mine*). Dr. Headlam makes no proposal in regard to the Apostles' Creed and does not in so many words suggest the Nicene Creed as the *baptismal* confession; but it is evident that he does not feel able to find a place in the reunited church for those who cannot personally accept it. He says:

I would put to you that the only Christian reunion that is possible is the reunion of that Christianity which is commonly designated as orthodox—a reunion on the basis of belief in the Incarnation and the Trinity. However much we may respect the personal character or the intellectual attainments of the Unitarian, it would be difficult to find a place for him in the reconstructed Church. To the Modernist I would say that he must settle with his own conscience whether he can accept the Creed of the Church. We cannot write a new creed for him, nor reconstruct Christianity to suit his taste. It is in the traditional beliefs now as always that the whole Church—Protestant and Catholic alike—finds its inspiration, and these beliefs are put forward in the Creed in the manner which may most generally obtain acceptance.¹

It is obvious, therefore, from both statements that the doctrinal basis of reunion is intended to serve as a ground of exclusion from the church of those who cannot conscientiously accept the Creed as their personal belief. It is this fact that

¹ *Doctrine of the Church*, p. 238; cf. pp. 233, 235.

makes the question so extremely serious. If we were in search simply of a formula to stand as the general manifesto of the church, it might not be necessary to insist that the words adopted should exactly express the personal beliefs of every member who has a right to be represented; but if we are in search of a formula that is to serve as a test of membership—a formula, that is, the non-acceptance of which is to be a sufficient ground for refusing church-membership to one who may passionately desire it, and who professes faith in Christ—that is a very different matter. It will not in that case suffice that our proposed doctrinal basis is truly venerable, that the majority of post-Reformation churches accept it, that it was established by an oecumenical council, or even that it was once the belief of the whole undivided church. Nothing less than absolute and demonstrable infallibility will do. For if this be lacking, the margin of uncertainty—whatever and however small it be—may prove the very flaw which causes the exclusion of a genuine Christian from the fold of Christ's church. We are told that, in the time of the Commonwealth, "Baxter and Dr. Owen were together members of a committee appointed by the Parliament . . . to draw up a list of fundamentals. The list was intended to define the meaning of the words occurring in the instrument of government, 'faith in God by Jesus Christ,' it being laid down in that document that all who professed such faith should have liberty, or free exercise of their religion. The divines appointed . . . very soon found, in Baxter's quaint language, 'how ticklish a business the enumeration of fundamentals was.'"¹ And no wonder. Those who undertake to legislate as to who are to be allowed in the church and who are not, may well feel, like the members of a jury in a trial for murder, that nothing less than certainty can justify an unfavorable verdict. In face of the gravity of the issue, it is hard to feel that all the difficulties are met by the plea that we cannot do without

¹ Bruce, *Apologetics*, p. 300; cf. Channing, *Works* (1843 ed.), Vol. II, p. 355.

some creedal test, and that this or that creed is on the whole the most suitable.

Dr. Headlam bases the claims of the so-called Nicene Creed not so much on its origin and history prior to its oecumenical enactment in 451 A.D. as on two other considerations: the wide acceptance of the creed, and its inherent merits.

I. He points out that it was accepted by the whole church—East and West, pre-Reformation and (for the most part) post-Reformation. "This Creed has that acceptance in a way that, apart from the Scriptures, no other document in the Christian world has": and—what is of special importance—it "has the merit of taking us behind all our divisions."¹

In regard to this acceptance by the whole undivided church, three questions need to be asked:

1. What was the moral character of the church that accepted it? Let us pass by the unsatisfactory character of the Council of Chalcedon itself, as to which Dr. Headlam rightly pleads that we must judge charitably. Let us rather turn to the point on which he lays the real stress. "The Creed which was adopted at Chalcedon was accepted by the Church, and whatever criticism we may have to make against the Council will not take away from the authority of the Creed."² But will not criticism justly leveled at the accepting church take away something from the authority of the Creed? Can the decision of a church that had so far forgotten its task, lost its purity, and missed its way, as had the church of the fifth century, be appealed to as of necessarily decisive authority for any subsequent age? For that was the century that saw the banishment of Chrysostom, the scraping of Hypatia, the persecution of the Donatists, the villainies of the "Robber Synod" of Ephesus, and the baptism of the bloody ruffian Clovis. It is not a question of judging the church of that time charitably or otherwise. It may be true that the fifth

¹ *Doctrine*, etc., p. 232; cf. p. 231.

² *Ibid.*, p. 237.

century was no worse, perhaps not so bad, as the twentieth is; but then we are not looking to the twentieth for an infallible formula. The question is whether or not we can rightly press on the allegiance of every Christian today the decisions of such a church as that of the fifth century.

2. What was the character of the "acceptance," on which so much is made to depend? Was it the free, untrammelled concurrence of Christians deliberating under no pressure but that of the transparent persuasiveness of the truth and the winning cogency of orthodox arguments? Not at all. The "acceptance" was the outcome of a long period of furious party-strife, in which the emperor and his court and the coercive machinery of the state were implicated from first to last. The long disputes that began in 318 A.D. were subject at every turn to imperial influence; and, under the successive edicts of Theodosius, Marcianus, Zeno, and Justinianus, heterodoxy was visited with state punishment. This is no mere matter of opinion; it is a matter of accredited history. What value attaches to a decision of the church arrived at and "accepted" under such conditions as these? Can the acceptance even be called unanimous in any real sense?

3. But in any case, what exactly is the ground for assigning supreme authority to this particular unanimous decision of the church? Are all unanimous beliefs of the church to be regarded as infallible, or only some? If all, what has become today of the unanimous belief of the primitive church in the early and visible return of Christ?² But if all are not infallible—and here is at least one exception—reason must be shown for accepting some unanimous beliefs and dropping others. What is it that makes the difference? Is it maturity? Then at what point, I ask, in the church's development, do her unanimous decisions cease to be fallible, and become infallible? Is it the importance of the subject? Then who is to say what are the vital and what the minor questions?

¹ See Martineau, *Seat of Authority in Religion*, pp. 152, 163 f. ² *Ibid.*, p. 565.

Is it the fact of the matter having been decided by councils prior to acceptance by the church? If so, then Athanasius, when he stood as the one dissenter "contra mundum," ought to have bowed to the authority of the church and become an Arian! Or is it the fact that the council is "general"? Then why not press today for the Chalcedonian symbol in its entirety¹—for was not that eventually accepted by the whole church? And is the "general" character of a council so easy to procure in reality, and so easily distinguishable when procured, that we may stake everything on the truth of its decisions, while treating as optional the findings of many a solemn synod which could not claim the title of "general"? Let me once again, in the words of another Bampton Lecturer of many years ago, press the plea that

it is only [by] an *assumption* . . . that universality and ubiquity are thus made the tests of religious doctrine. No universality or ubiquity can make that divine, which never was such. It is a mere prejudice of veneration for antiquity, and the imposing aspect of an unanimous acquiescence (if unanimous it really be), which make us regard that as truth, which comes so recommended to us. Truth is rather the attribute of the few than of the many. . . . Who then shall pronounce anything to be divine truth, *simply because* it has the marks of having been generally or universally received among men?²

A minister told me recently that he was in the habit of asking candidates for church-membership whether they wished to believe what the whole church believes. Candidates who remember that there have been times when the whole church believed something to be essential which we have since learned to be nonessential or perhaps untrue, would have no option but to reply to such a question, "No: not necessarily. In claiming church membership, I would rather profess simply my faith in Christ and my desire to believe *the truth*."

II. The claims of the Nicene Creed are made to rest also upon its inherent merit. The Lambeth Conference commends it as "the sufficient statement of the Christian faith." Dr.

¹ For which Dr. Headlam deliberately refrains from pressing (*Doctrine*, etc., p. 233).

² R. D. Hampden, *The Scholastic Philosophy Considered in Its Relation to Christian Theology* (1833), p. 356.

Headlam urges its dignity, its retention of what is necessary, its omission of what is unessential, etc. "The central faith of the Church has been from the beginning the belief in Christ. Here we have that belief expressed in its completeness and its fulness without mutilation but without addition."¹

1. If the Nicene Creed did really express belief in Christ "without addition," our discussion would be needless. But inasmuch as the Creed, in endeavoring to express belief in Christ "in its completeness," has made many and weighty additions to that simple profession, some estimate of the value of those additions is inevitable. And it is surely not hypercritical to urge that any verdict regarding them is bound to be to a certain extent relative to the personal attitude of the one who pronounces it. Many people find the clauses of the Creed perfectly acceptable, and, of course, they are entirely within their rights in doing so and in commending their view as the right one. But there are many others who claim the Christian name and desire the fellowship of the Church—yes, and who give evidence of the Spirit's activity in their lives—who yet find certain clauses in the Creed a great hindrance, and who cannot declare their acceptance of them without awkward mental reservations. By what authority is the standard of value of the one party to be made the standard of value for the other—on pain of exclusion of the latter from the church unless they comply? It is clearly a case for the utterance of Galba's challenge, "Commilito, quis iussit?"²

2. How can we regard as a "sufficient statement of the Christian faith" a formula which says nothing about the love of God or the goodness of our Lord's earthly life? These are fairly central articles of Christian belief, and ought surely

¹ *Doctrine*, etc., p. 233.

² Similarly, in regard to the *interpretation* of the Creed, Dr. Headlam says, "All that the Church may demand is that the interpretation should be in the opinion of a just judge one that may reasonably be held" (*Doctrine*, etc., p. 238). Could any statement reveal more patently the real arbitrariness of the standard proposed? Where can such a judge be found?

therefore to be explicitly mentioned in a statement that purports to be a summary of essentials. One can imagine the ready response, "These things are clearly *implied* in the Creed." But the whole Creed is also said to be *implied* in any real profession of faith in Christ; and, if so, why should the verbal expression of some implicates of faith be deemed indispensable, while the verbal expression of others equally vital is not considered necessary? Christian truth and Christian duty are co-ordinates; why should the church's baptismal formula bind the candidate to a certain minimum of Christian truth, while silent as to his commitments in the matter of conduct?¹ One cannot help seeing in the preference here given to orthodox belief an instance of a grave and age-long aberration of the church. The story of the creed-making centuries is the story of an increasing concern for doctrine and a decreasing concern for brotherly love; and the distorted vision therein revealed has often shipwrecked the great enterprises of Christianity. Yet it is this very one-sidedness that the Creed enshrines.

3. The Creed asserts that Jesus was "made flesh of (the) Holy Spirit and of Mary the Virgin," and that he "went up into the heavens." In the case of the ascension, if extreme latitude of interpretation were allowed, it might be argued that the Creed permits what is called a symbolical or spiritual interpretation, though one's right to such an interpretation would be at best precarious. But how can you interpret the statement about the Virgin Birth symbolically? It is hardly conceivable—in the present stage of the critical study of the Gospels—that it should be seriously proposed to exclude from the reunited church those who do not believe in the Virgin Birth. Yet what is the position otherwise? Men apparently must be prepared to declare their belief in a historical fact which they do not believe, in order to prove their fitness for

¹ "The obvious fact is that one might accept almost every article of the historic creeds without thereby pledging himself to the most elementary qualifications as a Christian."—Peabody, in the *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1921), p. 225. Cf. Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, p. 650.

church-membership, and they are to be left to settle with their own consciences whether they can do this or not.¹ If their consciences are sufficiently pliable to permit of their making a solemn statement of their personal beliefs, which, judged by the usually accepted standards, is simply not true, and to allow them to shield themselves under the permission to interpret symbolically, well and good; but if not, they are to remain outside, because they cannot expect a new creed to be written for them, or Christianity to be reconstructed to suit their taste! Is this, I ask, a satisfactory solution? Have we not overshot the mark when, for the sake of honoring a venerable creed, we have to shut up genuine Christians to a choice between excluding themselves from the church and playing fast and loose with truth, and to clear ourselves by giving due notice that the responsibility must rest with their own consciences?

But is not this whole idea of symbolically interpreting a personal creedal pledge totally unsatisfactory? For besides opening the door to a dangerous tampering with sincerity of speech,² it means a departure from the purpose of those who enacted the Creed, along with a pretense that there is no such departure. Our deference to the early church is to force us to retain its Creed for the same purpose as that for which the early church established it, viz.: the exclusion of heresy; yet it is not to prevent us interpreting the clauses of the Creed in a way that would have seemed to the early church utterly heretical. But either the utterance of the church in the Creed is absolutely binding, or it is not. If it is, then we are right in insisting on its acceptance by all church-members, but we have no right to interpret its clauses otherwise than as its authors meant them; if not, then we are free to interpret it as we feel led, but in that case the ground for making the verbal acceptance of it a condition of church-membership disappears.

¹ See the passage previously quoted from Dr. Headlam.

² See, e.g., Rev. H. Handley's words in the *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1914), pp. 340 f. for the idea of the *representative* repetition of the Creed in worship.

That modern symbolical interpretations would have been regarded by the early Christians as heretical can hardly be disputed. For the Creed is couched in the language of two ancient systems of belief now entirely abandoned—geocentric cosmology and Jewish eschatology. Its statement, for instance, that Jesus “rose on the third day according to the Scriptures” reflects the notion, now obsolete, but firmly held by the Jews of Palestine in our Lord’s day, that a dead man could not be still living, unless his physical body as well as his soul were alive; and it really precludes any interpretation of our Lord’s post-mortal activity on the lines of our more spiritual beliefs as to the future life. Dr. Headlam would apparently leave men quite free to spiritualize this and other causes of the Creed. “We all hold some clauses to be symbolical in their language,” he says, “and I think it quite honest to extend that principle, although personally I should not agree with it.”¹ But it has to be pointed out that a spiritual interpretation of these clauses, under which the Second Advent is regarded as the presence of the indwelling Christ, the judgment as the eternally proceeding separation of good from bad, the resurrection either as conversion or else as the beginning of a new life made by every individual at the moment of death,² would certainly have been regarded as heretical by the early church. We know how severely such suggestions were dealt with by the highest authorities in early times. Paul came down very heavily on the Greeks at Corinth who said that there was no resurrection,³ as also did the author of the

¹ *Doctrine*, etc., p. 238.

² Cf. Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*, p. 458: “If no visible descent of Christ is looked for, no simultaneous resurrection of humanity on the earth will be expected . . . we shall naturally think that each human being’s resurrection takes place at his death, and consists in the rising of the man from death to life in another realm of life.” (Similarly Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, p. 570.) Jesus’ words to the robber, “*This day* shalt thou be with me in Paradise,” are consistent with this view of the Resurrection, but not with that usually accepted, according to which Jesus was in the tomb (or in Hades) until the third day.

³ I Cor. 15: 12: these would not be men who denied the future life, but those who conceived it on Platonic (i.e., discarnate), rather than Jewish, lines.

Pastorals on those who said that the resurrection had already occurred,¹ and the worthy Polykarpos on "whoever perverts the words of the Lord, to [suit] his own lusts, and says that there is neither resurrection nor judgment."² The Fourth Gospel, with its spiritualized eschatology, probably owed its escape from orthodox censure only to the guarded obscurity of its language, the belief in its apostolic authorship, and its strange admixture of orthodox eschatological phrases.³ To accept today an ancient creed in a sense which departs widely from that held by the early church, which the early church would undoubtedly have repudiated as heretical, and which puts a strain on the logic as well as on the morals of many a modern signatory—and to do this with the idea that we are thereby safeguarding the essentials of the Christian faith and protecting the church from the entrance of heresy—is much too questionable a proceeding to serve as one of the foundation-stones of a great enterprise like Christian reunion.

While this proposed combination of verbal bondage with exegetical freedom is unsatisfactory, the exegetical freedom itself is a real necessity. In the first place, man must theorize about his religion. "As the eye naturally desires light and vision, and our body needs by nature food and drink, so our mind feels a peculiar and natural longing to know the truth of God and to become acquainted with the causes of things."⁴ But while this effort needs no justification, is divinely helped, and is fruitful in valuable results, yet absolute infallibility in our findings is beyond our reach. Christian doctrines are "human attempts to interpret human experiences—the unique personality of Jesus of Nazareth supreme among those human experiences."⁵ "We must differentiate between the experience of the early Christian church and its theological expressions . . . the forms in which it is expressed must

¹ II Tim. 2:18.

³ John 5:25, 28 f., etc.

² *Ep. ad Philipp.* vii. 1.

⁴ Origenes, *Princ.* ii. 11. 4.

⁵ Bethune-Baker, *Early History of Christian Doctrine*, p. x.

necessarily be related to the mental heredity of those who express it."¹ "We often fancy . . . that . . . the Holy Spirit can have no share in imparting partial and imperfect views of truth. But this is a sad misjudgment. God is so great that he can make much of imperfect agencies. His Spirit can have a helpful share in imperfect works."² Dr. Headlam himself fully recognizes this. He says:

Some have tried to find this infallible authority in Scripture, but they are at once confronted with the difficulty of the want of an authoritative interpreter and the discrepancies between different passages. Others have tried to find it in the authority of the church, but no one has yet been able to find an authoritative statement of where the authority of the church really lies. Others have tried to find it in the infallibility of popes, but they are immediately confronted with the fact that many utterances of popes have been erroneous, and that there is no exact means of distinguishing which papal utterances are infallible and which are not. The demand for infallibility is one which, in human life, it is impossible to gratify. All truth here must have an element of relativity and imperfection.³

Truly and rightly said; but in that case we cannot claim that the Nicene Creed is infallible; and it is therefore possible, on Dr. Headlam's own premises, that, where a modern Christian disbelieves some part of it, he may be right and the Creed wrong; yet the fact of his differing from the Creed is to keep him out of the church! The right attitude toward it would seem to be that which Dr. Headlam himself takes up toward other creeds and confessions—that, namely, which regards them as "the venerable relics of many sincere attempts to find and define the truth,"⁴ from which we may learn much, but which, owing to the conditions under which they had to be framed, are not fitted to be binding for all ages.⁵

¹ Halliday, *Reconciliation and Reality*, p. 25.

² Clarke, *Outline of Christian Theology*, p. 384.

³ *Doctrine*, etc., pp. 169 f.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 235.

⁵ "Place yourself at the standpoint of their framers and their age, allow for the fashion of their thought as you would allow for the idiom and vocabulary of their language, bear in mind the things they did not know, the history they had not read, the questions they had not raised and faced, the experience they had not enjoyed, the scholarship beyond their reach, and you will not do them the injustice of making them oracles for all time, or representing that their sceptre and their rod can arrest the tide of divine revelation and of human science."—Curtis, in the *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1914), p. 320.

It would follow from the conclusions reached in the foregoing line of argument that none of the ancient creeds, nor any creed that could ever be written, could suitably serve as a test for admission to the church. This view is at variance with the presupposition of Dr. Headlam's argument, viz.: that a written creed of *some* kind is indispensable as the basis of the reunited church. He urges against the non-creedal position the two considerations (1) that unlimited private judgment is not a sufficient basis for a religious society, and (2) the various branches of Christendom will insist upon a creedal basis. The latter of these two points is of secondary importance; we must not be debarred from the one defensible conclusion by the probability that some of our fellow-disciples will refuse to agree to it. The former rests on the assumption that, because ordinary human societies need rules and conditions of membership and machinery for the expulsion of the unworthy, so the church must have its creedal test and its power to excommunicate. But the analogy drawn between the church and an ordinary human association is misleading. What is true of the tennis club is not necessarily true of the church. For the church is universal and divine; and the conditions of its life are inward and spiritual, and therefore not such as can be judged and tested by others in a final way like the payment of a subscription.¹

But Dr. Headlam does not touch the true basis of the non-creedal position. This position is not, "The Bible and the Bible only, and therefore not the Creed," but "Neither the Bible nor the Creed as an *ultimate* authority, but both the Bible and the Creed as valuable 'sources' to be studied by the light of God's Spirit operating within us." This raises the question of the nature of ultimate authority in religion.

Owing to a natural craving for infallible and objective standards, and a horror of being too individualistic and too

¹ For a similar assumption in regard to the government needed by the church, cf. J. H. Newman, *Essay on Development*, pp. 53 f.

subjective, we often fail to see that the real foundation of religious authority is an inward and personal one, planted in that one region where God and ourselves come into immediate contact—the testimony of His Spirit in our own hearts.¹ Why do we value the Bible above other books? Not because others do so—for on that ground we might equally well follow the Koran. Surely only because God's Spirit within us enables us to recognize the divine finger-print in so many parts of the Bible. Why do we extol Christ above all others? Not because high claims have been made by him and for him, for the same could be said of Bar-kokba and Buddha; but because the divine in us re-echoes, tallies with, and testifies to, the divine in him.² And why do we believe in a creed? Not because it was carried unanimously at some early Christian synod, assembled under the shadow of an emperor's palace, and was then bolstered into general acceptance by the violent arm of the law; but only because or in so far as the divine Spirit, operating within us, prompts us to recognize and accept that statement as true. When therefore it is said, by the Lambeth Conference, that the Scriptures are the *ultimate* standard of faith, the statement is inexact; for if a standard is really ultimate, you have no right to pronounce one part of it more important or authoritative than another. We all do that with Scripture, whatever our theory of inspiration. But whoever does it introduces at once a more ultimate standard than Scripture itself; he introduces, that is, his own power—the gift of the Holy Spirit—of discerning divine truth in what is external and objective. Thus he who reproaches others with “picking and choosing what suits them” is in grave danger of being hoist with his own petard. Therefore “The Bible only, and not the Creed” is an error,

¹ Cf. W. E. Channing, *Works* (1843 ed.), Vol. I, pp. 164 f., 601; Vol. II, pp. 66 f., 69, 99.

² “If, as we believe, God has revealed Himself in Christ, it is only God Himself stirring in men's hearts who can teach the meaning and force of that revelation.”—L. Dougall, *Hibbert Journal* (January, 1921), p. 306.

because it ignores the real foundation of authority. But, for precisely the same reason, to make a written creed the final court of appeal is also an error.

This doctrine of the ultimacy of the inner or subjective element is often condemned because it is wrongly thought to involve two ideas, viz.: (1) that all objective embodiment of authority is by it pronounced unnecessary, and (2) that the "Inner Light" should make us infallible (which it obviously does not). Both of these are misapprehensions. By avoiding the first, and recognizing that it is the function of the "Inner Light" quite as much to give us power to recognize truth found by others as to enable us to arrive at it by our own unaided efforts, we can find a real place in our system for all external authorities, without robbing the individual of his sovereign right to decide for himself whom to trust as God's spokesmen. By avoiding the second error, we shall see why different men, though prompted by the same Spirit, arrive at different convictions in regard to the truth; the personal factor, which conditions our reading of the Spirit's witness, is something different for each of us, and cannot be measured or eliminated.

A thorough examination, therefore, of our powers to frame a list of Christian essentials shows clearly that no Christian and no set of Christians, however truly guided by the Spirit, and however wide the measure of agreement reached, is equipped with the necessary powers to determine absolutely the essentials of Christianity for any but themselves. There was every reason, in the nature of the case, why Baxter should find the settling of essentials "a ticklish business."

There is only one thing in which we can be sure that all Christians will agree—at least all Christians who come into consideration as possible members of the church. *They will all be willing to profess faith in Christ.* That, and that only, is the real "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus."¹ To

¹ Bartlet and Carlyle, *Christianity in History*, p. 343.

demand from applicants for admission to the church that they shall publicly and whole-heartedly profess faith in Christ is not open to the various objections that have been urged against the demand for the Nicene Creed; it is to ask for that without which—in some form—the Christian church would cease to have any *raison d'être*. If it be objected that this bare confession is a very inadequate summary of Christianity, I would urge that the ministers of the church will still be as free as ever to *teach* to others what they regard as the most important Christian truths and duties. If it be asked how, on these lines, the unity, purity, and true orthodoxy of the church are to be preserved, I reply, by the unifying, purifying, and enlightening power of the Spirit of God. If it be said that the proposed test will admit many improper persons to church-membership, I would point out that even the Nicene Creed will not prevent that, and that it is more calamitous and wrong to give the cold shoulder to one of the least of these brethren of Christ who believe in him, but who cannot sign the Creed, than to admit a number of possibly unworthy members. The exclusion of these latter, if it be really desirable, can be expected to follow of itself, if only the atmosphere within our Christian communities is made sufficiently Christian. The author of *Ecce Homo* tells us that “without excluding any, Christ suffered the unworthy to exclude themselves. He kept them aloof by offering them nothing which they could find attractive.” Can the church do better than follow her Lord’s example in this respect? “We shall probably find that it is by keeping alight the central fires of devotion and dedication, and by more positive teaching on the practice or demands of church membership, rather than by over-guarding the entrance, that unworthy invasion will be prevented.”¹

¹ *Pathways to Christian Unity* (1919), p. 204.

MYSTICISM AND PERSONALITY

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In a critical though generous review of my little book *Mysticism and Modern Life*¹ Miss Evelyn Underhill finds in it "traces of that defective conception which mars nearly all modern writing on mysticism, with the exception of Baron von Hügel's great and noble work—the conception which regards man as the first term and God as the second term, and which studies the mystical process with a view to the profit which man's soul can get from it, in the way of illumination, peace, strength, holiness." The emphasis in my pages lies, she asserts not untruly, "rather on self-fulfilment than on self-surrender." I plead guilty; yet hold that self-fulfilment has as true a place in mysticism as self-surrender. The two attitudes are not hostile but complementary. Mysticism has much to teach us concerning personality and much to give us in building up personal life. It seems to be becoming clearer, as the study of mysticism is related more closely to psychology and to philosophy, that neither mysticism nor personality can be understood except as they are seen in the light which they shed upon each other. There are two more or less distinct types of mysticism as respects their attitude toward personality, which may be loosely termed personal and impersonal mysticism. Which is the truer?

I

The type of mysticism which, judged by its concepts and expressions, is predominantly impersonal, or at least semi-personal, is hoary with antiquity and yet new every morning and fresh every evening. Indian mysticism in many of its

¹ *Harvard Theological Review*, IX (April, 1916), 234 ff.

phases is of this type, as are also neo-Platonism, Spinozism, New England transcendentalism, and the cosmic mysticism and health mysticism of the present day. So strong and widely prevalent have been the monistic and pantheistic forms of mysticism as to lead to the assumption that mysticism itself inherently tends toward impersonalism. The frequent occurrence in Plotinus, Dionysius, Erigena, Jacob Boehme, and even in Eckhard and later mystics, of such terms as the Abyss, the Absolute, Nothingness, the All, the Beyond, gives the impression that mysticism itself has no higher concepts than these for Ultimate Reality, and that it will inevitably emerge in this dim and empty shadow land.

Yet impressive in volume as is the stream of impersonal mysticism, the purer, stronger current is that of personal mysticism. Christian mysticism was originally and has remained prevailingly personal. Jesus was the outstanding personal mystic of history and so communicated his impulse to his followers that it has never been lost. The mysticism of the Seer of the Fourth Gospel and of Paul, in spite of its profoundly reflective and speculative character, is deeply personal. So also is that of Augustine's Confessions, of St. Francis, of Bernard of Clairvaux, of Eckhard, À Kempis, of Luther, Wesley, Newman, Bushnell, Henry Ward Beecher, Tyrrell, Phillips Brooks, and of myriads of humble mystics in all lands who have been, as Jesus said they would be, the salt of the earth.

It is true that Christianity has had also its mystics of the impersonal or semi-personal type, but they are the exceptions. Indeed so distinctively personal is Christian mysticism that it might seem as if no significant personal mysticism were to be found outside its pale.¹ But such is not the case, as Professor Pratt has recently reminded us:

¹ George Tyrrell exaggerated the contrast between Christian and Oriental mysticism in this regard when he wrote: "Heaven and earth are not more asunder than Oriental and Christian mysticism; the one looking to nonentity as the *summum bonum*, the other to the fulness of infinite existence."—*Letters*, p. 46.

The majority of Indian mystics have not been adherents of Shankara's monistic Vedanta but have belonged to the great bhakti schools whose emphasis has always been upon personality. The probability is that the great majority of mystics taken first and last have been very far from pantheistic; and there is nothing in the nature of mysticism which logically involves, or necessarily results in, a loss of belief in personality, either human or divine.¹

II

The mystical experience, broadly interpreted, leads by its very nature to the heart of personality. The "Awakening" arouses and heightens the consciousness of personality in the experient. With the dawn of the mystical life the self awakens and for the first time becomes fully aware, with a kindling of joy and gratitude, of its own higher powers and possibilities. And at each stage of the Mystic Way the self becomes more deeply and reverently conscious of itself and more expert in the exercise of its expanding capacities.

It is quite true that this experience is in a sense an *unselfing*, a self-losing, a submersion of the lower self, but only in order that the true self may come into full control and advance

Higher yet and higher
Out of clouds and night,
Nearer yet and nearer,
Rising to the light.

Not only does the mystical experience awaken and develop selfhood, *it opens the channels to other selves and makes possible the truest and deepest personal communion*. There is something mystical in all real and intimate personal intercourse when it rises above the merely physical and gregarious level. Companionship is mystical, friendship is mystical, love is mystical, community life is mystical. There is in each an indefinable something which gives the sense of sacredness, of reality, of finality. He who enters into any genuine, heart-felt relation with another, or with others, is aware, more or

¹ *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 471, 472.

less consciously, that in that mutual trust and confidence he comes in touch with a spiritual realm, immortal, invisible, eternal. He is no longer a mere creature of circumstance, a congeries of sensations and instincts, much less an epiphenomenon. He is a self among selves, a member of the Great Community, a citizen of the eternal republic of God. The ties which he feels weaving themselves about him are as mystical as they are human and as divine as they are human.

III

Yet intimately personal as is the mystical experience in relation to one's self and other selves, when it comes to the Supreme Reality the mystic is supposed to leave the confined limits of personality and lose himself in the abyss of the Absolute. Such, at least, is the impression which much of the literature of mysticism gives. If one would be "far ben" in mystical experience, he must—so the assumption runs—surrender all consciousness of self and be absorbed in pure being, which itself transcends all attributes of personality. Thus personality is swallowed up of the Absolute, which, when it is finished, proves to be Nothing.

So far from this being the real consummation, I think it can be shown (1) that this impersonalism is not the purest or most characteristic form of mysticism and (2) that it is a misinterpretation of a certain phase of the mystical experience instead of a true rendering of the experience itself. In the presence of the Supreme Reality there is a loss of isolation and a self-absorption of imperfect selfhood, but the true self is rather found than lost in coming into touch with the Infinite.

Perhaps no account of the mystical experience comes nearer to its essence than that it is *the sense of Presence*.¹ In his recent exceptionally sane and balanced discussion of

¹ Rufus M. Jones, e.g., defines mysticism as "consciousness of the Divine Presence."—*Studies in Mystical Religion*, Preface, p. xv.

mysticism in *The Religious Consciousness* Professor Pratt calls attention to this consciousness of Presence in mysticism and says of it:

Even if it be granted that the mystic's *idea* of God's presence is always due to social education, the intensity of the *experience* that God *is* present is hardly to be accounted for so easily. If we may trust the mystic's word at all, the experience is a very different thing from the idea; and while, very possibly, the idea must be there before the experience can come, something else must be there too.¹

In the mind of the mystic who is engaged in a creative task, this sense of Presence becomes a consciousness of divine co-operation which by no means suppresses the sense of the freedom of the autonomous self, but rather heightens it.

My Lord is large, my Lord is strong,
Giving He gave: my me is mine.
How poor, how strange, how wrong,
To deem He wrote the little song
I made to Him with love's unforced design.²

Here enters the consummate paradox of mysticism—duality in unity—the branch in the vine, Self in self, "I live, yet not I,"

Lost in God,
In Godhead found.³

By testimony of the most profound mystics, love is the crown of the mystical life, the bond of perfectness of the unitive life; and love requires a duality of selves in order to be love. It is duality in unity. Personality comes to its highest realization in the supreme mutuality of giving and receiving. It is a mistake to call this *absorption*, if by absorption is meant loss of either person—human or divine—in the relationship. It is not absorption but union.

It might be shown, I think, that much of what certain of the mystics have to say which looks like pure impersonalism is rather *an attempt to transcend the restrictions of individualism*. Individuality is essential to human personality; but not to

¹ Pages 451-52.

² Sidney Lanier.

³ Bronson Alcott.

divine Personality. Supreme Personality is necessary to true mysticism—as any adequate representation of it reveals. Professor Leuba, e.g., defines mysticism as “an experience taken to mean contact (not through the senses but “immediately”) or union of the self with a larger-than-self; be it called the Spirit-World, God, or the Absolute.”¹ If this definition is examined it will be seen to involve personality as a precedent condition. For a “larger-than-self” which was *impersonal* would not be larger but a less-than-self. The only true larger-than-self is a Larger Self. The constant endeavors on the part of mystics to reach an Absolute, a Whole, the One, are often attempts, not to get away from selfhood, but to find a Supreme Self large enough to be free from the limitations which attach to anthropomorphic conceptions. That these attempts to escape anthropomorphism overshoot the mark, as they do, is both misinterpretation and misfortune, but the motive should not be misunderstood.

IV

But what of Nature mysticism? Is not the personal element wholly absent from this form of mysticism? Is not Nature mysticism communion with the impersonal? On the contrary there is no such thing as communion with pure nature; for Nature does not exist apart from mind.² Minds commune *through* Nature, not *with* Nature.

It is because Nature is so rich and varied and marvelous a medium for the intercourse of the mind with itself, with other minds and with Other Mind, that we imagine that we are communing with Nature herself when we are merely using natural forms as symbols of personal realities. There is no meaning, anywhere, except to minds. Nature is *mediate*, not ultimate. The moment Nature ceases to be medium it

¹ *Journal of Philosophy* (February 3, 1921), p. 60.

² This of course is far from saying that Nature has no existence. That may *exist* which does not and cannot exist independently.

becomes *mud*. To possess Nature as *matter* means to lose it as *meaning*, and so to lose its deepest reality.

The mystical approach to Nature inevitably conducts one to Original, Creative Mind,—Primal Love, as that which shines through the order and beauty and teleology that we find in Nature. It is with this Mind, or Presence, that the Nature mystic comes into communion. He reaches through Nature to its Source and with that Source communes. It is "the light that never was on land or sea" that gives radiance to the light that is on land and sea. Light, color, space, form—sun, moon, stars, flowers, mountains, sea—all these are words, signs, symbols, for communing minds.

V

A striking instance of the transcendence of Nature on the part of a great religious Nature mystic is furnished in the study of Richard Jefferies by Edward Ingram Watkin in his recent volume *The Philosophy of Mysticism*:

The mystery, writes Jefferies in *The Story of My Heart*, and the possibilities are not in the roots of the grass, nor in the depth of things in the sea; they are in my existence, in my soul. . . . As time progressed—the need of Nature images became less. It [the prayer] is now less closely associated with the sun and sea, hills, woods or beauteous human shape. It is always within. . . . My soul cannot reach to its full desire of prayer. *I need no earth, or sea, or sun to think my thought.*

To Mr. Watkin this means "ascent from intuition of the Divine immanence in Nature to intuition of the Divine transcendence."¹ He recognizes that Jeffries was unconscious of his own theism but holds that that makes it no less real. Indeed implicit theism is often more vital than explicit theism.

True Nature mysticism, in other words, is grounded in the divine immanence and passes thence to the divine transcendence. Nature is thus, for the mystic, the "garment of God"—a garment which, even if he delights in its richly embroidered folds, possesses its true beauty only because it is a vesture, and not an end in itself.

¹ Page 380.

We conclude that mysticism as experience is essentially bound up with personality, individual and social, human and divine. It is easily capable of misinterpretation in terms of impersonality and thus of deflection into channels in which it loses itself in the sands of arid intellectualism or the marsh of sensuous pantheism. But that is not its true nature and end. Christianity keeps mysticism true to its meaning and purpose and so waters it with the river of life that upon its banks there grows the tree of life bearing twelve manner of fruits and yielding its fruit every month. And the leaves of the tree are for the healing of the nations.

IDEALISTIC AND PRAGMATIC INTERPRETATIONS OF RELIGION

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I

Historically idealism has been of religious significance in two ways. First, by its teaching that all existence is essentially a being known by some mind, it has maintained the ultimate spiritual character of the universe and sought to make man feel at home in his environment. Secondly, by its doctrine of the Absolute, the Infinite Bearer of all Experience, the Ultimate Solver of all Problems, the Absolute Mind that looks before and after and knows the infinite time-span in one completed whole of thought, it has developed a majestic conception that seems to be a logical elaboration of religion's vision of the God of the universe. With these conceptions it has undertaken, as one writer puts it, "to substantiate the extreme claims of faith—the creation of matter by spirit, the indestructible significance of every human person, and the unlimited supremacy of goodness."¹ It has specifically declared its fundamental interest in religion and its faith that by means of idealistic categories it has explicated the inner meaning of Christianity. Its pages abound with the language of inspiration. It speaks much of the infinite and the eternal, the fair perfection of the whole to which our temporal finite eyes are dim; and it proclaims in arguments of endless variety that things are not what they seem.

It is possible to sympathize with the aim of idealism to bring courage, hope, and inspiration without agreeing with the method by which it seeks to arouse these attitudes. As a

¹ Perry, *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 164.

matter of fact it has developed through several generations of minds with an outcome such as to lead to serious doubt whether the result arrived at is that which was originally intended.

One is led to ask, in the first place: Does the notion that the physical universe is ultimately spiritual because it is a system of *known* objects really help us religiously? No one urges more vigorously than Royce that the world of ideas is just as obdurate and unyielding as the world of physical nature conceived by the materialist. It is still there as a stern fact. We may call it a system of ideas in the mind of the Absolute. But the attitude logically called forth by such a eulogistic view is simply that of humble resignation. The suggestion is that the core of the religious spirit is essentially humility, adoration, worship, the acceptance of things as they are. It is significant that it is the *worship* element of religious experience for which men like Josiah Royce, William Ernest Hocking, and George Plimpton Adams seem most solicitous. The non-pragmatic participation in what is already there is the note that is sounded. Despite all appearances to the contrary our world is through and through spiritual.

Now it is not to be denied that the attitude of acceptance, acquiescence, adoration has played a great part in the older religious conceptions. Especially was it cherished by the western world in the Middle Ages. But it is a fact that the indubitable progress of science has introduced the concept of control. It has now become a question whether religion can remain essentially a worship function. Room must somehow be made to recognize that change and control of the environment, amelioration of its conditions, are actual achievements. It is difficult to see how we can rest content with simply proclaiming that the world is idea and therefore to be accepted as it stands.

With reference to the Absolute as maintained by the older idealists the objections are many. As simply a knower it is too intellectualistic. Its timelessness disagrees with its

immanence, for, as timeless, it transcends finite struggle. Its all-inclusiveness makes mere appearance out of evil, for evil must somehow have its place in the Absolute's view of the timeless whole, and, as having a place, must be somehow good. As the Ultimate Being in which all problems are solved and all contradictions resolved it reduces the finite world which is the nearest concern of struggling, toiling humanity to an unintelligible puppet-show. Evolution as taking place in time becomes mere appearance.

But it is not necessary to dwell on the standard refutations of standard idealism. The question is: Do the more recent protagonists of idealism develop from it conceptions which are more congruous with the categories which the development of modern life are thrusting upon us?

Adams in *Idealism and the Modern Age* shows clearly that he recognizes where the issue lies. Again and again he reiterates that whereas Platonism, Christianity, and Idealism have stood for attachment to ideal structures which call for recognition, knowledge, and love, the modern age emphasizes control, mastery, activity, the progressive remolding of circumstances in the interests of democracy. It is significant that Adams indulges but little in phrases drawn from the older idealism. One finds no talk of a monistic Absolute but rather of the pluralistic "significant structures." No space is taken up with proving that the physical universe is the expression of an Infinite Cognitive Consciousness. Rather the word idealism seems to be taken in the more familiar sense of devotion to ideals. It is the great system of ideals developed in any age, whether ancient or modern that calls forth the attitude of loyalty—a more secular expression, perhaps, for the attitude of religious devotion. Loyalty, reverence, contemplation, these are the ethical and religious values of idealism which Adams is concerned to conserve without holding too much to the trappings in which they have been traditionally enveloped.

Ultimately his position resolves to this: There are some things in the universe which man himself does not make but which he appreciates and accepts. These are the ideal structures of his age. To these he gives his loyalty. We cannot accept as final either the idea systems of a past age nor those of our own age. But the idea systems of all ages imply one underlying system which may be envisaged as the good. This last rather vague and abstract conception is apparently Adams' equivalent for the Absolute, though he does not use the term.

While Adams clearly recognizes the modern activist trend and avoids the conceptions that have latterly involved idealism in much criticism, he is still evidently hampered by the tendency to center religion in the act of worship. He deplores the fact that "our age estimates religion in accordance with the presupposition that nothing can be significant for the modern man except that which contributes to his forward-looking interest in control, organization, and activity; in behaviour and the anticipation of behaviour." He thinks that our modern "practical religion" witnesses to "the success with which the biological and economic (capitalistic) interest of men in instrumental power and pragmatic mastery have all but eaten their way into the very citadel of that interest which historically has been the spokesman for possession and contemplation, for the love and worship of some significant structure which alone makes any activity and any mastery worth while." But do not Mr. Adams' very words indicate that the far development of new conceptions calls for a reconstruction which he finds it impossible to make on the basis of his idealism and his interpretation of religion? May it not be that this enemy which he finds storming the citadel is an enemy only of the limitations of idealistic presupposition and that after all it is a champion of a larger and fuller religious life for man. How far can we develop a conception of religion that holds to the values of worship and possession but which

widens its scope to include those of activity and progressive melioration? To get some light on this question we must consider the philosophy of pragmatism.

II

With reference to pragmatism the complaint is usually made that it is many and not one. It must be confessed that there is a considerable variety among the applications and results of the various writers in the field. The collaborators in the volume on Creative Intelligence are careful to abjure any platform of planks on which the movement stands, modestly content to indicate that the probable common characteristics of all of them are the "ideas of the genuineness of the future, of intelligence as the organ for determining the quality of the future so far as it can come within human control, and of a courageously inventive individual as the bearer of a creatively employed mind."¹ But it is not necessary to canvass the entire circle of pragmatic writers to consider the significance of the method for religion. There are two great recognized leaders in America, William James and John Dewey, and it will be convenient to limit attention to these.

For both James and Dewey intellectual activity is essentially a function of will; experience is fundamentally a striving; and thinking is an instrument in the furtherance of the process. Ideas are not true in themselves but only in so far forth as they contribute to the progressive enrichment of experience. They are significant only if they work, to use the more popular expression. Ideas are first projected as hypotheses and then tested by their actual ability to lead to further significant experience. Along with this instrumental conception of intellect goes the faith that the world is such that it can be transformed and that intelligence can do the transforming. Because this view stresses life and striving it is called biocentric; because it believes in progressive adaptation

¹ Prefatory note, p. iii.

and transformation it is evolutionistic; because it rests upon experience it is empirical; because it believes the whole process can be one of making things better and more suited to human welfare it is melioristic and humanistic.

Of our two writers James is the more concerned to make the specific application to religion. He finds religious faith to be one aspect or expression of the faith function which is everywhere present in all forms of knowing. Among other things which experience presses upon us is the necessity for some kind of attitude toward the universe as a whole. Here is a forced option. Our attitude may be one of theistic belief or not. Agnosticism here leads pragmatically to the same result as atheism and so need not be considered an alternative. Here religious faith is entirely rational and one may have the right to act upon it and help make it true by working to establish the supremacy of the good. Another faith which we may hold as a definite working hypothesis is what James calls indeterminism. It is as allowable, James maintains, to believe that the world is pluralistic and amenable to shift and change and manipulation among the variously grouped parts, as it is to believe that it is monistic, whether taken spiritualistically or materialistically. Upon this view the mood of sheer acceptance and resignation is out of place. One is called upon rather to be up and doing, to bring about organization within experience through one's own choices and through co-operation with God. James's conception of the universe as pluralistic in character enables him to emphatically deny that evil is in any necessary way mixed up with the good. In fact the idealistic Absolute in which all contradictions are resolved and all ills given a seemingly station seems to him a slander upon the name of God. Rather he prefers definitely to reject the omnipotence and infinity of God in order to free him from responsibility for evil. God is not static in some state of Olympian bliss but is the great toiler with much work to do, seeking to eject the evil elements from experience and develop

a progressively purer and more ethically satisfactory cosmic organization. To co-operation in this task is man summoned by religious faith. The summons is urgent because the issue may be doubtful without our help. God has not yet won the victory and we have to face the possibility that he may not win it. But all the more should we recognize that "there is but one unconditional commandment, which is that we should seek incessantly, with fear and trembling, so to vote and to act as to bring about the very largest total universe of good which we can see."

These conceptions of the functional validity of religious faith, of indeterminism, and of a finite God are undeniably suggestive. They show how the modern-age emphasis upon volition, control, reconstruction, scientific method, and the democratic faith that the individual counts even in the largest concerns, can be taken up as significant factors into the religious consciousness. But it must be confessed that it is the suggestiveness of a sketch rather than of a completed picture. Difficulties occur to one. For example one reason why religion develops in man is that he tends to seek some expression for his faith that the universe in its deepest nature accords with moral aspiration—that values will be conserved. The conception of God is man's fullest expression of that assurance. But with James's conception of a finite God the whole problem breaks out afresh in the cosmic sphere. If God struggles with his environment after the human fashion, then what is there to guarantee to Him an ethical character to the universe which surrounds Him? If another Being is postulated to meet God's problem then we simply fall into a hopeless infinite regress. Further, as has been pointed out by Eugene Lyman (*The God of the Modern Age*), there is an ethical unsatisfactoriness about the idea of a finite God. In the eagerness to avoid ascribing evil to God there is a danger that we ascribe it to other cosmic forces that are not God, and

fail to bear our own responsibility—which, of course, vitiates the conception from a moral point of view.

When we turn to Professor Dewey we have a thinker who has wrestled with the central problems of pragmatism and sought to carry through the conceptions in a complete and thorough-going fashion. His *Essays in Experimental Logic* are perhaps the profoundest attempt to deal with the fundamental questions of the pragmatic method that have appeared. He is concerned to describe the actual procedure of the mind in the solution of problems, and he works out minutely the way in which difficulties cause the search for hypotheses. Hypotheses are developed in their logical implications to point to further experience, and further experience in turn is used to verify or bring about the rejection of hypotheses. One feels behind Professor Dewey's writings a great wealth of observation of concrete detail in everyday familiar experiences. He sets forth with endless patience the way in which we solve piecemeal our problems, one by one, according to "the situation."

But just because, perhaps, Professor Dewey takes a keen interest in the variety of concrete situations he seems uninterested in the larger massive reaction to the universe as a whole which is involved in the religious attitude. He identifies this religious reaction, unduly no doubt, with the particular attempt of idealism to conceive of the universe as a self-consistent interrelated Whole or Absolute in which all problems are solved in advance. Apparently this leads him to feel that religion is only one of the non-intelligent ways of escaping from the immediate pressure of specific problems. To seek solutions "in general" is simply to satisfy ourselves with sentimentalities, and meanwhile the particular ills of life go uncorrected. He has hard words to utter against the purely contemplative interpretation of intelligence which makes it simply a beholding eye to view the eternal verities of some beatific vision instead of setting it to work to make the social

order better. The implication seems to be that the idea of God is an abstraction which beclouds men's recognition of the true sources of problems in everyday life. In his own words:

The great scholastic thinkers (i.e., of the Christian theology) taught that the end of man is to know True Being, that knowledge is contemplative, that True Being is pure Immaterial Mind, and to know it is Bliss and Salvation. . . . Through this taking over of the conception of knowledge as contemplative into the dominant religion of Europe, multitudes were affected who were totally innocent of theoretical philosophy. . . . So deeply engrained was this idea that it prevailed for centuries after the actual progress of science had demonstrated that knowledge is power to transform the world, and centuries after the practice of effective knowledge had adopted the method of experimentation.¹

We recognize the healthy emphasis which Professor Dewey lays on concrete problems and the active, instrumental character of intelligence. But with reference to his general attitude toward religion we raise several questions.

1. Among the various concrete situations which confront human individuals, are there not some which we recognize as specifically religious? Despite the fact that we spend most of our time on limited problems and situations, are there not circumstances when the problem of a relation to the whole of things does become specific and urgent?

2. Because religion and the idea of God have been connected with idealisms and absolutisms in the past, does that mean they must always be so, and must be rejected with the discrediting of these philosophic conceptions?

3. Is it necessary to read religion always in terms of contemplation, resignation, mystic estheticism? If God is conceived as the Great Companion in the life of ethical endeavor does not this hearten humanitarian enterprises instead of ignore them? It would seem that both Dewey and the idealists have difficulty because they center religion in the mood of worship as such instead of in its urge toward wider and fuller life.

¹ *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 112.

4. Do not Professor Dewey's own ideals of humanitarian ethics, evolutionism, and democracy imply a profounder basis than he gives? He presents us with a faith in the power of intelligence to change the course of events. But the implications of such a faith is a cosmic ethical tendency which he does not explicate.

III

In conclusion, our study leads us to feel that idealism is correct in holding to the mood of contemplation and worship as a significant phase of the religious life, but its difficulty comes from conceiving this mood as its most important or even its exclusive aspect. As to pragmatism its emphasis on volition and activity is profoundly important and calls for the inclusion of voluntaristic values in religion. But its religious implications have not been adequately worked out either in James or Dewey. What is called for is a religion in which worship is means as well as end, and ameliorative activity is both an outcome of and an occasion for worship.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD AS A DEMOCRATIC IDEAL

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Many Christians are today ready to affirm that Christianity stands for the Brotherhood of Man. For many centuries, Christians when they "said their prayers" have been accustomed to repeat the words "Thy Kingdom come" ostensibly as expressing their great desire or one of their great desires. In the preaching of Jesus, the "Kingdom of God" was apparently the great central theme, and there is in recent years a revival of interest in this phrase and of study as to its meaning. And it is being largely used nowadays as a term descriptive of the ideal state of society, in which the Brotherhood of Man shall be realized. We have to consider the question whether or to what extent the phrase "Kingdom of God" and the ideas naturally associated with it may suitably be used to indicate the religion of the Brotherhood of Man or a religion through which the Brotherhood of Man may be gradually established.

As a standard by which to test any forms or conceptions of religion which may be considered as suitable to usher in and maintain the brotherhood of man and the real democracy of which it is, we have asserted, the necessary spirit, we must at the start, set clearly before us the two absolute essentials of such a real democracy. The first, we may call the *principle of individual responsibility*. The second is the *good will motive*. In a democracy every mature individual is to make his decisions as to what it is right and wise for himself and others to do, *by the power of his own mind*, in the light of such knowledge and experience as he shall have gained for himself.

There must be no outer compulsion of any sort upon him, as to his decisions. You may, if you like, apply to him the principle "the King can do no wrong," only that is to be applied to his thoughts and decisions, not to his overt acts. The concrete expression of this responsibility is in his ballot, and if this be kept in mind it will help to make the principle clear—almost self-evident. Each citizen is to have the right to vote as he thinks good, with no bribe, nor threat of any sort of welfare or ill-fare to warp his decision. He must yield in his *actions* to the plurality of judgments as to what is good, obeying the laws which he may often consider unwise. But he must not be limited in any way in his right to form his own opinion about those laws or policies under which he must live for a time, and to express that opinion in an orderly, legal way, doubtless in speech and press, but particularly in the ballot.

It is to be recognized that the acceptance of this general principle for one's self involves with logically absolute necessity its extension to all others who will accept it and live by it. That is, if I demand and accept the right to express my mind and share in determining the government and laws under which I live, unthreatened by any policeman or thug, with no bribe to pull me and no economic penalty (except such as would follow from the nature of the policy I advocate, itself) to push me, then I must grant the same freedom to everyone else who will accept it. This means that no power of soldier, constable, or court, nor of actual or threatened strike, nor of offered promotion, demotion, or dismissal may be used against me or by me against some one else, to make him say, "Yes," when his mind says, "No," or to make him vote "No" when his mind votes "Yes," so long as he and I are willing to abide by the result, until we can secure its change by the same democratic method in which it was determined. This is the principle of the "universal, equal, secret suffrage" demanded in democratic countries. As a theory of government it implies

that, given the opportunity and responsibility, every man or, at least the large majority of men, will in time come to see what is wise and good in the matter of such human relations as can be controlled or influenced by government, and that society will be better off, altogether, when governed by the wisdom which has been reached by a majority of its members, than by that which has been reached by a smaller number, who would therefore impose their will by *force* upon the majority, since the majority did not consent to their will.

The second principle absolutely essential to successful democratic government is the one to which we have already given considerable attention, the principle of the good will motive. Only when each citizen, each voter, therefore, each ruler, seeks the welfare of all concerned, that is, today at least, of all humanity, can there be any assurance that he will use the power of the ballot, the power of his share in the government in the interests of the governed. We have perhaps said enough, for the present about this principle. It is of the first importance that we keep in mind these two principles of individual responsibility and the good will motive, in judging any form of religion as to its compatibility with or value to democracy.

The Christian interest in the "Kingdom of God" dates, naturally, from the first century of our era. The hope of the Jews of the time of Jesus, was that the Roman yoke should be thrown off, and that Palestine should become an independent, prosperous, and glorious kingdom, with a glory similar to but even greater than that which was reputed to have been enjoyed under the reigns of David and Solomon. The hope of such independence and prosperity was the most vital part of the religion of the Jews at this time. It was by the power of God that the foreign yoke was to be broken, and it was his "Messiah" (Christ or Anointed One) who was to lead the nation in its revolution and to rule it as the representative of God.

Needless to say, the theory and ideal of modern democracy was unknown in Palestine in the first century. The consent of all worthy Jews to the reign of the God-anointed king, in the line of David, was, of course, assumed. But there was no thought that the power by which the king should carry on his government would be other than that of military and police force, wherever there might be any objection to the will of the ruler, except as supernatural or magical force might be added by God to the usual human forces at the disposal of ordinary monarchs.

In the Jewish thought of this time there is no trace of the principle that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." The Jewish political theory was that of the theocracy, with a visible representative of God anointed by his authority and appointed by him, seated on the throne, and exercising, without dispute, so far as other men were concerned, the royal powers deputed by the invisible God. We shall probably be safe in saying that such a theocracy, in one or another modification, has always been the theoretical form of the monarchies of earth until the modern days of constitutional or limited monarchies, and it has persisted even in them. Probably all the kings left on earth today make at least formal claim in law or in title to reign *Dei Gratia*, to be vicars or regents of the unseen (if not absent) God.

Whether or not a religion with a theocratic theory of civil government is favorable to the development of democracy will evidently depend on the faith held with regard to the nature of the god and his relations with men. In so far as the ruling deity governs men in accordance with what we have called the principle of individual responsibility, he will develop democratic tendencies and powers among his worshipers. In so far as he rules men by outward compulsion, and reveals his will by outward authority of some sort, not subject to the criticism of the mind of the individual, the effect will be

anti-democratic. Democracy, we have seen, requires freedom of judgment for every individual. Only the immanent god, expressing his truth and will through the mind and conscience of the individual is a friend to democracy, so far as this first standard is concerned.

The second question about the relation of theocratic faith to the development of democracy is concerned with the degree in which it promotes the good will motive among men. Logically, doubtless, it might be shown that the principle of individual responsibility is a form for thought and action, and an empty form, without the good will, which is the only suitable substance for the expression of that form. It might also be maintained that good will without the form which we have described under the term individual responsibility is likely to be ineffective, if not actually subversive of that which it would promote, i.e., the welfare of men. Yet in practice the one or the other may be emphasized and developed without a fully parallel process in the other.

We may say that the principle of individual responsibility had been recognized and taught by some of the greatest of the prophets of Israel, but its meaning and implications formed no essential part of the popular hope for the Kingdom of God, in the time of Jesus. So also of the good will motive. It also may be dimly discerned in some of the noblest thoughts of the prophets, but before Jesus we cannot find any explicit teaching that one should love *all* men, and certainly such universal human love did not flow from the popular conception of the nature of God or of his will, in the first century.

Jesus, as we have noted, used the Kingdom of God as his central theme. Like John the Baptist, we are told that he commenced his ministry with the message than which no other could have been so welcome or so exciting in his day: "Repent for the Kingdom of God is at hand." His subsequent life and teaching have been and are today interpreted in two radically different ways. For our purposes, we may call the

one school of interpreters the autocratic and the other the democratic school, according as the interpretation assumes or finds that the principles of Jesus' life and teaching are those belonging to autocracy or democracy.

The autocratic school holds that Jesus actually came to the earth to be substantially what the Jews were expecting, only much more, to be the divine representative of God—the visible presence of God himself, on the earth, to rule *by force* not only the Jews and Palestine but also all the rest of the earth. Most of this school would perhaps hold that for some reason it was not intended to carry out the whole of this program during the first earthly life of Jesus. They would acknowledge, certainly, that the use of external force to compel submission to “his claims” was abjured during his life in past history, but that element of autocracy is soon to be supplied. The return of Jesus to the earth to reign with external power, destroying his enemies and promoting his friends, has been expected every year from the first century down to the present, and the faith that he may come now at any hour to reign as the Divine Kaiser, and bring order out of the chaos and happiness out of the misery in which the world now groans, is passionately believed and advocated by large numbers of those who call themselves Christians, and, of course, the only orthodox Christians upon the earth.

But this school, while acknowledging a conspicuous absence of any attempt to compel submission by outward force during his historical life upon the earth, would find the other principal elements of autocracy even in that life. For these interpreters, Jesus was absolute in his power and authority to reveal truth and to legislate for mankind. Any utterance that he made is to be accepted as true without any question as to how it meets the ordinary tests of truth available to us today, and to question any statement attributed to him in the Four Gospels, with the possibility in mind of disputing its truth, is nothing short of blasphemy.

Likewise Jesus had absolute authority to speak for God as to what was right and wrong, to legislate for humanity. If he said that to divorce except for adultery was to commit adultery, that settles the matter forever, and if he said that people should not resist evil, but should make violence easy for the violent and robbery for the thief, then all war and all police activity become automatically wicked. The moral judgment or conscience of the individual has nothing to do in any instance in which Jesus has thus laid down the law but to apply it most simply and directly.

There are, of course, a great many who would be inconsistent in their interpretation of Jesus' authority. They would hold that Jesus taught nothing absurd, that we must try to find a reasonable meaning for his teaching, and are bound to obey it, only as we find such a reasonable meaning. Many, for instance, would abjure pacifism, while at the same time acknowledging the absolute authority of Jesus in all matters upon which he spoke. They would find a reasonable meaning to his injunction to "turn the other cheek" and to give up both cloak and coat—a teaching not as to the particular action to be followed in all circumstances, but as to the spirit of love that is to actuate under all circumstances. But these same interpreters would not admit any such right of seeking a reasonable meaning of the teaching upon divorce. That is divine legislation not subject to human questioning. So if Jesus said that he who should believe and be baptized should be saved, the baptism has the same authority as the faith, and no reason or experience has any weight to the contrary.

If it be asked how one is to be assured that Jesus had such absolute authority, the Protestant answer is that the divine nature and authority of Jesus were demonstrated by events inexplicable on the ground of known laws and processes of nature, preceding, during, and following the life of Jesus upon the earth. Although the most of these works, familiarly known as miracles, were benevolent in intention and helpful

in result, that is only a harmonious incident. The valuation of these events as proofs of divine authority depends entirely upon the belief that they had no adequate cause except "divine power," that they have no place in the laws or regular processes of nature, and that we could not say that under the same circumstances they would happen again, unless we include as the principal circumstance the will of God to act directly and without any regular *means*. To use the technical term for such phenomena in religion and anthropology, the proof of the authority of Jesus was his magical powers, and the magical events associated with his life. The Catholic answer to the question, What is the evidence for the absolute authority of Jesus? would doubtless be: the word of the church is your sufficient proof. And the Catholic church does not require either to go back to the historical Jesus, or to await his return as the divine Autocrat in order to have the benefits of his absolute authority. It holds that the authority of Jesus was delegated to the apostles, especially Peter and his successors and that absolute power to declare truth or to legislate for men abides in the priestly authorities of the church. The layman has individual responsibility only that he may deliver it up to the church, and thereafter use it, in so far as permitted by the church, under its direction.

The democratic school of interpreters of Jesus holds that he repudiated the autocratic ideal of the Kingdom of God, as a political organization to be ruled by force, by a human or *quasi*-human king as God's representative. He believed, apparently, that he was to be in some sense, doubtless in the real or right sense, the Messiah, anointed by God to proclaim and establish his Kingdom, but he steadfastly refused, perhaps even to the end of his life, either to claim to be the Messiah or to acknowledge definitely its proper application to him, because it meant for the people, even for his disciples, such an earthly autocrat as he refused to be, for he recognized that such a king could not establish by autocratic methods the

Kingdom of God. He taught, then, a spiritual kingdom in which God's reign was to be realized through the submission of the individual to the will of God, his inner loyalty to the laws and purposes of God. Jesus recognized and maintained the principle of individual responsibility to the full. He required the individual to make his own moral judgments and act, not according to any written code of laws of the past, nor any new enactments which he himself made, but according to God's voice in his mind and heart as expressed in the best thought and feeling of his own consciousness. To be sure, Jesus did not teach this principle explicitly. But his whole life and teaching was an expression of this principle.

Jesus said that he came to fulfil the traditional law of the Jews as embodied in what we most commonly call the Old Testament. But he showed what he meant by fulfilling, when he sought out and taught the fundamental moral principles contained within it, and insisted upon action according to these principles even to the contravention of the letter of the law. This attitude is shown clearly, the democratic school would hold, in the passage in Matt. 5:21-48 and particularly in his dealing with Sabbath laws and laws of ceremonial purity. It is shown in his declaration of the Golden Rule (Matt. 7:12) as the essence of the "law and the prophets" and again in his assertion that the "law and the prophets" hang upon the two great commandments of love to God and to neighbor (Matt. 22:38-40).

The democratic interpreters would further point out that Jesus not only refused to be "a judge and divider," or to lead a revolt against the government or to defend himself by force of arms, but regarded the ambition to assume the power and functions of an earthly king as a temptation to be sternly resisted. This is described in picturesque imagery in the account of the Devil offering him all the kingdoms of this world, if he would "fall down and worship him." The acceptance of autocratic power would have been for Jesus worship of the Devil.

Most significant in opposition to the position that Jesus claimed absolute authority to declare truth and to promulgate moral law, and that this authority of Jesus was demonstrated by inexplicable events or miracles, is the attitude which Jesus himself maintained with regard to his authority and especially with regard to confirmation by miracles. When the Pharisees came "seeking of him a sign from heaven" according to probably the oldest account we have (Mark 8:11, 12), "He sighed deeply in his spirit and saith, Why doth this generation seek a sign? Verily I say unto you, There shall no sign be given unto this generation." Whatever may be the reason for and significance and truth of the parallel readings in Matthew and Luke, referring to signs of the weather, and the sign of Jonah, the fact remains that a miraculous sign was refused as a confirmation of his authority. Of possibly greater importance is the account in Mark 11:12-33, and parallels in Matthew and Luke, according to which Jesus answered the question of the chief priests and scribes as to his authority, with the question to them about the authority of John the Baptist: When they evaded an answer to this question he refused the answer to theirs, evidently because his authority rested upon the same foundation as that of John's. No miracle is narrated of John, but the appeal of John's preaching to mind and conscience was sufficient evidence that he was a prophet or messenger from God. The evidence for the authority of Jesus was precisely of the same sort. His authority was that of the truth which he spoke and the good which he taught and did; and of that every honest man was the competent judge.

One further argument would be offered by the democratic school from the story of the temptation. One of the temptations was to demonstrate his supernatural authority or divine sonship by casting himself down from a "pinnacle of the temple." That he recognized this impulse to acquire prestige and a following by a supernatural sign, to be a temptation to do evil, and resisted it, seems to be a further proof of his

recognition that his authority was purely that of the appeal which his words and life should make to the moral judgment of the individual.

The answer of the democratic school to two principal objections to its interpretation of Jesus, might well be noted here. One objection is that the Fourth Gospel does represent Jesus as a divine autocrat, and appeal to the confirmation of his authority through miraculous signs. This would be freely admitted, but the reply would be that this Gospel differs radically from the earlier three in just these respects, that both cannot be correct, that the Fourth Gospel is a product probably of the early decades of the second century and represents the development of Christology up to that time, in certain circles, rather than the real facts about Jesus.

The second objection is that while Jesus, in his historical life, undoubtedly did refrain from autocratic aims and methods, he expected and taught that he would presently return "in the clouds, with power and great glory." To this it is replied that the reputed utterances of Jesus on this subject, in the synoptics, are few and of uncertain meaning, and that those which seem more definitely to promise a return of Jesus "in the glory of his Father with the holy angels" may be rather the reflection of the faith which arose in connection with the post-crucifixion visions of Jesus than a true account of his own utterances. Or it may be that Jesus accepted the version of the messianic hope, current in his time, that God would soon interpose in a miraculous manner, to bring to a sudden end the present age, and remedy existing wrongs and establish his Kingdom in outward, visible form, by his supernatural power. Beyond a doubt, something of this sort was ardently expected by the early Christian church, mistakenly expected, at least as to date, for the reappearance of Christ was confidently looked for within the lifetime of some of those who had seen and heard Jesus before his death. At best, the words of Jesus on this subject, given in the Gospels, are very few, and difficult of interpretation. The democratic school would admit

the possibility that Jesus himself may have mistakenly accepted some of the messianic ideals of his time, but point to the great weight of his unmistakable teaching of the principles of the spiritual kingdom, which harmonize completely with the democratic principle of individual responsibility.

Before leaving this contrasting of the rival autocratic and democratic interpretations of Jesus, we may observe that those students whom we have called the democratic school, are also properly called the modern critical school. They endeavor to develop religion in the full light of modern science and present-day conditions, and feel not only free but required, in order to a proper understanding and use of the Bible, to use the historical method of study and interpretation, without any attempt to accept all traditional views of authorship, authenticity, and date of the various writings, or to harmonize the statements and doctrines of each with all of the rest. The autocratic school, on the other hand, is also the traditionalist school, holding to the theory of the "deposit of faith" or the "faith once for all delivered to the saints," probably in the first century of our era, general accepting traditional interpretations, and views of authorship, integrity, date, etc., and regarding the so-called historical study or "higher criticism" of the Scriptures as impious and invalid. They are likely to be skeptical toward many of the conclusions of modern science and research, and to hold that the religion of the apostles of Jesus is the ideal and perfect religion, fully and perfectly adapted to all the needs of humanity in all time, subject therefore to no modification or change.

In considering these rival interpretations of the life and teaching of Jesus, in their relation to democracy, we have looked particularly at their respective positions with regard to the principle of individual responsibility. We must also notice briefly their attitude toward the good will motive.

Without doubt the autocratic school has generally accepted in theory the teaching of Jesus that the law of love is the

fundamental law of God, and tried to teach the loving life and extend its influence, by precept and example. Its deficiency in this regard has arisen from the fact that it has made other principles and motives of equal or greater importance, and has violated the law of love or acted contrary to the good will motive in many cases. To make belief in the authority of the pope or the church or the Scriptures or the value of the sacraments as important or more important for the individual than belief in the life of love, is, of course, to minimize the latter. One may say that practically all of the Christianity of the past up to a hundred years ago or less, has been that of the autocratic school, in one or another of its forms. And we look in vain for any of the great historic symbols, creeds, or confessions of faith which declares that good will to all men is absolutely essential to the welfare—the salvation—of the individual and of humanity.

This good will has not been taught as an essential of salvation, but various other things, all of them belonging to the general system of autocracy, have been declared essential. The general, conscious influence of historical Christianity down to the most recent times, has therefore been favorable to autocracy and hostile to democracy, in its denial of the principle of individual responsibility, and its neglect of and action contrary to the good will motive. Nevertheless under the pressure of the needs and conditions of humanity, and of the truth and value of the love-principle within Christianity, however officially neglected, democracy has been developing under the shadow—often the protecting and often the blighting shadow—of Christianity.

We noted in passing, that the democratic school recognized Jesus' teaching of the law of love, or the good will motive as of fundamental importance, both in his own thought and in its value for humanity. We may say that the whole tendency of this modern school is to make and keep this good will motive central in religion and in its interpretation of Jesus.

The historical content of the phrase "Kingdom of God" has varied much, but that term has, naturally, always been interpreted in harmony with the general principles and ideals of the theologians of the time and group. It has been understood to mean a form of organization of society and of divine rule in it, of Palestine, or of the whole of humanity on this earth, or to denote the organized church within humanity, or a condition to be realized not upon earth at all but in heaven. In most of these ideas God has been thought of as the Almighty Autocrat, and human autocratic methods have been used by church and state to express and enforce the divine rule. The democratic school of Christianity would hold that God truly rules only in so far as the individual acts from the good will motive, and freely decides for himself how he ought to act to express this motive. It repudiates autocracy altogether, even divine autocracy.

In summarizing the foregoing discussion we may say that all principles of religion which maintain the existence of any authority outside of the individual, to which he should submit *unconditionally*, are to that extent anti-democratic. Such principles are government by a hierarchy not chosen by or responsible to the laity; salvation through the magical influence of the sacraments; submission to "the church" however organized, as an authority for truth and morals superior to and not subject to the criticism of the individual, acceptance of a body of scripture as giving complete and infallible information and direction in regard to religious and moral truth and life; belief in the imminent return of Jesus to be an almighty and all-wise autocrat, destroying or coercing all who fail to submit entirely to his will, and abolishing, since supplanting, all spiritual movements for the redemption of humanity and political movements for the establishment of democracy. Out of the mass of literature on this subject, two very timely and valuable articles in the *Biblical World* for July, 1919, may be referred to, the one on "Premillennialism," by H. F. Rall

and the other on "Making Christianity Safe for Democracy" by G. B. Smith.

The "Kingdom of God" we may believe, was a democratic conception in the mind of Jesus, but it has been largely an autocratic conception from his day to ours. It is again being given a democratic interpretation by the "democratic school" of interpreters to which we have referred, and, more or less, doubtless, by many who do not fully accept the principles and conclusions of this school. It may be doubted whether this term will be abandoned or supplanted in the foreseeable future to any appreciable extent by even the most democratic. But in view of the fact that the term "kingdom" inevitably suggests autocracy and when used in religion an autocratic God, it might be well for friends of democracy occasionally to emphasize the democratic interpretation as contrasted with the other, and perhaps to use other phrases more obviously democratic to make clear their use of this famous term, so dear to us from a thousand associations.

But let us remember that we cannot get a democracy, or indeed a satisfactory condition of humanity, without good will freely expressed. Such free good will cannot be obtained by force from the outside of any form, divine or human. The spirit of love will never rule either by magic or machine-guns. Force must be used to control those who do not desire and are not ready to help promote the welfare of others, but to just the extent that it must thus be used, to that extent is democracy unrealized, and the Kingdom of the Loving Father incomplete.

UNSOLVED PROBLEMS

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF CONVERSION IN INDIA

One of the pioneer subjects for investigation in the field of the psychology of religion was the phenomenon of conversion. In fact the earliest of the modern books in the field, namely that of Professor E. D. Starbuck which was published in 1899, is scarcely more than an examination of some of the data in connection with this particular problem. Other writers like Professor G. Stanley Hall, in his *Adolescence*, and Professor G. A. Coe in his *Psychology of Religion*, have given considerable attention to this phase of religious experience, the field of investigation being fairly largely confined to America.

Mr. E. A. Annett, of the Indian Sunday-school Union, has undertaken a study along similar lines in the Indian field.¹ In the introduction he acknowledges his debt to Dr. Starbuck, a debt which is patent to the reader at every stage of the study. To begin with, the author gives very meager evidence of any extended acquaintance with the literature and results of the psychological study of religion. For source material he follows two methods. The first is the biographical and autobiographical literature of Indian Christians supplemented by a few biographies of Hindus which record experiences in some sense analogous to conversion. The second source used is the experience of Indian Christians, descriptions of which the author has tried to obtain by means of a questionnaire.

It is scarcely necessary to be reminded of the limitations of the questionnaire method. One would search long for a more convincing argument for its failure than here. In the first place the list of the questions propounded indicates the workings of a consciousness far removed in its method of operation from the Indian. For example one question is: "What were your feelings at the time of your conversion?" Another is: "How differently did you feel toward persons, nature, or God?" The average Westerner who has been reared in a community where militant evangelism is practiced knows that there has been something in the training of the youth of the West to prepare them to expect emotional experiences of the type to which Mr. Annett refers. At the

¹ *Conversion in India: A Study in Religious Psychology*. By E. A. Annett. Madras: The Christian Literature Society, 1920. xv+195 pages. Annas 14.

same time anyone familiar with Indian life knows that there is nothing analogous in Eastern experience. To be sure feeling is fuel for faith in India as elsewhere, but one who is expecting great and sudden outbursts of feeling, upsetting the whole view of life, is liable to disappointment.

One of the most insistent needs of the day is that those who desire to serve India religiously should appreciate the social psychology of the situation. Certainly the mind of the Indian is no *tabula rasa* awaiting impressions from foreign hands which seek to write upon it. It is rather the result of centuries of mystical culture which cares more for pretty figures than hard syllogisms and which has given expression to itself in a wealth of sacred literature. When one thinks about "Conversion in India," he must be ready to recognize the traditional cultural abyss that separates the whence from the whither of the subjects. The prophet of the new religion comes not to lives trained to the thoughts and emotions which he wants to arouse, but to thoughts and emotions perhaps of curiosity, perhaps of disdain, but certainly foreign. The sanctions of the old group are of a piece with its ancient pantheistic world-view, whereas those of the new group are derived from an ethical monotheism. In the face of these facts, he who expects sudden upheavals of religious consciousness and abrupt right-about-facing away from the traditional and toward the new, does so in the face of fearful odds.

In his introduction the author states that he secured "two thousand promises, many of them direct and personal," of answers to his list of questions, but that scarcely three hundred promises were made good. Could anything be more suggestive of the probability that the questions failed to elicit a better response than because there was nothing in the experiences of the questioned corresponding to the queries? I have gone over some of the leading questions, or all of them, with missionaries who are shepherding Christian communities numbering in the thousands, and in each case the criticism has been that these questions are suggestive of nothing in the experiences of their people. It is not too much to say that the seventeen hundred failures to answer are more significant for Indian religious experience than the three hundred actual responses. Indian Christians are scarcely so unreliable that 85 per cent of them would fail to redeem a promise made in good faith, if they were able. The fact is that questions about decisions, attitudes, motives, feelings, impulses, changes, disappointments, and the like demand a bit of psychological introspection quite beyond the grasp of the vast majority of the Indian Christian community.

There can be little doubt that some of the answers indicate the common fallacy of reflecting the thoughts and terminology of the questioner, as in the case in certain instance where alternative answers are suggested. As has been pointed out already, the whole discussion rests upon the supposition that the missionary ought to expect the sudden decisions which characterize adolescence in western lands and which the evangelist tries to bring about by some extraordinary appeal. There can be no doubt that many of the more educated Indian Christians are familiar with these ideas through western missionaries and literature. It is possible that in families which have been Christian for three or four generations there are such experiences. But in the majority of cases the attempt so to analyze the experience is forced and unreal. In India the line of demarkation is not one between the converted and the unconverted, but between the Hindu, the Muslim, the Jain, the Buddhist, and the Christian communities.

Ask any Indian of an established Christian family when he became a Christian (when he was converted), and you are likely to be told that he was born as such, since the family has been Christian for some generations. He is reared in the understanding that he is Christian from the beginning and is expected to conduct himself as such in a community where non-Christians are in the majority. And why should this not be a suggestion of value for Christian homes in the West? It is surely in more harmony with the spirit of Jesus than the fashion of teaching children that they are outside of the Christian fold until they experience a radical emotional upheaval.

Is there then such phenomenon as conversion in India? The answer is an emphatic affirmative, but the term connotes an experience that is typically Indian. The largest percentage of accessions to the church come from the Hindu community, and these "converts" have as the antecedent to their Christian experiences a social life that is the result of centuries of Hindu tradition. Those who come into the Christian church from the higher caste communities have a heritage of culture into which various strands have been interwoven including the illusory character of empirical life, the ultimate reality of the ideal, the absorption of the self in the corporate life of the group and of the universe, the impossibility of scientific knowledge and yet the necessity for super-sensual knowledge, emphasis on symbolism and ritualism in the attempt to give form and vitality to the shadowy concepts of the idealistic consciousness, together with many survivals of magic, tabu, animism, phallicism, and other practices of primitivity. Those who enter the

Christian community from the lower caste or non-caste groups have an inheritance of ideas, customs, and rites that is also composite, but partakes less of the rational and more of the ceremonial and magical. Indeed the social life of India is so sharply stratified, and the various communities so precisely demarked from one another both theoretically and practically, that it is quite impossible to give any general description in terms of a group consciousness that will be characteristic of all. Each concrete situation must be studied on its own merits, to determine the significance of the various constitutive elements of its life.

Conversion in India involves the process of gradually Christianizing a life with a background that may be characterized somewhat as above. It is quite as illogical to expect to up-root a man from his old Hindu cultural soil and transplant him in Christian soil without any preparation of either plant or soil, as it would be to up-root a banana tree from the tropics and transplant it in the frigid zone, expecting it to thrive. There is required a good deal of careful preparation, and constant nurture. Indian Christians do not spring up like mushrooms. They are the outcome of a gradual evolution.

Conversion in India is frequently a decidedly social phenomenon. Some experienced missionaries place no faith in its permanence unless it be so. When a whole village or a hamlet or any group which possesses a fair measure of solidarity decides after mature consideration that it will become identified with the Christian faith there is a strong probability that the movement will be stable. One cannot be certain in the case of isolated individuals. The social pull back to the old group life may prove too strong unless reinforced by a group of like-minded men. For that reason the mass movement so often the subject of unfriendly criticism has in the long run shown more evidence of genuineness and stability than has the work where isolated men have come. It is altogether a stupid misunderstanding of the social situation to speak of the fruitage of mass movements as "windfalls" and of the individual conversions as "picked fruit." The fact is that the so-called windfalls suffer much less from deteriorating bruises than do the misnamed picked fruit because they have a group sanction for their conversion which the others do not have.

Religious experiences of an intense and rapturous nature are not uncommon among Indians. The atmosphere of mysticism that characterizes Hinduism is well adapted to cultivate experiences of an ecstatic type. Indeed the religion of mysticism has a peculiar appeal to the Indian temperament. The literatures of India abound with accounts

of such experiences. From these Mr. Annett has selected a few which he uses as a basis for an attempt to prove that true satisfaction for this felt need can only be obtained through mystic union with the personal Jesus Christ. The placing of this chapter in his book must mean also that the author believes it lends strength to the expectancy of sudden religious upheavals culminating in a conversion to Christianity. Surely this biographical literature is immensely valuable as an unfolding of the operations of the Indian consciousness when it is dealing with the religious life and gives us suggestions as to a warm type of faith and piety which we may expect from our Indian brothers. But the connection between these experiences and the phenomenon of conversion seems to be neither logical nor psychological. We are getting a much more scientific treatment of this literature in those volumes of *The Heritage of India Series* which deal with the various Indian literatures.

There is no field in the world that offers a more bewitching and yet bewildering scope for the psychological examination of religious experience than India. The seriousness of the people toward religious problems is compelling. The multiplicity and multiformity of beliefs and rites are appalling. The chasms between the high and the low, and the apparent contradictions are confusing. Yet for the psychologist the field may be almost described as virgin. It would be of immense value for the progress of Christianity in India if every missionary were trained in the groundwork of social psychology.

ANGUS STEWART WOODBURNE

MADRAS, INDIA

CURRENT EVENTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Is There Anything in Prayer?—This is the title of a very suggestive discussion by J. Edward Park in the *Atlantic Monthly* for October, 1921. He declares that the conventional way of picturing prayer is artificial. A triangle is imagined in which the petitioner and the object of his solicitude are bases, and God is the apex. The praying person "sends up a prayer to God, which God considers, and, if it seems good to him sends down the answer." In reality there is no such triangle. The experience of prayer and of its "answer" are simple aspects of one and the same total experience. In any crisis of life where intense desire for some event exists, there is a surplus of emotion which cannot be expressed in action. When one has done all he can, he must await the outcome. If the unsatisfied desire meanwhile finds no wholesome outlet, worry, fear, and morbidness result. In prayer one gives a constructive outlet for longing, and assumes a co-operative attitude toward the cosmic forces which determine the outcome. The situation is thus changed by prayer, and different results in experience actually occur. "Prayer is not asking God to change the course of things, but asking him to help me to be a part of that course of things."

Is Naturalism Really Scientific?—Professor Herbert A. Youtz raises this pertinent question in a stimulating discussion entitled "A Missing World" (the *Personalist*, April and July, 1921). Just as the movements of the planet Uranus showed inexplicable variations until the new planet Neptune was discovered, so a purely mechanistic philosophy encounters disturbing phenomena so long as it attempts to do away with human personality. Professor Youtz insists that a real science must face *all* the facts. He contends as earnestly as do the advocates of naturalism that we must interpret all reality in terms of an evolutionary process. Personality is not to be saved by withdrawing it. "Man is bound up in the cosmic process as definitely as any animal. . . . All of our highest powers and capacities are linked by processes to the earlier stages and the lower animal powers. Mind itself is inseparable from brain. It is all one process, parts of one fact." But when beings with intelligence and conscience emerge, "you have an actor and not a thing or a puppet." "The cosmic process goes on, but man measurably

controls it and directs it and makes it work his purposes." To ignore or to obscure this fact is unscientific. Those who interpret the meaning of personal life—the theologians and philosophers—are as essential in a genuinely scientific world as are the scientists themselves.

What about Social Radicalism in the Churches?—Professor Harry F. Ward in the *Methodist Review* (September, 1921), raises this question in an article entitled "Which Way Will Methodism Go?" Shall the church become a defender and bulwark of the present social order? Or shall it be expected and encouraged to ask critical questions and to arouse debate over unsatisfactory conditions? There have been some notable attempts of late—especially in connection with the financial support of the Young Women's Christian Association—to persuade those interested in capitalistic control to withhold funds wherever Christian organizations are suspected of sympathy with radical social reforms. Professor Ward calls attention to the fact that the bulk of Methodist membership is rural and small town. "This section has long had an economic grievance against the financial world and its control of credit, transportation, and distribution." Public sentiment may thus be counted on to support a sober criticism of industrial conditions. The attempt to obscure the issue by bringing to the front theological controversy will fail, for not all theological modernists are social radicals, nor are "fundamentalists" inevitably conservative on industrial questions. A real passion for social regeneration will, Professor Ward believes, arouse a spirit of enthusiasm in Methodism. His diagnosis would seem to fit equally such a denomination as the Baptists, and all whose membership is recruited by evangelism among the common people.

What about Religious Leadership in Protestantism?—Professor Franklin H. Giddings in the *Independent*, August 20, 1921, presents a startling situation in Protestant churches. There are five thousand vacant pulpits this year in America and another five thousand will need ministers next year. But the seminaries have turned out only one thousand six hundred graduates this year. And not all of them can be counted on for ministerial service. While colleges and universities are over-crowded, why has the theological seminary a small attendance? Dr. Giddings' analysis of the present situation of the Protestant churches and their failing influence in the last generation, finds three outstanding causes: (1) bad theology, (2) bad Christianity, (3) bad Protestantism. His solution is concretely stated: "The Protes-

tant churches can save themselves if, and *only* if, they stand with courage and conviction for: (1) Intellectual honesty, attested by a respectful demeanor toward scientific thinking and historical scholarship; (2) Regeneration, attested by honest work and honest dealing; (3) Faith in regenerative forces, attested by liberty of conscience and respect for the free, moral agency of individual fellowmen."

The same facts form the basis of Glenn Frank's editorial comment in the *Century* for September. It is evident that for some reason the Protestant ministry does not attract students enough to supply the need for educated leaders. The precise difficulty is hard to determine. Undoubtedly the economic situation is a potent factor. Until churches are ready to give financial support to men of ability they cannot expect the best service. Even more important, however, is the sense of an opportunity to accomplish really big things. Here freedom to experiment is imperative. But the conservative tendencies of religion tend to put a premium on conventional activities and ideas.

The Religion of G. Bernard Shaw.—In the *Independent*, July 23, Preston Slosson tells of the religious experiences of Shaw. He was brought up in traditional Calvinism with its emphasis on supernaturalism and divine interventions. He regarded the teachings of Charles Darwin as destructive to the foundations of this religion. But gradually Shaw came to believe that Darwin was an honest naturalist trying to work out the theory of natural selection. But evolution could not be wholly explained on that theory for Shaw held that the creative energy of organic nature did not merely result from chance survival. It was through biology that Shaw found his present creed. He now believes that life is divine and that God is doing his best unceasingly in human evolution toward better things. Man has a sacred moral obligation to help God to perform this great task.

Should the Churches Scold the Colleges or Help Them?—This important question is raised by Rev. T. H. Taylor, in the *American Church Monthly*, August, 1921. Children both at home and in the church are too often fed religiously with mere conventional doctrines. When they are suddenly plunged into the freedom of the colleges and universities, they become bewildered. The wreck of faith is not entirely due to storms of the sea or the dangers of the voyage but largely to the improper fitting out of the ships before they leave the sheltered harbor of home and church. The intellectual difficulties of our day are inevitable. The church must be ready to help her youth to face the crises. First,

the ministers and the Sunday-school teachers need more definite courage to recognize the changes wrought in the traditional ideas and to be intellectually honest in dealing with the youth. Secondly, the minister should make more definite systematic efforts to acquaint people in his parish with the proven results of modern thought and to interpret these conclusions in a religious way.

Has the Church the Right to Judge Economic Questions?—Economic heresy hunters are a feature of modern religious life. They discredit certain leaders of the social movement in the churches, or cut off funds from religious organizations that utter moral judgment concerning industrial conditions and relations. This situation is discussed by Professor Harry F. Ward in the *Nation*, August 24, 1921. If the church has any right to give moral judgments on economic questions, that right must be derived from its ability to know the exact facts and on the basis of these to make a plan for human rights. It is deplorable that so frequently ministers are handicapped by inadequate knowledge in their endeavors to interpret the world of human passions. None the less the church must insist on its right to stand in defense of the spiritual interests of men. And this right it is staunchly defending today.

Democratizing Philanthropy.—Social betterment has been, in the past, a gift from the few to the many. Should it not rather be the co-operative effort of all? Mrs. Cornelia J. Cannon, in an article called "Philanthropic Doubts" in the *Atlantic Monthly* for September, states the case for organized activity, to replace the "orgy of charitable activity" that has characterized the last thirty years in America. "Our task is," she says, "not buttressing the weaknesses of our fellows with our strength, but organizing the energies of man to reconstruct his world."

Writing as a Side-Line for Ministers.—The *Writer* for August has a suggestive article, "Writing as a Side-Line for Ministers": "It would help many . . . ministers . . . to keep from growing rusty if they would use their spare time for side-line writing for magazines. It would quicken them intellectually, inspire them to better service, increase their audience, and awaken them to renewed interest in life. . . . Being a minister," the author, Mr. William S. Poole, continues, "I find much difference between preaching a sermon to the people of a congregation who take what I give them because I am their minister, and submitting an article to some editor at 'usual rates' and getting

a rejection slip because I did not measure up. . . . This grindstone keeps my ax sharpened." He mentions the many ways in which a minister has the qualification for doing effective Christian work through the press.

The Women's Congress in Vienna.—The Third Congress of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom was held in Vienna during the month of July, with Miss Jane Addams presiding. Representatives from twenty-eight countries came as delegates, fraternal delegates, or visitors, and conferred with each other upon matters relating to the peace and freedom of a reconstructed world. Miss Florence Kelley, reporting the congress in the *Survey* for September, says: "In general the resolutions introduced by the national sections and from the floor, by their number, variety, and the tenacity with which several were advocated, registered growth in confidence, keeping step with the growth of women's political power since the first congress at the Hague in 1915."

Significant among the resolutions adopted were those bearing upon the problems of education, such as the resolution in favor of abolishing corporal punishment in all institutions, including reformatories; and for protecting children against misuse for political purposes. The focal point of a discussion of state or ecclesiastical control of education was a question put by Madame Duchêne of Paris: "If the self-governing nations cannot control their schools in the interest of the people, and of the future peace of the world, what is the basis of our hope that we can control any part of our government?"

A cable message from the congress carried congratulations to President Harding on calling an International Conference for the Limitation of Armaments, and the congress committed itself to a program of demonstrations in favor of immediate world-wide disarmament in the week previous to the conference.

Mobilizing Christian Public Opinion.—The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America is performing an invaluable service in voicing the sentiments of Christian people. The following letter to President Harding is significant:

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, through its Commission on International Justice and Good-Will, desires to express to you its profound satisfaction in your invitation to other nations to join in a Conference on the Limitation of Armaments.

We rejoice in the step thus taken and earnestly hope that it may lead to some concerted plan by which general disarmament may be brought about.

We are convinced that this action would be of incalculable significance in making larger funds available for the constructive tasks of peace, in removing suspicion and misunderstanding among the nations, in abolishing war, and in promoting international good-will and brotherhood.

In declaring our conviction on this great moral issue, we are confident that we are voicing the sentiment of the overwhelming majority in all of the thirty denominations that comprise the Federal Council. At the meeting of the whole council last December, attended by official representatives of all these churches, action was taken urging our government "to co-operate fully with the governments of the world for the achievement of general disarmament." Similar action has been taken independently by practically all official church assemblies since that time. Beyond any question the religious forces of the nation are united in their desire to secure the early adoption, both nationally and internationally, of a thorough-going policy for the limitation of armaments.

We are, therefore, grateful to you for the step you have taken, pledge ourselves to use our best efforts to arouse the minds of the people to the moral principles that are at stake, and assure you that your action is supported by our united prayer that the coming conference may result in rich blessing to mankind.

A Creed for Peace-loving Christians.—The Commission on International Justice and Goodwill, of the Federal Council of Churches, has formulated the following:

CREED FOR BELIEVERS IN A WARLESS WORLD

Isaiah 2:2-4

- I. WE BELIEVE in a sweeping reduction of armaments.
- II. WE BELIEVE in international laws, courts of justice, and boards of arbitration.
- III. WE BELIEVE in a world-wide association of nations for world peace.
- IV. WE BELIEVE in equality of race treatment.
- V. WE BELIEVE that Christian patriotism demands the practice of goodwill between nations.
- VI. WE BELIEVE that nations no less than individuals are subject to God's immutable moral laws.
- VII. WE BELIEVE that peoples achieve true welfare, greatness and honor through just dealing and unselfish service.
- VIII. WE BELIEVE that nations that are Christian have special international obligations.
- IX. WE BELIEVE that the spirit of Christian brotherhood can conquer every barrier of trade, color, creed, and race.
- X. WE BELIEVE in a warless world, and dedicate ourselves to its achievement.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE RELIGIONS OF MANKIND¹

For a long time to come it will be a daring feat for any single man to write a history of the religions of the world. When one remembers the vast array of scholars who have labored in the fields of documentary criticism, history, and doctrine to achieve what we know of the development of Christianity, the task before the writer who would deal with all religions seems appalling. Why not then a co-operative work done by a group of specialists? The answer is that there is no such group of specialists who are sufficiently agreed on method to make their work a unity. Until that consensus as to method is achieved we shall be grateful that individual scholars like Professor Soper are brave enough to undertake the task. His work deals with all the great living religions as well as those of Egypt, Mesopotamia, Greece, and Rome. It is delightfully easy to read and has the great virtue of clarity. Most writers of history of religions get lost in the forest of facts, confuse and weary the reader, so that the main line of the religious development is lost. Professor Soper avoids that danger and has produced a work which is probably the best in English for the beginner in the field.

One questions the advisability of including the chapter on "animistic religion." Certainly it should not be under that antiquated Tylorean title, but "primitive religion," the author notes, is no better. As a matter of fact there is no such thing as animistic or primitive religion which can be described in one sweeping picture. Perhaps "Beginnings of Religion" might be a better title, but then does not the subject belong to the psychology rather than to the history of religion? Magic, taboo, fetishism, totemism, sacrifice, are not precisely the same in all religious groups and the historical thing would seem to be to deal with them as they appear, carrying their peculiar meaning, in the story of the beginning of each religious development.

A serious defect of the book is that the religions are interpreted too much in terms of gods, beliefs, and ideas, rather than in terms of social situations. Religion is rooted in life; and gods, cult, and creeds emerge as a people solves its life problems. The history of a religion should

¹ *The Religions of Mankind*. Edmund Davison Soper. New York: Abingdon Press, 1921. 344 pages. \$3.00.

follow the developing social life, its interests, needs, and problems and show how their satisfaction, solution, or frustration produced the characteristic religious forms and beliefs of the people. Only so is it possible to understand their joy in a religion different from that of other peoples. This probably accounts for the fact that the author condemns some things and often regrets that other religions did not achieve the exalted ideas of God and salvation attained in Christianity. The reason is in the social situation and the task of the historian of religion is to understand it.

Professor Soper has chosen deliberately to give to his book an apologetic cast in the interest of Christianity as he interprets it. His philosophic presupposition is that God has been progressively revealing himself to the peoples as they were able to receive the truth and that he has revealed himself most completely in Jesus Christ. There can be no objection to this position if one is writing apologetics. It is just so that modern Buddhist and Moslem writers are presenting their own religions. But for all things there is a time—a time for apologetics and a time for history of religions. They do not belong together. The sacred duty of the scientific student of religions is not to pity, nor to preach, nor to condemn, but to understand and to interpret. And yet, in spite of its apologetics, which may indeed commend it to the general reader, the Christian pastor, and beginning students to whom it is addressed, the book is a welcome addition to the literature of the science.

A. EUSTACE HAYDON

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ISRAEL AND EGYPT¹

This is the work of a busy pastor in Glasgow. The amount of labor that has gone into the making of this book is amazing. Mr. Knight has read almost everything of importance upon the subject and he has reported his reading accurately. The care that is shown in the proof-reading is typical of the whole work. The book is a veritable mine of information upon Egypt and Palestine and will constitute a monument to the diligence of the author.

The historical value of this book is open to serious question. The reviewer will not concern himself with its contribution to the history of Egypt, except to point out that Mr. Knight takes Petrie as his guide for

¹ *Nile and Jordan. An Archaeological History of the Inter-Relations between Egypt and Palestine from the Earliest Times to the Fall of Jerusalem in A.D. 70.* G. A. Frank Knight. London: James Clarke and Co., 1921. xii+572 pages. 5 maps. 36s.

the most part and consequently adopts the longer chronology. For example, he places the beginning of the First Dynasty at 5510 B.C., in contrast to Erman, Meyer, Breasted, *et al.*, who put it at about 3500 B.C. He follows Hommel in making Egyptian civilization to have originated in Babylonia, whence it was brought to Egypt by Semitic invaders, who were in turn conquered by the Egyptians to whom, however, the Semites taught the arts of civilization.

In the field of Hebrew history, there can be no serious difference of judgment on the part of historical students as to the slight value of Mr. Knight's treatment. It is innocent of any knowledge of historical method. There is no sharp discrimination in the evaluation of sources. The Chronicler ranks high as a credible historian. The Targum, Josephus, Manetho, the Apocrypha, and the Apostle Stephen all come in for recognition as witnesses to the history of the ancient world and are given much weight as preserving ancient traditions. The Song of Songs furnishes "facts" as to Solomon. All is grist to Mr. Knight's mill. The plagues recorded in Exodus actually happened as there related. The tabernacle of the Priestly Code was an actual building as described. The story of Joseph, including the episode with Potiphar's wife, is literally true as told. It is refreshing after wandering so long in uncertainty about early Hebrew chronology, to turn to Mr. Knight's table and find that Isaac was born in 2065 B.C., Abraham died in 1990 B.C., Moses was born in 1525 B.C., the Exodus occurred in 1445 B.C., Moses died in 1405 B.C., and David was born in 1039 B.C. and died in 969 B.C. The "Pharaoh of the Oppression" was Thothmes III and Amenhotep II was the Pharaoh of the Exodus. Queen Hatshepset was the daughter of Pharaoh who saved the life of the infant Moses.

One end that Mr. Knight had in view in writing this book was to stress the influence exerted by Egypt upon the life and thought of the Hebrews. This is a perfectly proper purpose and is in the main right. It is practically certain that the influence of Egypt upon Hebrew life has so far been underestimated. But Mr. Knight overdoes the matter. He sees Egyptian influence where there is no reason to see it. For example, why must Job's longing for a record of his words inscribed upon the rock be connected with the rock-inscriptions of Egypt? Was not the rock of Behistun known to the Hebrews of that day? The Assuan colony had an Aramaic copy of the Behistun inscription. Were there not rock-cut inscriptions in Sinai and on the Dog River? Again, why must Job's reference to "clay under the seal" argue for Egyptian influence? Was not the seal well known in Palestine itself, to say nothing of the clay tablets and the seals of Babylonia? When Job says, "Oh,

that I knew where I might find him, that I might come even to his seat!" must we see an Egyptian background? Were gods enthroned only in Egypt? The Code of Hammurabi, for example, represents Shamash, the sun-god, as seated upon his throne delivering the laws to the king. Is it to be supposed that contemporary Persian or Greek god were never thought of as sitting down? Need we go abroad at all to account for Yahweh's being thought of as seated upon a throne? Such claims as these weaken an otherwise good case. In so far as Mr. Knight succeeds in impressing upon his readers the fact that the relations between the life of Egypt and the life of Palestine were continuous and intimate, his work will be of service in enlightening the present age regarding the unity of the civilization of the ancient oriental world.

J. M. POWIS SMITH

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A NEW THEORY OF GOSPEL ORIGINS¹

Mr. Robinson Smith's solution of the Synoptic Problem, as readers of his earlier publications know, is the simple one "that Luke followed on after Matthew and used him as a source, even as Matthew followed on after Mark and used him as a source." To the demonstration and elaboration of this thesis, with related investigations, the present volume is dedicated. There are five main lines of argument, summarily presented in the first chapter. Proof 1, which Mr. Smith seems to regard as most telling, consists of a list of twenty-two passages in Mark, of which Matthew in eighteen cases chose the first part and Luke the second, or what was left after Matthew had had "first choice." Proof 2 consists in over one hundred and fifty passages in which Luke "consciously or unconsciously" agrees with Matthew in the latter's alterations of his Markan source. Only a half dozen of these are given; for the rest reference is made to E. A. Abbott's *Corrections of Mark*, and to Sir John Hawkins. Proof 3 is the citation of nineteen passages in which Luke seems to change further Matthew's changes from Mark. Proof 4 is based on eleven passages in which Luke pieces together a detail from Mark and a detail from Matthew. Proof 5 consists of four doublets in Luke, one of which comes from Mark, the other, says Mr. Smith, from Matthew.

If these five lines of proof could be substantiated, without discount, they would indeed make a very strong case. But a careful examination

¹ *The Solution of the Synoptic Problem*. Robinson Smith. London: Watts and Co., 1920. 10s. net.

will show that they are subject to a considerable discount. The citation of passages is always in English. In the discussion of Proof 1, to be sure, Mr. Smith says, "Let us see that the demonstration holds good in the original Greek as well. We find that it does." If he had printed the passages in Greek the critical reader would often be dubious. We are asked to believe, for example, that Luke having Mark and Matthew both before him, read in Mark 10:38, *δύνασθε πιεῖν τὸ ποτήριον ὃ ἐγὼ πίνω ἢ τὸ βάπτισμα ὃ ἐγὼ βαπτίζομαι βαπτισθῆναι*; he then read in Matt. 20:22 *δύνασθε πιεῖν τὸ ποτήριον ὃ ἐγὼ μέλλω πίνειν*; and decided that he could not use this phrase, since Matthew had already done so. But there was left the question as to the baptism, which he took and used in a wholly different context and setting, as well as in a wholly different wording (12:50) *βάπτισμα δὲ ἔχω βαπτισθῆναι καὶ πῶς συνέχομαι ἕως ὅτου τελεσθῇ*. Who can make such a procedure on Luke's part plausible, or assign to it any possible motive? And what of the numberless cases where Matthew or Luke, or both, take over the *whole* of the Markan original?

Alternative hypotheses, which would explain the alleged phenomena, are not given a hearing. The existence of Q is flatly denied, as is that of any *Ur-marcus*. No allowance is made for accidental agreement or divergence, for scribal conformation of one text to another, for the influence of other possible sources. The whole line of argument has something mechanical about it; in the author's own words, it is "almost mathematical in its precision." Not thus is justice done to those who are writing the Gospel.

But the general student will probably be most interested in Mr. Smith's further demonstrations. The earliest gospel, he argues, is the Gospel according to the Hebrews, written about 80 A.D.; on this is based our Mark (*ca.* 105 A.D.). Our Matthew follows about 120 A.D., based on Hebrews and Mark, written in Syriac, then translated into Greek. About 140 A.D. comes John, and about 145 A.D. Luke; each of these is based upon all its predecessors.

The earliest epistles (Pauline and non-Pauline alike) are written in the last two decades of the first century, and are sources of the Gospels. The Pastorals are probably written by Luke. This sequence is arrived at in a perfectly mechanical fashion; if similar (even slightly similar) language occurs in two separate documents, one has borrowed from the other and is therefore later. Just how one is to decide infallibly which is borrower is not always made clear. The general result of all this Mr. Smith sums up as follows: "Nearly every road that one follows up

leads, not to negative results, but to the negation of some fact in the Christian religion or the life of Christ." The essentially supernatural elements of the gospel story are "falsified accounts." The crucifixion story is made up of elements borrowed or invented. The evangelists seem to have had singularly little conscience, moral or literary. Luke is peculiarly culpable. "He knew very little of what he was writing about, committing blunder after blunder, and thus discredits the Christian message as a whole." Thus the primitive Christian documents, proven so very corrupt, can no longer serve as the basis of our faith. "Until we learn better, then, it would seem our duty to base our religion on the safe and simple practice of wisdom and goodness, rather than on the uncertainty of anything come down from above."

Exactly one-half of the book is given up to a reprint of the author's *Consecutive Life of Christ*, a fusion of the four Gospels into one continuous narrative, which originally appeared in 1911. The text has been revised.

CLAYTON R. BOWEN

MEADVILLE THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

GEORGE BURMAN FOSTER'S LECTURES ON THEOLOGY¹

At the time of his death, December 22, 1918, Professor Foster occupied the chair of the Philosophy of Religion in the University of Chicago. Some years previously he had been professor of Systematic Theology in the Divinity School of the same institution. A comprehensive statement of his theological views was never prepared for publication by him but, fortunately, extensive notes of his classroom lectures were left in manuscript. These, supplemented by student notes taken substantially verbatim by the editor, are now made accessible to students of theology in the work under review. The preparation of this work for publication by the editor is a labor for which all the old students of Dr. Foster will be profoundly grateful. It is true that this work represents his interpretation of Christianity some twelve years prior to his death and one must presume that such a keenly inquiring mind as his must have moved forward beyond some of the positions taken here. But Professor Macintosh, who had singular opportunities to know his opinions, says in the Preface, after referring to Dr. Foster's confession of the deepening of one's faith in God through the experiences of tragedy in one's life:

¹ *Christianity in Its Modern Expression*. George Burman Foster, edited by Douglas Clyde Macintosh. New York: Macmillan. xii+294 pages. \$3.75.

With all allowance for such modifications of opinion as are to be expected from time to time in the mind of so eager and incessant a thinker, I believe it may be said that this book as it stands represents in the main those moral and religious convictions to which in the various vicissitudes of life this sincere lover of truth was ever wont to return after all investigation and reflection.

The work comprises two treatises, dealing respectively with the dogmatics and the ethics of the Christian religion. Both are incomplete, particularly the second. The procedure in both is the same, from a discussion of the "Foundation" to the "Superstructure" of each. The separation is not altogether natural to one inclined to pragmatism, the ethics being really a continuation of the dogmatics. It seems to me, however, that in spirit the work belongs to apologetics rather than to dogmatics, since it is evident from the outset that the author is much less concerned with the task of elaborating a body of specific Christian doctrines or beliefs than with the prior question of the possibility of a truly scientific theology and the method of doctrinal formulation that shall be in accord with the character of the Christian religious experience, on the one hand, and the actual processes of the real, objective world, on the other. Throughout the author is the student, the inquirer, rather than the dogmatician. Formal doctrinal statements there are, but they are distributed through the book rather disconnectedly and mingled with expressions of personal feeling and conviction or startling questions and surprising digressions. It is doubtful that a modern theologian can be found who is more thoroughly aware of the supreme issues theology must face today because of the tremendous changes that have recently come over the spirit of the thinking public, or who is more modestly aware of the imperfect character of all those formal statements that attempt to exhibit to intelligence the inner movement of the modern Christian spirit Godward and manward. Dr. Foster was evidently in search of a theology when he wrote these notes and his work tends to *awaken* the minds of young men rather than to *satisfy* them. For him, as thinker, Christianity was not so much a solution of mental difficulties as it was a prodigious problem and in spirit he was more a mystic than a rationalist.

The opening sentences are indicative of the attitude throughout the entire work:

The dogmatics of the Christian religion *seeks* [italics mine] to give a scientific exposition of the Christian faith. It is a doctrine of faith, of the content of faith, and therefore of the world of faith, i.e., a world which faith affirms to be reality. But it is precisely on this account that the fundamental difficulty of dogmatics arises, viz., How can the invisible spiritual *reality*

[*italics the author's*] affirmed by faith become an object of scientific investigation and exposition?

Subjective, personal faith is what he is thinking of. He desires to find a way of regarding it as more than subjective, that is, as constituting a world of reality in which believing spirits live. But his problem, which remains unsolved, is, how to relate this inner world of faith to the world of historical occurrence and external observation. Is the faith-world to be affirmed in spite of the other real world, or alongside of it but equally true, or because of it, or must one or the other be declared illusion? It seems to me that, on the whole, the second of these positions is the author's. Science *is* and so is faith. Science must be free and so must faith. If possible, they must be reconciled and unified, but that remains a problem still awaiting solution. The work labors under the disadvantage of the Ritschlian effort to secure religion against the dangers of scientific investigation by assigning to it a separate realm where it may reign, no matter what science may discover, instead of finding in religious faith the unity of our whole life and seeing in science one of the forms in which it operates. What is the world of faith but that same world which is the object of scientific investigation and exposition?

The author seeks to lay the foundation of Christian dogmatics in a discovery of the essence and vindication of the truth of the Christian religion. The fundamental distinction of religion from other sides of the spiritual life lies in "the certainty of a supramundane power on which we, together with the world, are totally dependent," toward which there is a surrender of will and a feeling of confidence, and with which there is an effort to obtain personal communion (pp. 11, 12). This definition is evidently drawn from Christianity itself rather than from a generalization of religions. Religion is said to be one of man's spiritual activities, essentially different (pp. 18, 19) from the aesthetic, the scientific and the moral, though allied with them. But does not this attempt to protect religion against the entanglements which these involve, deprive it of its dignity by limiting it to one phase of life instead of making it the whole? Its dignity and supreme worth seem thereby endangered.

Classifying religions as nature religions, folk religions, and redemption religions, Christianity is placed among the last. In distinction from mystical and pessimistic redemption religions, "Christianity is historical redemption-religion *par excellence*" in that its faith centers in the historical Jesus who lives through history as the "abiding ground and immediate object of personal faith." It is ethical redemption, whose good consists in unity of character with the perfect God and with

all the children of God (pp. 29, 30). Well said, indeed, but is it not thereby too negatively conceived? Is not Christianity creative firstly and redemptive secondarily? Is it not deliverance from the lower because it is attainment of the higher? Is not the "trustful surrender to Jesus Christ" in the first instance an identification of the purpose of our life with his? In places the author seems to turn to this view. For example, he says (p. 41), "Eternity is the persistence of the worthwhile through the mutations and illusions of the temporal; it is essentially continuation of values. Eternity is thus not a gift, but an achievement."

When it comes to the question of the truth of the Christian religion it is pointed out (p. 35) that "the collapse of all efforts at proof is grounded in the character and limits of theoretical cognition." The reality of the faith-content of Christianity transcends these modes of knowledge. The standard orthodox proofs are outlined and shown to culminate in the affirmation that we know the Scriptures are divinely inspired "by the inner witness of the Holy Spirit, who, as we read in the Holy Scriptures, recognizes his own work therein." "Good again," says the author (p. 37), "but how shall we be certain that this really originates from the Holy Spirit, and not from our own spirit? Here the thread of the orthodox view snaps." Is there anything fundamentally different offered in its stead? For answer we are referred (p. 39) to the Christian's inner "certainty" of a supreme goal of filial communion with God as "unconditionally worthwhile and obligating," of a free uplift above guilt and weakness, pain and death. What guarantees the certainty of the absolutely worthwhile? The answer is (p. 45), "a disclosure belonging to human history . . . the person and spirit-work of Jesus Christ." That which was "inexpugnably certain to Jesus on the basis of his inner experience" becomes ours as the effect of "the impression" which his person and work make on us. Thus we pass to the idea of revelation. Our certainty rests on the "central revelation of God" in his (Jesus') spiritual person and effectiveness. Thus we become certain of God. "It is God in him that does it. The object of faith is God himself; but the disclosure of God is in the spirit and disposition of Jesus. Not Jesus with God, but God in Jesus is the object of religious faith." This is a very different thing from certainty of the historicity of the career of Jesus (p. 46). It is a value-judgment. "The certainty we need is religious as against historical certainty. Its basis is not an historical inquiry, but a moral and religious experience." The truth of Christianity is thus assured by revelation. "Revelation is an historical phenomenon which is yet super-historical in content and kind." How then do we know that the revelation is real? We know it because we

experience it, that is, we feel and esteem it to be such. Thus the author makes the great leap into the transcendent, as do the orthodox and the mystics.

The body of the work, so far as it is a coherent whole, elaborates these positions under the rubrics of traditional theology. It is evident that the principal factors which co-operate in these lectures are four: First, the traditional Christian dogmas as respects both their form and their content; second, the conviction that the worth of any theological dogma reposes on the manner in which it springs from religious experience and ministers to the spirit of religion; third, the necessity of satisfying the claims of the scientific and philosophic spirit by exhibiting the genuine knowledge of reality inherent in faith; fourth, the feeling that the ultimate test of the truth of any doctrine is found in the guidance and strength it furnishes for the practical issues of life. These, it seems to me, are to receive emphasis in any theological effort of the present day. Of this Dr. Foster was well aware and he approached his problem with courage, though he was probably conscious of having done less in the end to solve his problem than he hoped for at the outset.

As respects the first of these factors, he follows the main traditional order, namely, God and the world (Man is subsumed under the world), God and Jesus Christ the Lord, God and the Holy Spirit. (The last, as the editor points out, does not here appear under that head but much of the material pertaining to it is supplied in the ethics.) It is to be kept in mind that his acceptance of the revelation of God as in some sense trinitarian was not based on its supposed origin from an authoritative source or on the belief that it was truly biblical. On the latter point he says (p. 99), "the ecclesiastical doctrine of the trinity is not a synthesis of the content of the Scriptures but rests upon violent interpretation of single sayings in the Scriptures." "At the same time he says (p. 99), "the religious basic views of Christianity gave impulse to its formation in the old church," and, "in the Reformation the evangelical knowledge of salvation was interpreted in the use of the traditional doctrine of the trinity." His interest in the doctrine rested on his interest in the progress of the Christian religious spirit. The doctrine expressed, though defectively, the life of Christians in the spirit. The soul of Dr. Foster's theology is to be found in the second of the factors named above. It was because he loved and lived the religious life that he theologized. He regarded the older life with reverence because the higher life of the present grew out of it but also transcended it. And it must, therefore, seek more adequate expression than the older formulations supplied. He says (p. 102):

The vital essence of trinitarianism is the idea of world-upholding holy love, with its self-revelation in history and its self-communication to the individual. . . . But in distinction from the ecclesiastical doctrine of the trinity, we have not reached three hypostases, but only three sides (modes of operation) of the Divine Being actively disclosing himself.

The author persistently seeks by the aid of science and philosophy to set forth consistently the knowledge-content of Christian faith but he does not entertain for a moment the supposition that faith must wait upon either science or philosophy for its right to live. They are, rather, its servants. But one could wish that, instead of giving to religion, as he seems to do, a self-guaranteed place beside them, he had sought to set forth the wholeness and unity which all the spiritual capacities of men find in the exercise of religious faith. It would be in entire keeping with the spirit of the author. He was profoundly a religious man, held to his faith amid all the trials of life and made it his purpose to impart that faith to all, though it was done in a way which most of his contemporaries who heard of him failed to appreciate duly.

GEORGE CROSS

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PRINCIPAL GARVIE ON PREACHING¹

The long-expected volume in the International Theological Library from the hand of Principal Alfred Ernest Garvie of New College, London, is entitled *The Christian Preacher*. This applies strictly to only the second part of the volume; the first 271 pages being devoted to a survey in large outline of the history of Christian preaching. This serves as a desirable introduction to the second section, and may seem to many readers as the more interesting and profitable part of the book. This first part contains ten chapters. Large obligation to Hering, Ker, and Dargan is recognized. The names chosen are selected with fine discrimination. The quotations are given with excellent insight. For example, the excerpt from the sermon of Bernard of Clairvaux in preaching the Second Crusade is more valuable than pages of description would have been. Fuller quotation would have increased the value of the book. The example of spiritualizing a text, given from Thomas Aquinas (p. 113), is better than many paragraphs describing the method and warning a preacher against it as a homiletic habit. This touch upon sources is a valuable factor in Dr. Garvie's work. The method in this first section is topical rather than chronological, although the larger divisions of history are generally regarded; this adds to our interest,

¹ *The Christian Preacher*. Alfred Ernest Garvie. New York: Scribner, 1921. xxvii+490 pages. \$3.50.

but involves a certain loss in clearness. The chapter, "Priest, Monk, and Friar," is one of the most interesting; the section on Puritan preaching is exceedingly well done; the last chapters are too crowded. The section devoted to missionaries is a scant sketch of foreign missions rather than a study of preaching by missionaries, where a definite piece of needed work might have been done in delineating the typical forms of preaching that Christian foreign missions have developed. An American reader feels that something should have been said concerning the continuity of the Puritan tradition in the colonial preaching in America; that Bushnell should have been at least mentioned; that the pulpit service of the New England theologians deserved a section. In a footnote on page 253 Dr. Garvie explains his scanty reference to Henry Ward Beecher on the ground that "Dargan has reserved for a third volume the treatment of preaching in the United States, so that no reference to him [Beecher] can be given." Surely this is a slim excuse in view of the abundant Beecher literature, especially the *Life* by Lyman Abbott.

Turning to the second section, we find three chapters devoted to the different aspects of the preacher's character and work. These gather up the best that has been written in available homiletic literature and add discerning reflections by Dr. Garvie. They present the most clear and satisfactory studies of this sort that we know, not even the books of Dr. Charles E. Jefferson surpassing them. Pages 283 ff. on the preacher's use of the results of modern scholarship ought to be burned into the mind of every minister in America. Dr. Garvie has fused fearlessness and reverence, courage and common-sense in a rare way. Nothing could be finer than this section. The counsel concerning the work of the preacher as evangelist is also most timely and vital. The final section is devoted to the technique of sermon preparation and delivery. The strong affirmation that the preparation of the sermon involves the deeper preparation of the preacher himself is made with great energy. Dr. Garvie is practical and clear in this part of the book, which will probably be the one most useful to the average minister. If only the average minister either can or will buy and use the book with its almost five hundred pages! We wish that Dr. Garvie had not used Latin and Greek words without translation or explanation, as he does on pages 68, 85 (lines 6, 7; the fault is avoided at the bottom of the same page), 86, and 344. The classics as well as Hebrew are "elective" in America, and our preachers cannot understand technical philological references as they could in a former day. On page 222, 1839 should be 1739. This book should go alongside Gladden's *Christian Pastor* in every thoroughly equipped ministerial library.

OZORA S. DAVIS

BOOKS RECEIVED

[The more important books in this list will be reviewed at length.]

ARMS, GOODSIL F. (ed.). *History of the William Taylor Self-Supporting Missions in South America*. New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1921. 263 pages. \$2.00.

A brief history, by a missionary of long service, of the self-supporting schools established by William Taylor in the late seventies along the west coast of South America, and of the work which sprang later from these centers.

ARMSTRONG, ROBERT CORNELL (ed.). *The Christian Movement in Japan, Korea, and Formosa*. Japan: The Methodist Publishing House, 1921. iv+430+cxxxiii pages. \$2.00.

The official yearbook for the year 1920, published by the Federation of Christian Missions, containing the customary reports, summaries, and statistics.

BARTON, WILLIAM E. *Safed and Keturah*. Boston: The Pilgrim Press, 1921. x+180 pages. \$1.25.

A collection of witty parables touching various phases of modern life.

BOREHAM, F. W. *The Home of the Echoes*. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1921. 208 pages. \$1.75.

A book of essays wonderfully illuminating the common things of life. The writer is an artist in his work. He has been called the "Preacher Essayist." One longing to preach and by preaching to touch life into being can find genuine inspiration here.

CAVALIERI, PIO FRANCHI DE. *Note Agiografiche* (Studi E Testi, 33). (Fasc. 6). Rome: Tipografia Poliglotta Vaticana, 1920. 225 pages.

A very useful edition, with extensive introductory and interpretative discussions, of texts of some less well-known martyrologies, including that of Carpus, Pamphilus, and Agathonice, the passion of Theodoret of Antioch, and a new recension of the martyrdom of Theodotus of Ancyra.

CHRISMAN, LEWIS H. *John Ruskin, Preacher, and Other Essays*. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1921. 183 pages. \$1.25.

Eleven essays of marked interpretative value. Professor Chrisman shows that some of our greatest preaching is done by those not ordained as clergymen. Ruskin was one of these lay preachers. Whittier, too, delivers a message of love.

GRAY, JOSEPH M. M. *The Contemporary Christ*. New York: The Methodist Book Concern, 1921. 321 pages. \$2.00.

A group of stimulating sermons by one of the leading Methodist preachers of the day, dealing with the fundamentals of Christian living and representing the author's ministry of recent months.

HARKNESS, GEORGIA E. *The Church and the Immigrant*. New York: George H. Doran, 1921. xii+110 pages. \$1.00.

Not a profound book but a splendid introduction to the problems facing the immigrants. The book presents the European background, and the significance of the same for American life, together with practical suggestions as to ways in which the active church can contribute to our immigrant neighbors.

HAYES, EDWARD CARY. *Sociology and Ethics*. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1921. viii+354 pages. \$3.00.

A book written with the conviction that scientific method has today come so completely to dominate the thinking of leaders of society that there is need for an ethics which shall derive its conclusions from critical observation and analysis, rather than from conventional and a prior maxims. Social science furnishes the means for determining ethical values.

HORSCH, JOHN. *Modern Religious Liberalism*. Scottsdale, Pa.: Fundamental Truth Depot, 1921. 331 pages.

An elaborate survey, with copious quotations from various modern writers, with the purpose of showing that "liberalistic" theological views are destructive of religious faith.

JAEGER, VERNERUS (ed.). *Gregorii Nysseni Opera*. Vol. I. *Contra Eunomium Libri*. Berlin: Weidmann, 1921. x+391 pages.

The initial volume of a much needed critical edition of the works of this church father. The editor, who is a competent scholar, presents not only a critically reconstructed text but cites extensively in a critical apparatus the variant readings of the manuscripts. The absence of an introductory discussion regarding the textual evidence available, and other topics of kindred interest, seems unfortunate.

KEITH, A. BERRIEDALE. *The Karma-Mimamsa*. (The Heritage of India Series.) Calcutta: The Association Press, 1921. 112 pages.

A careful and illuminating treatment of the philosophy of duty and of the sacrificial system which has controlled the orthodox twice-born castes of India.

KINGSBURY, F., and PHILLIPS, G. E. *Hymns of the Tamil Śaivite Saints*. (The Heritage of India Series.) Calcutta: Association Press, 1921. 132 pages.

Translations of the poetry of devotion of Tamil Śaivism selected from four of the most honored writers.

LATTEY, REV. CUTHBERT, and KEATING, REV. JOSEPH. *The New Testament*. (Vol. III.) *St. Paul's Epistle to the Churches*. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1921. xiii+258 pages. \$2.50.

A new English translation by representative Catholic scholars. The letters of Paul are arranged in chronological order. The English text is attractively printed and is furnished with brief introduction and footnotes.

LEUBA, JAMES H. *The Belief in God and Immortality*. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1921. xxviii+333 pages. \$2.50.

A second edition of a careful statistical study intending to indicate to what extent these fundamental beliefs are held by various classes of intelligent persons.

LOETSCHER, FREDERICK WILLIAM (ed.). *Papers of the American Society of Church History*. (Second Series. Vol. VI.) New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1921. xxxvi+239 pages.

Papers delivered at the American Church History Society at its meeting, December, 1917. Notable among the number is a discussion of Christian work among the North American Indians in the eighteenth century, the Council of Constance, the Training of the Ministry in the United States before the establishment of Seminaries, and the recent activities of Catholic historians.

MERCER, SAMUEL A. B. *The Life and Growth of Israel*. Milwaukee: Morehouse Publishing Co., 1921. xvi+170 pages. \$1.75.

A short history of the Hebrews, intended for use in Sunday-schools and among laymen. It dispenses with technical details and emphasizes religious values.

MOWINCKEL, SIGMUND. *Der Knecht Jahwäs*. Giessen: Töpelmann, 1921. 69 pages. M. 3.

A presentation of a new theory as to the identity of the Servant of Yahweh in the Servant Songs, viz., that the servant in question is none other than the prophet Deutero-Isaiah himself.

PECK, GEORGE CLARKE. *Cross Lots and Other Essays*. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1921. 184 pages. \$1.25.

Fifteen essay sermons which keenly analyze life in its struggle with our complex relations and badly mixed ethics. The tenth essay "Say it with Flowers," makes one feel the pull of the larger ethics necessary for our day.

SAILER, T. H. P. *The Mission Study Class Leader*. New York: The Mission Education Movement, 1921. 194 pages. \$1.00.

A revised and enlarged edition of a work published by the same author in 1908, and designed especially for leaders who have already had some experience in dealing with mission study classes.

SANDERS, FRANK K. *Old Testament Prophecy*. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1921. viii+102 pages. \$1.25.

A very condensed presentation of the messages of the great prophets, intended for the use of students in colleges and Bible schools. It is almost too skeletal to be effective.

SIMPSON, REV. HUBERT L. *The Intention of His Soul*. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1921. xv+260 pages. \$2.00.

Twenty-six essay sermons of real literary merit which strike deep into the art of living. Preachers who wish to study how to reach thinking men should read this series.

SNOWDEN, JAMES H. *The Meaning of Education*. New York: The Abingdon Press, 1921. 122 pages. \$0.75.

A brief but scholarly summary of current educational psychology, very readable and to the point.

SWENSON, DAVID F. *Sören Kierkegaard* (Reprinted from Scandinavian Studies and Notes.) (Vol. VI, No. 1.) Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1921. 41 pages.

A well-written and appreciative sketch of the career and work of this vigorous and trenchant critic of conventional Christianity.

SYMPHERD, W. D. *The English Bible*. Newark, Delaware: The Craftsman of Rells, 1921. vi+547 pages. \$3.00.

The purpose of this book is to introduce the authorized version to students as a masterpiece of English Literature. It is printed in large, clear type, arranged according to paragraphs and, where fitting, in poetical form, and provided with very brief introductory notes. The author is well informed on the chronology of the literature and has succeeded remarkably well in his purpose.

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
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